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Abstract 
 
 In April 2016, in Basic Plan 2016, Japan produced what amounted to Japan’s first timetabled 
implementation of a series of space programs that are specifically designed to support a more proactive 
U.S.-Japan alliance role in maintaining a favorable balance of power with China and to more robustly defend 
Japan against North Korean ballistic missile threats. This policy represents a significant departure from a 
near 50-year history during which Japanese space activities were prevented from any involvement in 
national security. The policy is also the result of a long drawn out process of navigating complex 
interrelationships between external security threats, the U.S.-Japan alliance, and internal policymaking, 
involving intensive coordination between with Japanese political, bureaucratic, and industrial constituencies. 
 The workings of these interrelationships have largely remained unexamined and unexplained, especially 
in the most critical period 2008-2016 leading up to Basic Plan 2016. Debate on Japanese space policy so far 
has been mainly based on top-down models involving traditional macrotheoretical analytical frameworks 
used mainly to demonstrate how policy change evinces more fundamental continuity in Japan’s security 
strategy. Traditional microanalytical approaches have focused on how institutions resist change and 
challenges.  
 Yet the evidence gathered in this dissertation shows that in the period 2008-16 there were demonstrable 
and dynamic changes not only in the expression and objectives of Japanese space policy, but also in the 
institutional arrangements required to enact them. This dissertation seeks to demonstrate and delineate those 
changes and interrelationships. To accomplish those goals, this investigation employs the first use of 
Strategic Action Field theory (the SAF framework) to study and explain the transformation of Japanese 
space policy. The SAF framework is used to comprehensively analyze the logics of Japanese space policy 
and institutional change. It achieves this by analyzing how groups of stakeholders in both the sphere of 
international relationships and domestic players (politicians, ministries, institutions, etc.) dynamically 
interacted to produce Japan’s new policy and institutional arrangements. While uncovering the logics behind 
Japan’s policy, it also notes how progress in policymaking and implementation was forged by a group of 
experts who have helped push more policy coordination power into the Prime Minister’s Cabinet Office. 
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要旨 
戦略的行動理論を導入した 1969〜2016年の日本の宇宙政策進化における論理の究明 
 
 
宇宙基本計画（平成 28 4月 1日閣議決定）は、この政策は前の政策とは大きく違い、初めて、具体
的なスケジュールを設定し計画したというところに特徴が見られる。またその内容は、一つは日米
同盟の強化という点、そして中国を制約するため、また北朝鮮の弾道ミサイル脅威から日本を防衛
するという３つの重要な役割をもっている。 
 
この政策は、日本の宇宙活動が国家安全保障に関与していない 50年近くの歴史からみても飛躍的に
違いがある。そしてこの政策が決定する過程で、外部の安全保障上の脅威と、日米同盟の維持、内
政における政権と官僚との複雑な相互関係のバランスを考慮することは困難であった。 
 
現在に至るまで、この政策が決定されるにあたっての複雑な内部における相互関係について学術的
に具体的な枠組みを検証し説明されることがなかった。 
 
これにおいて、一般的に２つのアプローチが考えられる。 
 
一つは国際関係論によるアプローチであり、もう一つはミクロ理論である。双方ともに、なぜ日本
政策を根本的に変えることが困難なのかということ部分を論点として説明がなされるという傾向が
見られる 
 
この論文は、Strategic Action Field（戦略的活動フィールド）理論を導入した最初の試みとなっている。
SAF 理論の特筆する点は、国際機関、内閣、省庁、民間、市民、といった様々なレベルにおいて枠
組みをもち同時にそれら全てを包括できるロジックを持っていることである。 
 
最終的に、この論文では内閣府内部において少数の有識者と共に、関与する中央政府省庁との強い
対立を避けて、政策を打ち立てたことを結論づけている。 
 
 
キーワード：日本の宇宙開発政策、国際関係論、Strategic Action Field（戦略的活動フィールド）理論 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction: Japan’s Latest Space Policy and Analytical Implications 
 
Overview of Japan’s Basic Space Plan of 2016 
On April 1, 2016, the Office of National Space Policy (ONSP), released its Space Basic Plan (hereafter, 
Basic Plan 2016), which had been painstaking designed to finally precipitate in what is, arguably, Japan’s 
ever first fully-timetabled national security-oriented space program.1 Basic Plan 2016 focused and 
concentrated space policy as an important component of Japanese national security planning. It is possible 
to argue that it has been designed to be a comprehensive implementation of policies and programs 
adjusted for the challenges Japan faces in the 21st century – in a multipolar world in which Japan has been 
forced to tackle increasingly challenging regional security issues. Regarding alliance management and 
external balancing, Basic Plan 2016 explicitly supports the goal of advancing operational integration of 
space technologies and programs in the service of the U.S.-Japan security alliance. In terms of internal 
balancing, Basic Plan 2016 is backed by a Cabinet resolution, and thus supported by the full political 
weight of the second administration of Prime Minister Shinzō Abe.  
 Overall, Basic Plan 2016 reflected the goals of Japan’s first National Security Strategy (NSS) 
published by the National Security Council (NSC) established in 2013 that sought to recognize outer 
space as a strategic domain, folding it into an essential component of the foreign policy and security 
doctrine of the second Abe administration.2 Basic Plan 2016 also openly stated that Japan must actively 
develop a national security space program with the utilization of outer space in tune with the new NSS, 
including use of space technologies and their development by the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF 
under the Ministry of Defense, or MOD) for national security purposes.  
 Basic Plan 2016 focused on security components that reflect the new and openly acknowledged role 
of space technologies in national security. Briefly, the plan focused on: a commitment to gradually 
doubling the number of satellites in Japan’s Information Gathering Satellite (IGS) reconnaissance satellite 
constellation; developing a space-based component for maritime surveillance to play a role in a joint 
Japanese-U.S. Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) capability; boosting Japan’s communications, 
Positioning, Navigation and Timing (PNT) capabilities for national security purposes; bolstering Space 
Situational Awareness (SSA) capabilities, and; linking Japan’s space assets in the service of U.S. security 
strategy to support the allies’ deterrence capabilities.3 
                                                
1 See Uchū Kihon Keikaku (Heisei 28 Shigatsu Ichinichi Kakugi Kettei) [Space Basic Plan (2016, April 1, Cabinet 
Decision) at the Office of National Space Policy (ONSP), Cabinet Office, Government of Japan; the ONSP’s website 
contains all prior Basic Plans, decisions, resolutions and debates subsequently referred to in this article as coming from 
the ONSP or the Secretariat for Space Headquarters. For a specific analysis of recent Basic Plans, see Yoshinori Komiya, 
Director-General, Office of National Space Policy, Cabinet Office, Japan, “Basic Plan on Space Policy Implementation 
Schedule (Revised FY2015),” presentation to the International Symposium on Ensuring Stable Use of Outer Space, 
Tokyo, 3 March 2016.  
2 National Security Strategy, 17 December 2013. 
3 MDA is defined by the International Maritime Organization as the effective understanding of anything associated with 
the maritime domain that could impact the security, safety, economy, or environment. The maritime domain is defined as 
all areas and things of, on, under, relating to, adjacent to, or bordering on a sea, ocean, or other navigable waterway, 
including all maritime-related activities, infrastructure, people, cargo, and vessels and other conveyances. MDA is 
therefore the effective understanding of anything associated with the maritime domain that could impact security, safety, 
economy, or environment. Space capabilities are an important element of MDA, including space-based radar imaging and 
surveillance, to track and or/identify maritime objects. SSA refers to the ability to view, understand and predict the 
physical location of natural and manmade objects in orbit around the Earth, with the objective of avoiding collisions. ISR 
is the coordinated and integrated acquisition, processing and provision of timely, accurate, relevant, coherent and assured 
information and intelligence to support military activities involving land, sea, air and orbital-based sensors. ISR 
  10 
 Basic Plan 2016 can also be seen as part of an explicit effort to support the U.S. “rebalance” through 
the revision of the U.S.-Japan Guidelines for Defense Cooperation, which, explicitly emphasize the 
promotion of integration of national security-related space projects.4 According to the Guidelines, the 
SDF and the U.S. are able to cooperate and to contribute to whole-of-government efforts in utilizing outer 
space as outlined above in such areas as MDA; space-based ballistic missile defense (BMD) early 
warning (EW); intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); PNT; SSA; meteorological 
observation; command, control, and communications; and ensuring the resiliency of space systems.  
 Further: “In cases where their space systems are threatened, the Self-Defense Forces and the United 
States Armed Forces will cooperate, as appropriate, in mitigating risk and preventing damage. If damage 
occurs, they will cooperate, as appropriate, in reconstituting relevant capabilities.”5 Additionally, the 
Guidelines can be seen in the context of the Abe administration’s broader security reforms to date, 
showing space activities to be a major new operational plank of Japan’s regional security strategy.6 
 
Major Programs 
Under Basic Plan 2016, Japan’s space program began actively advancing a series of strategically 
important programs in pursuit of this new paradigm. First, regarding PNT services, Japan will deploy its 
“full” seven-satellite Quasi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS) constellation to serve as a regional PNT 
system specifically to complement the Global Positioning System (GPS) of the U.S. Department of 
Defense (DOD). Second, Japan committed to delivering an operational SSA system by mid-2018 
involving cooperation between the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA, Japan’s rough 
equivalent of NASA) and the MOD, with support from the Cabinet Office and the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MOFA).7  
                                                                                                                                                        
encompasses multiple activities related to the planning and operation of systems that collect, process, and disseminate 
data in support of current and future military operations. (See Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) in the Department of 
Defense, Department of Defense DIRECTIVE NUMBER 2005.02E, 31 March 2015; “Space Situational Awareness” 
Space Security Foundation; Report to the Subcommittee on Air and Land Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House 
of Representatives — General Accounting Office, 2008-03-15, 23 April 2008. 
4 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan, Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee, A Stronger Alliance for a 
More Dynamic Security Environment: The New Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation, 27 April 2015, p. 4.  
5 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan, The Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation, 27 April 2015, p. 21. 
6 These include the NSS and NSC in December 2013; revisions of the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) 
and Mid-Term Defense Program (MTDP) in the same month; passing a State Secrecy Law, again in the same month; 
adoption of the Three Principles of Defense Equipment Transfers in April 2014; and a revised Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) Charter in February 2015 allowing for the transfer of aid to foreign militaries if used for humanitarian 
and disaster relief purposes; In 2016 several laws came into effect: The Law on Response to Contingencies, enabling 
Japan’s exercise of the right of collective self-defense in scenarios where an attack on another state in a close relationship 
with Japan poses a clear danger to overturning the Japanese people’s right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, 
where there is no other appropriate means to repel the attack, and where the use of force is restricted to the minimum 
necessary to repel the attack; and the Law to Ensure Security in Contingencies Significantly Affecting Japan, replacing 
the 1999 Regional Contingencies Law and designed to boost Japanese non-combat logistical support for the US and now 
other states regionally and even globally; the International Peace Support Law, removing the need for Japan to enact 
separate laws for each SDF dispatch in order to provide logistical support to multinational forces; and revisions to the 
International Peace Cooperation Law, enabling the SDF during UN Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) to use force in 
pursuing certain duties rather than solely for the defense of SDF personnel. 
7 Space Situational Awareness (SSA) refers to the ability to view, understand and predict the physical location of natural 
and manmade objects in orbit around the Earth, with the objective of avoiding collisions. SSA has become a prominent 
concern for both military and commercial systems, largely due to increasing military reliance on a range of space assets. 
Anti-satellite (ASAT) testing by China in 2007 and the 2009 collision of a non-operational Russian satellite with an 
operational Iridium satellite also raised concerns (Secure Word Foundation, 2014). 
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 The MOD’s involvement is significant because for the first time the SDF has become directly 
involved with SSA, which for decades had been controlled by civilian authorities.8 Indeed, SSA has 
become strategically important for the U.S., which is anxious to monitor Chinese space activities, 
particularly the potential development of anti-satellite (ASAT) technologies. Behind this, improving SSA 
is an important plank in the environmental monitoring of orbital debris, a major global commons issue 
that will be discussed in Chapter 4. Then, in order to monitor Chinese and North Korean military 
activities, particularly North Korean missile bases, and its Punggye-ri Nuclear Test Site, Japan is to 
considerably increase the number of satellites in its IGS fleet, long restricted to a nominal constellation of 
two optical and two radar satellites (and spares).  
 To support the doubling of the IGS fleet, JAXA has been tasked with building data relay satellites 
needed to cope with new data handling requirements. Also, the MOD is to fly an experimental BMD EW 
sensor on a dual-use Earth observation (EO)/ reconnaissance satellite developed by JAXA.9 Japan is now 
seriously considering developing this technology, which would, if deployed, represent a major advance in 
Japan’s BMD capabilities, and perhaps could even be used as a deterrent or forward shield for the U.S. to 
counter trans-Pacific medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) and ICBMs.10 
 Not least, JAXA has also engaged in developing a series of dual-use space programs. One, for 
example, is the SLATS (Super Low Altitude Test Satellite, subsequently named Tsubame) program, in 
which maneuverable reconnaissance satellites can “dip” deeper into lower orbits to capture higher 
resolution images. A second is the development of small satellites that can be built and launched quickly 
by plane or by the Epsilon rocket for tactical reconnaissance purposes.11 By November 2016, the Cabinet 
Satellite Information Center (CSIC) in the Prime Minister’s Cabinet Secretariat, which is in charge of the 
IGS constellation, announced that it planned research into the capability to quick-launch sub-100 kg, 
reconnaissance satellites to supplement the IGS constellation in times of emergency or crisis, as it put it.12 
 It should be noted that all these dual-use or direct-use national security space programs are to be 
funded on top of a range of long-established civil-use and scientific missions, including EO, 
oceanography and climate change observation and monitoring programs, communications and 
broadcasting satellites, ongoing participation in the International Space Station (ISS), continued 
development of the Epsilon solid-fueled launch vehicle, the powerful new H-III launch vehicle (the 
successor to today’s H-IIA), and a plethora of extant programs that have preoccupied Japan’s space 
development subgovernment implementation agencies to date.  
 
 
                                                
8 The MOD requested ¥1.4 billion for the fiscal year beginning April 2017 to start preparations; see Bōeishō Heisei 29 
Nendo Yosan Yōkyū no Gaiyō [Outline of the Ministry of Defense Budget Request for 2017] p. 11. 
9 For the purpose of this dissertation, dual-use space technology, in the case of Japan, is technology that can be used for 
both peaceful and defensive military purposes, and for the latter, includes the use of space for military purposes in the 
pursuit of limited collective self-defense (CSD).  
10 Paul Kallender-Umezu, “Profile: Hiroshi Imazu, former Chairman, Space Policy Committee, Liberal Democratic Party 
of Japan,” Space News, 27 October 2014. 
11 SLATS was successfully launched on 23 December 2017, see Kendall Russell, “JAXA Experiments with New 
Satellite in Super Low Earth Orbit,” Satellite Today, 29 December 2017, 
http://www.satellitetoday.com/launch/2017/12/29/jaxa-successfully-launches-two-earth-observation-satellites/. 
12 「短期打上型小型衛星システムの実証研究について 平成２８年１１月７日 内閣衛星情報センタ」[Tanki 
Uchiage Kogata Satellite System no Jisshō Kenkyu ni Tsuite, Heisei 28 Nen 11 Gatsu, Nanoka Naikaku Eisei ō Senta] 
[Regarding Empirical Research into the Use of Temporary Use Small Satellites, November 7, 2016, Cabinet Satellite 
Intelligence Center.] The tiny satellites are to be capable of one meter resolution or better, i.e. mount sensors (cameras) 
with the ability to determine shapes that have a cross-section of about a meter. 
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Dual-Use Means Paramilitary or National Security Use 
Japan’s commitment to delivering the new space capabilities outlined in Basic Plan 2016 is demonstrated 
by its ability to devote growing budgetary resources to these dual-use and direct-use national 
security-related programs. This fundamental change is made possible due to the dual-use justification of 
the space budget allowing for the leveraging and effective virement of funds into military-applicable 
technologies, even if these expenditures are not officially counted as part of the defense budget.  
 The dual-use nature of so many of the individual assets means that the more direct national 
security-use space program outlined in Basic Plan 2016 is inherently disaggregated among a series of 
players, programs and technologies. Under Japan’s budgeting and program structure, a basket of 
ministries control development programs that, while not formally for exclusively military use, can be 
used for national security purposes. In other words, a substantial part of Japan’s space program could be 
described as paramilitary, or in the term commonly used for the employment of space technologies for 
both non-military and military use, dual-use.   
 To support this framework, in fiscal 2015, Japan spent around ¥595 billion (roughly US$5.9 billion) 
on space-related programs, of which ¥245 billion has been devoted to BMD and ¥352 billion on the 
non-BMD space general space activities budget. If all the projects that can be used for national security 
purposes either directly (as in the case of IGS), or indirectly (such as with QZSS and a basket of EO 
satellite programs for example) are included, it is possible to say that the combined total national 
security-use (direct military use/involvement) and dual-use portion of Japan’s space program accounts for 
between 35-40 percent of the national space development budget.  
 Further, following pressure from the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), Japan may – although this is 
possible rather than probable – eventually be able to raise its national space development budget from the 
current ¥350 billion level to around ¥500 billion annually to accommodate the development of these and 
future programs. Further, in the wings, Japan now considering the development of space-based EW, and 
potentially, space-based electronic intelligence (ELINT) and space-based signals intelligence (SIGINT) 
capabilities.13 
 
Space Policy and Internal & External Balancing 
To use the terminology of international relations paradigms, in terms of internal balancing, the major 
programs highlighted in Basic Plan 2016 represented the conclusion of a long series of bureaucratic 
coordination issues over ministerial roles, budgets, policy and leadership initiatives that rumbled on for 
the best part of fifteen years. These activities have involved, broadly speaking, the gradual assumption of 
power of the Prime Minister’s Cabinet Office (Kantei) over individual ministries, most notably the 
Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT), which, especially from 2003, 
controlled the lion’s share of Japan’s space development budget, and was anxious to preserve its 
independence in policymaking and budgeting.  
 In terms of external balancing, Japan has now formulated a new multilateral approach that at the 
                                                
13 Naikakufu Uchū Senryakushitsu, Uchū Kankei Yosan ni Tsuite, Heisei 26 Nendo Hosei Oyobi Heisei 27 Nendo Uchū 
Kankei Yosan an ni Tsuite, January 2015 [Prime Minister’s Office, Strategic Headquarters for Space Policy, Regarding 
the Space Development Budget for 2015 and 2016]; Senryakushitsu, Uchū Kankei Yosan ni Tsuite Heisei 27 Nendo 
Gaisan Yōkyū ni Tsuite, September 2014 [Strategic Headquarters for Space Policy, Regarding the Space Development 
Budget Request for 2016]; Ministry of Defense, Defense Programs and Budget of Japan Overview of FY2015 Budget, 
p.14. 
  13 
same time deeply synchronizes with Japan’s overall national security policy. Most fundamentally, 
however, following a combination of increased Japanese concern about North Korea’s ballistic missile 
and nuclear programs, and of the U.S. in particular of China’s motives, Basic Plan 2016 can be said to 
have anchored Japanese space policy as an important subset in the U.S.-Japan alliance partnership. 
 However, the term “balancing” is a shortcut that already makes a series of assumptions about not 
only Japan’s behavior and perception of the security threats it faces, but also the behavior of its neighbors. 
According to Balance of Power Theory, balancing usually refers to the use or adoption by the State of 
so-called hard military capabilities to defend itself, or to deter or to constrain actions by a more powerful 
state. By adopting the concept of balancing, the assumption can be made that Japan has adopted, to some 
level, realist logic in its national security strategy.14  
 With this in mind, then, the policies and programs outlined in Basic Plan 2016 can be characterized 
as qualitatively and quantitatively different from recent practice. Until 2008, uniquely in the world, 
Japanese space policy was wedded to a 1969 Peaceful Purposes Resolution (PPR) that appeared to strictly 
limit use of space by the SDF.15 In this respect, Basic Plan 2016 seems to be in rather stark contrast with 
Japan’s historical stance and a range of concomitant deep-seated legal and normative constraints.  
 Indeed, from 1969 until 2008, the PPR was the founding principal of Japanese space development 
and policy. It articulated an unequivocal commitment to “peaceful only, nonmilitary development” that 
was far beyond the provisions of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST), which generally allows for the 
“peaceful” use of space, defined as the “nonaggressive” use of military technologies.16  
 Against this, it is also equally possible using a constructivist or liberal-type framework, for example, 
to argue and show how minimalist, or at least gradualist Japan’s change in space policy and technological 
development has been. For example, many programs that could have been taken over for direct military 
                                                
14 For the classic discussion of balancing, see Kenneth N. Waltz, Realism and International Politics (New York: 
Routledge, 2008), p. 137. Balancing encompasses the actions that a particular state or group of states take in order to 
equalize the odds against more powerful states; that is to make it more difficult and hence less likely for powerful states 
to exert their military advantage over the weaker ones. 
15 See Waga Kuni ni okeru Uchū no Kaihatsu Oyobi Riyō no Kihon ni kan suru Ketsugi [Resolution Concerning Japan’s 
Basic Development and Utilization of Space, (Plenary Session of the House of Representatives, 5 May 1969); and also 
Heiwa’ to iu Go no Imi ni kan suru Nihonkoku no Kokumu Daijin no Genmei (1968 Nen Dai 61 Kokkai Kagaku Gijutsū 
Shinkjō Taisaku Tokubetsu Iinkai Giroku) [Declaration of Japan’s Minister of State Concerning the Term ‘Peace,’ 
(Minutes of the Special Committee on Science and Technology Promotion Policy, 61st Diet, 1968. For background, see 
Setsuko Aoki, “Tekihō na Uchū Gunji Riyō Kettei Kijūn toshite no Kokkai Ketsugi no Yūyōsei” [The Significance of the 
Diet Resolution in the Legitimate Standards for the Weaponization of Outer Space], Sōgō Seisakugaku Working Paper 
Series, No. 68, Keio University, April 2005, esp. pp. 5–6, 16–22; and also, Setsuko Aoki, “Military Uses of Outer Space: 
Law and Policy in Japan,” International Symposium on Space Technology and Science Paper 2004-r-32, 2004, pp. 1-6. 
16 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon 
and Other Celestial Bodies, Office for Outer Space Affairs, Treaties and Principles. The treaty was opened for signature 
in the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union on 27 January 1967, and entered into force on 10 October 
1967. As of September 2015, 104 countries are parties to the treaty, while another 24 have signed the treaty but have not 
completed ratification. The Republic of China (Taiwan), which is currently only recognized by 21 UN member states, 
ratified the treaty prior to the United Nations General Assembly's vote to transfer China's seat to the People's Republic of 
China (PRC) in 1971. The OST prohibits states party to the treaty from placing weapons of mass destruction in orbit of 
Earth, installing them on the Moon or any other celestial body, or otherwise stationing them in outer space (i.e. in orbit). 
It also exclusively limits the use of the Moon and other celestial bodies to peaceful purposes and prohibits their use for 
testing weapons of any kind, conducting military maneuvers, or establishing military bases, installations, and 
fortifications (Article IV). United Nations, United Nations Treaties and Principles on Outer Space, ST/SPACE/11 (New 
York: United Nations, 2002); and for the status of those treaties and agreements across countries, see also United Nations, 
United Nations Treaties and Principles on Outer Space and Other Related General Assembly 
Resolutions—Addendum—Status of International Agreements Relating to Activities in Outer Space as of 1 January 2007, 
ST/ SPACE/11/Rev.1/Add.1/Rev.1. For general information, see the official website of the UN Office for Outer Space 
Affairs. 
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use by the SDF are in fact buried in dual-use paramilitary programs. And the vast majority of those 
dual-use programs remain under the control of MEXT, a ministry that until very recently was avowedly 
culturally, institutionally and legally expressly against promoting any military use of space. 
 The analytical frameworks that emphasise this type of argument stem from a recognition of the 
extreme pacifism and idealism evinced in the PPR that governed Japanese space policy for nearly forty 
years. 17  It is possible, especially reading the somewhat florid and vague language of the 1996 
Fundamental Plan, for example, to point to the essential idealism of Japanese space policy at the time, as 
noted above.18  
 Less altruistically, but nonetheless stressing how reluctant Japan has been, overall, to forge a national 
security role for space technologies, others have cast the growing role of a national security element in 
Japan’s space program as a deeply modulated response that cautiously folds its space technologies into 
Japan’s traditional broad and multilayered security strategy.19 For now, however, simply speaking, in 
Basic Plan 2016, the use of outer space as a national security program can be seen as designed to 
contribute to the defense of Japan facing increasingly troublesome regional security issues.  
 
Problems of Interpretation- Analytical Implications 
As has been sketched in outline above, forming an understanding of Basic Plan 2016 both the context of 
space policy transition, institutional roles, and the use of outer space’s relationship with national security 
immediately opens up the possibility of discussion of a whole range of interpretations. Establishing the 
historical, normative and institutional context for examining or measuring the extent or significance of 
space policy change is also, then, therefore a basic prerequisite in making sense of the significance of the 
changes.  
 As a prelude to more complex and contextual discussions, it is important here, however, to note the 
following. As will be shown in Chapter 5, the PPR was self-consciously and publicly held up as a 
demonstration of Japan’s commitment to Article 9 of the 1946 Constitution not to rearm. Further, the 
non-participation of the SDF in space activities was supported by a complex institutional framework 
designed to ensure this – either directly, through policy instruments – or indirectly, through 
disaggregation and the competitive division of responsibilities between civilian ministries and 
subgovernment implementation organizations. And it is from this context that prior discussions of 
Japanese space policy change have been analyzed. But, in turn, those studies have also failed to account 
                                                
17 Oros (2008), pp. 122-148; Oros (2007), pp. 29-48, 35, 40; Columba Peoples, “A Normal Space Power? Understanding 
‘Security’ in Japan’s Space Policy Discourse,” Space Policy, Vol. 29, No. 2 (2013), pp. 135-143; Johnson-Freese and 
Gatling (2004), pp. 538-552; Suzuki (2007); Aoki (2009); Moltz (2012), pp. 43, 63. For views arguing for Japanese 
military intent, see Hughes (2009), pp. 48-50; Pekkanen & Kallender-Umezu (2010); Kallender-Umezu (2013), pp. 
28-34; Christopher W. Hughes, “Japan, Ballistic Missile Defence and Remilitarisation,” Space Policy, Vol. 29, No. 2 
(May 2013), pp. 128-134; Satoru Ikeuchi, Uchū Kaihatsu wa Heiwa no Tame: Uchū no Gunjika ni Noridashita Nihon 
(Tokyo: Kamogawa Shuppan, 2015), pp. 79-134. 
18 See Space Activities Commission (SAC), Fundamental Policy of Japan’s Space Activities (Provisional Translation), 
revised 24 January 1996, available online at www.mext.go.jp, pp. 1-17. For a discussion of these policies, see Pekkanen 
& Kallender-Umezu (2010), pp. 34-5.  
19 Kallender-Umezu (2013), pp. 28-34; Peoples (2013), pp.135-143. This builds on similar work emphasizing continuity 
in other scholarship, for example, Johnson-Freese & Gatling (2004), pp. 538-552, p. 542. The IGS were actually 
categorized as “crisis management satellites” with both civilian and military purposes so as not to fall foul of the PPP; see 
Kazuto Suzuki (2007); Setsuko Aoki, “Japanese Perspectives on Space Security” in John M. Lodgson and James Clay 
Moltz (eds.) Collective Security in Space: Asian Perspectives (Washington, DC: The George Washington University 
Space Policy Institute, 2008); Aoki (2009), pp. 363-438; Moltz (2012), pp. 43, 63. 
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for the qualitative and quantitative paramilitarization of space technologies and the very neorealist 
language of Basic Plan 2016. 
  
Some Neorealist Perspectives 
Is Japan docking with its destiny of becoming a “normal” power? A neorealist approach may well 
proceed with an analysis along the lines that Japan, facing increasingly worrying security challenges from 
North Korea and China, would be expected to take measures to strengthen its national security 
capabilities directly through increasing its military power, and indirectly through various elements of 
diplomatic engagement, alliance building, and soft power.  
 In this context, space policy change, the abandonment of the PPR and Basic Plan 2016 seem entirely 
logical. From such a perspective, the PPR had effectively disabled the generation of meaningful 
space-based policy responses to meet Japan’s increasing security dilemma primarily, perhaps, caused by 
the emergence, first, of North Korea’s ballistic missile program, then its growing nuclear weapons 
capabilities, and, more recently, the growing assertiveness of China. Basic Plan 2016 now demonstrates 
that Japan is behaving “normally” …and that the brakes are off. 
 Before going into this debate into a little more detail, it is useful first to touch a little more on some 
of the accepted prior scholarship and debates on discussions of Japanese space policy to date. It is 
generally accepted by most domestic policy analysts, and spelled out in a series of Fundamental Plans 
from the late 1960s until 1996, that under the PPR, Japanese space development and policy was 
positioned as status enhancing – an industrial “catch-up” strategy that allowed Japan to join the small 
club of advanced spacefaring nations in a unique way, because of the PPR.20  
 In short, following this type of analytical narrative, Basic Plan 2016 can be seen as one logical 
product of the Basic Law, which scrapped the PPR and provided Japan with a legal basis to pursue the use 
of defensive military space, and put the Cabinet Office in the position to coordinate space policy goals 
under the approval of the prime minister.  
 Again, context is important. Basic Plan 2016 is not the first attempt to achieve such goals. Various 
attempts to better coordinate space policy and control interministerial competition were then attempted by 
the Cabinet Office, resulting in Basic Plan 1 (2009) and Basic Plan 2 (2013), both of which met with 
mixed success in terms of building an administrative and budgeting framework to implement the 
objectives of the Basic Law. But then again, it is possible to see new players coming in in a “rush” in 
recent years.  
 For example, under the NSC’s directive, the MOD, long institutionally reluctant to participate in 
space development, quickly released its own revised Fundamental Plan, which began the task of 
integrating its space policy with MEXT – with which the MOD shared almost no experience in terms of 
developing space programs.21 Also, in assessing Basic Plan 2016, it is important to note that JAXA was 
legally committed to “peaceful only” space development all the way up until 2012, and that the MOD 
                                                
20 This view of the PPR is generally accepted both by mainstream scholars and specialists, both in Japan and abroad. The 
foundational English language texts commenting on the PPR include Setsuko Aoki, “Current Status and Recent 
Developments in Japan’s National Space Law and its Relevance to Pacific Rim Space Law and Activities,” Journal of 
Space Law 35, No. 1 (2009), pp. 363-438; Paul Kallender-Umezu “Enacting Japan's Basic Law for space activities: 
Revolution or evolution?’ Space Policy, Vol. 29, No. 1, (February 2013), pp. 28-34; Kazuto Suzuki, “Administrative 
Reforms and the Policy Logics of Japanese Space Policy,” Space Policy, Vol. 21, No.1 (2005), pp. 11-19. 
21 Uchū Kaihatsu Riyō ni kan suru Kihon Hōshin ni tsuite (An) [Basic Policy Regarding Space Policy Budget 
(Provisional)] Ministry of Defense.  
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only released its first military space policy document in 2009. So, specifically, under the NSC and under 
the Abe administration, it is possible to construct a narrative on how space policy transformation has 
accelerated since 2013. The specific actions of JAXA and MOD for example, require context and 
explanation. So do, as will be explained, the direct interventions of conservative politicians, pressure from 
industry, and – not least – the U.S.   
 As noted, the developments in space policy since 2012 come hand-in-hand with a new security 
architecture and policies being implemented by the second Abe administration. From being totally 
excluded from national security or military involvement as late as 2008, space policy and technology is 
moving to become a major plank of defense and alliance security policy. Concomitantly, since December 
2013 and the first NSS, Japan appears to have made some rapid strides in reestablishing a new security 
posture for the coming decade, most recently with the legislation to allow Japan some limited rights of 
collective self-defense (CSD), although this has proven contested and unpopular with much of the 
Japanese public, which does not (fully) understand the need for it.22 
 A brief summary of different approaches by international relations experts and security scholars on 
what could be called the “Abe Doctrine” (roughly defined as a set of principles to adjust Japan’s security 
policy to balance against the feeling of growing regional insecurity and to accommodate the U.S. “pivot” 
to Asia) show that analysts, using through their particular models and paradigms, can come to quite or 
very different conclusions even though, in assessing how qualitatively different Japanese space policy is 
compared to even recent prior practice, they are dealing with the same sets of facts.23  
For example, according to one recent study, Japanese space policy change, especially as announced in 
Basic Plan 3 and Basic Plan 2016 may represent the latest slash at the Yoshida Doctrine, whose impending 
death has been painstakingly achieved through a gradualist, multi-decade process of “salami slicing” away 
at prior military constraints.  
According to this line of argument, since 2013, Japan has entered a new paradigm under the revisionist 
policies of the Abe government, which amounts to a new shift that seeks to assert Japan’s normal role as 
regional and global power. One text sees the Abe government as driven by a policy of “resentful realism.” 
While this analysis may be appropriate to the internal logic of the framework used, it is difficult to see how 
Basic Plan 2016 is “resentfully realist,” a term which lacks meaning in the context of space policy 
objectives.24   
 
 
                                                
22 Paul Kallender-Umezu, “Japan Pursues Rearmament, Despite Opposition,” Defense News, 14 June 2015. 
23 Christopher Hughes, Japan’s Foreign Policy and Security Policy under the ‘Abe Doctrine: New Dynamism of Dead 
End? (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015). Hughes believes that the Abe Doctrine is a radical departure from the 
Yoshida Doctrine, which Hughes says was based on three components: a “low” military posture; a security treaty, and 
later alliance, with the U.S., with the caveat that Japan would heavily hedge so as to extricate itself when possible from 
commitments to the U.S., while focusing on economic revival and growth, and a gentle, quiet reintegration of Japan into 
the East Asia region, including engagement with China. By contrast, Abe, in line with the objectives of Nobusuke Kishi 
(former Prime Minister and grandfather of Abe) wants, in the opinion of Hughes, to restore Japan to great power status, 
including a leadership role in Asia, and is pushing to allow Japan to use military power for national security interests. For 
Hughes, further, a key element of the Abe Doctrine is the notion of breaking free from the postwar regime, both 
domestically and internationally, which Abe believes is rooted in Japan’s defeat in World War II. In this view (the view 
of Abe), the Yoshida doctrine is a regime of defeat. Until the postwar regime is cast off, Japan cannot be an autonomous 
great power; and until the Yoshida doctrine is shaken off, Japan cannot take its rightful place alongside the U.S. and other 
advanced democracies. 
24 Christopher W. Hughes, Japan’s Reemergence as a “Normal” Military Power (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2004); Japan’s Remilitarization (New York: Routledge, 2009); Hughes (2015). 
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Dealing with Dual-Use 
It is also important to understand the analytical importance of space technology’s inherent dual-use nature. 
On top of this, it is also important to understand the attitude of policymakers and institutions to dual-use 
applications. Of course, much of space technology has very potent tactical and strategic military 
applications.25 Rockets, particularly solid-fueled versions such as the Epsilon, can be repurposed into 
ballistic missiles. EO satellites used for crop monitoring or land measurement can be used for 
reconnaissance, as is currently proposed with the use of the JAXA’s Advanced Land Observing 
Satellite-2 (ALOS-2/Daichi) as part of a new space-based reconnaissance architecture where many of 
Japan’s EO satellites will play indirect, and in more and more cases, direct national security-related roles, 
as outlined in Basic Plan 2016.26 
From a neorealist point of view, the inclusion of space technologies in national security issues can be 
stretched to have special significance for Japan because space technologies can provide a potentially 
potent mix of force multiplying and strategic capabilities for nations that wield them.  
Following this line of argument, taking into account the influence of, for example, powerful domestic 
industrial and commercial lobbying, exogenous security pressures (such as missile and nuclear tests by 
North Korea, or, since 2010, paramilitarized mass incursions by Chinese fishing fleets into Japanese 
territorial waters), and elite decision-making models, in 2010 I argued that, measured in terms of military 
potential, Japanese space technologies were already reaching the point where Japan could become a 
potent strategic space power.  
Rather similar to Japan’s status as a virtual nuclear weapons state, where Japan has had the 
technological means to weaponize its civilian nuclear power technologies, should a scenario develop in 
which Japan chose, or felt compelled to do so, it would be able to relatively quickly (within a few years, 
not within a decade) deploy a range of military space technologies. Behind that, I suggested that Japan’s 
space program could be viewed as a strategic hedge.27  
Taking this argument further, it is possible to argue that the pace and importance of the changes of 
Japan’s space policy transformation over the past twenty years, culminating in Basic Plan 2016, 
challenges the view of the essential continuity in Japanese security policy, or at least demonstrates greater 
Japanese resolve to overcome previous obstacles to adopting a more muscular security trajectory. In this, 
examining certain trends evident in Basic Plan 2016 is particularly analytically powerful to explaining the 
existence of a new security direction for Japan, because space-based capabilities provide the means to 
                                                
25 See especially Johnson-Freese, Space as a Strategic Asset (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), pp. 2-6, 
27-50, 82-140; Michael E. O’Hanlon, Neither Star Wars Nor Sanctuary: Constraining the Military Uses of Space 
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), pp. 1-28; and for the controversies over defining space weapons, 
see James Clay Moltz, The Politics of Space Security: Strategic Restraint and the Pursuit of National Interests (Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 2008), esp. p. 43. For fundamentals of military space operations and identification of 
general mission areas, as well as clear and practical explanations of military space concepts, see United States Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, Space Operations, Joint Publication 3-14, 6 January 2009, pp. ix–xi, II.1–II.10; and also U.S. Air Force 
Space Command (AFSPC), Strategic Master Plan FY06 and Beyond (Peterson AFB, CO: Air Force Space Command, 1 
October 2003), pp. 2, 17-33. 
26 See ‘Epsilon Launch Vehicle’ http://global.jaxa.jp/projects/rockets/epsilon/. The Epsilon’s payload capabilities, its 
ability to be prepped for launch and controlled by minimal staff, and overall design and performance philosophy arguably 
make it a ballistic missile prototype hiding in plain sight. However, the series of solid rockets developed by the Institute 
of Space and Astronautical Research (ISAS) from the 1960s onwards are commonly recognized as prototype ballistic 
missiles or at least have characteristics and capabilities that readily lend themselves to conversion, notably the M-3S-II, 
the J-1 and the M-V, the Epsilon’s predecessor. See Saadia Pekkanen & Paul Kallender-Umezu, From the Market to the 
Military in Space Policy (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press 2010), pp. 97-9, 108-113.  
27 This is the critical argument of Pekkanen & Kallender-Umezu (2010). 
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leverage advanced Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)/defense transformation-type technologies for 
qualitative advantage even within a constrained quantitative resource base.28  
It is quite possible to extend this argument yet further. From what could be termed as rather an 
extremist neorealist point of view, with the advent of Basic Plan 2016, Japan might even have begun to 
procure a plethora of advanced military space capabilities, or even that it has, or is, or will “boil off” the 
foam of hitherto masked strategic intent or hedge, so that space technologies will become overtly 
militarized if and when necessary, fulfilling the deeper strategic purpose that was always part of (if left 
unstated), decisions taken forty five years ago to embark on a national space program.  
Following this line of argument, a basket of programs promoted in Basic Plan 2016 can be seen as 
logical outcomes of previous technologies developed for inherently dual-use applications should the need 
arise. One example of this could be the IGS satellite fleet, consisting of electro-optical and synthetic 
aperture radar (SAR) technology originated in EO satellites developed for JAXA’s predecessor, the 
National Space Development Agency of Japan (NASDA). This program started out as a “multi-purpose” 
EO program, but is now a core part of Japan’s space-based ISR network whose central purpose is military 
reconnaissance.29  
In terms of viewing Japan’s space program as a disguised strategic hedge, the MDA functions are 
being developed from a series of JAXA developed civilian-scientific ALOS satellites. Among these 
ALOS-3, for example with already military-effective 80-cm resolution sensors, will also to host an 
experimental EW sensor developed by MOD. Can such developments be characterized as merely the 
logical extension of a long and carefully laid out plan? To deal with the burgeoning ISR data demands of 
building out Japan’s ISR infrastructure, JAXA is developing a satellite laser communications system 
based on the OICETS/Kirari test satellite and an advanced data relay satellite based on the Data Relay 
Test Satellite (DRTS/Kodama), both originally conceived as technology demonstration satellites for 
NASDA for “peaceful purposes-only” communications technologies research and development.30 Further, 
as noted, Japan is considering both space-based SIGINT and/or ELINT capabilities derived from prior 
civilian satellite technologies such as ETS-VIII program, despite already possessing an advanced 
land-based capability.31  
All of these systems can significantly support the SDF’s ability to respond to conventional threats. 
The QZSS system, supporting the Air Self-Defense Force’s (ASDF’s) use of Joint Direct Attack 
Munitions (JDAMs) to strike with pinpoint accuracy against an adversary’s missile bases, also opens up a 
                                                
28 Barry R. Posen, “Command of the Commons: The Military Foundations of US Hegemony,” International Security, 
Vol. 28, No. 1 (Summer 2003), pp. 12-14. 
29 For IGS development, see Pekkanen & Kallender-Umezu (2010), pp. 50, 63, 130-131, especially 136-138, 143-150, 
139-142, 147, 202-203, 240, 242. Also for a constructivist view on why the IGS constellation development fit into a norm 
of ‘reach, reconcile and reassure’ see Andrew Oros, Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity and the Evolution of Security 
Practice (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008), pp. 122-148; Andrew L. Oros, “Explaining Japan’s Tortured 
Course to Surveillance Satellites,” Review of Policy Research, Vol. 24, No. 1 (January 2007), pp. 29-48, 35, 40; Joan 
Johnson-Freese and Lance Gatling, “Security Implications of Japan’s Information Gathering Satellite (IGS) System,” 
Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Autumn 2004), pp. 538-552, in particular p. 542. The IGS were 
actually categorized as “crisis management satellites” with both civilian and military purposes so as not to fall foul of the 
PPP; see Kazuto Suzuki, “Space: Japan’s New Security Agenda,” RIPS Policy Perspectives No. 5, October 2007. 
30 For OICETS/Hikari, see Pekkanen & Kallender-Umezu (2010), pp. 87, 125-126, 153-155, 171, 241. For DRTS, see 
JAXA web page “Satellites and Spacecraft Data Relay Test Satellite "KODAMA" (DRTS)”; Pekkanen & 
Kallender-Umezu (2010), p. 105. 
31 Engineering Test Satellite (series developed by NASDA and JAXA). For ETS-VII, see JAXA, “Engineering Test 
Satellite VII “KIKU-7” (ETS-VII),” http://www.jaxa.jp/projects/sat/ets7/index_e.html. 
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range of means for Japan individually, but particularly in combination with the U.S., to look to negate 
many of China’s deterrent capabilities.  
Deeper still, through the ETS-VII/Orihime-Hikoboshi (“star-crossed lovers”) orbital maneuvering 
and space robotics program, Japan has already experimented with remote and computer-controlled 
technologies that convertible to co-orbital ASAT applications. It is notable that such technologies were 
conceived over twenty five years ago and tested, on orbit, in 1997, far in advance of the U.S., Russia or 
China. Thanks to ETS-VII, arguably, Japan possesses a range of technologies that can be repurposed for 
fighting an orbital space battle through applying to a wide range of small and microsatellite platforms 
through its tested ability to conduct approach and close proximity maneuvering and docking.32  
Yet further, the development of small “temporary” IGS-support optical satellites closely resembles in 
function the U.S. Air Force’s TacSat series, which will be capable of providing quickly available tactical 
ISR and communications capabilities. The Epsilon, if required, can play its own role as a fast-access 
multipurpose launch vehicle for this range of small satellites. Japan has also experimented with 
technologies (although currently mothballed) such as the robotic space plane Hypersonic Flight 
Experiment (HYFLEX), which, while only a testbed, has given Japan invaluable data on the performance 
characteristics needed to construct a vehicle similar to the USAF’s X-37B.33  
I argued in 2010 that it is useful to understand the reality of the range of technologies that Japan’s 
space program had developed prior to the Basic Law under the constraints of the PPR that had primed 
Japan for the capability of fairly rapid deployment of militarily useful technologies, should decisions be 
made to that end. It is also possible to assert that Japan’s already advanced status in launch vehicles 
augments its position as a recessed nuclear power, providing it with the ultimate potential for internal 
balancing. Japan’s political unwillingness to breach the Three Non-Nuclear Principles and to produce and 
possess nuclear weapons remains, but it is indisputable that the technological barriers in regard to the use 
outer space for a range of strategic military technologies certainly continue to lower.  
It is commonly recognized that Japan has had the technology to produce nuclear weapons from at 
least the 1970s. The U.S.’s Rumsfeld Commission concluded in 1998 that Japan’s J-I and M-V rocket 
programs, based on technologies designed in the 1980s, were readily convertible to ballistic missiles. The 
Commission compared the M-V rocket to the U.S. MX Peacekeeper ICBM. The Epsilon, as the M-V’s 
successor and one of the world’s most advanced solid fuel rockets, is an even more directly convertible 
ICBM that would be capable of mobile launch-on-demand, and reconfigurable to submarine launched 
ballistic missiles (SLBM).34 
                                                
32 In fact, Japan had a second potentially much more utility dual-use co-orbital program called SmartSat. See Pekkanen 
& Kallender-Umezu (2010), pp. 163, 167, 172, 210, 241. 
33 Formed in 2007, the Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) program is a joint initiative of several agencies within the 
U.S. DOD. The ORS Office’s development goals are “to rapidly deploy capabilities that are “good enough” to satisfy 
warfighter needs across the entire spectrum of operations, from peacetime though conflict,” according to the ORS website. 
Prosaically, this means ORS is tasked to provide quick-response tactical space-based capabilities to the military utilizing 
small satellites, such as the TacSat program and smaller launch vehicles, such as the Minotaur and the Raptor and 
SPARK, or Spaceborne Payload Assist Rocket (Super Strypi) air-launch rockets. Japan’s dual-use space programs share 
some similarities with these efforts. For the Minotaur and Raptor launch vehicles.  
See for ‘Agile Space Launch’ in www.aerospace.org at http://www.aerospace.org/2014/07/31/agile-space-launch/.  
 For the ORS webpage, please see: http://ors.csd.disa.mil/. For information about TacSats, information about 
individual satellites is dispersed among organizations. For an overview go to ‘Tactical Satellite Program’, Wikipedia, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tactical_Satellite_Program. For the Hypersonic Flight Experiment (HYFLEX), mounted on 
the J-1, see Pekkanen & Kallender-Umezu (2010), pp. 125, 195, 204-205. 
34 Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, 15 July 1998, 
http://fas.org/irp/threat/missile/rumsfeld/pt1_china.htm. 
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For those looking at forward-thinking strategic intent, a policy initiative by the Ministry of Economy 
Trade and Industry (METI) in 2007 is instructive. METI’s Space On Demand (SOD) program of that year 
was couched in the objective of investing in technologies to achieve shorter development times and 
promote improved functionality for all space systems, lowering development schedules for highly 
functional satellites in two-to three years for $30 million, a tenth of the price of their JAXA-developed 
antecedents. The SOD concept included, for example, quick-reaction launch vehicles (such as Epsilon 
and derivatives), or others that could launch from aircraft or submarines, as well as satellites that are 
reprogrammable on orbit. The overall similarity of SOD to the USAF’s Operationally Responsive Space 
(ORS) space program, including for example the USAF’s TacSat program, is striking – a fact noted by 
METI itself.35 
From an extremist neorealist viewpoint that assumes Japan’s space program was always a strategic 
recessed hedge, Basic Plan 2016 could be seen a big step forward toward Japan’s unfurling of its long 
held back and hidden full capability for using space technologies for traditional hard balancing.  
Reading history backwards, it is possible to construct a narrative that supports this line of argument. 
For example, Japan has conducted a series of dual-use technology tests that could serve for nuclear 
warhead reentry vehicles. One test used a Russian-built ICBM re-entry vehicle and service module 
derived from the OGCh Fractional Orbital Bombardment System and launched on the missile-convertible 
M-3SII. Fast forward to 2021 or so, and the credibility of any Japanese nuclear launch system would 
further be augmented by the meter-level accuracy of the QZSS system, assuming its survivability to cyber 
or kinetic ASAT attack. While admittedly far-fetched, Japan might then even look to deploy these 
recessed missile and warhead technologies as SLBMs on the Sōryū submarines of the Maritime 
Self-Defense Force (MSDF) that appear adaptable for mounting sea-launched missiles.36  
In totality, Japan’s advancement in space technologies could, in theory at least, enable it to edge 
toward all the key components of a latent nuclear delivery system for a second-strike force de frappe or 
tactical nuclear force. Such a capability would serve as a useful deterrent against North Korean and 
Chinese assets and fit with recent Japanese debates on the need for an autonomous strike capability, 
whether conventional or nuclear, to augment deterrence and U.S.-Japan cooperation.37 
Taking a more subtle view on things, it is possible to argue that Basic Plan 2016 might represent a 
utilitarian way for Japan to increase its external balancing power while avoiding a more traditional arms 
buildup. Even “low-key” paramilitary space assets built by JAXA flying dual-use EO missions can 
contribute to the force multiplier effect in battle and as a conflict-winning or warfighting ISR 
infrastructure. 
Behind this argument is the proposition that, due to the advantages of space technologies, military 
power perhaps should no longer be measured merely in terms of the classic “comprehensive national 
power” indicators of the size and numbers of military expenditure, armed forces and key weapons 
                                                
35 On Japan’s SOD initiative, see Norihiko Saeki, “COTS Policy & ‘Space on Demand’ in Japan,” Tokyo: METI, 29 
October 2007. The Operationally Responsive Space Office (ORS Office) is a joint initiative of several agencies within the 
U.S DoD from 2007. The ORS Office focuses on providing quick-response tactical space-based capabilities to the 
warfighting utilizing smaller satellites, such as TacSats and smaller launch vehicles. 
36 Franz-Stefan Gady, “Japan Launches 10th Advanced High-Tech Attack Sub,” The Diplomat, 09 November 2017, 
https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/japan-launches-10th-advanced-high-tech-attack-sub/. 
37 Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Jones, “Thinking the Unthinkable: Tokyo’s Nuclear Option,” Naval War College 
Review, Vol. 62, No. 3 (Summer 2009), pp. 69-74. 
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platforms, national population and Gross National Product (GNP).38 These traditional indicators remain 
important in determining defense choices and especially with regard to equipment procurement – and are 
now being addressed by the Abe administration’s increased defense expenditures. 
However, arguably, this concentration on the raw indicators of military power fails to fully consider 
how Japan might (or has the technological capacity to) radically shift its security stance by building a 
qualitative edge through space technologies.39 This technology-strategic approach, with space and its 
latent qualitative importance as a force multiplier, is pertinent in Japan’s case, given its well-known 
historical maxim of “rich nation, strong army,” recognizing that Japanese military capabilities may be 
vested in less readily overt but nevertheless highly transferable and potent dual-use civilian and 
paramilitary technologies and forces.40 
Thus, for an analyst looking for evidence that Japan beginning a stealthy rearmament process, 
Japanese space technology could be said to be “hiding” the military potential of recently established 
dual-use military space programs that are developed “in plain sight”. Following this logic, it is possible, 
perhaps, to say that Japan in the case of space has increasingly conformed to the full logic of realism and 
superseded the constrained stance of the Yoshida Doctrine: perceiving clearly North Korean and Chinese 
threats and even an emerging Sino-Japanese arms race in space; and is proactively responding through the 
build-up of its own array of space capabilities.  
Thus, Japan’s ISR, QZSS (GPS backup), SSA, MDA, BMD, and EW programs, and the 
augmentation of its recessed nuclear option and potential orbital warfare capabilities can be seen as 
internal balancing strategies for this “stealthy” rearmament, and through the close integration of these 
programs into U.S.-Japan alliance strategy, they can be cast in terms of representing external balancing 
that amounts to embracing U.S. containment of China.  
                                                
38 Robert Dujarric, “Shinzō Abe: Investing in the Past, Ignoring the Future,” The Diplomat, 25 July 2014. For specific 
trends in Japan’s defense expenditure and procurement, see Hughes (2015), pp. 36-37; Eric Heginbotham, “Japan’s 
Military Choices in a Resource Constrained Environment,” MIT Center for International Studies Working Paper (March 
2015), pp. 1-3. The MOD for fiscal 2015-2016 requested a 2.2 percent increase in the defense budget, which would bring 
it back to the levels of the late 1990s and mark the largest defense budget in the post-war period. See Bōeishō, Waga 
Kuni no Bōei to Yosan: Heisei 28 Nendo Gaisan Yōkyū no Gaiyō [Ministry of Defense, Defense Budget for 2016], 
August 2015. 
39 The NDPG will increase the destroyer fleet of the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) from forty-eight to fifty-four, 
including the addition of two further Aegis BMD-equipped destroyers to the existing four Kongō-class and two 
Atago-class vessels. The MSDF will further continue to procure four new 25DD Akizuki-class multi-mission destroyers, 
and two 27,000 ton 22/24DDH Izumo-class helicopter carriers embarking up to 14 helicopters, providing a very strong 
anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability and highly versatile naval assets. MSDF submarine capabilities are 
significantly increased, with the revised NDPG and MTDP continuing the 2010 NDPG’s build-up of the MSDF 
submarine fleet from sixteen to twenty-two boats, and the introduction of the Sōryū-class submarine platform that 
provides leading-edge technologies in air-independent and fuel-cell propulsion. The MSDF’s air fleet strengthened 
through the procurement of the P-1 with an 8,000-kilometre range capable of patrolling and ASW operations deep into 
the South China Sea. The revised NDPG and MTDP maintain the acquisition of forty-two F-35A fifth-generation fighters 
for the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF). The ASDF continues to procure the 6,500-kilometer range C-2 transport; Patriot 
Advanced Capability (PAC)-3 batteries for BMD; and is set to procure unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) to patrol Japan’s 
extensive coastline and remote islands. The Ground Self-Defense Force will create a 3,000-personnel unit akin to a 
marine corps for the retaking of remote islands, equipped with 52 amphibious armored personnel carriers and 17 MV-22 
Osprey aircraft. Japan Ministry of Defense, National Defense Program Guidelines for FY2014 and Beyond, 17 December 
2013. 
40 For the classic formulations of Japanese dual-use civilian-military technology, see Richard J. Samuels, Rich Nation, 
Strong Army: National Security and the Technological Transformation of Japan (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1994); and Michael E. Chinworth, Inside Japan’s Defense: Technology, Economics and Strategy (Washington, D.C.: 
Brassey’s US, 1992). On Japan’s use of “paramilitary” force to bolster Japan’s armed forces, see Richard J. Samuels, 
‘“New Fighting Power!”: Japan’s Growing Maritime Capabilities and East Asian Security,” International Security, Vol. 
32, No. 3 (Winter 2007/2008), pp. 84-112.  
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To push such neorealist-type analysis to an extreme end-point, it can also be argued that Japan’s 
incorporation of space policy into national security policy could even signify the beginnings of, or a 
possible step towards a broader Asia-Pacific arms race. 
However, these kind of narratives also immediately throw up quite obvious problems. Overall, it has 
taken Japan some twenty years to conclude a comprehensive and actionable policy and institutional 
framework to construct a national security space program since the first move in this direction in 1998 
with the inauguration of the IGS program. Second, as will be discussed in later chapters in detail, Basic 
Plan 2016 ultimately represents what might be called only a best-effort compromise and partial 
implementation of the Basic Law. A close analysis of the intent of the Basic Law shows that at least its 
drafters envisaged, or were aiming at an administrative leadership structure in the Cabinet Office with 
more policy and budgeting power over Japan’s space programs. In the event, the Cabinet Office took full 
control of – and gain direct budgeting power – of only one new strategic program, the QZSS 
development. 
Then, one of the primary goals of Basic Plans 1-3 was to try to fund and develop a dual-use global 
EO monitoring program; this initiative received increasing amounts of direct and indirect support from 
U.S. planners, who wished to deputize more Japanese space assets in the service of a wider MDA 
network to monitor Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) activities. Such attempts to launch a 
major new EO program were stymied and eventually, arguably, failed, with the current dual-use 
MDA-related satellites announced in Basic Plan 2016 very much the rump of previous more ambitious 
plans.  
Then again, as will be shown, Basic Plan 2016 and its predecessor Basic Plan 3 turned out to be far 
less militarily ambitious than a much more radical proposal floated by very LDP senior politicians with 
close connections with space policy, who envisaged (and envisage) a much more comprehensive range of 
military space assets more quickly, including development funding for space-based EW, and even, 
institutionally, fundamentally changing the institutional orientation of JAXA into something approaching 
the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA).  
All these points will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 2 and, again, in the second half of this 
dissertation. In sum, however, these final points hardly show Japan as pushing towards rearmament or 
more significant change even when several important constituencies (Japanese defense hawks, the U.S., 
METI and industry) want Japan to do more, and more quickly.  
The logical endpoint of neorealist-type analysis is to look for evidence of Japan rearming. In space 
technologies, there are lots of hints that this may happen, and certainly the technological capacity for this 
has indeed been put in place. But there are, as yet at least, very few concrete programmatical steps in this 
direction. 
 
A Constructivist-Liberal-Institutional Logics Viewpoint  
Against neorealist approaches, constructivism-based analyses argue for the essential continuities of 
security policy. Such arguments seek to demonstrate how, fundamentally still, Japan’s stable, deep-rooted 
and embedded domestic politics and norms of anti-militarism continue to trump any international 
structural pressures.  
 So, current security reforms are seen moderate, or even positive for the U.S.-Japan alliance and the 
international community, and fully in line with previous national and bilateral strategic postures. 
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According to such an argument, changes remain tempered by, and are the product of the same past 
domestic political and international constraints.41 
…And is there is plenty of evidence to support claims that Japan is maintaining, overall, a cautious, 
gradualist approach in adapting its security strategy to meet the uncertainties of a multipolar world. For 
example, “Japan’s Legislation for Peace and Security” faced lengthy opposition scrutiny forcing the Abe 
Cabinet to extend the Diet session by 95 days from June into September, making it the longest in the 
post-war era.42  
While the bills passed the House of Representatives in July with the support of the majority 
LDP-Kōmeitō coalition, the bills were also passed in the face of widespread public opposition. The 
legislation is attributed to causing Mr. Abe’s approval ratings to fall into negative figures for the first time 
since he returned to power in 2012, with 50 percent disapproving of the Cabinet and 38 percent approving, 
according to one authoritative Japanese media survey conducted in August 2015. Not least, Diet members 
from opposition Democratic, Innovation, Communist and Social Democratic parties walked out of the 
vote in protest and in the face of widespread public opposition.43 
So it is also possible to argue that neorealist viewpoints, the product of the distortions of paradigms 
that make over-simplistic assumptions about behavior that is the result of many inputs, ignore the context 
of the many compromises (internal balancing) that were required to achieve, after years of struggles, the 
drawing up of Basic Plan 2016.  
Following this line of argument, consequently, while Basic Plan 2016 may be dressed up in overtly 
realpolitik language in Japanese space policy documents, the deeply embedded institutional and 
normative frameworks that stood for nearly four decades have, overall, acted as significant hadome 
(brakes) on policy transition. Further, considering the security dilemma Japan faces, it can be argued quite 
reasonably and logically that its response is extremely moderate.  
                                                
41 For a sample of views arguing for the essential status quo in Japan’s security policy under Abe, see Kenichi 
Matsumoto, “(Right Tilt?) Is “Japan’s Move to the Right” True? Second Abe Administration Faces Test of Realism,” 
Discuss Japan: Japan Foreign Policy Forum, 5 March 2013; Aida Hiro, “(Right Tilt?) Does Shinzō Abe’s Election 
Really Herald a More Militarist Japan?” Discuss Japan: Japan Foreign Policy Forum, 5 March 2013; Tadashi Karube, 
“The Illusion of “Rising Nationalism”: Internationalism and Xenophobia in today’s Japan,” 7 July 2014; Yuichi Hosoya, 
“Bringing ‘Internationalism’ Back,” 23 June 2014; Shinichi Kitaoka, ‘The Turnabout of Japan’s Security Policy: Toward 
“Proactive Pacifism,”’ 2 April 2014, all on nippon.com; Gerald L. Curtis, “Japan’s Cautious Hawks: Why Tokyo is 
Unlikely to Pursue an Aggressive Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 92, No. 2 (March/April 2013), pp. 78-86; Brad 
Glosserman, “Abe’s Dilemmas,” PacNet, No. 37, 30 May 2014; Michael Green, and Jeffrey Hornung, “Ten Myths About 
Japan’s Collective Self-Defense Change: What the Critics Don’t Understand About Japan’s Constitutional 
Reinterpretation,” The Diplomat, 19 July 2014. 
42 The blanket legislation is usually referred to as 平和安全法制整備法案 [Heiwa Anzen Hō Seibel Hōan], see 平和
安全法制等の整備について 内閣官房 (2015 年 5 月 14 日), 平和安全法制」の概要 内閣官房 (2015 年 5 月 15 日). 
43 Organizers of the protests legislation outside the Diet buildings estimated that up to 100,000 protesters marched 
against the bills' passage of the lower house in July. During Diet committee hearings on the bills, constitutional scholars 
and a former supreme court justice argued that the legislation was unconstitutional. Abe was also publicly criticized by 
atomic bomb survivor Sumiteru Taniguchi in his speech at the Nagasaki memorial ceremony on August 9, when he stated 
that the defense reforms would take Japan “back to the wartime period.” The security bills were finally approved 148 
votes to 90 by the House of Councillors and became law on September 19, following opposition attempts at delaying 
tactics and even some brawls in which some Diet members attempted to stop the vote to move the bill out of committee 
and to a general vote. See “Abe's future uncertain as public support dives,” Nikkei, 3 August 2015; “Japan Moves to 
Allow Military Combat for First Time in 70 Years,” New York Times, 16 July 2015; “Experts’ ‘unconstitutional’ verdict 
on security bills highlights contradictions,” Mainichi Shimbun, 6 June 2015; “Former justice brands security bills as 
unconstitutional, slams Abe for sophistry,” Japan Times, 16 September 2015; “Nagasaki survivor warns Abe reforms 
'will lead to war,’” The Daily Telegraph, 9 August 2015; “Japan to allow military role overseas in historic move,” BBC 
News, 18 September 2015; “Diet session extended through September as Abe aims to pass contentious security bills,” 
Japan Times, 22 June 2015.  
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Even when Japan’s space policy has been examined from the benchmark of a hard or soft 
(quantifiable or qualified) contribution to national security, the tendency has been to interpret policy 
outcomes as reinforcing how little Japan’s security strategy has changed.44 Thus, one major line of 
interpretation has been that Japan stands as an exception – even a culturalist exception – to regional and 
global trends for the militarization of space; that Japanese space policy has largely stood as a non-security 
driven and normative exception to regional and global trends for the militarization of space, seeking space 
technology for its own sake and civilian “soft power” ends.45 
For those looking to test Japan’s intent on a unitary State actor level, the story of the QZSS program 
can be used as a valuable counterpoint to METI’s SOD program. The utility of PNT services for both 
economic infrastructure and geostrategic security has been well known ever since the first Gulf War, 
when GPS-guided weapons decimated Iraqi forces, providing the force multiplier effect that gives 
militaries capable of wielding space technologies and integrating them into military campaigns a major 
advantage over adversaries without such capabilities.  
There is evidence that Japan sought PNT technology, or at least became aware of its potential 
implications, as early as the mid 1970s. By the late 1990s, development of an independent or regional 
GPS capability became a strategic priority. Yet, a narrative history of the QZSS program, only now being 
realized at the end of this decade, twenty five years after first concrete plans to develop the system, is a 
tale of false starts, failures, and bureaucratic battles, despite strong pressures from industry, and then from 
within the government itself, to develop the system.46  
Thus, it is possible to see both Basic Plan 2016 as the thin edge of a wedge of a process leading to 
rearmament, with Japan barely disguising the development of strategically potent capabilities made much 
more so through integration with U.S. technological and material superiority, or, indeed, to frame Japan’s 
latest policy as a fairly minimalist approach, considering the increasingly worrying security threats on its 
doorstep. A closer examination of space policy transition following the 2008 Basic Law shown in Table 1 
below, summarizing the precursor plans to Basic Plan 2016, highlights some of the difficulties involved 
when applying current analytical models. 
A neorealist-type analytical model, using the Basic Law as a benchmark to examine how far Basic 
Plan 2016 has implemented the Basic Law would seek to show that Japan has responded rationally to 
both growing international security pressure, and the need to service the U.S.-Japan security alliance, the 
cornerstone of Japan’s military defense policy. A focus on a simplified model that focuses on the 
relationship between the U.S. and Japan shows implied successive intervention was required by the LDP 
to force administrative institutions to take a more assertive implementation. 
Table 1 does indeed, on a simplistic level, show an action-reaction framework between domestic 
policy evolution and external security concerns. On the other hand, the number of steps and the level of 
coordination required both externally and internally shows how complex and difficult it has been to 
implement elements of the Basic Law. At the very least, the number of attempts to enact the Basic Law 
suggests the need for considerable domestic debate and adjustment. 
 
 
                                                
44 Oros (2008) is the classic statement of this. 
45 Kazuto Suzuki, Uchū Kaihatsu to Kokusai Seiji (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2013), pp. 179, 182-183.  
46 For a narrative history of the QZSS saga and its contested integration first into national, then international security 
policy 1974-2009, see Pekkanen & Kallender-Umezu (2010), pp. 198-201. 
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Table 1: Comparative Dimensions of Key Policy Benchmarks  
(Simplified: Japan-U.S. Interaction 2009-16) 
Policy Basic Law Basic Plan 1 Basic Plan 2 LDP Strategy Mid-Term Plan Basic Plan 3 
  Foundational Implement 
Basic Law 
Revise Basic Plan 
1 following failure 
to secure budget 
 
Root-and-branch 
reorientation after 
failure of MDA 
constellation 
Reorientation of 
Basic Plan to 
confirm national 
security direction 
 
Implementation of 
NSS reflecting 
LDP Strategy 
Date  August 2008 June 2009  January 2013 August 2014 August 2014 January 2015 
Details 1] End PPR; 
normalize 
defensive military 
space use in line 
with OST. 2] Make 
a Basic Plan within 
1 year. Focus on 
industry & security 
rather than R&D.  
3] Review JAXA 
role in 1 year. 
Establish a new 
policy & 
administrative 
executive to effect 
Basic Plan. 4] Draft 
a Space Activities 
Act in 2 years. 5] 
Formulate a 
pathway to increase 
budget from ¥300B 
to ¥500B over the 
course of 5-10 
years. 6] Space 
development as a 
strategic policy tool 
to counter China in 
Asia. 
Six basic 
principles, 5-year 
goals, 10-year 
targets for 5 
satellite systems: 
land/ ocean/ 
environment, 
Earth 
observation, 
weather, 
telecoms, QZSS 
and IGS.  
Four R&D 
programs: space 
science, human 
space activities, 
space solar power 
R&D and 
microsatellite 
development.  
Boost annual 
budget to ¥500B 
by 2013. Focus 
specifically on 
QZSS and ensure 
regular launches 
of student and 
university 
microsatellites. 
Focus on:  
1] a regional QZSS 
system 
2] a continuous 
global monitoring 
system 
3] integrate new 
satellite systems 
into national 
security 
4] more flexible 
space access 
5] downgrade 
JAXA R&D for 
science and space 
exploration, human 
space flight.   
Improve SSA, 
MDA and unify all 
Earth observation 
data into one 
infrastructure. 
Promote a 
pan-ASEAN 
disaster monitoring 
constellation. 
1] Integrate space 
policy with NSS & 
create NSSS 
2] Integrate NSSS 
with U.S. NSSS 
3] Investigate 
establishment of 
Uchūchō with a 
single budget line 
4] Increase budget 
by up to ￥200B/ 
year (to￥500B)  
for military space 
5] Double IGS 
constellation 
6] Create MDA 
constellation 
7] Deploy 
space-based EW & 
ELINT satellites 
8] Create space 
infrastructure at the 
service of MOD 
9] evolve JAXA to 
take DARPA- 
type role 
10] Set up an 
independent think 
tank. 
Space’s primary 
purpose is to 
strengthen national 
security; boost 
cooperation with 
the U.S; create a 
long-term plan to 
strengthen 
industrial base. 1] 
Specific policies: 7 
satellite QZSS 
/boost IGS, EO 
satellite systems/ 
new data relay and 
optical data relay 
satellites /H-3/ 
harden launch 
centers. 2] 
Utilization: (a) 
SSA, MDA, coms, 
EW, fast flexible 
launch, high 
flexibility satellites 
(b) pico- and 
nanosats.  
3] Strategic: (a) 
improve planning 
and policy (b) 
finish Space 
Activities Act. 
Policy guided by 
NSS; National 
security top 
priority along with 
U.S. cooperation. 
China openly 
stated as key 
destabilizer. 
QZSS, IGS 
funded to 2025; 
IGS fleet to be 
doubled; 2 high 
data rate satellites, 
including 
1military dual use 
optical data relay 
satellites; SSA 
and MDA to be 
worked out in 
2-year studies. 
QZSS officially a 
backup for GPS. 
JAXA to work 
closely with 
MOD; ALOS 
satellite to host 
MOD EW sensor; 
JAXA dual-use 
tacsats and SLATs 
funded.   
  
 
Outcome Ongoing Failed Overtaken Partial failure 
necessitating 
(Basic Plan 3) 
Ongoing Mediated     
Solution  
About to be 
implemented with a 
pronounced national 
security focus as a 
result of Basic Plan 
2016. 
Uchūchō delayed 3 
years; compromises 
expected over MDA, 
etc. 
MOF rejected 
budget rise & took 
advantage of DPJ 
confusion and 
ministerial in- 
fighting. Policy 
moves on autopilot 
until Basic Plan 2. 
CO partial control 
via QZSS; failed 
to tackle 
infighting; lost 
credibility over 
wide area 
observation 
program. METI 
withdraws; JAXA 
moves in.  More 
military emphasis. 
Established to end 
infighting. In MTP, 
ONSP actively 
worked on 
coordination with 
NSS with MOD and 
dual-use actors. But 
critical decision on an 
Uchūchō shelved. 
To result in Basic 
Plan 3 but talk of an 
Uchūchō quietly 
shelved. Depth of 
subordination of 
policy to NSS within 
NSC unresolved. 
Ministerial 
opposition expected. 
Uchūchō shelved; 
delayed increase 
in IGS 
constellation 
numbers; ONSP’s 
MDA plans 
shelved in favor 
and multi-year 
negotiation to deal 
with continued 
inter-ministerial 
discussions. 
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U.S. Government 
Stance or Role 
  2+2 June 2011    1st Dialogue 
   on Space 
   March 2013 
2+2 Oct. 
2013 
 
 2nd Dialogue 
 on Space 
 May 2014 
Defense 
Cooperation 
Guidelines 
 
Bolster cooperation 
on ISR, BMD, 
outer space and 
cyberspace; 
specifically, in 
space in 4 areas: 
SSA, QZSS, MDA, 
dual-use sensors. 
Collaborate with 
GPS/QZSS, SSA, 
MDA, TCBMS for 
International Code 
of Conduct; May 
2013 Exchange of 
Notes concerning 
SSA Services. 
BMD: Deploy SM-3 
Block IIA, 2nd second 
AN/TPY-2 radar: 
SSA, MDA, 
cooperate on 
International Code of 
Conduct; establish 
bilateral Defense ISR 
Working Group. 
Space assets 
indispensable for 
U.S.- Japan 
security; provision 
of SSA data from 
JAXA to U.S. 
Strategic 
Command. 
First update since 
1997: promoted 
“seamless” 
cooperation in space 
and cyberspace 
focused on SSA and 
MDA 
 
Sources: Author’s own research 
 
Institutional Realities 
On the other hand, the complexity and internal balancing required to formulate Japan’s post-Basic Law 
space policy can be illustrated through the brand-new policymaking structure that was implemented in 
2012 after the Basic Law, which sought to set up Cabinet Office control, or at least coordination of 
policymaking, as encompassed in the establishment of the ONSP. The chart below shows how the ONSP 
coordinates a range of implementing bureaucratic institutions, with policymaking guidance controlled 
through the Space Policy Commission (SPC). 
 While the position of the ONSP, situated within the Cabinet Office, shows the connection it has with 
political power (in fact in 2012 the Prime Minister took a dual role as a competent minister for JAXA in 
terms of space policy), the chart also shows the potential of tangled lines of purpose, in that JAXA has 
three ministers overseeing it. This begs the question: Why does JAXA need to have three ministers with 
input on its role? And how, or how well do they work together? 
 Framing a detailed and systematic explanation of this policymaking structure will be a major task of 
this dissertation. But for the moment, a quick glance at this framework shows the number of stakeholders 
and suggests the complexities of coordination involved in policymaking, especially considering that the 
establishment of the ONSP was supposed to represent a simplification and rationalization of space 
policymaking, putting the Cabinet Office in greater control of policymaking above the parochial interests 
of individual ministries, so as to soothe the implementation of the Basic Law.  
     Figure 1. Japan’s Administrative and Intuitional Framework for Space Policy in 2012 
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Some Preliminary Thoughts on the Complexity of Stakeholder and Institutional Arrangements 
Thus, a close analytical look at the normative, political, administrative and industrial players and the 
many complex agreements (particularly between ministries) that combined to form Basic Plan 2016 
shows it to be very much the evolved product of sets of legal and constitutional limitations, policy norms, 
and administrative structures. Clearly then, to account for all these factors requires a multi-stakeholder 
and multi-level approach to understanding the processes behind Japanese space policymaking.  
 I argue that such an approach is critical to understanding the “hows” and “whys” of Basic Plan 2016. 
If we take into account both the external and internal processes that combined and interconnected, it 
might be helpful to combine them all into a schema showing the main levels of decision-making as in, for 
example, Figure 2. 
 As will be shown extensively in this dissertation, all these layers of decision-making were active at 
different points, and in different ways, over extended periods. For example, in this schema, in Level 2, the 
U.S. can be seen as either acting as a break or an accelerator for policy and institutional change at critical 
points in the history of Japanese space development. Much the same can be said for Level 8. For example, 
in the wake of the Taepodong overflight of 1998 there was a public outcry of concern (arguably media 
created) about potential Japanese vulnerability to ballistic missile attack, which rippled through Level 3, 
for example. 
 
Figure 2: Japan’s Eight-Layer Analytical Model for Space Policy Transition 
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Research Questions 
For the purposes of clarity, this dissertation assumes that Japan is now indeed using space technologies 
and space policy as part of a regional (external) security balancing strategy. As will be seen in Chapter 2, 
various arguments have, and can be made, as to how and in what way Japan has been externally 
balancing; for example whether Japan has been bandwagoning on the U.S. security guarantee, and is now 
moving to hugging the U.S. and hedging against the potential of a rising regional power, China, or 
perhaps is soft balancing against China.47 In this respect, this dissertation acknowledges a realist 
framework of analysis at some level to explain Japan’s external policymaking.  
But another fundamental point is that Japan is doing so in a particular and nuanced way, based on the 
specificities of the foundations of its traditional defense strategy, and, extremely importantly – and in 
terms of space policy specifically – on the delimitations on the capacity for and speed of change when 
working through a complex institutional and administrative framework. Thus, in this dissertation, a new 
definition of “internal balancing” is used, which refers to the recalibration of domestic institutional 
frameworks to achieve the “external balancing” function.  
In provisionally accepting the concept of external balancing as applicable to Japan’s evolving space 
policy, the logical question becomes “how” or “how much” is Japan balancing. In many ways, Basic Plan 
2016 can be characterized from a neorealist perspective as fulfilling some of its potential for national 
security applications. However, as pointed out above, it is equally possible to look at elements of Basic 
Plan 2016 to argue how little and cautiously Japan has responded to increasingly alarming regional 
security threats and pressures, including pressures exerted by the U.S. Thus, juxtaposing Japan’s latest 
space policy with national security policy using standard international relations paradigms, the same 
empirical data can be used to justify distinctly different conclusions.  
 As outlined above, if a framework is adopted that incorporates all the stakeholders and their 
interactions that seeks to account for interpreting why and how fast or slowly and to what objectives Japan 
has transitioned its space policy, then, by comparison, a simple international relations-based paradigm 
looks at least a blunt instrument. In fact, it is the contention of this dissertation that conventional 
approaches, when adapted to study Japan’s space policy transition, are unable to fully account for all the 
actors and processes involved, especially in terms of their interconnections and relationships.  
Bearing all this in mind, after setting up the context and accounting for the complexities involved 
that traditional frameworks do not seem to adequately cover, I propose the following research questions 
to provide analytical clarity to tackling the issues involved: 
 
                                                
47 According to the Balance of Power Theory, States, motivated primarily by their desire for survival and security, will 
use internal balancing, i.e. develop and implement military capabilities and hard power mechanisms to constrain the most 
powerful and rising state that can prove a potential threat. At the same time, states will conduct external balancing in 
which they will ally with other states to balance and gain more leverage over a dominant or rising power. In recent years, 
soft-balancing has emerged as a new concept of illustrating how states balance powerful actors, which advocates the use 
of economic and diplomatic tools to constrain the most powerful state and inhibit their exertion of power and dominance. 
As opposed to traditional balancing, soft balancing is undertaken not to physically shift the balance of power but to 
undermine, frustrate, and increase the cost of unilateral action for the stronger state. Soft balancing is not undertaken via 
military effort, but via a combination of economic, diplomatic and institutional methods. See Waltz (2008), pp. 137, 168; 
Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, World out of Balance (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), p. 22; 
William C. Wohlforth, Stuart J. Kaufman and Richard Little, “Introduction: Balance and Hierarchy in International 
System,” in William C. Wohlforth, Stuart J. Kaufman and Richard Little (eds.) The Balance of Power in World History, 
(New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), pp. 9-10. On soft balancing, in particular, see Robert A. Pape, “Soft 
Balancing against the United States,” International Security, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Summer 2005), p 36. 
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1. Why did it take so long to enact the Basic Space Law of 2008? 
 
Subsidiary Questions: 
  
2. Why is enactment of the Basic Law still only partial in Basic Plan 2016? 
3. What we infer anything from this about Japan’s ability to make strategically important  
  decisions in the 21st century?  
 
The primary and the first secondary question demand analytical clarity in order to account for the 
issues and problems associated with understanding the hows, whys, and whens (and why nots!) of space 
policy and institutional change. The remaining question contextualizes another critical question: what 
does all this mean?  
Reflecting on the complexity of the above framework, and in tackling these research questions, this 
dissertation seeks to demonstrate two major findings. The first is that, through Basic Plan 2016, Japan has 
effectively managed to achieve a working compromise that deals with both internal and external issues. 
The second is that this has been achieved with a new style of policymaking by using neutral experts 
operating in the Cabinet Office, who were able to surmount at least some of the narrower interests of 
particular stakeholders, particularly the specific aims of individual ministries, so as to make possible the 
implementation of many (but not all of the) key changes intended by the initiators of the Basic Law; and 
that this was achieved, inevitably, through many struggles and compromises, by adapting tactics 
developed and refined during the administration of Prime Minister Junichirō Koizumi and recalibrated 
through many twists and turns through 2008-2016, so that by 2016 the Cabinet Office had established the 
principal of more political control of important policy framing over and above the narrow sectionalist 
institutional objectives of MEXT.48  
While this is a simplistic summary, one of the main themes of this dissertation is the focus on 
understanding the logics of Japanese policymaking, noting what is new, how things changed, and when 
and why, while fully acknowledging the interconnectedness of both external and system-level threats, and 
internal political-bureaucratic-institutional dynamics. Conversely, another major assertion of this 
dissertation is that understanding the logics of policymaking in the field of space policymaking, and 
proximate fields such as national security strategy and grand strategy as they evolved, sheds deeper 
insight into the frameworks governing and contextualizing Japan’s decisions. It’s easy to attach a label 
and ascribe a motive to a particular decision by selecting an analytical lens that ascribes motives to those 
decisions. It’s more interesting, demanding, and revealing to examine policymaking both “from the inside 
out” and “the outside in.” So understanding both external (international, geostrategic, alliance, security) 
factors and internal (domestic politics, bureaucratic actors, industrial stakeholders, even public opinion) 
factors is important.  
As pointed out, it is quite possible to use empirical evidence provided by Basic Plan 2016, when 
applying a particular analytical lens, to conclude that Japan is rearming stealthily through militarizing its 
space program. It is equally possible, using a different analytical lens, to say that Japan is doing virtually 
the opposite; that it is refraining from rearming and doing the bare minimum it needs using defensive 
                                                
48  For a survey of these initiatives, though not considering space policy specifically, see Tomohito Shinoda, 
Contemporary Japanese Politics, Institutional Changes and Power Shifts (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013).   
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space technologies, to secure itself and shelter under the U.S. security umbrella, despite a plethora of 
pressures to do more. 
Thus, the basic research questions of this dissertation reflect, then, a need to move beyond 
conventional analytical paradigms, debating whether Japan is “hugging or hedging,” or stealthily 
rearming, or reluctantly balancing, etc.  
In trying to address these questions and themes, this dissertation also attempts to: 
 
1. Explore the rationality of the decision-making of the Japanese state as expressed through policy 
transformation and institutional arrangements that accompanied (or enabled, or stalled) that change. 
2.  Demonstrate the importance and relevance of space policy as a national security issue, and as a 
global governance issue.  
  
The SAF Framework 
To answer my research questions, I have adopted a fresh approach. One of the key issues with my 
decision-making layer analysis is that it inherently seems to suggest a vertical hierarchy of decision 
making layers. But, reviewing all the actors and their interrelationships, I felt such an approach did not 
fully explain the dense and multidirectional interconnections and interactions between different 
stakeholders, constituencies and institutions that were connected in more complex ways than simply “up” 
and “down” the layers.  
 To account for these problems, and to overcome the rigidities of the eight-layer decision-making 
framework, this dissertation will uses what I call the Strategic Action Field (SAF) framework (the SAF 
framework). First published in 2011 as the Theory of Fields, the SAF framework was designed 
specifically to model groups of stakeholders involved in dynamic changes over time. This approach was 
also specifically developed to create an analytical framework to deal with those groups in the context of 
interdependent linkages. The utility of this can be demonstrated by the fact that it is immediately apparent 
that connections between the seven or eight decision-making layers are both bi- and multi-directional.49  
The SAF framework’s major utility comes in its recognition of the dynamic interplay of such links, 
modulated through matrices of actors in groupings called Strategic Action Fields (SAFs), in which the 
actions of one field or the players in it may affect others, but do so in logically explained and rational 
patterns of behavior. Moving beyond the idea of vertically-integrated decision layers, the SAF framework 
seeks to put players, motives, behaviors and actions into interdependently linked fields of action that have 
their own dynamics, but whose behavior is bidirectionally interlinked and made logical and 
understandable according to certain rules governing position and behavior. 
By applying an SAF-based approach to space policy and institutional change, it is possible to create 
an analytical framework that accounts for the internal logic of all the decision layers and their 
interconnections. This is achieved by putting the players/actors/competitors into SAFs in which internal 
and external behavioral dynamics can be understood through simple sets of rules. While the SAF 
                                                
49 The primary sources are Neil Fligstein and Doug McAdam, “Toward a General Theory of Strategic Action Fields,” 
Sociological Theory, Vol. 29, No. 1 (March 2011); Neil Fligstein and Doug McAdam, A Theory of Fields (New York, 
NY: Oxford University Press, 2012). The work builds on earlier research from Fligstein in particular, for example, Neil 
Fligstein, The Transformation of Corporate Control (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990); Paul DiMaggio 
and Walter W. Powell, ‘Introduction,’ pp. 1-40, in The New Institutionalism in Organization Analysis, Paul J. DiMaggio 
and Walter W. Powell (eds.) (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); Neil Fligstein, “Social Skill and Institutional 
Theory,” American Behavioral Scientist, Vol. 40, No. 4 (February 1997), pp. 397-405.  
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framework borrows, for example, from rational actor scenarios to understand institutional behavior, in 
essence, the SAF framework also, crucially, provides an analytical framework that spans both 
macrotheory (international relations paradigms) and microtheory (institutional dynamics), and their 
interplay.   
 
Outline to the Remainder of this Dissertation  
Chapter 2 looks at how macrotheory and microtheory has been applied to studies of Japan, focusing on 
security policy when possible, but also taking into account parallel fields when applicable, for example 
when Japan has had a contested or evolving relationship in terms of trade or economics, which has led to 
internal and external balancing. An extensive summary survey of main microtheories, for example, 
various stripes of institutionalism, is also conducted, to see how analysts explain the institutional and 
political frameworks for making policy. Hybrid theories are also looked at. Finally, a review is made of 
how space policy transition has been analyzed to date. Chapter 3 looks in detail at the SAF framework 
and outlines how will be applied to Japan’s space policy transition. To answer the basic question, “is 
space policy important, and if so why?” Chapter 4 establishes the importance of outer space as both a 
global governance issue and a global security issue.  
The second half of the dissertation starts a detailed analysis of how, when and why space policy 
changed from the 1960s through to 2016. Chapter 5 uses a rather conventional narrative of space policy 
transition to form Basic Plan 2016 by splitting policy evolution into five phases.50 Chapters 6-9 then 
focus on explaining how we can understand why Japan did what and when in space policy transition by 
exploring the behaviors of different SAFs (actors) in terms of the SAF framework. Chapter 10 draws 
some conclusions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
50 The analysis in this chapter is largely based on work done in Paul Kallender, “Japan’s New Dual-Use Space Policy: 
The Long Road to the 21st Century,” Asie.Visions, No. 88, November 2016. 
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Chapter 2 
Theoretical Considerations: Conventional Macro- and Microtheoretical Approaches 
 
Macrotheoretical Approaches 
 
Neorealist-based Security Studies of Japan 
Continuing on from Chapter 1, Chapter 2 tests the utility of using various commonly-adopted international 
relations and institutional frameworks to answer the research questions in terms of the eight layer 
decision-making model.  
 Mainstream international relations theory-based academic scholarship on Japanese security policy is 
mainly based on general surveys of Japan’s overall security policies. Because of this, assessment of space 
policy as a subset of national security strategy could then be interpreted in terms of how it can be used to fit 
into ready-made conclusions – for example evidence that Japan is conducting expected behavior as 
predicted by the frameworks applied. As outlined in Chapter 1, neorealist points of view on Japan might 
look at Japan’s security trajectory and potential for attaining greater assertiveness, “normal” status, and 
remilitarization of defense policy.1  
The critical issue with such an approach when dealing with space policy is that neorealist 
frameworks tend to place focus on Levels 1 and 2 and possibly Level 3 of the eight layer decision-making 
hierarchy. In this respect, in focusing on just the security aspects of Basic Plan 2016, a neorealist 
approach might place the plan as part of a recent process of rebalancing against China to contain it. As a 
rational actor, Japan must logically become increasingly concerned about China; that Japan will at some 
point to a lesser or greater degree, rearm; and that militarizing space is one step in a process of building 
the capacity to do so.2 For neorealists, the basic assumptions never change. Ultimately, there are never 
absolute guarantees of security for any state, even from allies or alliances. In a fluid geostrategic 
environment, following the collapse of the bipolar confrontation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, 
and facing uncertainties in the post-Cold War jigsaw of emergent security dilemmas in East Asia, 
particularly provoked by the rise of China, it is rational for Japan to strengthen its military. Space 
technology can be seen as another step toward eventual rearmament, be it moderate (or recessed). For 
neorealists, at least the partial rearmament that allows the military use of space is explained by the fact 
that Japan is assessed as being entangled in a regional security dilemma.3 
                                                
1 Remilitarization here is defined as increasing acceptance by Japan’s policy makers and its citizenry of the efficacy and 
centrality of military power for national security ends. Japan has thus moved from a demilitarized state early post-war, to 
now adopt an expanded military role in terms of function, geographical scope, and external partnerships, and a new 
preparedness to exercise armed force for security purposes not only individually but through CSD. 
2 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York, NY: Norton, 2001), pp. 140-143, 156-157; 
Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics,” International Security, Vol. 18, No. 2. (Autumn, 
1993), pp. 63, 68-69; Kenneth N. Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War,” International Security, Vol. 25, No. 1, 
(Summer 2000), p. 33. 
3 Adam P. Liff, “Racing toward Tragedy?: China's Rise, Military Competition in the Asia Pacific, and the Security 
Dilemma,” International Security, Vol. 39, No. 2 (Fall 2014), pp. 52-91. 
4 Beyond Lind’s buck-passing, others have characterized Japan’s security strategy towards China, until at least recently, 
as bandwagoning: Japan has sought to profit from a relationship with China, a rising power. Some observers have 
explained mounting tensions as a result of Japan “resisting” China. Another neorealist lens held to Japan holds that Japan 
is “hedging,” which can be defined as a strategy that gives equal weight to economic and military security, against China, 
so that Japan is hedging with the U.S. to counter potential security threats and with other countries against economic 
dangers. Hedging signifies a more ambivalent strategy than balancing in that it implies Japan does not more openly ally 
with one particular country than another.  
 Dealing with China has become major preoccupation of both Japanese and U.S. strategy. Until recently, Japan’s 
relationship with China had been characterized mainly by growing trade and economic interactions, although, as will be 
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Neorealist-type analysis can easily find much empirical evidence to show how, and how much Japan 
as a power does react directly to security threats. In both national security and space policy documents, 
China is now openly stated as a major security issue. China’s behavior in space has, as has been pointed 
out, been cited by Japan as direct drivers for security policy transition. And yet there are glaring 
deficiencies. Japan has no nuclear weapons or offensive strike capabilities (although these are regularly 
posited), and it has only just recently marginally raised its defense spending after a decade of decline. 
Perhaps, then, the answer is the U.S. security guarantee? Until there is what is perceived a real need or 
urgent need, for example, a tipping point in Chinese behavior, and/or, for example U.S. alarm and 
pressure for Japan to rearm further, Japan will refrain from investing more in military space technologies. 
But the possibility or, for some, the probability of this is always present. 4  
However, the fact that Japan hasn’t rearmed to the extent that some neorealists in the early 1990s 
predicted, or seems perpetually “on the way,” means that neorealism has traditionally struggled to gain 
analytical traction and identify significant change. Japan’s “failure” or “reluctance” to rearm more has 
been seen as a “structural anomaly” in the international system.5 In the midst of a changing regional 
balance of power, Offensive Realism, Defensive Realism, and other more Japan-specific derivatives of 
neorealism have been given some impetus with China’s rise and Japan’s search for a more proactive 
                                                                                                                                                        
seen on the chapter, the U.S. has been growing increasingly suspicions about China’s motives in its space and cyberspace 
development since at least the turn of the century. Overall it is fair to comment that the trading relationship between the 
U.S. and China and Japan and China has been transforming from one of foreign direct investment to China to a 
relationship of interdependent trading partners. Therefore, at the core of realist views about how Japan is coping with the 
rise of power is the analytical framework of Balance of Power Theory (see also Chapter 1 for this).  
 Many analysts have explained Japan’s policy to China since 1978 and the advent of the growth of China as 
balancing or containment, and increasingly so over the last decade. For example, Ross and Zhu see Japan as “resisting” a 
growing China. Japan has also been assessed as “containing” China by “balancing” or “constraining” China either by 
strengthening Japan’s defenses (internal balancing) or by reinforcing the U.S.-Japan alliance, a case of external balancing, 
starting perhaps more obviously with the tensions that surfaced during the premiership of Prime Minister Junichirō 
Koizumi (2001-6). More directly, for example, Hsiung and others, have argued that Japan is, in fact, already rearming.  
 Regarding external balancing, realists predicted that concern about China has, is, or will drive it into becoming a 
closer alliance partner with the U.S. In this case, Japan is bound to contain and balance China, and recent security policy 
transitions should be seen in this light. Jerdén and Hagström view Japan’s security strategy towards China as a 
combination of containment and balancing. Some neorealist scholars contend that Japan has neither pursued a policy of 
containment toward China, but neither has it simply followed a policy of engagement either. 
 For more detail, see Jörn Jerdén and Linus Hagström, “Rethinking Japan’s China Policy: Japan as an 
Accommodator in the Rise of China, 1978–2011,” Journal of East Asian Studies, Vol. 12 (May 2012), pp. 215-250; 
Robert S. Ross and Zhu Feng, (eds.) China’s Ascent: Power, Security and the Future of International Politics, (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 2008), p. 7; James C. Hsiung, China and Japan at Odds: Deciphering the Perpetual 
Conflict (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), pp. 16-17; Richard Samuels, Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand 
Strategy and the Future of East Asia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007), p. 114; Kenneth B. Pyle, Japan 
Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose, (New York, NY: Public Affairs, 2007), p. 2; Christopher C. 
Hughes and Ellis S. Kraus, “Japan’s New Security Agenda,” Survival: The IISS Quarterly, Vol. 49, No. 2 (Spring 2007), 
p. 168; Christopher C. Hughes, Japan’s Remilitarization (New York, NY: Routledge, 2009), p. 87; David Arase, “Japan, 
the Active State?: Security Policy after 9/11,” Asian Survey, Vol. 47, No. 4 (July/ August 2007), p. 578; Andrew Oros, 
Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity and the Evolution of Security Practice (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
2008), p. 43; John Mearsheimer, “China’s Unpeaceful Rise,” Current History, Vol. 105, No. 690 (April 2006), pp. 
160-162; Tomohito Shinoda, “Becoming More Realistic in the Post-Cold War: Japan's Changing Media and Public 
Opinion on National Security,” Japanese Journal of Political Science, Vol. 8, No. 1 (July 2007), pp. 171-190; Liselotte 
Odgaard, “A New Cold War?” International Studies Review, Vol. 10, No. 1 (March 2008), pp. 193-4; Mike Mochizuki, 
“Japan: Between Alliance and Autonomy,” in Strategic Asia 2004-5, Ashley Tellis and Michael Wills (eds.) (Seattle: 
National Bureau of Asian Research 2004), pp. 103-38; Mike Mochizuki, “Japan's shifting strategy toward the rise of 
China,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 30, Nos. 4-5 (July 2007), pp. 739-776; Mike Mochizuki, “Terms of 
Engagement: The U.S.- Japan Alliance and the Rise of China,” in Beyond Bilateralism: U.S.- Japan Relations in the New 
Asia-Pacific, (eds.) Ellis S. Krauss and T. J. Pempel, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004), pp. 87-115. 
5 Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics,” International Security, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Fall 1993), 
pp. 55-70; Kenneth N. Waltz, “Structural Realism After the Cold War,” International Security, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Summer 
2000), pp. 33-36. 
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foreign and security policy.6 Among these, Defensive Realism-type analysis has noted modifications in 
Japanese strategy, but has still not identified fundamental shifts manifested in internal and external 
balancing.7 Put bluntly, Japanese security strategy refuses to “play ball” and fully conform with many of 
the predictions of neorealism.  
Neorealist scholars of Japan have increasingly recognized the complexity of Japan’s nuanced and 
multifaceted view of security. In terms of such an approach to the eight-layer decision model, this type of 
approach implies acknowledgement of the importance of decision-making and compromises through 
Levels 3, 4 and 5 at least. Thus, through a neorealist approach, Japanese security policy can surely been 
viewed a mix of pragmatism, financial constraints, bureaucratic politics, and public opposition to radical 
change. Perhaps it would be possible to see Japan is seen as an opportunist power (a view also expressed 
by some neoliberal institutionalists – see below), and perhaps, narratively, it is possible to describe space 
policy transition as the result of all these factors.8 
Plugging Basic Plan 2016 into a neorealist framework, some analysts have characterized Japan’s 
security policy changes as primarily responses to external security changes through the prism of external 
drivers that have pushed Japan to “normalize” its security strategy. Japan has been seen conducting various 
forms of balancing priorities in maintaining both the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance with more friendly and 
profitable relations with Japan’s Asian neighbors.9 In this light Japan’s new bilateral emphasis with the 
                                                
6 John J. Mearsheimer, “The Gathering Storm: China’s Challenge to U.S. Power in Asia,” The Chinese Journal of 
International Politics, Vol. 3, No. 4 (December 2010), pp. 390-391; Green (2001); Tsuyoshi Kawasaki, “Postclassical 
Realism and Japanese Security Policy,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 14, No. 2 (June 2001), pp. 221-240; Pyle (2007); 
Hughes (2009); Bjørn Elias Mikalsen Grønning, “Japan’s Shifting Military Priorities: Counterbalancing China’s Rise,” 
Asian Security, Vol. 10, No. 1 (March 2014), pp. 1-21; Jeffrey W. Hornung, “Japan’s Growing Hard Hedge Against 
China,” Asian Security, Vol. 10, No. 2 (June 2014), pp. 97-122; Darren J. Lim and Zack Cooper, “Reassessing Hedging: 
The Logic of Alignment in East Asia,” Security Studies, Vol. 24, No. 4 (November 2015), pp. 713-716; Sebastian 
Maslow, “A Blueprint for a Strong Japan? Abe Shinzō and Japan’s Evolving Security System,” Asian Survey, Vol. 55, 
No. 4 (July/August 2015), pp. 739-765; Christopher W. Hughes, “Japan’s Resentful Realism and Balancing China’s Rise,” 
Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Summer 2016), pp. 109-150; Christopher P. Twomey, “Japan, a 
Circumscribed Balancer: Building on Defensive Realism to Make Predictions About East Asian Security,” Security 
Studies, Vol. 9, No. 4 (December 2007), pp. 167-205. 
7 For neorealist-oriented assessments, mainly defensive realist in nature, seeing as yet limited change, see: Eric 
Heginbotham and Richard J. Samuels, “Mercantile Realism and Japanese Foreign Policy,” International Security, Vol. 22, 
No. 4 (Spring 1998), pp. 171-203; Victor D. Cha, “Defensive Realism and Japan’s Approach toward Korean 
Reunification,” NBR Analysis 14, No. 1 (June 2003), pp. 5-32; Jennifer Lind, “Pacifism or Passing the Buck? Testing 
Theories of Japanese Security Policy,” International Security, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Summer 2004), pp. 92-121; Samuels 
(2007); Paul Midford, Rethinking Japanese Public Opinion and Security: From Pacifism to Realism? (Stanford CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2011); Paul Midford, “Japan’s Approach to Maritime Security in the South China Sea,” Asian 
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re-establish itself as at least a major Asian power, See Pyle (2007), esp. p. 41. See also Robert Gilpin, War and Change in 
World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 17. 
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U.S. can indeed be seen as balancing. But of what kind? Has Japan been “Passing the Buck?” Or is it 
“reluctantly realist?” Or is Basic Plan 2016 part of further “hugging and/or hedging?”10 
Other explanations for the policy and contents of Basic Plan 2016 can come in combinations of 
neorealist and constructivist frameworks, accepting that domestic factors, institutions, norms, and politics 
are important. Some analysts have applied a multilevel and cautious analytical approach combining 
‘domestic and structural factors’ to examine Japan’s security policy, for example the idea of ‘identity 
theory’ as an alternative constructivist approach. Others argued that Japan’s pacifism, or culture of 
anti-militarism, was a constructivist norm, but that Japan’s buck-passing policy actually represents a 
realist strategy.11 Figure 3 illustrates this approach. 
 
 Figure 3: Basic Neorealist Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
However, given that Japan has a considerable array of dual-use space technologies that could be 
deployed for much more direct military use, it seems extremely reluctant to do so. We are faced, then, 
with the question of why hasn’t Japan done more? Given that the Basic Law gives Japan plenty of leeway 
to develop a host of military space technologies short of placing weapons in space, Japan’s stance, as 
evidenced in Basic Plan 2016, seems remarkably unopportunistic. So, logically, at this level of analysis, 
it seems reasonable to look at the institutional and cultural factors behind Japan’s lack of opportunism.   
 Thus neorealist-based studies of Japan’s security policy may be used to account for Japan’s reaction 
to what most analysts agree is its increasing complex security situation, mainly caused by problems 
                                                
10 See, for example Aaron L. Friedberg, “Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia,” International 
Security, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993), pp. 5-33; Lind (2004), pp. 92-12; Green (2003); Lind, “Japan’s Security 
Evolution,” Policy Analysis 788, Cato Institute, 25 February 2016; Thomas J. Christensen, “China, the U.S.-Japan 
Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia,” International Security, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Spring, 1999), pp. 49-80; 
Thomas J. Christensen, “China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia,” chapter in (eds.) G. 
John Ikenberry, Michael Mastanduno, International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific, (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2003), p. 30; Eric Heginbotham and Richard J. Samuels, “Japan's Dual Hedge,” Foreign Affairs, 1 
March, 2003; Heginbotham & Samuels (1998), pp. 171-203; Samuels (2007); Samuels, “Japan's goldilocks strategy,” The 
Washington Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 4 (Autumn 2006), pp. 111-127; Pyle (2007).  
11 For example, Catalinac advocated an ‘identity theory’ as an alternative constructivist approach. Lind argued that 
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associated with the rise of China and the unpredictability of behavior by a nuclear armed North Korea. 
But such studies fail to account clearly for the pace of policy transition and the grinding series of 
coordination battles between ministerial stakeholders through Basic Plans 1-3 and Basic Plan 2016. Such 
approaches brush over Levels 4 and 5 of the decision-making framework, levels that are demonstrably 
essential to providing an analytical framework that accounts for when decisions were made, and their 
contents.  
 The empirical facts show that it took Japan ten years to overturn the PPR and best part of fifteen 
years to develop a fully-funded policy allowing for the military use of space. Japan’s response can be 
characterized as underwhelming from a neorealist expectation of change. For example, developing a 
much more capable MDA system is perceived by most defense policy analysts as potentially beneficial on 
a number of levels, is technologically non-difficult, and is highly desired by Japan’s key alliance partner, 
the U.S. Yet, as a case in point, we can see that in Basic Plan 2016, instead of investing in new global EO 
monitoring constellation as a net add to the IGS system, a fundamental aim expressed in Basic Plan 1, 
Japan has rather chosen the path of least resistance and taken a paramilitary or dual-use approach to MDA 
by deputizing the capabilities of several JAXA EO satellites.  
 In broader context, excepting the domain of space, Japan has yet to have developed dedicated aircraft 
carriers (although at the time of finalizing this dissertation, there was talk of limited carrier-type 
capabilities in terms of flying F-35Bs from Japan’s helicopter carriers), nuclear weapons, or to have 
significantly raised its defense budget, as mentioned above. Even taking into account the assumption that 
Japan may choose to exercise at some point limited rights of CSD, seen through the prism of neorealism, 
Japan has certainly continued to place many restrictions on its future military role, even under a 
“revisionist” Abe administration. In terms of space technologies, seen from the Level 1 and Level 2 State 
actor-result framework, Japan has a vast array of dual-use technologies that could be more assertively and 
openly used in Japan’s defense and in support of the U.S.-Japan alliance, but has indeed “failed” to do so. 
 
Constructivist & Neoliberal Approaches 
Japan’s “reluctance” to militarize its space program can also be explained through a number of 
frameworks. For example, Punctuated Equilibrium Theory suggests that most social systems exist in an 
extended period of stasis, which are later punctuated by sudden shifts in radical change and that policy 
change usually only occurs incrementally due to a large number of brakes, such as the inertia of 
institutional cultures, vested interests, and the bounded rationality of individual decision makers.12 As 
applied to Japan, however, most non-neorealist international relations paradigms applied to Japanese 
security policy come via various schools of constructivism and (neo)liberalism. 
 In contrast to neorealists, the core research question is why hasn’t Japan done more to rearm itself? 
To explain security policy transition, as briefly mentioned in Chapter 1, constructivists focus on hadome, 
embodied in norms and patterns that show Japan to be a country with a strong culture of anti-militarism, 
expressed on a number of levels and in different ways, especially in institutional arrangements. It is held 
that Japan will remain disinclined toward militarism based on a deeply held skepticism of Japan’s military, 
which is seen as unpopular and undesirable, having led Japan to the disaster of near national annihilation 
                                                
12 Frank Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, Agendas and Instability in American Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press 1993); Claudio Cioffi-Revilla, “The political uncertainty of interstate rivalries: A punctuated equilibrium model,” in 
Paul Diehl, The Dynamics of Enduring Rivalries (Chicago: University of Illinois Press 1998), pp. 64-97; Paul Pierson, 
Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).  
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in 1945. Connected with this, it is held that there is a widespread disinclination by the Japanese public (as 
demonstrated in the popular protest against Mr. Abe’s latest security legislation) to become 
embroiled/entrapped in overseas conflicts in which Japan has no direct stake. To illustrate the 
constructivist approach, see Figure 4. 
 So, for constructivists, Japan is, and will remain disinclined toward militarism based on ideological, 
ideational, and social processes. Because Japan’s definition of national security goes far beyond traditional 
military notions, national security is viewed in comprehensive economic and political terms. Then, 
culturalist based studies focus on domestic norms, institutions, and anti-war sentiments. Analysts look in 
detail at internal factors as to why Japan has placed many hadome on what realists would expect, that is to 
say, a twenty-year military buildup. Some constructivists on the other hand, recognizing that Japan is 
evolving its security strategy and carefully building up its defense forces now argue that Japan is 
becoming a more “normal” country because of the influence of extant hadome.13 
 In view of the series of changes in security legislation that have occurred since the noughties and, 
arguably, accelerated in (or because of) the second Abe administration, constructivists have therefore 
been forced to accommodate a growing “normalization” of the role of the military. Some have recognized 
that Japan may now be engaged in the strategic social reconstruction of a new defense paradigm 
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Anti-militarism,” International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993); Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism: National 
Security in Germany and Japan (Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998); Peter J. Katzenstein, 
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definitions of threat and interest that have strong effects; see “Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security,” 
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115-130, 191-209; Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, Japan’s National Security: Structures, Norms and Policy Responses 
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 Katzenstein mounted the first major challenge to the neorealist-based Japan as a rational actor model, building on 
the work of Onuf, Wendt and Kratcochwil, who showed that anarchy does not necessarily mean that states must adopt 
egotistical self-help behavior. Katzenstein questioned the validity of realist approaches based on their inability to account 
for the collapse of the bipolar order and the rise of nationalism (and perhaps the same arguments could equally be applied 
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eschewing deliberately or otherwise a more muscular rearmament. From a constructivist point of view, 
such a course of action is still quite understandable and logical, and can be used to explain, for example, 
why the SDF (or the MOD) is not playing a bigger role in space policy.14 
 
Figure 4: Japan Basic Constructivist Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 So what of space technologies? Over the course of twenty years of discussions with MOD sources 
about the SDF’s attitude to space technologies, in fieldwork, interviewees have constantly emphasized that 
apart from the PPR, the SDF has been and remains traditionally reluctant to invest in space technologies 
beyond ISR. Most importantly, for the SDF, space technologies are first and foremost seen as expensive. 
Without concomitant budget increases to accommodate investment, the MOD will not cannibalize 
resources from other programs that are better understood. Tanks are easy. Space technologies are 
“difficult.” 
 And because U.S. military space technologies are at least usually a generation or more advanced than 
their Japanese versions (originally developed for “peaceful purposes only” applications), if the MOD were 
interested in investing in space technologies, it would normally prefer to buy tested, advanced U.S. 
hardware. But that, again, is expensive, and puts the MOD potentially in the position of rentier, with little 
control over the technology. Then, the more expensive space capabilities the SDF maintains, the more 
costly and complex it becomes to create doctrine for their use, non-use, role, and their protection. 
Maintaining a fleet of space assets requires new doctrine and new cooperation modes with the U.S. and new 
diplomatic strategies to justify such resources. (Some of the implications, risks and responsibilities of 
becoming a military space power are discussed in Chapter 4). 
 In short, the MOD still rather lacks the technological, budgetary, institutional, technical and policy 
mechanisms, and the personnel and doctrinal maturity to consider complex space development programs. 
Given that for nearly half a century the SDF was expressly forbidden from employing all but the most basic 
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use of space technologies, it is not surprising that it did not build up institutional or intellectual resources 
regarding the use of space technologies and the MOD seems reluctant to play a larger role.  
 However, in international relations scholarship, this logic appears somewhat distorted. The MOD’s 
institutional reluctance is, instead, seen in terms of its non-participation as a societal norm, of pacifism, or a 
result of civilian control, etc. A narrative along the lines of the impact of years of civilian control leaving the 
SDF institutionally incapable of quickly assembling the technological and doctrinal heft to conceive, 
launch and manage a complicated space program deploying, for example, orbital EW is not wrong. But it is 
a very shallow and broad perspective dismissive of the deeper realities, particularly when dealing with 
space technologies and policy.  
 Then, Japan’s unwillingness to “do more” is also painted by constructivists in terms of a deep-rooted 
distaste of Japan’s military, responsible for the disasters that befell Japan in the Pacific War. So the SDF’s 
reluctance is based on civilian control which constrains the SDF’s perception of its needs and security 
policy in general. The SDF’s position, further, is constrained by competition between ministries in 
controlling the former Japan Defense Agency (JDA) and Japan’s “peace” constitution.15 
 If all this is correct then, the analyst is still faced with Japan’s steady rearmament in gradual stages 
from the 1970s, with nationalist politicians sometimes in the vanguard, and various low-key but 
strategically important behind-the-scenes actions. On the broadest level, in the 1970s, as Hook notes, 
following the revaluation the yen in 1985, Japan became the third largest economy in the world in dollar 
terms and was able to develop an increasingly potent SDF as the most highly advanced nonnuclear force 
in the Asia Pacific.16 Constructivists have also seen Japan’s “nuclear allergy,” enshrined in the Three 
Non-Nuclear Principals established by the cabinet of Prime Minister Eisaku Satō in 1967 as a major pillar 
of Japan’s antimilitarism.17 These remain important national commitments, and are often cited by Japan 
as critical evidence proving its fundamental strategy of becoming a trading, not a military power. But the 
Principals failed to constrain Japanese elites from agreeing to secretly allow nuclear weapons to be 
stationed offshore from Yokosuka Naval Base, and a secret agreement made by Satō himself to allow the 
import of such weapons to Okinawa in times of crisis.  
                                                
15 A classic statement of this comes from Yasuhiro Izumikawa, “Explaining Japanese Antimilitarism: Normative and 
Realist Constraints on Japan’s Security Policy,” International Security, Vol. 35, No. 2 (Fall 2010), pp. 123-160. It is 
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a framework for much of Japan’s official postwar political ideology show that public sentiment “cannot be simply 
categorized as antimilitarist,” as evidenced by the success of Koizumi in changing Japan’s security posture during his 
2001-6 prime minstership. Bukh noted that Japan lurched from a condition of democracy, liberalism, and debate through 
the early 20th century, partially accepted militarism of the 1930s, swung towards antimilitarism in the late 1940s, and 
beyond, then at least gave some support for the popular nationalism of Koizumi a little more than a decade ago. Bukh 
reassembles anti-militarist sentiment as a form of disengagement among Japanese people from fear of U.S. entanglement 
and involvement by Japan in bloodshed in U.S. wars. Such sentiments, mixed with a degree of distaste, may even contain 
a strong degree of repurposed nationalism. See, Bukh (2010), pp. 7, 453-73.   
16 Glenn Hook, Militarization and Demilitarization in Contemporary Japan (London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 50-6. 
17 Katzenstein (1997), p. 128. 
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 In addition, the supposed (or often cited) range of “cultural” and institutional wellsprings toward 
inertia mentioned above did not stop Japan conducting three secret studies into the utility of developing 
nuclear weapons. Their development was rejected in terms of their lack military utility and the strategic 
risks they posed (for example igniting a regional nuclear arms race) not perhaps, primarily, because of 
pacifist sentiments.18 
 Arguably, then, looking at the decade to 2010 in particular, it can be said that constructivists have 
indeed had to work harder to take into account the significant strides taken through the 2000s towards a 
form of “normalization” of Japan’s security posture. Further, since 2011 in particular, the SDF has 
recently undergone what may be construed as somewhat of a public rehabilitation because it is 
increasingly accepted as a necessary evil or even as a valuable part of Japanese society, particularly 
following the Great East Japan Earthquake and the success of Operation Tomodachi.19  
 All this has led Bukh to observe that Japan, from a unitary actor or realist-type point of view, has 
become something close to a state practicing defensive realism! Taking into account all of the brakes that 
are exerted, it is debatable whether studies that focus on Levels 4, 5 and 6 without seriously assessing the 
pressures exerted at the “upper” levels, can provide a really adequate framework. 
 
Neoliberal Institutionalist Approaches  
Neoliberal institutionalist approaches focus on Japan’s growing multilateralism and multilayered security 
strategy, and how Japan works hard to forge ties with its Asian neighbors as part of a comprehensive 
approach to security involving increasing trade and economic ties. This obviously reasonable and 
commonsense approach is particularly stressed by Japanese analysts.20 For many neoliberal 
internationalists, Japan’s security strategy is constrained by its status as a “middle power,” prosecuting 
policy where and when it can in areas such as multilateralism and human security.21 Kier suggests that 
Japanese policymakers’ concerns about the power of the military within a state have had a decisive effect 
on security policy to the extent that military doctrine is rarely a carefully calculated response to the 
external environment.22 
 For example, Soeya, a major proponent of the “middle power” theory, states that Japan’s postwar 
Constitution and the U.S.-Japan alliance have “fundamentally constrained Japan’s freedom of action in 
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No. 4 (July 1988), pp. 517-541. For Japan’s discourse of liberalism utilized for justifying gradualist rearmament, see 
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international security and limited Japan’s foreign policy options to those of a middle power.” According 
to Soeya, Japan must now work through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), treating 
other Asian countries as equal partners to cultivate “value-oriented” diplomacy. 
 Such ties are rather more complex and nuanced relationships than the mere security alliances. For 
analysts following the neoliberal school, while the U.S. will remain Japan’s security guarantor, Japan 
should find ways to co-exist with China so as to “balance and integrate the hedging and engaging policies 
toward China as a coherent and shared strategy among middle powers in the region” by “forming an 
epistemic community among Asian civil societies” under the rubric of middle-power cooperation.”23 
 
         Figure 5: Basic Neoliberal Institutional Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Some have argued that Japan’s security policy has been driven by an “ambivalent multilateralism” 
that is in fact a “disguised bilateralism.” From this perspective, Japan’s view of international relations is 
fundamentally hierarchical, based on long historic roots with its relationship with China. Japan’s pre-war 
policy of bandwagoning for profit with its alliance with Great Britain is cited, along with, for example, 
Japan’s poor diplomatic punching power, leading Japan to explore a sub-tier of multilateral security 
relationships following the 1994 Higuchi report. Such a backdrop helps explain Japan’s actions (or lack 
of them).24  
 For others, Japan has become a powerful (albeit non-nuclear) middle power – a “Great Britain of 
Asia.” This view takes into account the changes of the 2000s, arguing that the depth and breadth of 
defense cooperation between Washington and Tokyo since 11 September 2001 have been 
“unprecedented,” built on the 1997 Revised Guidelines for Defense Cooperation; since 2001, Japan has 
evolved a modern national security bureaucracy with the changes prosecuted by an evangelical and 
unabashed nationalist in the person of Junichirō Koizumi. Thus, the publication of the 2000 
Nye-Armitage Report, the 2004 Araki Report, and subsequent National Defense Program Guidelines have 
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gone a long way to already “normalizing” Japan, which now, under the Abe administration, is becoming 
rather like a non-nuclear Great Britain of Asia.25  
 Another point of view, taking into account a neorealist-type perspective, holds that Japan’s 
perception of China as a threat has led Japan to incorporate a ‘hedging’ strategy into its policy of 
engagement with China by strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance and building a multilayered security 
framework that gives China incentives to conform its external behavior to ‘international standards.’26  
 The need for a multilayered strategy has been highlighted in a report written for The Tokyo 
Foundation that attempted a neutral consensus attained through a range of scholars and experts, 
advocating a four-level approach to enhancing Japan’s security.27 One 2011 report by a team of leading 
academics and security experts tasked with formulating national security policy toward China 
recommended that Japan should focus on “integration” “balancing,” and “deterrence” to address specific 
issue areas. The authors contended that, under, the Yoshida Doctrine, Japan did not have an advanced 
strategy toward Asia other than the “leading goose” development model, and needed a new policy. The 
rise of China and the challenges to moral credibility of the U.S. as a result of its overtly unilateral foreign 
policy under President George W. Bush, together with the loss of economic power of Japan in Asia 
relative to China, have necessitated a new strategy of bandwagoning with the U.S. and balancing with 
Asia through improving relations with other nation-states in the Asia-Pacific region against U.S. 
unilateralism (and perhaps against China).  
 For these pragmatists, Japan’s military strategy should be based around “enhancing the operational 
domain of the Self-Defense Forces around the Nansei Shotō islands (southeastern island chain stretching 
beyond Okinawa) by promoting…ISR activities.” Most significantly perhaps, the report also notes: “The 
new operational concept of the Joint Air-Sea Battle should be explored in the alliance agenda.” The basic 
rationale of this approach was to make China’s noncompliance with international rules and norms 
expensive and deter China from attempting to change the status quo by force.28 At this point, the 
                                                
25 Ralph A. Cossa and Brad Glosserman, “U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation: Has Japan Become the Great Britain of Asia?” 
Issues & Insights, Vol. 5, No. 3 (March 2005). 
26 Yasuhiro Matsuda, “Engagement and Hedging: Japan’s Strategy toward China,” SAIS Review of International Affairs, 
Vol. 32, No. 2 (Summer-Fall 2012), p. 109, cited in Lim & Cooper (2015), pp. 696-727. 
27 Shinichi Kitaoka, Akihiko Tanaka, Chikako Ueki (Kawakatsu), Matake Kamiya, Ken Jimbo, Tsuneo Watanabe, 
“Policy Proposal: Japan's New Security Strategy: Multilayered and Cooperative Security Strategy,” Policy Research 
Division, The Tokyo Foundation, October 8, 2008. The four levels were: 1. Pursuing a defense buildup to create a 
multi-functional, flexible defense capability. 2. Proposing collective self-defense. 3. The creation of a National Security 
Council. 4. Boosting ties with ASEAN countries through ODA. Many of the proposals, originally aimed at the Taro Asō 
administration, are mainstays of the current Abe administration. 
28 The report loosely agrees with the findings of Gilbert Rozman, Kazuhiko Togo, and Joseph P. Ferguson (eds.) 
Japanese Strategic Thought toward Asia (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), in which the Yoshida Doctrine is not 
seen in terms of diplomatic strategy, not military policy; a collective effort and capacity to “counterbalance” (not contain) 
China through the application of diplomatic competition that punishes non-cooperation, prosecuted in a “comprehensive 
manner,” including “hard balancing, soft balancing, and institutional balancing to shape China’s strategic choices.” This 
all focused on ultimately promoting the harmonious integration of China into the international order. Military strategy as 
a third layer that is woven in, to deter China’s creeping expansion of its military activities in disputed areas, or if it 
decides to resolve conflicts by force. See Ken Jimbo, Ryo Sahashi, Sugio Takahashi, Yasuyo Sakata, Masayuki Masuda, 
Takeshi Yuzawa, “Japan’s Security Strategy Toward China: Integration, Balancing, and Deterrence in the Era of Power 
Shift,” The Tokyo Foundation, October 2011, pp. 5-8.  
 In more detail, the report offered 15 specific policy proposals. In terms of “Integration”, Japan should: 1. Form a 
resilient habit of cooperation capable of withstanding the power shift. 2. Explore new frontiers in Japan-China security 
cooperation. 3. Reinforce the crisis management mechanisms in place at the Japan-China summit level and between their 
national defense authorities. 4. Gain access to Chinese-led frameworks and take steps toward two-way integration. 5. In 
terms of “Balancing,” Japan should inaugurate a Japan-US-China strategic security dialogue. 6. Strengthen security 
cooperation with Australia, South Korea, India, and Southeast Asia. 7. Promote functional and ad-hoc regional 
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similarities of the consensus in the Tokyo Foundation report and Japan’s current national security strategy 
can be noted.  
 
Analytical Eclecticism and Hybrid Approaches  
Bearing in mind the merry-go-round of debates outlined above, others argue that Japanese security strategy 
can only be adequately explained both through combining elements of neorealist and/ or constructivist 
and/or neoliberal paradigms.29 Katzenstein has noted that research on Japan’s security policy has differed 
from analyst to analyst (in general, meaning (neo)realists, (neo)liberals and constructivists) and needs to 
sidestep “metatheoretical debates,’” and that a more inclusive and complete understanding of Japan’s 
security orientation could be developed by drawing from different styles of analysis.30 Within this, some 
scholars have argued that the Japanese State and its people do not fit conveniently into the standard 
categories of international relations paradigms.31 Kang has emphasized that balancing should not be “the 
default hypothesis in international relations,” especially when it comes to analyzing relations in Asia.32 
Others have challenged the entire relevance of Western international relations paradigms as 
problematic for Asia. For example, Kang concluded: “The paradigm wars have grown stale: Pitting 
realism, constructivism, and liberalism against one another and then attempting to prove one right while 
dismissing the others has created a body of soul-crushingly boring research.”33 To adequately explain 
Japan’s changes in security policy in the 1990s, Shibata combined an historical insitutionalist approach 
with a two-level analysis (see next sections) along the lines of Allison to look at U.S.-Japan security 
policy transition in four periods, in four institutions, and in three policy areas during the period 1993-7.34 
                                                                                                                                                        
cooperation. 8. In terms of “Deterrence,” Japan should promote dynamic deterrence with respect to opportunistic 
expansion by China. 9. Promote a Japan-US joint air-sea battle (JASB) concept. 10. In terms of “Integration and 
Balancing”, Japan should utilize Japan-South Korea strategic cooperation wisely. 11. Promote regional cooperation with 
China through the six-party talks and Japan-China-South Korea cooperation. 12. Prepare for a North Korean 
destabilization scenario. 13. Bring China into the extensive array of regional security cooperation arrangements. 14. Build 
“a coalition of the willing” within regional institutions. 15. Promote the reform of regional institutions. 
29 Peter J. Katzenstein, Nobuo Okawara, “Japan, Asian-Pacific Security and the Case for Analytical Eclecticism,” 
International Security, Vol. 26, No. 3 (Winter 2001), pp. 153-85; Tsuyoshi Kawasaki, “Between Realism and Idealism in 
Japanese Security Policy: The Case of the ASEAN Regional Forum,” The Pacific Review, Vol. 10, No. 4 (January 1997), 
pp. 480-503; Paul Midford, “The Logic of Reassurance and Japan’s Grand Strategy,” Security Studies, Vol. 11, No. 3 
(Spring 2002), pp. 1-43; Midford (2011); Yazuhiro Izumikawa, “Explaining Japanese Antimilitarism: Normative and 
Realist Constraints on Japan’s Security Policy,” International Security, Vol. 35, No. 2 (Fall 2010), pp. 123-160. See also 
Oros (2008); Oros (2007), pp. 39-44; Berger et. al. (2007). 
30 Peter J. Katzenstein, Rethinking Japanese Security: International and External Dimensions (New York: Routledge, 
2008), p. 3. 
31 Or, for example, that Japan’s actions be seen as those of a pacifist state, a normal country, a normal military power, a 
global civilian power, and even a global ordinary power. See, for example, Yōichi Funabashi, “Japan as Global Civilian 
Power,” Asahi.com, 21 December 2004; James Llewelyn, David Walton and Gen Kikkawa, A Pacifist State in a Hostile 
Region: Japan and Post-War Conflict in Southeast Asia (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 2009); Yukiko Miyagi, 
“Japan’s Middle East policy: ‘still mercantile realism,”’ International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 12, Issue 2 
(March 2012), pp. 287-315; Glenn D. Hook, Julie Gilson, Christopher W. Hughes, Hugo Dobson, Japan's International 
Relations: Politics, Economics and Security (London: Routledge, 2001), pp. 24, 37-9, 41. 
32 David Kang, “Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks,” International Security, Vol. 27, No. 4 
(Spring 2003), p. 166. 
33 Ibid, p. 83. Kang argued that realism is inadequate because it failed to explain why arms racing had not occurred and 
that Asian states did not appear to be balancing against rising powers such as China. Rather they seem to be 
bandwagoning. 
34 Teruyoshi Shibata, Reisengo Nihon no Bōei Seisaku: Nichibei Dōmei Shinka no Kigen [Japan’s Post-Cold War 
Defence Policy: The Origins of the Strengthened Japan-US Alliance] (Sapporo-Shi: Hokkaido Daigaku Shuppankai, 
2011). Shibata argues that external pressure altered Japan’s internal policy in the form of the 1994 Higuchi Report that 
proposed strengthening the security treaty. The report recommended that the SDF be allowed to participate in UN PKOs, 
and promoted both U.S.-centered bilateralism and UN centered multilateralism, thus setting basic parameters for critical 
changes in defense and security policy following the end of the bipolar order. Looking that the Nye Report in 1995 and 
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But again, it can be said that the purpose of such approaches, seems, arguably, to win arguments 
about how to label policy changes rather than to explain those policies on their own terms. At least, 
perhaps, an analytically eclectic approach to assessing Basic Plan 2016 might conclude that it is the 
product of balancing parsed through institutional brakes by a State (Japan) recognizing it will be a middle 
power and is unwilling an unable to engage in conflicts; that wants to hedge and maintain technologies 
for more strategic weapons, but lacks cash and diplomatic clout; and that is reluctant and unable to deal 
with the strong potential of an antagonistic diplomatic and media-driven backlash against more overt 
defensive strengthening.  
All this is entirely reasonable and resonates well with the empirical facts and my fieldwork. But this 
type of approach does little to explain, why the latest policy allows for the development of TacSats and 
contemplates the highly advanced and strategically provocative development of space-based EW, for 
example.35  
 
Microtheoretical Approaches 
 
Bureaucratic Institutionalism  
As Shibata’s approach implies, system-level analyses fail to address the complexities of policymaking in 
Japan that exist through all the seven or eight levels of inputs that form the decision-making calculus that 
feeds into and forms the foundation of space policy formulation. As has been pointed out, Japan’s space 
policy transition cannot be understood without an analysis of Levels 4, 5 and 6. Against this, there is a vast 
literature on Japanese policymaking that emphasizes the power of the central bureaucracy and, post-war, 
the growth of an enormous layer of subgovernmental institutions with enormous budgetary needs. Such 
analyses are built on a similarly large literature on organizational theory and institutionalism, and the 
peculiarities of the construction of the Meiji State and modern Japan following the Pacific War. Figure 6 
outlines the basic forms of institutionalism. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
the National Defense Program Outline, then the 1996 Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration, and the review of the 1978 Guidelines 
for U.S.–Japan Defense Cooperation in 1997, Shibata notes how Japan’s defense policy establishment (institutions) and 
elites began to embrace the alliance in the 1990s based on a combination of rational cost calculations of political actors 
and bureaucratic dynamics, referring back to the traditional debate over agency (politicians or the bureaucracy) as the 
primary force of change, also noting that the growing power of the JDA in the Higuchi report. At the time of the Nye 
report, the Pentagon was the primary actor, which then, in turn, consolidated the power of the JDA, working with a 
growing consensus of mainstream political security politics supporting the 1997 guidelines. 
 As such it is possible to call Shibata’s analysis a typical version of historical institutionalist theory based on a 
path-dependency hypothesis leading to cumulative and incremental change based on the gradual increase in power and 
credibility of the JDA and its uniformed bureaucrats, who pushed for ever closer bilateral ties during the period. 
Institutional change was therefore driven by the impact of a series of policy ideas, including bilateralism with the U.S., 
the rise of the idea of comprehensive security, and the need for deeper U.S. policy coordination with the primary actors 
being the Prime Minister’s Advisory Group on Defence, Japan’s Security Council, and the Security Subcommittee (SSC). 
35 One can equally argue that Japan’s inability to coordinate an MDA system when Japanese territorial waters appear to 
be sometimes swamped by Chinese paramilitary fishing fleets shows just how minimalist Japan’s response is. And do the 
argument can go round in circles. See Dan Southerland, “Japan May Face a New Chinese Onslaught in Dispute Over East 
China Sea Islets,” Radio Free Asia, 25 October 2017; Grant Newsham, “Shinzo Abe’s Japan: A Threat to Nobody,” 
Japan Forward, 1 November 2017; Newsham, “Defending Japan’s southern islands from Chinese osmosis,” Asia Times, 
13 October 2017. 
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         Figure 6: Basic Institutionalist Theories 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 This section is rather longer than the other surveys of international relations paradigms because, as the 
introduction section of this dissertation suggests, understanding the role (motivations) of bureaucratic 
players in space policy is indispensable to understanding the hows, whens and whys of policy 
implementation and its struggles, particularly in the 2009-16 period.  
 That said, beyond space policy, the importance of the role of bureaucracy in Japan is well accepted by 
many international relations scholars – except, perhaps, the most recalcitrant realists. In fact, much of 
critical analysis of space policy transition between 2009-14 occurs between Levels 3, 4 and 5. Thus, an 
understanding bureaucratic institutionalism, which looks at analytical models of motivations and behavior 
of institutions, and then, with hybrid models discussing their relationships with politicians, is helpful. 
 
Pluralism and Allison’s Second and Third Models 
The role and importance of bureaucratic politics in decision-making scenarios in Japan stems from 
pluralistic theories that assume politics consists of competing organized interests, with Japan’s central 
ministries playing a predominant role.36  
 Allison’s basic premise for making sense of complex government decisions rested on the fact that the 
rational actor model used by neorealists and various stripes of neoliberal approaches could be 
supplemented by an organizational process model and a bureaucratic politics model. Allison’s second 
model defined government actions as outputs of large organizations whose behavior is determined by 
standard routines and operating procedures, which government leaders can disturb, but not substantially 
control. In Allison’s third model, bureaucratic politics hypothesizes intensive bargaining among 
decision-making entities. Thus, government policy is not solely made by calculating decision-makers but 
is rather a conglomeration of the inputs of large organizations and political actors, as he put it.37 
 Clearly such an approach could provide an analytically useful framework when applied to space 
policy transition. In bureaucratic models, organizations and political actors compete against each other in 
                                                
36 Stephen D. Krasner, Defending the National Interest (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), p. 26. 
37 Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Addison-Wesley Longman, 
1999), p. 67. 
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attempting to forge governmental policies. Thus, decisions are formed among internally generated 
alternatives, with choices that are forged in the bureaucratic system. This seems especially pertinent to 
Japan, when, as with space policy, decisions have to be made by several bureaucratic participants and 
other actors, and where jurisdictional lines are either unclear, or contested. Often, the focus of attention is 
on Level 5, and inter-bureaucratic battles, which are seen as the cauldron of policy decision-making 
processes, into which inputs from Levels 4 and 6 also feature. 
 When applied to international negotiations, Levels 1 and 2 become more important, but again the 
cauldron of action centers on Levels 4 and 5. This has led to the use of mixing bureaucratic models with 
hybrid theories such as two-level games, which will be discussed below. In order to understand the 
complexities of the roles of bureaucratic actors in policymaking, it is important to understand their basic 
behavioral modes and modus operandi. Such issues are conventionally analyzed and explained through 
institutional behavioral models. The next section therefore first deals with institutionalism generally; then 
institutional frameworks as applied to Japanese policymaking. Following that, some specific examples are 
briefly examined.   
 
Classical Institutionalism, New-, and Neoinstitutionalism 
Classical institutionalism has examined the role of bureaucracies in policymaking. International 
institutionalism, closely associated with Regime Theory, assumed that the existence of structured 
interactions between State-level and international organizations has a profound impact on State policy and 
that policy is related to (neo)liberal internationalism.38 New institutionalism-based approaches provide a 
partial framework for analyzing the behavior of bureaucracies in competitive areas. Such approaches 
emphasise how path dependent bureaucracies are, in that their historical origin and role makes their 
decision-making heavily constrained by past choices, and that they seek to avoid change, unless they 
perceive change is in their interest.39  
 Behavioral science-based approaches view institutions as conglomerations of norms and normative 
values built on the choices of individuals. Structural functionalist-based analysis focuses on how 
                                                
38 Institutions can be defined as a structural feature of society in which groups of individuals engage in patterned 
interactions that are partly predictable and that transcend the actions of the individuals involved. Of the six main 
traditional Institutionalist schools, Empirical Institutionalism emphasized how the structure of government affects in the 
way policies are processed and choices made. Derived from neoliberal internationalism, Regime Theory argues that 
international institutions or regimes affect the behavior of states or other international actors, based on the assumption that 
cooperation is possible in the anarchic system of states, as regimes are, by definition, instances of international 
cooperation. See Guy Peters, Institutional Theory in Political Science: The ‘New Institutionalism’ (New York: Continuum, 
1999), pp. 18-19. As noted, Peters defines six major branches. Normative Institutionalism focuses on norms of institutions 
and how they function and determine behavior. This can in fact be broken down further into Classical (Historical) 
Institutionalism. As the formal study of institutions and their roles, Classical Institutionalism began as a discipline over 
100 years ago, perhaps best represented in 1887 on the U.S. government and his 1898 monograph, in Woodrow Wilson’s 
The State: Elements of Historical and Practical Politics. A Sketch of Institutional History and Administration. In this 
school, the behavior of an institution was determined in law by its position in the government and the history of its 
development and its culture. Studies were historical rather than analytical. Classical Institutionalism was preoccupied with 
formal structures and legal systems, involved detailed accounts of particular political systems and intricate accounts of 
interlinked rules, rights and procedures that institutions operated, and focused on origins of power and action but not how 
institutions adapted to challenges.  
39 Neoinstitutionalism is a hybrid of Normative Institutionalism, which comprises Classical Intuitionalism and Rational 
Choice Institutionalism. Rational Choice Theory examined how individuals maximize their utility in any given situation, 
using the principal-agent model. This, applied to institutions, focused on how institutions accrue stability through dealing 
with collective action problems. Institutional decisions are seen as the aggregation of individual behaviors and decisions 
based on utility maximization with a set of institutional rules and norms, usually based upon the perception of the 
ideology of the institution. 
  47 
conformity stymies change.40 Structural functionalists argue that organizations form identities that are 
enduring and distinctive and that those values are the primary factors in determining policy, less so 
rational choice incentives. Organizations congeal into collections of rules and roles that become 
preoccupied with preserving their own powers and prerogatives, that the operating software of 
bureaucratic organizations leads their behavior and actions towards maintaining continuity and tamping 
change; or even that power as it becomes invested and entrenched in established institutions becomes 
merely a function of self-preservation.41  
  A classic study of the insitutionalist school proposed that decision-making in organizations is 
bounded by the logic of appropriateness (as opposed to the logic of consequences), a framework of 
routinized responses to problems; a constrained or bounded rationality that governs decisions that places 
the maintenance of stability as the primary goal of institutions. Ultimately, this logic holds that 
organizations are more interested in preserving their own roles than accepting change, unless they have to, 
or that change can be in the interest of the organization, for example, when the change is considered 
legitimate because it can be fit into the logic of the institution’s preservation or goals, or that more simply 
because the change actually delivers stability. But, saying that, according to the logic of appropriateness, 
the first choice of organizations is generally to maintain the status quo. Thus, the logic of appropriateness 
is often associated with inefficiency and rigidity. Many other formulations also focus on why institutions 
tend to favor stability in decision-making, etc.42  
                                                
40 Talcott Parsons, The Social System (New York: The Free Press, 1951). Early post-war work at the Columbia School 
under Robert K. Merton focused on bureaucracies. Merton depicted multiple forces within a bureaucracy orientating 
officials to conform to a normative order, with the strength of the pressures being so strong that Merton argued that 
officials are prone to follow rules to the point of rigidity, formalism, and even ritualism. Merton’s main finding was that 
processes within organizations lead officials to orientate their actions around rules even “to the point where primary 
concern with conformity to the rules interferes with the achievement of the purposes of the organization.” See Gabriel A. 
Almond and James S. Coleman, (eds.) The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1960); Robert K. Merton, “Bureaucratic structure and personality,” in Social Theory and Social Structure, 2nd edition, 
(Gencoe, IL: Free Press, 1940), pp. 195-206. 
41 Selznick was a major proponent of the neo-classical organizational theory. In particular, in Leadership in 
Administration (New York: Harper & Row, 1957) Selznick basically asserted that institutions are “imbued” with goals 
and procedures that gradually accrete so that institutions develop inherent values and rationales built on distinctive 
histories, and that these lead organizations to create a distinctive identities and unique values and to defend their vested 
interests to the point where official goals can even mask the organization’s real objectives. See, for example, Philip 
Selznick, “Foundations of the Theory of Organization,” American Sociological Review, Vol. 13, Issue 1 (February 1948), 
pp. 25-35. Selznick also argued that organizations constantly monitor threats to their stability and function reinforce their 
internal stability and focus on the continuity of policy against change or external pressures and retain their homogeneity 
of outlook based on survival and the maintenance of prestige. See also Arthur L. Stinchcombe, Constructing Social 
Theories (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), pp. 107-111. 
42 James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, “The new institutionalism: organizational factors in political life,” American 
Political Science Review 78, Vol. 25, No. 1 (September 1984), pp. 738-49. This summary of March and Olsen is from 
Peters (1999), p. 17. The logic of appropriateness is a view of action that defines a basis for decision-making 
biased toward what social norms deem correct rather than what cost-benefit calculations consider to have the most utility 
or advantage. Motives in specific situations follow from rules that have been institutionalized in social practices and 
sustained over time through learning and that govern the appropriate courses of action for a given role or identity. Thus, 
the logic of appropriateness yields for organizations institutional order, stability, and predictability.  
 At the same time, this logic may run counter to democratic principles by implying the substitution of tacit 
understanding for collective deliberation. The logic of appropriateness differs from the logic of consequences, which 
holds that self-interested rational actors with fixed preferences and identities behave according to calculations of expected 
returns from alternative choices.  
 The logic of appropriateness presumes that organizations will follow rules because they are perceived as natural, 
valid, and legitimate, and that those rules may be replaced or modified over time. However, the logic of appropriateness is 
often associated with inefficiency, rigidity, and incrementalism.  
 Thus some argue that institutions are wedded to persistent patterns of behavior that are created when the institutions 
are formed. See Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo, (eds.) Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in 
Comparative Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). Others assert that that institutions are 
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  All these analytical models can explain the motivations of bureaucratic actors, and account for a 
certain set of behaviors and actions. But such models tend to focus on the actors themselves rather than 
the wider network or networks of interdependent relationships with other actors, (institutions) or the 
broader environment in which institutions act. Also, the frameworks of these approaches focus on the 
behavior or institutions on the assumption that they are relatively stable because they need to be 
consistent in the roles they play, and because they have evolved to solve collective action problems and 
hunt for gains from trade. Therefore, in a competitive environment, institutions involved in politics, for 
example, are interested in maintaining their own powers and budgets first and foremost, but that they may 
also seek power to gain control of rule-making systems.43 
 To emphasise how institutionalism sees bureaucratic decision-making as almost truculently obstinate 
in the preservation of budgets and power first and acceptance of change if only sublimated to the benefit 
or non-harm of a particular organization, Niskanen’s classic Rational Choice Theory-based study of 
bureaucracy sees institutions compete as self-interested actors attempting to maximize their own gains and 
lower their transaction costs, in which leaders use their positions to usually only boost budget allocations 
and accrue more personnel, powers and prerogatives.44 These views of bureaucratic institutions, then, 
basically hold them as essentially “selfish” in that institutions will place their own preferences above other 
considerations.  
 All these approaches are obviously useful in understanding, for example, the motivation of MEXT in 
blocking institutional reform from 2009-12. Yet, the transition of space policy through Basic Plans 1-2016 
involves a long series of dynamic interactions and negotiations between ministries and the Cabinet Office. 
Negotiations involved positions that shifted in action-reaction scenarios, changes in comparative power 
between several institutions, and successive recalibrations in the relative stances of institutions in 
relationships that were evolving sometimes by the month, with all these spinning cogs and action-reaction 
cycles occurring over a number of years. In other words, to understand the behavior of Japan’s bureaucratic 
actors in accounting for space policy transition and changes in the balance of institutional policymaking 
power, the analyst needs to take into account a multi-stakeholder competition of shifting stances and 
competition and cooperation over a period of phases and years.  
 
Neoinstitutionalism  
More helpful, perhaps, is neoinstitutionalism, which was specifically developed to explain more 
completely why organizations make decisions and change, and how institutions react strategically to 
pressures. In this approach, organizations are evaluated as a collection of actors not so much following 
                                                                                                                                                        
path-dependent, where path dependence is explained through positive feedback that codes the role of the institution. See 
Paul Pierson, “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics,” The American Political Science Review, 
Vol. 94, No. 2 (June 2000), pp. 251-267. Others explain change in institutional behavior in terms ‘punctuated equilibria,’ 
in which organizations can undergo rapid periods of change followed by long periods of stasis. For yet others, change 
happens through ‘critical junctures,’ in which institutions are forced to change at the risk of incurring huge penalties, but 
that institutions can but also admit gradual and incremental adjustments. Finally, another argument is that the stable 
mindset of an institution means it will only support a limited range of possibilities. See, again, Peters (1999), pp. 77-82. 
43 Terry M. Moe, “The politics of bureaucratic structure,” In Can the Government Govern?, (eds.) John Chubb and Paul 
Peterson (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1990), pp. 267-329. 
44 According to Niskanen’s famous model of bureaucracy, bureaucracies necessarily play an important role in 
policymaking in modern societies that are characterized by a sophisticated division of labor. Niskanen proposed that the 
head of any public administration unit seeks to maximize his (or her) unit’s budget, increase the number of employees, 
and hence, increase his or her power and importance, a process fortified by the fact that bureaucrats are not bound by 
re-election constraints. See William A. Niskanen Jr., Bureaucracy and Representative Government (Transaction 
Publishers, 1971). 
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their own scripts as constrained by competition within their fields. This might be characterized in terms of 
something like actors competing in internal market.45 
 Organizations can be seen as dynamic even when they are well established because powerful actors 
continually work to maintain their legitimacy to outside threats.46 DiMaggio and Powell, in their study of 
institutional isomorphism, examined how institutions defended themselves from change, outside 
interference, or attempts to reform them, for example, but will accept change if change reinforces the 
organization’s legitimacy, as those institutions construct or perceive it.47  
 Neoinstiutionalists also recognized that “organizational fields” of action, i.e. complex interactions with 
other organizations and stakeholders, including regulatory agencies, form frameworks that also influence 
decisions. Responses become shaped by a narrowly defined set of legitimate options, which are, in turn, 
informed by competition, and the institutions’ awareness of their interdependence with competitors, 
where the actions of institutions are bounded by both accumulated internal and internalized norms, 
regulatory considerations, and the network(s) of relationships in which they were embedded. Such norms 
then create templates for action, which create unified or monolithic responses to uncertainty.48 
 Because of its emphasis on how institutions change and react to pressures around them, i.e. focusing 
on institutions as potentially dynamic and capable of change, and relating that change to a broader 
environment, neonstitutionalist approaches are analytically useful for examining Levels 4 and 5, for 
example. As is recognized by Fligstein and McAdam, the SAF framework draws heavily on 
neonstitutionalist approaches. However, fundamentally, neonstitutionalist approaches do not examine, or 
rather, are unconcerned with Levels 1 and 2. Outside factors may kick off change, but the dynamic 
interactions between outside and external events are not analyzed systematically in a framework designed 
to explain this interaction. This lack makes them only partially useful to examining space policy 
transition. 
 
Institutional Theory in Japan 
Bureaucratic institutionalism in Japan traditionally focuses on the role of the central bureaucracy and 
political power in postwar Japan. Because studies can tend to focus on the inner complexities of 
tatewari-gyōsei (institutional stovepiping) and inter-bureaucratic competition, they are also helpful in 
explaining the mechanisms of policymaking in Japan. But, as with other bureaucratic models, their 
primary focus may often be on Level 5. That is to say, such approaches are insufficient to explain (or take 
                                                
45 Christine Olivier, “Strategic Responses to Institutional Processes,” Academy of Management Review, Vol. 16, No. 1 
(January 1991), pp. 145-179. 
46 Paul J. DiMaggio, “Interest and Agency in Institutional Theory,” pp. 3-12, in Institutional Patterns and Organizations 
(ed.) Lynne Zucker (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1988); Michael Lounsbury, and Mary Anne Glynn, “Cultural 
Entrepreneurship Stories: Legitimacy, and the Acquisitions of Resources,” Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 22, No. 2 
(June 2001), pp. 545-564. 
47 DiMaggio and Powell divided their concept of “isomorphism” into “coercive,” “mimetic” and “normative 
isomorphism.” In coercive isomorphism, the implication is that bureaucracies fight change through emphasizing their 
legitimacy to political threats. In mimetic isomorphism, bureaucracies fight any uncertainty by emphasizing their status 
quo functions. In normative isomorphism, bureaucracies fight change through emphasizing their professionalism and 
competency. See also DiMaggio & Powell (1983). For more on isomorphism, see Marco Orru, Nicole Woolsey Biggart, 
and Gary C. Hamilton, “Organizational Isomorphism in East Asia,” in Powell & Di Maggio (1991), pp. 361-369. 
48 Richard W. Scott, “Unpacking Institutional Arguments,” in The New Intuitionalism in Organizational Analysis, (eds.) 
Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), pp. 164-192); Richard W. Scott, 
Institutions and Organizations, Ideas, Interests and Identities (London: Sage, 2014), p. 56; Fligstein (1990); DiMaggio 
and Powell (1991). 
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into account) the broader context of decision-making and the importance of relationships and interactions 
with other decision-making levels (called in the SAF framework the “greater field environment.”)  
 Bureaucratic institutionalists can be divided between those who see the central bureaucracy as 
fundamentally controlling Japan’s government; those who see politicians as playing an important role when 
strong individuals arise; and those who see fundamental cooperation between the bureaucracy and 
politicians as a modus operandi forged (sometimes/often cynically and uncomfortably) in the mutual 
pursuit of self-interest. Frameworks that study the role of politicians and the bureaucracy are looked at more 
fully in the Political-Bureaucratic Models section, discussed below. Such frameworks are built on a 
deeper foundation of historical- and new institutionalist-based studies that look at the origins of 
bureaucratic power in Japan. Such studies emphasise that modern Japan is founded on a “developmental 
state” model. This describes the deeply embedded and powerful role of today’s central ministries as 
entrenched repositories (and the heirs of) elite technocrats that first built the Meiji State, and then 
post-war, that rebuilt the modern Japanese State, accruing vast reservoirs of power, lawmaking ability, 
accumulated rights, prerogatives, and jurisdictions (to which they jealously cling) in the process.49  
 Sasada summarized three main models to explain changes and continuity in institutions, emphasizing 
“critical juncture,” “path dependency,” and “ideational reinforcement” to explain how and why Japanese 
bureaucracies resist any interference to their extant, evolved roles, so that Japan’s central bureaucracies 
are institutionally and culturally resistant to any policy changes that may alter the distribution of power, 
rights, competencies, jurisdictions, budgets and objectives accrued and entrenched when individual 
ministries, or the central bureaucracy as a whole is faced with pressure to change policies or roles (or lose 
budget, or staff, for example).50 The basic standpoint in discussing the role of Japan’s central bureaucracy, 
then, is based on a recognition of its enormous, but not indefatigable power. The second point has been 
explaining the modus operandi of ministries and how they usually block change unless it is in their 
advantage, or they cannot avoid it. Within this, it is possible to discern several schools of analysis of 
Japan’s central bureaucracy, all attempting to frame answers to the basic research question: “Who 
governs?”  
                                                
49 In his classic study, Pempel cites the central role that the Japanese bureaucracy has played in implementing so many of 
the major changes in Japan “as a planner and agent of change” and traces this evolution and roles back to the to the Nara 
period (710-794), through to the establishment of a proto-national bureaucracy in the centralized feudalism of the 
Tokugawa family in the early 1600s, and then the adoption of Bismarck’s Prussian model to effect industrialization 
during the Meiji restoration, creating a cadre of highly competent and entitled technocrats hired through rigorous 
examinations that stressed their general competence to govern as most important, rather than specialist knowledge.  
 As well as stressing the cultural and political dynamics of independence and power built into and accreted by the 
antecedents of today’s central bureaucracy, Muramatsu and Pempel emphasized that the basic forms of control – formal 
and informal – over Japan’s postwar economy exercised by Japan’s central bureaucracy that still exists today. The 
foundation of this, invested in the postwar priority production system were themselves founded in the controls instituted 
after 1941 to meet the exigencies of total war. These, in turn, were preceded by foundational implementative legal rights, 
such as the Emergency Measures Law concerning Exports and Imports in 1937 that forced strategic industries into cartels 
controlled indirectly through subservient trade bodies.  
 Muramatsu and Pempel assert that during the invasion of Manchuria, a class of dynamic bureaucrats who formed 
their own elite cadre came to control vast productive swaths of the Japanese economy and that is princely cadre looked 
down on parliament and political control, joined forces with the military, and formed a core of privileged expectations 
that set the stage for postwar bureaucratic dominance of the economy.  
 Leading these young guns were Nobusuke Kishi (Ministry of Commerce and Industry), Shiro Tabata, and Hiroo 
Wada, of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. Kishi masterminded a policy of rationalization of industries and the 
military to advance into Manchuria to secure national resources to sustain future war efforts. See T. J Pempel, 
“Bureaucracy in Japan,” Political Science and Politics, Vol. 25, No. 1 (March 1992), pp. 19-24. 
50 Much has been written about the pre-war managed economy model, as cited extensively in Hironori Sasada, The 
Evolution of the Japanese Developmental State: Institutions locked in by ideas, (Abingdon, Oxon; NY: Routledge, 2013); 
see also Gao Bai, Economic Ideology and Japanese Industrial Policy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
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 Debate is divided into the “Dominant Bureaucracy School” and the “Pluralist School.” The former 
describes Japan’s central bureaucracy as a state within a state, exercising pervasive leadership over the 
recovery and development of post-war Japan, even having dictatorial powers. The latter analyzes power 
distribution between politicians and the central bureaucracy and found a more nuanced picture.51  
 In particular, the “Pluralist School” analyzes power distribution between politicians and the central 
bureaucracy and finds more nuanced pictures variously depicting dual-competitive control, dual-states, or 
a flux between the bureaucracy and politicians, particularly ambitious or intellectually engaged 
individuals, and “reciprocal consent” models, in which the LDP’s Policy Affairs Research Council 
(PARC) is ultimately able to control policy and regulate the bureaucratic response. An approach based on 
this understanding obviously has utility for analyzing Level 4 and Level 5 interactions.52 
 
Political and Constitutional Approaches  
Understanding the role of politicians and their interactions up and down the decision-making levels and 
with various actors forms another important part of the jigsaw in understanding Japanese space policy 
transition. While political relationships in general in the bureaucratic model sections argue over the 
relative power or powerlessness of politicians compared to the established policymaking power of the 
bureaucracy, the empirical evidence shows that key certain politicians played major roles in space policy 
transition at decisive points.  
 Analysts of Japanese security strategy transition have taken into account political and constitutional 
factors, and the role of political leadership. Research has uncovered examples of the intricate and deeply 
interconnected relationships key politicians have forged with Japan’s central ministries. On a general 
level, most analysis of security strategy and politics is based on Article 9 of the 1947 Japanese 
                                                
51 The foundational texts for this are Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy 
1925-1975 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1982); Daniel Okimoto, Between MITI and the Market: Japanese 
Industrial Policy for High Technology (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1989); Marie Anchordogy, Computers 
Inc.: Japan’s Challenge to IBM (Cambridge Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1989.) 
52 Many agree that policy zoku developed as more competent LDP politicians worked with and paid off more interest 
groups; competition and or/cooperation grew between politicians and the bureaucracy, particularly from the 1970s, during 
and after the prime minstership of Kakuei Tanaka, who turned the LDP into a major power nexus.  
 A pluralist model or a principal-agent (politicians as principals and the bureaucracy as agents) model grew, 
involving for some, necessitating “reciprocal consent” between politicians, bureaucracies and markets, while the series of 
scandals visited upon the bureaucracy in 1990s in particular lowered public trust in the bureaucracy and powered reforms. 
Sometimes zoku politicians even cooperated with the bureaucracy against reforms and attempts to lower government 
deficits and cut spending and bureaucracy.  
    See Kent E. Calder, “Linking Welfare and the Developmental State; Postal Savings in Japan,” Journal of Japanese 
Studies, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Winter 1990), pp. 31-59; J. Mark Ramseyer, and Frances McCall Rosenbluth, Japan’s Political 
Marketplace (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), p. 20.; Michio Muramatsu and Ellis S. Krauss, “The 
Conservative Party Line and the Development of Pattered Pluralism,” in Kozo Yamamura and Yasukichi Yasuba (eds.) 
The Political Economy of Japan, Volume 1: The Domestic Transformation (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
1987), p. 540; Curtis (1999), p. 53; Muramatsu and Krauss (1987), p. 517; Leonard J. Schoppa, “Zoku Power and LDP 
Power: A Case Study of the Zoku Role in Education Policy,” Journal of Japanese Studies, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Winter 1999), 
pp. 79-106; Gary D. Allison, “Tanaka Kakuei, Structural Corruption, and the Advent of Machine Politics in Japan,” pp. 
123-144, in Andrew Gordon (ed.) Postwar Japan as History (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993); 
Muramatsu and Kraus (1987), pp. 516-34; Richard Samuels, The Business of the Japanese State: Energy Markets in 
Comparative and Historical Perspective (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), pp. 8-9; Okimoto (1989); Eiji 
Kawabata, “Reforming the Bureaucracy,” chapter in Democratic Reform in Japan: Assessing the Impact, (eds.) Sherry L. 
Martin and Gill Steel (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2008), p. 102; Kawabata, “The Japanese Civil Service 
and Economic Development, Catalysts of Change,” (eds.) Hyung-Ki Kim, Michio Muramatsu, T.J. Pempel, Kozo 
Yamamua (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); pp. 7-10, 58-64; T.J. Pempel, “The Bureaucratization of 
Policymaking in Postwar Japan,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 18, No 4. (November 1974), pp. 647-64. 
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Constitution, in which the Japanese people not only forever renounce war as a sovereign right but also the 
threat or use of force to settle international disputes.51  
 Against this, constitutional revision has been a fundamental goal of some conservative politicians 
since 1947. Since 1991, however, successive LDP governments have engaged in what has been called 
“constitutional bypassing,” where successive legislation gradually pushing back limits to the use of the 
armed forces, most noticeably now under the second Abe administration.52 The “chipping away” at 
Article 9 is said to have accelerated after the 1990 Persian Gulf Crisis, spurred by the belief, among some 
conservative policy elites at least, that Japan should play a more active role its own security agenda, 
especially its policy on overseas dispatch of the SDF, to “normalize” itself as a middle-power State.53  
 Some argue that powerful prime ministers can play a major role in policy change and they are key 
actors, at least in the short periods they yield sufficient political popularity and/or political clout to 
achieve specific agenda. Sometimes strong (or popular) prime ministers can effectively deal with 
subgovernments, particularly the bureaucracy, puppet-masters and habatsu (intra-LDP sectionalism). 
Clausen and others argue that because the prime minister wields power through the Cabinet, the prime 
minister’s control over the Cabinet also delimits or enables the exercise of power. Prime ministers who 
have successfully prosecuted particular agendas have also pursued leadership and presidential-style 
premierships, manipulated the media, and bypassed or harnessed bureaucratic resources.54 Ryūtarō 
                                                
51 1947 Japanese Constitution, Chapter II (Renunciation of War), Article 9. 
52 These stories are covered in length in mainstream realist articles and monographs. For constitutional bypassing, see in 
particular, Hook and McCormack (2001), pp. 3, 13-17; and see also generally, Boyd & Samuels (2005), pp. 1-77. 
53 This led, not without great difficulty and opposition, to new legal frameworks to allow the SDF to participate in 
Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs), the passing of the International Peace Cooperation Law, (the so-called PKO Law), 
which in 1992 enabled the dispatch of the SDF to Cambodia. Japan also gradually adjusted its ODA to become more 
active in the realm of UN-supported human security initiatives. In the mid-1990s, the government also reconfirmed its 
commitment to the U.S.-Japan alliance through a joint declaration between the U.S. president and Hashimoto, then, under 
Koizumi, the dispatch of the SDF to the Indian Ocean and Iraq, and the enactment of laws in 2004 and 2006 to help the 
SDF deal with attacks from outside of Japan. Other changes ensued, including the elevation of the JDA to the MOD, 
greater activity by the SDF in peacekeeping, disaster relief, and other gradualist profile-raising developments, including 
the acquisition of a BMD system; see Hughes (2009); Tatsumi and Oros (2007).  
    These changes could be described in terms of the emergency of an unofficial “dual identity” for Japan’s security 
posture that has emerged since the mid-2000s that sees Japan as a nearly normal military power, but still restrained by its 
1947 Constitution. While some analysts have traced the security policy changes that have emerged since 1998 through the 
power of activist prime ministers, following 2000, a steadily broader consensus many of the old taboos at least in policy 
elites have broken down in the face of a pragmatic need to react to North Korean and, latterly Chinese security concerns. 
 So much so, that differences in security issues are now to be found within party lines, rather than between left-right 
ideological differences. For arguments along these lines, see Pekkanen & Kallender-Umezu (2010), p. 14-18; Green 
(2003), pp. 25-26. For an overview of the various political party proposals, see Hughes, “Why Japan Could Revise Its 
Constitution and What It Would Mean for Japanese Security Policy,” Orbis, Vol. 50, No. 4 (Autumn 2006), pp. 736-741; 
Robert Pekkanen and Ellis S. Krauss, “Japan’s ‘Coalition of the Willing’ on Security Policies,” pp. 431-439; Samuels 
(2007), pp. 135-137; Jacob Brown, “Catalysts, Choices and Cooperation: Japanese Military Normalization and the 
U.S.-Japan Alliance,” Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Summer 2005), pp. 41-42. 
54 Clausen, in his study of the prime ministerships of Hashimoto (1996-1998), Koizumi (2001-2006) and Hatoyama 
(2009-2010) has argued that Japanese prime ministers played an important role in the realm of defense policy and politics 
by empowering different actors, and that strong or competent prime ministers have enabled Japan to advance policies that 
may usually be generated on autopilot by the bureaucracy. Then, because the prime minister relies on the Cabinet to wield 
power, the prime minister’s control over the Cabinet determines his influence over government.  
 Clausen notes that while prime ministers are technically free to choose their own cabinet ministers, in reality prime 
ministers have often been beholden to party elders in their choices. For a long time, intraparty competition and a weak 
support staff also limited the effectiveness of the prime minister. Though political and administrative reforms during the 
late 1990s and early 2000s increased the support staff of the prime minister and consolidated the number of Cabinet 
ministers, thus making Cabinet consensus easier, the problem of intraparty competition still remains.  
 The same can be said of Japanese politics. The timing of prime ministerial interventions in the affairs of 
subgovernments, their choice of political allies, their use of institutional resources, as well as the public framing of their 
initiatives has made significant differences in the outcomes of their policy initiatives. Though no one approach is superior 
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Hashimoto and Shinichiro Koizumi are cited, for example, as having been able to execute tough security 
policy and alliance management issues, and take on Japan’s centralized bureaucracy (with mixed results), 
to achieve (again with mixed results) “reforms”, for example, to rationalize the bureaucracy (in 
Hashimoto’s case) and push through partial postal privatization (in Koizumi’s case).55  
 In the context of neorealist arguments, Koizumi can be cast as therefore specifically advancing the 
process of shaving down, or salami-slicing Japan’s restraints on military involvement in direct response to 
external drivers, using threats such as the Taepodong overflight to begin operation of BMD.56  
 On the other hand, in terms of institutional impact, Koizumi’s ability to partially reform Japan’s 
postal service, one of the bureaucracy’s most closely held subgovernment domains, in which he faced 
down not only the yusei zoku (the postal services-related group of Diet members) in the LDP and 
significant opposition in the bureaucracy, showed just how powerful a skilled (and/or well advised) and 
activist prime minister can be.57 In fact, the “Hashimoto model” and the “Koizumi model” were to 
provide major impetus and a framework for action that was to be adapted in the formulation of the ONSP 
in 2012.  
 Indeed, Level 4-Level 5 interactions form a core part of later analysis in this dissertation. Obviously, 
then, in the jigsaw of stakeholder relationships that need to be fitted together, the role of the relationships, 
alliances and battles between activist politicians and the bureaucracy and/or individual elements of it is 
                                                                                                                                                        
in and of itself, when the right approaches are combined, they can create a powerful political punch. See Daniel Clausen, 
“Leadership, Strategy, and Policy Entrepreneurship,” in “Japanese Security Politics: A Comparison of Three Prime 
Ministerships,” Florida International University, Vol. 13, Issue 1 (Article 11 in 2013), 24 May 2013; Robert Angel, 
“Prime Ministerial Leadership in Japan: Recent Changes in Personal Style and Administrative Organization,” Pacific 
Affairs, Vol. 61, No. 4 (Winter 1989), pp. 583-602; Tomohito Shinoda, Leading Japan: The Role of the Prime Minister 
(Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2000).  
55 Shinoda cites Ryūtarō Hashimoto, who was able to deal with tough trade negotiations with his counterpart Mickey 
Cantor, and who signed the U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security (Joint Declaration), and the 1997 U.S.-Japan 
Guidelines for Defense Cooperation, turning around the feeling that the alliance was adrift.  
 Extremely pertinent to this dissertation later, which will be approached in a detailed analysis of space policy 
administration change, Hashimoto also set up a major advisory committee as part of his six-area attempted reforms of the 
administration. Hashimoto’s basic competency led to other positive impacts felt in both domestic and foreign policy, 
including a successful visit to China and thaw in relations with PRC (following his endorsement of the Murayama 
Statement) and personal advocacy of BMD cooperation. See Shinoda (2000) pp. 50-51, 201. 
 Koizumi aggressively used the Cabinet Office, strengthened by Hashimoto, to create bureaucracy-bypassing action 
committees (while courting political allies from all spheres and the general public) to advance policy, particularly postal 
reform, détente with North Korea (while annually visiting Yasukuni Shrine), and embrace of the U.S., pushing forward 
Japan’s support of the U.S. in the wake of 9/11. This was achieved through lightning fast and bold public political 
pledges that outpaced bureaucratic resistance, and through Cabinet Office through populating it with outside experts and 
talented bureaucrats from line ministries, and the use and his own “hit squads” of activist committees, enabling him to 
push through both the Anti-Terror Legislation of 2001 and Iraq Dispatch Legislation of 2003, that led to dispatches of the 
SDF to the Indian Ocean and Iraq, moves that strained the limits of constitutional pacifism and that bordered on the de 
facto initiation of collective self-defense, according to some scholars.  
 See Tomohito Shinoda, “Koizumi’s Top-Down Leadership in the Anti-Terrorism Legislation: The Impact of 
Political Institutional Changes,” SAIS Review, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Winter-Spring 2003), pp. 19-34; “Japan's Cabinet 
Secretariat and Its Emergence as Core Executive,” Asian Survey, Vol. 45, No. 5（September/ October 2005）, pp. 800-821; 
“Japan’s Top-Down Policy Process to Dispatch the SDF to Iraq,” Japanese Journal of Political Science, Vol. 7, Issue 1, 
(April 2006), pp. 71-91; Koizumi Diplomacy: Japan’s Kantei Approach to Foreign and Defense Affairs (Seattle, WA: 
University of Washington Press, 2007); Daniel M. Kliman, “Japan’s Security Strategy in the Post-9/11 World: Embracing 
a New Realpolitik,” CSIS: Washington Papers 2006, p. 83. 
56 David Envall, “Transforming Security Politics: Koizumi Junichirō and the Gaullist Tradition in Japan,” Electronic 
Journal of Contemporary Japanese Studies, July 20, 2008; Samuels (2007), pp. 178-9; Gavin McCormack, Client State: 
Japan in the American Embrace (London, UK: Verso, 2007). 
57 According to Gerald Curtis, a zoku is composed of “Diet members who have a considerable amount of expertise and 
practical experience about a particular area of government policy and enough seniority in the party to have influence on a 
continuing basis with the ministry responsible for that policy area.” This quote from Curtis (1988), p. 114. See also 
Schoppa (1991), pp. 79-106. 
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important. And this type of analysis looks to have utility for explaining, for example, decisive political 
interventions by LDP politicians during various phases of space policy and administrative change.  
 
Political-Bureaucratic Conflict Models and the Shinoda Veto Power Model 
Much empirical work in Japan has discussed the evolving relationships between political and bureaucratic 
actors. Looking at Levels 4 and 5 underscores the importance of studying this relationship in analyzing 
space policy change. Taken in conjunction with studies showing how attempts to regulate or reform 
particular sectors, impinging on the rights, prerogatives, and/or budgets of individual ministries, and how 
ministries reacted, many case studies on such conflicts are also instructive in delineating modes of 
institutional behavior in Japan, emphasizing how difficult it can be to effect major changes in policy 
without bureaucratic consent. Such difficulties also have obvious analytical importance to discussing 
national policy, and can be seen as detailed studies of the domestic level games involved in reaching 
consensus in inter-State negotiations as studied by two-level game theory, which is discussed below.  
 There is also a vast range of empirical evidence studying tatewari-gyōsei in Japan, both in terms of 
the contested relationship of the civil service with politicians, and, even deeper, contested relationships 
between ministries. For example, Ito surveyed successive attempts by politicians between 1949 and 1990 
in three waves (1949-1954, the 1960s and the 1980s) to, variously: control public spending; exert political 
control over the bureaucratic subgovernment; curb or cut personnel numbers; and/or consolidate 
ministries and agencies – all with mixed results. Ultimately, however, each time political pressure was 
brought to bear on the bureaucracy, it typically responded by sublimating the pressure to consolidate its 
own power.58  
                                                
58 Mitsutoshi Ito, “Administrative Reform,” in Pempel and Muramatsu (1995), pp. 234-248. Ito identified three patterns 
of behavior by the bureaucracy to retain its power and prerogatives: positive responses, resistance, and avoidance to 
pressures to limit the size (curb personnel numbers) budgets, and to defenestrate and simplify regulations, i.e. reduce 
informal ministerial oversight.  
 For example, in 1949, the central bureaucracy sublimated the demand for a 30 percent (160,000 personnel) staff cut 
to create today’s vast subgovernmental system; work was redistributed to new institutions and agencies such as the 
Agency of Science and Technology, the Pension Bureau, the Prime Minister’s Office, and the Atomic Energy 
Commission. Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda’s establishment of the First Provisional Administrative Reform Council 
(FPARC) in 1961 to exert more political control resulted in the foundation of the bureaucratically-controlled Prime 
Minister’s Cabinet Office. Later FPARC attempts under Prime Minster Eisaku Sato in 1968 to abolish one bureau in each 
ministry did manage to cut 18 of 120 bureaus; but the establishment of the ‘scrap and build’ system to limit the number of 
ministries did not prevent the establishment of the Environmental Agency in 1971 and the National Land Agency in 
1974.Further, the 1969 Law Concerning the Number of Personnel in Administrative Agencies fixed the total number set 
absolute ceilings for ministerial staffing was not applied to the vast subgovernment system.  
 Nakasone’s attempt to control the bureaucracy in the 1980s through the Second Provisional Administrative Reform 
Committee (SPARC) was partially successful in cutting the General Account Budget, but attempts to cut informal powers 
exercised through permissions boomeranged, and personnel cuts were resisted. SPARC, designed to bypass bureaucratic 
interference as an independent committee of nine members, had only one central bureaucrat sitting at the top table, 
arming the committee with 21 experts, 50 councilors and 70 executive staff, and appointed Toshio Doko, former Toshiba 
CEO and chairman of Japan Federation of Economic Organizations, as chair. Proposal 1 of July 1981 recommended the 
reduction of subsidies and numbers for public corporations. Proposal 2 of February 1982 recommended the 
rationalization of permits and authorizations. Proposal 3 recommended the reinforcement of the Cabinet Office and the 
establishment of a Comprehensive Administrative Agency, as well as drastic privatization. These moves were followed 
by the First, Second and Third Provisional Councils for the Promotion of Administrative Reform in 1983, 1987 and 1990. 
 While the General Account Budget was reduced and the budget deficit lowered from 32.6 percent in 1980 to 15.6 
percent in 1982, the number of permissions granted by ministries and public corporations increased from 7,000 to 10,045 
in 1981. Attempts to consolidate the Economic Planning Agency, the National Land Agency, the Hokkaido Development 
Agency and the Okinawa Development Agency were stymied. The Management and Coordination Agency set up 1984 as 
a watchdog to cut waste was staffed with bureaucrats and led to the redirection of resources rather than an absolute cut in 
personnel. 
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 Attempts by Prime Minister Hashimoto in the late 1990s through the Administrative Reform Council 
(ARC, Gyōsei Kaikaku Kaigi) in 1996 to rationalize the bureaucracy were also mixed, and were to have 
unfortunate and direct impacts on Japan’s space program, as is discussed in detail below.59 
                         Figure 7: Political-Bureaucratic Conflict Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 As outlined above, the four-year battle by Koizumi aided by Heizō Takenaka to privatize the Japan 
Post Office has been analyzed because of the insights it gives in answering the basic question of “Who 
governs?” Koizumi’s attempt at privatization brought him into highly public and open conflict – 
deliberately so in Koizumi’s case as part of his public relations strategy to win popular support – in a bid 
to garner public opinion (with much success, it might be added) in support of “reform” put him in conflict 
with not only the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT) and bureaucratic control of the Fiscal 
Investment and Loan Program (FLIP), but also his own party’s yusei zoku, including future prime 
minister and present Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, Tarō Asō.  
 Echoing prior attempts to sidestep the bureaucracy, Koizumi not only created independent 
committees, including the famous “guerilla unit” of inner-circle aids to try to ram through his policies, but 
new political posts to oversee the reforms, led by Takenaka, as Minister of State for Economic and Fiscal 
Policy in 2001, Minister of State for Financial Services in 2002, then Minister of Internal Affairs and 
                                                
59 On paper, the Hashimoto reforms were supposed to be the biggest in postwar history, merging 22 ministries into 12, 
doubling the number of political appointees in ministries and agencies, collapsing overlaps, and empowering the prime 
minister and the Cabinet Office. The critical point about the reforms was that they enabled the prime minister to appoint 
ministers at his own discretion and directly control four important policymaking councils. Second, the reforms attempted 
to enhance political control over the merged ministries by increasing the number of political vice-ministers (appointed 
from among Diet members) and parliamentary undersecretaries to twice the previous number. By attempting to increase 
the staff of the Cabinet Office to strengthen the political control of policy (i.e. more independent of the central ministries) 
was also an important new attempt to assert more political control over the bureaucracy.  
 See Junko Kato, “Reforming the Japanese bureaucracy: Perceptions, potential and pitfalls, Japanese political reform: 
Progress is process,” Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Asia Program Special Report, No. 117 (January 
2004), pp. 34-7; Susan Carpenter, Japan’s Nuclear Crisis; The Routes to Responsibility (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 
2012), pp. 33-156. 
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Communications, and then as Minister of State for Privatization of the Postal Services.60 Koizumi’s 
struggles with not only the bureaucracy, the embedded subgoverment behind it, and his own politicians, 
were to be echoed by the battles of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) with MEXT five years later 
during a vital period when the DPJ fought the bureaucracy to implement the DPJ’s vision of the Basic 
Law.  
 At levels 4 and 5 (mainly Level 5), case studies have focused on the inner mechanics of institutional 
behavior modes in Japan. For example, Nobel found that attempts to deregulate sectors of the economy 
over the past two decades have also often been sublimated into opportunities to actually extend 
bureaucratic power.61 Case studies, again, tend to reinforce the notion of bureaucratic intransigence to 
change, unless that change is sublimated to a compromise in which key actors do not lose power and 
budgets.  
 For example, studying Japan’s response to the country’s financial crisis in the 1990s, Scheiner and 
Muramatsu found that the reliance of politicians upon the MOF’s expertize, that is to say the incumbent 
power of the MOF, acted as a brake that delayed financial reforms until the end of the decade.62 This 
situation was exacerbated by the fact that the banking sector hid information from the MOF and that the 
MOF later colluded with the banking sector to hide the scale of the issue until at least the mid-1990s.63  
                                                
60 The battle between Koizumi and the MPT and the Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs, Post, and 
Telecommunications (MPHPT, later the MIC) remains instructive because of the dynamics of competition between 
bureaucratic power, the players and what they represented, and the tactics involved. Attempting to wrest control from the 
MPT over the then ¥250 trillion Postal Savings Fund (PSF) postal life insurance and control of postal services, which the 
MPT controlled through a national network of 19,000 tokutei postal offices, brought Koizumi into direct confrontation 
with not only the MPT and yusei zoku politicians. The move also threatened the MPT’s major leverage over the Fiscal 
Investment and Loan Program (FLIP), which sustained the vast subgovernment of around 100 amakudari-run operations 
and provided vast sums of money for infrastructure projects in constituencies and for favored contractors. That is to say 
the reforms proposed by Koizumi amounted to an attack on the whole postwar bureaucratic system.  
 A four-year battle ensued, with Koizumi attempting to take control of policymaking through the Cabinet Office, 
bypassing the MPT, fighting of a civil war with yusei zoku led by Tarō Asō, and employing Heizō Takenaka to lead a 
specially convened Cabinet Office-based conference, and then the formation of a “guerilla unit” of inner-circle aids as 
both an outflanking agent and battering to hammer out a comprehensive postal privatization plan, and, then in extremis, 
the calling of a snap election in 2005 to force the issue. Having won the election, Koizumi was to see his reforms 
subsequently watered down and repurposed.  
 See Patricia L. Maclachlan, “Two Steps Forward, One Step Back: Japanese Postal Privatization as a Window on 
Political and Policymaking Change,” pp. 157- 18, in Political Change in Japan: Electoral Behavior, Party Realignment, 
and the Koizumi Reforms, (eds.) Steven R. Reed, Kenneth Mori McElwain, and Kay Shimizu (Stanford CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2009); Heizō Takenaka, Kōzō kaikaku no shinjitsu: Takenaka Heizō daijin nikki [A Testimony about 
Structural Reform: The Diary of Minister Takenaka Heizo] (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shinbunsha, 2006), pp. 216-18. 
61 Noble found that general politicians and ministries have actively deployed regulation as a means to extend their bases 
of power and that ministries see any form of change either as an opportunity to expand their power or a threat. When the 
principal agent model has been applied to Japan as with Ramseyer and Rosenbluth, politicians behave as “fire alarms,” 
but that most policy areas fail to attract strong political reforms due to the lack of direct reward and the complexity and 
time demands. Even when politicians are interested and undeterred, bureaucrats may be able to play multiple principal 
agents against one another.  
 For Noble, in Japan, the dynamic is based on a crucial managerial issue – the degree to which party leaders can 
centralize oversight over a myriad of interests behind ministries, including their supporters in industry for example, and 
the backbenches of the legislature. See Gregory W. Noble, “Trends in Economic and Social Regulation and Implications 
for Japan,” Journal of Social Science, Vol. 54, No. 2 (March 2003), pp. 45-75. 
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Interpretation,” in Steven R. Reed, Kenneth Mori McElwain, Kay Shimizu Walter H. Shorenstein, (eds.) Political 
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181-191. 
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 Similarly, studying telecommunications reform, Kawabata found that the supposed liberalization of 
the telecom market in the 1990s with the privatization of NTT actually led to an explosion of amakudari 
appointments, and also that MPT could play a dual role as an old-guard ministry protecting its role 
controlling the postal sector against reform attempts, while at the same time positioning itself as a 
vanguard agency in promoting telecommunications technology advancement, particularly promoting the 
use of the Internet so as to gain more control of the process.64  
 Pertinent to discussing the position of MEXT, Kawabata also theorized that a particular ministry’s 
“sanction power,” defined as how much exclusivity of jurisdiction a ministry has in a particular field, 
plays a major role in deciding how the ministry interacts with all other players, what its policy choices are, 
and what outcomes are possible. According to Kawabata, “exclusivity of jurisdiction” is thus the main 
factor in interministerial relations. The major factor pertinent to the exclusivity of jurisdiction are a 
ministry’s share of resources.65 Then, for policy areas for which jurisdiction is not clearly defined by a 
law or laws, “ministries typically develop unwritten rules about the division of labor between ministries, 
resulting in division of jurisdiction and equilibrium relationships between ministries.”66  Kawabata 
theorized that when a ministry breaks this equilibrium by trying to expand its role, “issue salience” 
increases for other ministries, and, as a result, jurisdiction becomes nonexclusive. The jurisdiction of a 
newly created policy area can also be nonexclusive when two or more ministries may claim jurisdiction.  
 Against this, nonexclusive jurisdiction over an issue often forces a ministry to deal with other 
ministries and get influential politicians to mediate if interministerial negotiations break down. Once 
invited to participate, politicians then advance their own policy preferences. “This fluid situation makes it 
easier for business leaders and other societal actors to insert their preferences into policy.”67 
 Such frameworks can also give insight into Japanese space policy change, because activist politicians 
have put strong efforts in changing space policy, to varying degrees, in a number of contexts, and with 
mixed results. In fact, as mentioned previously, political intervention in the formulation and execution of 
Japanese space policy change forms an important part of this dissertation’s analysis. Powerful politicians 
did play an important role in space policy transition, interlinking through Levels 1-5, but especially 
between Levels 3-5. The dramas that played out, particularly between 2009-16 in space policy and 
institutional transition, reflect the larger narrative of political-bureaucratic contentions following the 
Hashimoto reforms of the late 1990s in which activist politicians pushed to assert more political control 
over the bureaucracy. However, while very useful, the political-bureaucratic layer level and the phases of 
contention within it only make up one part of the story; a critical piece of the jigsaw for sure, but not the 
whole picture. 
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Two-Level Games  
A two-level games-based analysis of Japan’s space policy transition may also be analytically useful 
because such approaches, building on the work of Rosenau and Putnam, provide a framework for 
understanding how countries have to balance internally before they can reach international agreements.68   
 Two-level theory applied to explain Japanese international negotiation strategies and results provides 
insights into inter-ministerial bargaining and its relationship with political and international influences 
that can be applied to examining space policy change, in particular because the approach to Japanese 
two-level games emphasizes the power held by individual ministries and their orientation towards 
international agreements. Such approaches usefully delve deep into Level 4 bargaining, but also explain 
the direct relationship to international bargaining, and could be more useful than the more purely 
domestic-focused case studies based on the simple bureaucratic models mentioned above.  
 
       Figure 8: Basic Two-Level Games Scenario 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 In terms of studying whether or how Japan will or will not adopt international rules, for example, 
two-level games models show that this may depend on the attitude of the most powerful ministry 
involved. For example, a study on Japan’s approach to carbon trading showed that while the Ministry of 
the Environment (MOE) strongly supported ambitious greenhouse gas reduction targets through 
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international carbon trading, it could not fight the power of METI, which controls energy policy, has a far 
bigger staff and budget, and strong connections to business, which felt targets suggested by MOE to be 
unfair. Further, METI was strongly opposed to accepting the scheme because it reasoned that acceding to 
the MOE’s initiative might be the thin end of the wedge in setting a precedent for yielding more 
policymaking power to the MOE.69 
 Against this, there are examples of ministries skillfully using external pressures in order to reinforce 
their domestic power. For example, in examining Japanese participation in the negotiation process leading 
up to the 1988 Basle Capital Accord, Tamura found that the MOF simultaneously pursued the 
international goal of preserving the international competitiveness of Japanese banks, but used the talks to 
impose statutory capital adequacy rules on the sector against domestic opposition.70 
 In his study regarding trade liberalization issues, Ishiguro found that Japan’s central bureaucracy 
forms the main framework for decision-making, and that and decisions are made based on the balance of 
bargaining power between ministries. Pressure by international negotiators on powerful Japanese 
bureaucratic players varied depending on the goals of the ministries involved, their jurisdictional role, 
their political connections, and the behavior of business lobbies behind them. Japan’s negotiating position 
was the sum of the balance of power of interministerial coordination.71 
 Studies of Japan’s ODA strategy also provide interesting similarities with space policy.72 In 
comparing rational actor models (for example the “commercial instrument” interpretation referring to 
ODA as a means to expand trade by creating markets and the “mercantile realist” interpretation of ODA 
as one arm of Japan’s foreign policy of advancing its technological and economic position) and the 
bureaucratic model that states that government decisions are the result of bargaining by bureaucratic 
actors, Oguchi found that the influence of diplomatic and strategic pursuits and their impact on the 
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internal bargaining calculus to affect policy could not be ignored.73 The formation of government policy 
saw intense inter-ministerial bargaining but, above this, the prime minister, key figures within LDP and 
the government, and the business community all played important roles and made rational choices, and 
individual ministries tried to align with external pressure to argue against other bureaucratic units and 
strengthen their own positions. 
 In studying why gaiatsu (foreign pressure) succeeded and failed in the 1989-1990 Structural 
Impediments Initiative negotiations with the U.S., Schoppa found that extremely complex and nuanced 
interconnections, which he called “synergistic linkage” between negotiators, elite decision makers, 
ministries, stakeholders and even the general public affected not only Japan’s initial bargaining position, 
but what concessions were and were not made, and the processes of how these results unfolded. 
Understanding these complex relationships, Schoppa argued, is necessary to understand how “win-sets” 
are formulated.74 
 Schoppa’s analysis seems particularly pertinent because it exposes both a deep interconnectedness 
between all the eight levels of decision-making, from the intergovernmental level all the way down to the 
level of public opinion, while also shedding light on the complexities of domestic bargaining. As Schoppa 
puts it, games scenarios “have not developed a systematic hypotheses about how domestic politics 
produce a nation’s “national interest” and the strategies to be pursued at the international level.”75 
Schoppa found that changes in U.S. tactics did matter, especially when they altered (increased) the 
number of domestic Japanese participants to previously uninvolved bureaucratic agencies, new or 
different or senior politicians, interest groups and even the general public, and also by internationalizing 
what had been previously dealt with as purely domestic issues. Such tactics, and the complex but rational 
interactions on multiple levels between various stakeholders, as will be seen later, clearly came into play 
with Japanese space policy change.  
 
 
Views to Date on Japanese Space Policy Transition 
As noted in Chapter 1, debates have surfaced in recent years about Japan’s space policy transition and what 
it means and what it says about Japan and its security policies. As also noted, such debates have led to a 
range of conclusions that are at odds with each other, or only focus on certain aspects, or are (arguably) 
outdated or outmoded by Basic Plan 2016. This section looks at some of these debates, analyzing their 
utility. 
 The first major mainstream publication to surface on Japanese space policy and analyze (indeed 
recognize) its role in Japan’s evolving security strategy was by Oros, who initially focused on the rapid 
decision taken in the weeks after the 1988 Taepodong flyover to develop the IGS system. In his earliest 
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paper on the subject, Oros looked at realist, gaiatsu, domestic politics and culturalist arguments, and 
found them all inadequate.  
Oros’ initial basic conclusion as to why Japan quickly decided to budget and deploy the IGS system, 
but not place the satellites/the program under the control of the SDF, was that this response represented 
the outcome of an important new political and leadership awareness of Japan’s security issues. Oros 
established that competing bureaucracies saw the IGS system as a chance to appropriate new budget. For 
their parts, both the SDF and industry had begun pressing since 1993 for Japan to have a space-based 
reconnaissance system independent from and complementary to other intelligence sources, while telling 
the public that the SDF felt it was too reliant on the U.S. Then, regarding Japan’s domestic commercial 
constituency, Japanese industry, meanwhile, wanted the work. However, for Oros, it was political 
leadership that kick started and enabled the relatively fast and smooth decision-making and budgetary 
process that led to the IGS program.76 Behind this, Oros clearly demonstrated the role of interactions 
between Levels 1-4.  
In his follow-on study, Normalizing Japan, Oros asserted that Japanese space policy is governed by 
international relations issues best explained through internal political struggles, moderated by Japan’s 
culture of antimilitarism. While acknowledging the idea of a rational actor, multi-stakeholder, multi-level 
analysis model, compared to his earlier paper, Normalizing Japan’s approach was somewhat subordinated 
into a constructivist framework. In it, Oros referred to Japan’s domestic culture of antimilitarism, which 
has prohibited a “full role for military actors” as being decisive in Japan not more openly militarizing 
space. Following his “reach, reconcile and reassure” analysis, Oros stressed how moderate Japan’s 
reaction to the Taepodong incident was. Despite the extent that the Taepodong provocation produced 
political outrage and public alarm, Oros stressed how much Japan failed to push back against growing 
external threats more strongly: Japan did not overturn the PPR, and deliberately placed the IGS program 
under civilian control by creating the Cabinet Satellite Intelligence Center (CISC), and not under the 
JDA.77  
Thus, for Oros, Japan chose not use a worrying security threat in the form of the Taepodong incident 
to begin discard its post-World War II pacifist identity in order to become a muscle-flexing military giant 
more commensurate with its international status and the changing (or worsening) external security 
environment. For Oros, because of the resilience of Japan’s antimilitaristic culture, Japan took the 
Taepodong incident in its stride. Japan’s reaction was cushioned by from being harsher by the enveloping 
blanket of its antimilitaristic characteristics. In framing such arguments, Oros’ own start-point begins with 
stating that… “Japanese space policy stands out form the other world space powers due to the nearly 
complete separation of space policy from military planning” … that was gained without substantial 
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military funds devoted to outer space research, concluding that, “…the best explanation for this 
remarkable departure is rooted in Japan’s security identity of domestic antimilitarism.”78 
Oros extended this logic to future Japanese security policies, and concluded that it was unlikely that 
Japan remilitarize unless major shocks compelled the Japanese political system to break from past practice 
and crystalize the adoption a new, alternative identity that had had not yet materialized.79 However, Oros 
did hint that the sudden (or rapid) development of the IGS might represent the thin edge of a future wedge:  
 
“Though certainly the decision calls into question the staying power of Japan’s 
postwar security identity of domestic antimilitarism in the twenty first century, as 
with nearly all security decisions in recent years, political leaders worked hard to fit a 
new policy objective within the contours of the security identity, sacrificing some 
efficiency and broader objectives of the satellite program in the process.”80  
 
 Oros’ original paper looking at how LDP politicians played a key role in pushing forward the 
domestic procurement of IGS is, however, particularly useful for examining Levels 3, 4 and 5. Some of 
the empirical research from his paper will be useful in the following SAF-based analysis. Arguably, 
however, Normalizing Japan is now out of date following the incorporation of space policy into national 
security policy, and the increasingly national security-first priorities of Basic Plan 2016, not least with the 
involvement of the MOD. 
  
U.S. Think-Tanks Turn their Eyes on Japanese Space Policy 
Against this, a number of think tanks and reports published during the noughties examined the potential 
for U.S.-Japan security cooperation in space from the point of view of looking for ways to deputize Japan 
to aid U.S. space supremacy. U.S. think-tank views of Japan’s space program in the 2000s looked at 
policy transition in terms of alliance security issues, foreshadowing the reorientation of U.S. policy under 
President Barack Obama to harness Japanese space technologies to the U.S. “pivot” strategy after 2010. 
In 2003, a report funded by U.S. and Japanese aerospace companies and written by the Center for 
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) noted that the first launch of IGS satellites represented an 
“inflection point” in that Japan was now using space for military purposes.  
 The CSIS report looked forward to increased U.S.-Japan cooperation based on future policy and 
administrative reforms, primarily to advance U.S. geostrategic aims, encouraging Japan to move further 
and faster both in policy and administrative change, in particular for GPS-QZSS interoperability, and the 
scrapping of the PPR to advance Japanese-U.S. space-based intelligence sharing.81  
 Following this, a 2005 RAND military think-tank report noted that, facing increased security 
instability, and that as far back as 1993 a defense advisory panel had recommended that Japan should 
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develop its own satellite reconnaissance system, Japanese space policy had reached a “fork in the road.” 
In its fourth option for future U.S.-Japan collaboration, the report suggested that a focus on national 
security programs would be beneficial to bilateral relations, bringing forth the chance of more cost 
sharing and technological integration with the U.S.82 
 Also, an academic think-tank speculated that, following the lofting of Japan’s first IGS satellites, 
Japan might consider enlisting dual-use space technologies if “faced with a major conflict,” and pointed 
to the utility of Japanese technological capabilities that could be harnessed by the SDF, including 
improving EO satellites, launch vehicle technologies, Japanese prowess in electronic warfare, and BMD. 
Interestingly, despite the PPR, the author noted that NASDA, as a repository of expertize and 
technologies, and the proximity of establishments to SDF facilities, could already be considered as a 
virtual but unused repository of defense technology, and that the agreement between the U.S. and Japan to 
research BMD was already seen as threatening by China.83 
 
Domestic Views of Japanese Space Policy Transition 
On the other hand, domestic scholars of Japanese space policy have focused on constructivist and 
institutionalist-type approaches to explain space policy transition until 2008. While recognizing that 
security pressures have played a role in spurring policy change, thus acknowledging realist pressures, 
Suzuki described the drafting of the Basic Law through a political-bureaucratic model based on rational 
actor scenarios. Suzuki’s analysis took into account Levels 1 and 2, but an analysis of Levels 3, 4 and 5 
form the crux of his framework in which “policy logics” contend with political relationships to explain 
policy change.84 
Anan took a traditional bureaucratic insitutionalist-rational actor approach to explain why it was so 
difficult for Japan to implement the Basic Law after 2008, with his analysis focusing on 
political-bureaucratic conflicts between 2009-12, but stopping there. In these, between MEXT and the 
Cabinet Office, according to Anan, MEXT was so fixedly wedded to protecting its administrative power 
and budgets against the Cabinet Office that MEXT opposed any change in policy or administration 
because such changes almost automatically threatened its central role in space development.85  
Both these approaches are analytically coherent, and this dissertation will draw on these authors’ 
frameworks to analyze Japanese space policy and its relationships with institutions. But the main issue is 
these studies don’t deal with the critical period 2012-16 which saw the apparent acceleration of policy 
change, strong pressure applied by LDP, the conversion of semantic descriptions of policy goals to the 
overtly realist language of Basic Plan 2016, the proposed doubling of the IGS fleet, the direct 
participation of the MOD with MEXT in strategically important new space military technologies, and the 
integration of Japan’s space program into the U.S.-Japan security alliance; events which were, arguably, 
not expected by Suzuki, Anan and Oros. 
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Recent (Post-Basic Law) Non-Japanese Views 
Non-Japanese analysts by-and-large look at the implications of the Basic Law beyond being an 
administrative and legal solution to domestic inefficiencies (resolution of these being the main focus and 
goal of the Basic Law, according to Suzuki and Anan). For example, Moltz sees fear of Japan falling 
behind China and a “space race” with China as a major exogenous pressure behind the Basic Law.86 
Peoples has recently argued that Japan’s space policy is following a general trend of ‘securitization’ of 
space policy that is a world-wide trend. ‘Securitization’ for Peoples is a process through which 
non-military issues come to be seen as issues of national security so that it is justifiable to use exceptional 
political measures to deal with them. By being ‘securitized,’ formerly nonmilitary issues are increasingly 
seen as, and dealt with, in terms of military threats that pose real national security challenges.87 
For Peoples, then, the Basic Law invoked a ‘broadened’ conception of security in an attempt by 
Japan to offset the apparent potential for military applications by emphasizing defensive purposes and by 
articulating a ‘comprehensive’ understanding of security. He concluded that Japan has constructed a new 
conception of security that encompasses “non-military security functions” such as crisis management, 
disaster response, and environmental monitoring, that is not only in line with ‘global norms’ of other 
space powers but also in tune with the comprehensive security notions that Japan has built up since the 
1990s in particular.88 Again, this analysis, is, arguably, outdated or challenged by Basic Plan 2016.  
In 2010, my previous research in In Defense of Japan: from the Market to the Military in Space 
Policy (IDOJ) adopted an analytically eclectic approach that hypothesized that the Basic Law would open 
the door for a dual-use domestic space market providing a wide swath of national security space projects, 
all achieved in a way that would provide a range of internal and external balancing required to resolve 
structural and domestic inefficiencies.89 Taking a detailed empirical approach, IDOJ combined traditional 
frameworks to conclude that the Basic Law was designed to resolve a series of pressures built up on both 
on Japan’s normative policy (i.e. the PPR) and its administrative arrangements since the late 1990s. 
Understanding space policy change, IDOJ asserted, required taking into account a wide range of 
influences, from the strategic international relations level all the down to prosaic industrial and 
commercial concerns. 
Borrowing heavily from Samuels’ neorealist approach, IDOJ adopted a “market to the military” 
hypothesis. This asserted that, from its inception, Japan’s space program was a strategic technological 
hedge to make sure that Japan was technologically and industrially capable of maintaining its status as an 
advanced sovereign power. Thus, when exogenous security pressures appeared, Japan reacted rationally 
because the Basic Law removed the over-strict PPR and allowed Japan to create a defensive-only military 
space policy. At the subgovernment level of policy implementation, the Basic Law also overcame 
inefficiencies that had built up in implementation through ministries competing with each other in 
zero-sum games. 
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  Figure 9: Pekkanen-Kallender Analytical Eclectical (Neorealist) Model 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 Following the stated wishes of the Basic Law by placing space development under Cabinet Office 
control, and as part of a broad national security strategy, IDOJ stated that narrow sectional conflicts 
between competing ministries could be resolved and budget opened for ministries and contractors. By 
doing this, and creating a protected national security market for space activities that were closed to 
international competition on national security grounds, contractors unable to compete in the international 
commercial space development market could be protected, subsidized and nurtured.90  
 In other words, a series of “win sets” were created. At the same time, domestic considerations deeply 
colored the framework of each change. Because of the institutional complexities of the implementation of 
Japan’s space program, where budgets were divided between competing ministries, a reordering was 
required, achieved through strong political initiatives, to implement Cabinet Office control over policy, 
programs and budgeting.91 This at least provided a rational explanation to account for the motives behind 
the Basic Law. 
 So, IDOJ combined the prior work of neorealists such as Samuels and Green to show Japan’s 
behavior as a rational actor at the international level, and Oros’ constructivist approach, to show how 
domestic bureaucratic and normative frameworks deeply affected how Japan militarized its space 
development. While broadly helpful in understanding many of the interconnected and interlinked 
international and domestic pressures behind the Basic Law, including for example, examining the role of 
industrial interests in pushing for the abandonment of the PPR, in retrospect, by 2012 it was becoming 
increasingly apparent that IDOJ had rather overlooked an institutional behavioral approach, which has 
been amply proven important to understand national policy making.  
 This led IDOJ to fail to fully predict the long-drawn out bureaucratic battles that have delayed full 
implementation of the Basic Law as late as 2017. IDOJ’s failure to see this was a major impetus for the 
author’s PhD research and the search for an adequate framework to analyze and contextualize space 
                                                
90 Ibid., pp. 18-20. 
91 Ibid., pp. 245-50. 
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policy transition. IDOJ did, then, make sense of many of the factors leading to the Basic Law and even 
the realist language and integration of space policy and assets into a wider national security strategy, but 
at the price of ignoring the role of the bureaucracy as a brake on the ambitions of politicians and industry.  
One of the author’s recent studies, “Hiding in Plain Sight: Japan’s Militarization of Space and 
Demise of the Yoshida Doctrine,” labels the most recent policy changes under the second Abe 
administration as “revisionist.”92 How the authors tackled space policy transition using an analytically 
eclectic, but fundamentally neorealist approach can be seen in Figure 10 below. 
“Hiding in Plain Sight” argues that the combination of Basic Plan 2016 and the revised Security 
Guidelines could herald a fundamental change in Japan’s security that represents the vanguard of a 
broader transformational process of Japan’s strategic defense posture. According to this analysis, Japan 
may indeed be moving toward a policy of increasingly open deterrence and containment of North Korea 
and China. This also involves cessation of hedging and making game-changing contributions to 
U.S.-Japan military cooperation and strategy. Last but not least, this analysis asserts that the through the 
militarization of space, it is possible to say that Japan may finally be at a departure point from the 
Yoshida Doctrine.93 
 
   Figure 10: Kallender-Hughes Neorealist Model 
 
 To prove these claims, the paper tests neorealist, liberal and constructivist approaches and combines 
them into a framework that set out the expected drivers and proxy indicators of change and continuity in 
security trajectory and how these are in turn manifested in Japan’s Yoshida Doctrine. This framework is 
summarized in Table 2, below.  
 “Hiding in Plain Sight” argued that, because for over forty years since 1969 and the PPR, space policy 
was paraded as a paragon of self-imposed restraints on remilitarization, Japan’s space programs can be seen 
                                                
92 Paul Kallender and Christopher W. Hughes, “Hiding in Plain Sight: Japan’s Militarization of Space and Demise of the 
Yoshida Doctrine,” under editing at Asian Security; Peoples (2013), pp.135-143; Johnson-Freese and Gatling (2004), pp. 
538-552; Suzuki (2007); Aoki (2008); Aoki (2009), pp. 363-438; Moltz (2012), pp. 43, 63; Hughes (2009), pp. 48-50; 
Pekkanen & Kallender-Umezu (2010); Kallender-Umezu (2013), pp. 28-34; Hughes (2013), pp. 128-134.  
93 Samuels (2006), p. 118.  
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as a “hard test” case for assessing shifts in security policy; that the pace and importance of the changes 
during the past two decades, accelerating the last seven years and culminating in Japan’s recently published 
explicit military space strategy in Basic Plan 2016 overturns the view of essential continuity in Japanese 
security policy.94 
 
Table 2: Central Tenets and Baselines of Change for the Yoshida Doctrine and the Impact of Japan’s 
   Space Militarization 
 
 The key evidence for this is was placed in an argument stressing how the commitments instituted in 
Basic Plan 2016 constitute, through the latent force multiplier potency of space technologies, combined 
with new SDF capabilities, to constitute the fruition of the “rich nation, strong army” technology-centric 
strategy (proposed by Samuels) that will give Japan far more military potential than is commonly realized. 
Thus, space technologies, “hiding in plain sight,” give Japan the ability to break out from its previous 
                                                
94 Uchū Kaihatsu Senryaku Honbu, Uchū Kihon Keikaku, 9 January 2015. 
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security paradigm should it feel the need to, for example in the face of a major security shock, and/or a 
major deterioration in relations with China, and/or the beginning of an arms race, or even, for example, 
deeply held concerns of a future partial abandonment by the U.S.95 
 The article does not, however, address Levels 4, 5 and 6 in detail. By not examining internal 
decision-making structures and processes inherent in space policy transition, “Hiding in Plain Sight” choses 
to ignore the fact that Basic Plan 2016 makes small advances in terms of SSA but almost minimal advanced 
in MDA, and is heavily watered down compared to demands made by LDP defense hawks.   
 In conclusion, then, it can be said that each and every one of the approached discussed in this chapter 
can give frameworks of varying utility to interpret some important facets of Japanese space policy transition, 
but none of the approaches encompass a framework that takes into account all the major actors and inputs, 
motivations, goals and relationships, and connections between the international political and security 
situation with all the multiple players and their objectives. The task ahead, then, becomes, how do we fit all 
the pieces of the jigsaw together, and into what sort of frame?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
95 For example, space technologies can be used as force multipliers to help what are already qualitatively significant 
improvements to conventional forces as outlined in Chapter 1. For the classic formulations of Japanese dual-use 
civilian-military technology, see Samuels (1994); Chinworth (1992). On Japan’s use of “paramilitary” force to perhaps 
disguise a bolstering of Japan’s armed force, see Samuels (2007/2008), pp. 84-112. For an analysis of RMA’s importance, 
see Posen (2003), pp. 12-14.  
  69 
Chapter 3 
The Strategic Action Field Framework Model 
 
As the issues with the various approaches examined in Chapter 2 indicated, the essential argument of this 
dissertation is that it is analytically unhelpful to try to make sense of the transition of Japanese space 
policy between 1969 and 2016 without taking into account the influence of decisions of actors and 
stakeholders taken at six, seven, or even at eight levels. The utility of the SAF framework is that it 
holistically seeks to understand the motives and behaviors of actors and stakeholders within a framework 
that accounts for interconnected decision-making, and, simultaneously, logically examines how decisions 
within the layers set up subsequent reactions up and down (or through) interconnected decision layers. 
 To analyze and contextualize space policy transition over time, an adapted version of the recent 
Theory of Fields framework developed by Fligstein and McAdam, the SAF framework, is proposed.1 At 
its simplest, the SAF framework used in this dissertation puts each decision-making level into a matrix of 
interconnected SAFs, each with their own players and behavioral logics. This framework is utilized to 
deal with all the inputs and conflicts between stakeholders that account for when, why, and what was 
decided in policy and institutional change. Because the SAF framework inherently accounts for changes 
happening in a series of phases, the roles of each player, and their behavior in each SAF, and the behavior 
of that SAF, and its relationships with other SAFs, all become logically explainable and understandable. 
See Figure 11 for a visual representation of an SAF.  
 
        Figure 11: Basic Strategic Action Field 
 
Why SAFs? 
Perhaps figure 11 looks rather woolly at first sight. Put simply, an SAF is community in which actors, 
which, in the framework are called players, interact with knowledge of one another under a set of 
common understandings about the purposes of the field, the relationships in the field (including who has 
power and why), and the field’s rules. SAFs therefore draw attention to the ways in which organizations 
(which can include institutions, lobbies, trade associations, ministries, corporations, political pressure 
                                                
1 Fligstein & McAdam (2011, 2012). 
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groups, powerful leaders, labor unions, political parties, etc.) intersect with other players, thereby creating 
a field or context (an SAF field) for explaining stability and change in society.2  
 Overall, the SAF framework holds that all collective actors, including organizations, clans, supply 
chains, social movements, and governmental systems, etc., are made up of SAFs. The basic construct is 
the SAF itself. SAFs are frameworks that can be analyzed to study the competitive behavior of actors in 
arenas. SAFs can comprise of interlinked and hierarchical SAFs, with some SAFs embedded in others, 
resulting in what can be simple or dense, or multilayered, and interlinked arenas. 
 A simple example of an SAF might be a department in a global enterprise. This department is located 
in a division in the company, but it is also linked independently or interdependently with government 
regulatory bodies, trade associations, suppliers, etc. The department interacts in a larger field with its 
competitors and challengers (bodies or organizations that might help or impede or stimulate its functions 
in some manner) which are themselves embedded in an international division of labor, each constituting 
SAFs of their own.3 
 
Antecedents to the SAF Framework 
The SAF framework and the conception of SAFs build on the work of economic sociologists, institutional 
theorists, and social movement scholars. In looking at the sources and motivation for Fligstein and 
McAdam’s drawing up of the SAF framework, we can say that it is, broadly speaking, an attempt by 
social scientists of the institutionalist and organization behaviorist schools to explain how and why 
players behave in a certain manner in a group or groups.  
 
Antecedents to the SAF Framework 
The SAF framework builds on various organizational and institutional theories looking at the behavior of 
players. However, the SAF framework’s first point of departure from prior theories is in placing players 
in groups or fields (rather than just institutions or organizations) in which they related to other players. In 
this framework, the position in the field of a particular stakeholder (player) indicates the potential for a 
force exerted on the player, which is given motivation to act, affecting that structure and impacting or 
causing reactions from other players in the SAF, or in other SAFs. An understanding of motivation and a 
framework for understanding different actions and behaviors is therefore important to understand how 
SAFs work and how (and when, and why) changes occur.4  
 Neoinstitutionalism in the 1990s forms a major precursor to the SAF framework, although 
antecedents using sociological ontology stretch back to the late 1970s with the work of Giddens. In 
Giddens’ theory of structuration, agents (people, institutions) regulate their actions drawing on 
preexisting structures and systems of power, and seek social stability. But when trust breaks down 
between actors or organizations, changes occur through the agency of actors. While very useful in starting 
to explain changes in stakeholder behavior, the theory was deemed insufficient by Fligstein and McAdam 
                                                
2 Fligstein & McAdam (2011), p. 3. 
3 Fligstein & McAdam (2012), pp. 3-7. 
4 John Levi Martin, “What Is Field Theory?” American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 109, No. 1 (July 2003), pp. 1-49. 
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because Giddens’ approach did not deal with the issues of collective action and the motives and the role 
of relationships between players or groups or stakeholders.5  
 In another antecedent of the SAF framework, Bourdieu proposed a theory of fields and combined it 
with a theory of action that explained how networks, structures, or sets of relationships affected the 
behavior of actors. But in his theory, actor behavior was not codependent and tended to be maximizing 
within narrow constraints. In Bourdieu’s world, actors with varying resource endowments vie for 
advantage, but there was no discussion on relationships with related fields and, again, little discussion of 
collective action.6 
The SAF framework also heavily borrows from neonstitutionalists such as DiMaggio and Powell, 
Meyer and Rowan, Scott and Meyer and Zucker. These authors have all proposed that organizational 
behavior is deeply embedded in a wide array of social and political environments, and such groupings, as 
described in various studies have some similarities to SAFs. For example, Scott and Meyer used the term 
“sector” to describe collections of interconnected actors that could affect the behavior of a particular 
organization or organizations. DiMaggio and Powell argued that organizations facing uncertain problems 
will be affected by different external forces and behave differently depending on the sets of circumstances 
and opportunities.7 
Others have researched how networks functioned to shape the relations between organizations 
embedded in them, for example leading to interdependence, trust and collusion. On the other hand, Social 
Movement Theory, which seeks to understand why changes occur in society, does succeed in explaining 
the dynamics of how conflicts emerge and how organizations change, but fails to account for how and 
why conflicts settle.8 Table 4 below shows some of the major antecedents to the SAF framework.  
Some neonstitutionalist approaches seem to be useful in examining multi-stakeholder bureaucratic 
behavior. For example some approaches have stressed how some organizations can be entrepreneurial 
within the internal market of their organizational fields. Within this “market logic,” within a competitive 
organizational field, institutions are constantly to try to shape the rules of the contest. In this, certain more 
powerful organizations are liable to want to influence the field and change the rules of the game to 
enhance or preserve their advantage(s). But, while such “entrepreneurial” organizations need to lobby and 
build consensus within their organizational fields to create new policy logics, even the most powerful 
                                                
5 Anthony Giddens, Central problems in social theory: Action, structure, and contradiction in social analysis (Berkeley 
and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1979); Giddens, The constitution of society: Outline of the theory of 
structuration (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1984). 
6 Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc J. D. Wacquant, An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 
1992); Ronald L. Jepperson, “Institutions, institutional effects, and institutionalization,” pp. 143-63, in (eds.) Walter W. 
Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio, The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1991). 
7 Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, “The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality 
in organizational fields,” American Sociological Review, Vol. 48, No. 2 (April 1983), pp. 147-160; John W. Meyer and 
Brian Rowan, “Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony,” American Journal of 
Sociology Vol. 83, No. 2 (September 1977), pp. 340-363; John W. Meyer, and W. Richard Scott, Organizational 
Environments: Ritual and Rationality (London: Sage, 1983); Lynne G. Zucker, “The Role of Institutionalization in 
Cultural Persistence,” American Sociological Review, Vol. 42, No. 5 (October 1977), pp. 726-743. See also, Edward O. 
Laumann, David Knoke, The Organizational State: Social Choice in National Policy Domains (Maddison: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1987). 
8 John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, “The Trend of Social Movements in America: Professionalization and Resource 
Mobilization (Morristown, NJ: General Learning Press, 1973); John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, “Resource 
Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory,” American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 82, No. 6 (May 1977), pp. 
1212-1241; Doug McAdam and Hilary Boudet, Putting Social Movements in Their Place: Explaining Opposition to 
Energy Projects in the United States, 2000-2005 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
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actors in the field in cannot easily impose new norms and logics on a field unless such new norms are 
accepted by other important actors.9 
As pointed out in Chapter 2, neoinstiutionalist-based approaches assert that organizations follow 
rules, and these rules form the critical governing logic controlling motivation and behavior. The SAF 
framework also recognizes this. But the SAF framework also asserts that the behaviors of institutions can 
be nailed into an overall framework that explains and predicts actions that can be applied across different 
sectors of activities.10 But while conventional institutional logics-based analysis focused on shared 
understandings between institutions and organizations in fields, Fligstein and McAdam maintain that 
prior studies of institutions and organizations have tended to ignore the dynamism (or instability) lurking, 
or hidden, or inherent in any arena (i.e. SAF). While institutional theory has focused on explaining order 
and reproduction, the SAF framework sees SAFs as always ripe for contestation and dynamic.  
 In the SAF framework, SAFs contain actors and institutions (players) that, if not constantly 
jockeying for position, will do if given the chance. Players (stakeholders, etc.) make moves to secure 
advantage or protect their positions and other players have to interpret them, consider their options, and 
react in response. Players are constantly monitoring each other and considering their own position and 
advantage. Less and more powerful players make constant adjustments given their position and the 
actions of others. Less powerful players may take any number of actions to try to even marginally 
improve their positions in the field.11 
 Also, in SAFs, as Fligstein and McAdam stress (see below), understanding the origins and 
emergence of the formation of the field is critical to understanding the role of agency in the field, of 
power, and conflict, interests and resources, or positions relative to each other. Fligstein and McAdam 
argue that understanding field formation is crucial to understanding how fields might change, or react to 
stresses placed on them, or how stresses emerge within them. To Fligstein and McAdam, because earlier 
studies often do not thoroughly analyze how a field emerged, such approaches are inadequate and they 
“cannot even account for the piecemeal changes that we expect in the constant playing of the game as 
conditions change within a field or between fields.”12 
 Further, for Fligstein and McAdam, while organizations (players) in fields do follow scripts, every 
single aspect of their behavior cannot not determined by, and cannot be entirely accounted for, by those 
scripts. Player behavior is not solely path-dependent, but is dynamic. Crucially, behavior is conditioned 
by the impact of new challenges that can cause the formation of new behavior, all contextualized by a 
broader field environment (see below). “If a field is really an arena in which individuals, groups, or 
organizations face off to capture some gain as our view suggests, then the underlying logic of fields is not 
                                                
9 Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, “Interest and Agency in Institutional Theory,” in Institutional Patterns and 
Organizations, (ed.) Lynne G. Zucker (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1988), pp. 3-12; Neil Fligstein, “Social Skill and 
Institutional Theory,” American Behavioral Scientist, Vol. 40, Issue 4 (February 1997), pp. 397-405; Olivier (1991), pp. 
145-179.  
10 Policy logics are defined in Roger Friedland and Robert Alford, “Bringing Society Back In: Symbols, Practices, and 
Institutional Contradictions,” in Powell & DiMaggio (1991), pp. 232-63. 
11 Friedland and Alford (1991), pp. 232-266; Scott (2014), p. 56; Neil Fligstein, The Transformation of Corporate 
Control (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990); Paul DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, ‘Introduction,” pp. 
1-40, in DiMaggio & Powell (1991); Bourdieu and Loïc (1992); Jepperson (1991), pp. 143-63; Mustafa Emirbayer and 
Victoria Johnson, “Bourdieu and Organizational Analysis,” Theory and Society, Vol. 37, No. 1 (February 2008), pp. 1-44; 
Martin, (2003); Paul Sabatier, (ed.), Theories of the Policy Process (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Second Edition, 
2007); Edward O. Lauman and David Knoke, The Organizational State: Social Choice in National Policy Domains 
(Madison WI: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1987). 
12 Fligstein and McAdam (2012), p. 29; DiMaggio (1988), pp. 143-163. 
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encoded in the structure of the network but in the conceptions of power…resources, rules, and so on that 
shape action within the strategic action field.”13 
Table 3: Some Direct Antecedents to Strategic Action Theory 
Theory Focus Proponents Insufficiencies 
Sectors Organizations Scott and Meyer 1983 Static: Sectors are fields containing all of the organizations 
that might affect a particular organization,  
Institutional logics Intuitions  Friedland and Alford (1991) 
Scott (2001) 
Static: Focus on how consensus forms and is upheld, fails to 
account for actors’ positions, the creation of rules in the field 
that favor the more powerful over the less powerful, and the 
general use of power in strategic action fields. Fails to account 
for potentially oppositional positions of actors and ways in 
which different actors in different positions will vary in their 
interpretation of events and respond to them from their own 
point of view. 
Organizational fields  Organizations DiMaggio and Powell Identifies three kinds of forces driving organizations in fields 
toward similar outcomes, what they call mimetic, coercive, 
and normative isomorphism. Organizations respond to change 
by trying to suppress uncertainty: explains conformity and 
stability but does not question how fields emerge or change 
Institutional Theory Organizations Jepperson (1991) Static: Constructivist view that actors are dominated by shared 
understandings to reinforce stasis; does not deal with change 
Fields  Sociology of actors & 
individuals 
competing for power  
Bourdieu and Wacquant 
(1992) 
Emirbayer and 
Johnson (2008)  
 
Fields, which might be networks, structure or set of 
relationships which may be intellectual, religious, educational, 
cultural, in which various social and institutional arenas in 
which actors compete for the distribution of different kinds of 
capital. Actors with varying resource endowments vie for 
advantage: no discussion on relationships with related fields; 
focus on relationship of individual actors, little discussion of 
collective action, etc.  
Field Theory Sociology of actors in 
groups, motivation 
behind actions in 
those groups.  
Martin (2003) Individual behavior exists in the context of a field and the 
position of the individual in the field indicates the potential for 
a force exerted on the individual, who is given motivation to 
act, affecting that structure; motivation is therefore important 
as opposed to chance. Static, based on individuals not 
organizations.  
Networks Groups of related 
companies or 
organizations 
Powell et al. (2005) Models relationships between actors within a field; networks 
shape the relations between, organizations embedded in them 
but fails to analyze the shared (or contested) understandings 
that inform and shape their actions.  
Policy domains  Governmental 
institutions 
Laumann and Knoke (1987) A national policy domain’s power structures are composed of 
multiplex networks among formal organizations, not elite 
persons.  These connections enable opposing coalitions to 
mobilize political resources in collective fights for influence 
over specific public policy decisions.   
Structuration Sociological study of 
actors seeking 
security in rules and 
resources (power and 
capital)  
Giddens (1979, 1984) Focus on individuals, change occurs when trust breaks down, 
no theory of collective action  
Source: Author’s own interpretation 
                                                
13 Ibid., p. 29. 
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With this in mind, in general, the SAF framework seems to have utility for explaining transformation of 
policy that requires argument and conflict on several levels of decision-making, because the framework 
inherently recognizes the potential for change within each layer of decision-making, between the layers, 
and up and down the layers. For example, the SAF framework allows for the fact that decisions in one 
layer of the decision tree may affect other layers, and that they also cause reactions in the other layers, 
which then cause further reactions.  
 But rather than creating a mess of inputs and outputs, rather like a cascade of reactions that appear 
tangled and difficult to interpret, the SAF approach provides a framework where it is possible to see the 
rationality and logicality of decisions (outputs). Those outputs then become inputs for following actions, 
and so on. Thus, the SAF framework contains and connects all the decision-making levels and deals with 
changes (perhaps best described as rolling series of changes) over extended periods of time and in a series 
of scenarios, each rolling on from the next, all of which can be examined and explained holistically.  
 
Simple characteristics of SAFs 
In a nutshell, an SAF could be compared to an arena for recurring games. As an analytical tool, SAFs are 
defined as fundamental units of collective action in society. SAFs are constructed as analytical arenas 
within which stakeholders (players) with varying resource endowments vie for advantage. SAFs may 
have fixed or shifting boundaries depending on the definition of the situation and the issues at stake. 
SAFs are constructed (or emerge or change to a greater or lesser degree) as shifting collections of players 
within them and in related SAFs. The behavior of players, and changes in their behaviors, turn on sets of 
understandings fashioned over time by members of the field. Thus, SAFs contain groups of players that 
are related to and interact with one another on the basis of shared, sometimes conflicted, and sometimes 
consensual relationships within the SAF. 
 This principle can be extended to other SAFs so that SAFs are linked, with some SAFs more 
intricately connected to others. The key variable is the dynamics of the power struggles between players, 
which are inherent in SAFs, and between SAFs. The importance of interdependence between players in a 
SAF, and between SAFs, cannot be overstated. Further, the nature of the interdependency, or lack of it, 
and the nature of the ties between SAFs constitute one of the main sources of change and stability in all 
fields.14 
 In the wider framework, which Fligstein and McAdam call their Theory of Fields, the theory is 
composed of seven elements that serve as a framework for understanding how players behave and respond 
                                                
14 The description of the construction and characteristics of SAFs in the following paragraphs is adapted from Fligstein & 
McAdam (2012), pp. 8-23. 
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to changes and challenges to any given status quo position within a SAF, and then between SAFs. Those 
elements are:  
 
1. The SAFs themselves, which act as the arenas in which power struggles take place (or don’t).   
2. The players (actors/stakeholders).  
3. The “social skill” or parameters for action, motivations and abilities of the stakeholders to act.  
4. The “broader field environment” and broader externalities that may affect the behavior of stakeholders in 
a particular SAF or SAFs.  
5. The role of exogenous shocks, and what the authors call “the onset of contention,” or changes external 
(or, indeed, internal) to a SAF or SAFs that can cause change within it and in other related SAFs.  
6. “Episodes of contention,” in other words, power struggles set off by shocks.  
7. “Settlement,” or the reshuffling of power arrangements within a particular SAF and/or related SAFs. 
Figure 12 shows the “lives” of SAFs. 
                            
      Figure 12: The Lives of SAFs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
General Rational Actor Rules for SAFs 
Fligstein and McAdam applied a rational actor behavioral analysis model to the motivations of players 
within SAFs to construct the following general rules, so that in SAFs for players: 
 
1. There is a general, shared understanding of what is going on in the field, that is, what is at stake. Thus, 
there is a broad interpretive frame that players bring to make sense of what other players within the SAF 
are doing. When a field is settled, there is a consensus about the parameters of actions among players, but 
those players may not view the division of spoils in the field as legitimate.  
2. There is a set or sets of players in the field that can be generally viewed as possessing more or less 
power, and that players know who their friends, their enemies, and their competitors are because they 
know who occupies those roles in the field.  
3. That there is a set of shared understandings about the nature of the “rules” in the field so that players 
understand what tactics are possible, legitimate, and interpretable for each of the roles in the field. Players 
therefore agree on the rules that govern their interaction and these rules can be both formal and informal.  
4. Regarding agency, each player has different interpretative frames reflecting the relative positions of 
players within the SAFs. Players will tend to see the moves of others from their own perspective in the 
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field. This implies that players may come into a field with different, perhaps conflicting, ways of 
understanding goals and objectives of a particular policy. 
5. In most fields, dominant and or incumbent players will embrace a frame of reference that encapsulates 
their self-serving view of the field, while dominated or challenger players will adopt/fashion an 
“oppositional” perspective. The reactions of more and less powerful players to the actions of others thus 
reflect their position in the field. 
 
 The SAF framework therefore looks at the organizational dynamics of, and the agency of fields, or, 
more specifically, the process of competitive engagement in which collective actors/stakeholders vie and 
jostle for advantage within SAFs. Players are embedded in a division of labor within their fields and they 
share a collective understanding of their positions and objectives. SAFs, then, are also arenas in which 
external shocks or new entrants cause incumbent players to reconfigure their roles, which can produce a 
gradual merging of interests to new goals amid a concurrent change in the structure of SAF itself. 
  
Agency 
In terms of discussing agency, the SAF framework looks at the motivations of institutional actors as 
players based on the following aspects:  
1. What is at stake; which players are powerful and what position they occupy in terms of the understood 
rules of the field. 
2. What are the tactics available in competition 
3. The frame in which players tend to interpret the motivations of competitors from their own 
perspectives.15  
 
 In this construct, the dynamics of players are characterized in terms of incumbents, challengers, and 
governance players. Incumbents rule the roost, and dominate the frame of competition. Challengers wield 
little influence, but, recognizing the dominant logic of incumbent players, articulate an alternative vision, 
while outwardly at least conforming to the prevailing order. Governance units tend to uphold the 
prevailing order. We will discuss this in more detail below. Overall, the prevailing norms of the system 
within the field competing organizations operate in govern the parameters of both incumbents and 
challengers.16 
 The utility of this model when studying the behavior of institutions (for example MEXT or METI, 
etc.) is that the SAF framework holistically takes into account the expected behaviors of clusters of 
interrelated players to given inputs, but that it also sees these relationships as dynamic over time, rather 
than static or one-shot deals (see the Formation, Stability, Contestation and Settlement section below). As 
noted, there is often jockeying for position between players in a field as a result of their contested nature. 
Under certain circumstances, then, there is, then, jockeying between fields.  
 Further, SAFs can be arrayed along a continuum between SAFs that may appear settled, but may 
contain widespread dissent and conflict, or the potential for such, within them. Because of this, even 
apparently stable fields or clusters of fields contain the potential for change if some sort of disruption 
occurs. Disruption in (even one part of) one SAF can then disrupt proximate or even more distant SAFs.   
                                                
15 Fligstein & McAdam (2011), p. 4. 
16 Ibid. pp. 7-8.  
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 If there are outside disruptions to the field, or if the relative power of players is equalized, for 
example, there may be a good deal of jockeying for advantage if the shared meaning of the field is 
challenged. Conflict can break out, and the very structure of the SAF may be up for grabs, so that it is 
possible for a whole new order to appear with a redefinition of the positions of the players, the rules of the 
game, and the overriding ends of the SAF. The SAF framework, then, seeks to understand how order was 
established, and how stability is contested; and how SAFs journey from formation to stability, through 
contention, and onto (partial/contested/temporary) settlement. Thus, SAFs are expected to exist in a state 
of flux, as the process of contention is often (usually) ongoing and threats to the current order are always 
present to some degree. To summarize, in terms of placing behavior of actors in SAFs, those behaviors 
can be characterized along the following general rules: 
 
1. SAFs are dynamic; there are always contests or potential contests bubbling underneath the most stable 
field that can be set off by disruption to one or more players in a SAF or in a proximate SAF. 
2. SAFs are embedded in a broader network of proximate fields, as themselves organized as intricate 
systems of SAFs.  
3. Both the stability of and the propensity for change, and the dynamics of change, lay both in the internal 
dynamics of a SAF or SAFs and their relationships with other SAFs and the broader environment.  
4. Changes in SAFs often or even normally occur as a result a result of destabilizing change that develop 
within proximate SAFs.  
 
2. The Players (Actors/Stakeholders) 
The key internal dynamics of SAFs are mediated through players. As noted, Fligstein and McAdam 
define players in SAFs into three categories: Incumbents, challengers, and governance units.17 Positions 
in SAFs are defined by the relative power of players based on the power distribution within the SAF. 
Incumbents wield disproportionate influence. Often the purpose and structure the SAF are adapted to the 
interests of the incumbents. The parameters for sets of actions and behaviors of players within SAFs, the 
rules, tend to favor incumbents. Challengers occupy less privileged positions and usually wield little 
influence over the SAF’s operation. While they recognize the nature of the field and the dominant logic of 
incumbent players, challengers also can usually articulate an alternative vision of the field and their 
position in it. Most of the time, challengers can be expected to conform to the prevailing order, although 
they often do so grudgingly, taking what the system gives them and awaiting new opportunities to 
challenge the structure and logic of the system. 
 Governance units can be seen as either neutral players, or overseeing compliance with the field’s 
rules and, in general, facilitating the overall smooth functioning and reproduction of the field. These 
governance units can be internal in the SAF and distinct from external structures that hold jurisdiction 
over all, or some aspect of, the SAF. In an industrial sector, these many be, for example, trade 
associations. In a very simple and important way, the various attempts by politicians and some civil 
servants to bolster the power of the Cabinet Office in space policy and budgeting over the power of over 
ministries could be called an attempt to introduce a more effective governance unit.  
 Further, in the SAF framework, the position of governance units is more nuanced and not neutral. 
Governance units tend to reflect the influence of the most powerful incumbents in the field. A little bit 
counterintuitively, Fligstein and McAdam assert that the function of governance units often is not to serve 
                                                
17 Fligstein & McAdam (2012), pp. 13-14. 
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as neutral arbiters of conflicts between incumbents and challengers. Rather, their function is, often, to 
reinforce the dominant perspective and guard the interests of the incumbents. Governance units generally 
do this in three ways: 
 
1. By overseeing the smooth functioning of the system, freeing incumbents from management and 
leadership that they may have exercised during the emergence of SAF.  
2. By legitimizing the status quo, and the extant prevailing behavioral logic, positions of actors and their 
relationships, and the prevailing rules of the field.  
3. By, for example, serving as a liaison between the SAF and proximate SAFs, with the implication that 
such behaviors or actions are to prevent, forestall or sublimate conflict.  
 
 Thus, typically, in the SAF framework, governance units serve as defenders of the status quo and are 
a generally conservative force during periods of conflict. Fligstein and McAdam assert that internal 
governance units are a unique element that the SAF framework brings to institutional conflict models 
based on rational actor frameworks. Taking all these new points into account and summarizing them for 
clarity, Figure 13 shows how we can order some of the relationships of the players. 
 
Figure 13: Adapted SAF for Japan Space Policy and Institutional Change 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s own schema of an operational SAF, adapted from Fligstein & McAdam (2012). 
 
3. Social Skill & Strategic Acton – Motivational Matrix  
In their original theory, Fligstein and McAdam took a sociological ontological approach to explaining the 
role of players in social life, resting on cultural factors, and focusing on motivations, winners and losers. 
However, in space policy and institutional change, we will see that (and how) certain individuals 
(particularly politicians and activist civil servants) played identifiably important empirical roles in space 
policy transition and in critical decisions, actions and policies. Therefore the positions, motivations, logics 
and scope and parameters for actions (limits on the impact of their agency) of players, (also in the case of 
activist challenger politicians), are inextricably linked to how well or how much they can force ministries 
to modify their behavior. That is to say, the crux or crucible of analysis will often be in SAFs that 
describe bureaucratic and political interaction.  
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 The SAF framework squarely contextualizes the constraints on the behaviors of players as embedded 
in a larger matrix, i.e. relationships with other fields. For analytical simplicity, the adapted SAF 
framework used in this dissertation calls concerted (impactful) behavior, or a series of actions by a 
particular player or players to affect changes in the SAF as innovative and/or strategic action. Strategic 
action can take many forms. It might be a bid by one player to change the behavior of other players in a 
particular SAF, or; to try to take control of an SAF; or to forestall the loss of control against a threat, and 
so on.  
 Innovative action is generally understood in this dissertation as an attempted precursor to attempted 
strategic action. In more conventional terms, innovative action could be something close to nemawashi 
(preparing the groundwork, setting out the stall, gathering allies and developing the means) to try to exert 
more profound or impactful change, i.e. leading to or preparing for strategic action. Both innovative and 
strategic action involve players, that, given a chance, try to change the rules of the game or act in some 
way to maximize their gains. In this way, viewed from a more traditional neoinstiutionalist approach, we 
can say that the logics of appropriateness and consequences are embedded in the function of interactions 
with other actors and other fields. Within a competitive organizational field or SAF, players – be they 
politicians or institutions or lobbies (or, as is often the case in space policy transition, the U.S. 
government) – try to shape the rules of the game. Challengers need to lobby and build consensus within 
their SAFs to create new policy logics.  
 Yet, crucially, Fligstein and McAdam assert that even the most powerful players cannot easily 
impose new norms and logics on a field unless they are accepted by other important players.18 Thus 
innovative action of some kind is usually required as a prerequisite to strategic action that will be 
attempted by players to create and sustain new forms of collective action by securing the cooperation of 
others. 
 Further, within SAFs, there is another important tendency that borrows from neoinstitutionalism. In 
the SAF framework, more powerful (incumbent) players in incumbent groups help to produce and 
reproduce a status quo, aided by the status quo. In emergent or unsettled SAFs, the task for skilled 
strategic players is to gain advantage over others, for example help them build coalitions able to organize 
the field, or to use their superior resources to produce (or reproduce) a hierarchical field. The most 
important point is that players that undertake strategic action must be able to use whatever tactics they 
have developed in an intersubjective enough fashion to secure the cooperation of other players. This kind 
of skill enables players to transcend their own individual and narrow group interests as a prerequisite for 
shaping a broader conception of the collective.19   
 
4. The Broader Field Environment- The State as a Collection of Interdependent SAFs 
The SAF framework has utility over two-level games or institutional logics-constructivist frameworks 
because virtually all of the previous work on fields focuses mainly on the internal functions of these 
orders, often depicting them as largely self-contained, autonomous worlds. As outlined earlier, the next 
distinctive central analytic feature of the SAF framework is the importance of linking, or embodying the 
SAF or SAFs in broader matrices of relationships with other SAFs, in other words, the broader 
environment within which any given SAF is embedded. SAFs are embedded in complex webs of other 
                                                
18 DiMaggio, “Interest and Agency,” pp. 3-12. Fligstein (1997), pp. 397-405; Olivier (1991), pp. 145-179.  
19 Fligstein & McAdam (2012), pp. 16-18. 
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SAFs, about which Fligstein and McAdam make distinctions. The first distinction they make is 
between distant and proximate fields. This distinction holds that proximate SAFs are those with recurring 
ties to, and whose actions routinely affect their “neighbors.” The most distant SAFs have the fewest ties 
and may have only occasional effects on more distant SAFs. 
 However, the second distinction, between dependent and interdependent SAFs, may be even more 
important, because this distinction captures the extent and direction of influence that characterizes the 
relationship between any two fields. A SAF that is largely subject to the influence of another is said to 
be dependent on it. This dependence can be via formal legal or bureaucratic authority. Then, third, when 
two linked SAFs exercise more or less equal influence over each other, we can say that they have 
interdependent relationships to one another. Also, some SAFs can be independent with some and 
dependent on others, depending on the situation.20   
 
States and Governments as Collections of SAFs 
This framework is especially useful for looking at domestic relationships between decision layers within 
unit-level States when working with different actors. In the SAF framework, States (or, more particularly 
the governing apparatus of a country or State) can be characterized as dense collections of interdependent 
SAFs whose relations can be distant or proximate and, if proximate, can be nestled in 
horizontal or vertical relationships to one another. Thus the decision of a State in international 
negotiations is only the signature on a document put together by a myriad of interlinked SAFs in a dense 
system or systems of interdependent fields. This construction has obvious utility to discussing the 
framework of interlinked behaviors of actors and SAFs when attempting to understand the timing and 
content of particular agreements (and the negotiations that led to them) between Japan and the U.S.  
 The fundamental construction of a State, according to Fligstein and McAdam, is a collection of SAFs 
that govern action and make possible new forms of action (political SAFs) and bureaucratic and legal 
apparatus that enforce and adjudicate claims (bureaucratic SAFs). As States developed and expanded over 
a relatively long historical period involving the pacification of an area or region, or steps toward the 
political or administrative centralization of a territory, the growth of cities, the creation of bureaucracies, 
markets, etc., all involved (and continue to evolve) an ever-expanding network of SAFs. All these 
innovations will produce incumbents and challengers and will inevitably face internal governance issues, 
which could be called growing pains. This can be clearly seen, for example, in the growth of a vast 
subgovernance structure in Japan after the Second World War through the proliferation of agencies and 
organizations under the control of Japan’s central ministries and civil service.   
 In the SAF framework, the State, as conceived as a body that concludes binding agreements with 
other States, is internally supported, or at times undermined, by events in internal SAFs and nonstate 
SAFs. So, States, according to Fligstein and McAdam, are really just sets of SAFs in which players 
(politicians, bureaucratic actors, ministries, subgovernment implementation agencies and organizations, 
etc.) engage in political (or bureaucratic) strategic action towards defining new balances of power within 
SAFs and between SAFs. Thus, State SAFs will contain internal SAFs in which there will be struggles 
over the conferral of power, or conflicts over who controls new legal rights or protections, which will lead 
to the potential of more contention and conflict. As a State SAF adjusts to new circumstances, for 
example a major threat or challenge, there will be the possibility of the creation of new SAFs by groups 
                                                
20 Ibid., pp. 18-19. 
  81 
or interests (new players, for example) seeking power or advantage in the new situation. Major challenges 
can be anything from an economic crisis, significant social unrest, or the pressure of a mass social or 
political movement (an extreme case would be a general strike or even a revolution), or a security 
pressure, a military emergency, an attempted coup, or the contested outcome of an election. Such 
challenges force State-level SAFs to fashion new governance systems, or regulatory or compliance 
systems to deal with them. 
 Therefore, just like any other SAF, State SAFs are also dynamic and contested. They may appear 
stable and settled, but in some cases a certain trigger can send a cascade of actions and reactions that can 
challenge, undermine, threaten, or destabilize the field. Also, generally speaking, when a pressure is 
exerted on a field, for example, or when a new SAF is forming, there is contestation about the new rules 
and balance of power within the SAF, and in turn, the relationship and role of that SAF within the state 
SAF. As a State develops new roles and faces new political, economic and social problems, the State 
evolves, leading to the further accretion of new and contested, interconnected SAFs as new groups make 
demands of it, resulting in the historical layering of the State as it seeks to create new forms of 
governance in response to particular crises, shocks or needs. Further, in the modern era, as economic, 
political and social complexities arise, the State SAF may be periodically or regularly challenged by 
multiple SAFs. 
 Thus, in the SAF framework, the State is definitely much more than unified actor. Rather, the State is 
a complex accretion of sometimes competing and sometimes cooperating SAFs which change, or 
accommodate new SAFs. Further, the SAFs within the State are dependent on their links to SAFs outside 
of the State. Further yet, not requiring war or revolution necessarily, State SAFs are always being 
challenged, particularly by non-state SAFs, whether they be social movements or economic interests, 
which will challenge political and bureaucratic SAFs to act to adjudicate, for example, in disputes. And, 
for example, non-State SAFs may challenge the legitimacy of state SAFs to exert authority or to govern 
in a particular way, resulting in the onset of contestation.  
 
Implications for Bureaucratic Institutionalism 
Viewing the State as a construction of myriad, often densely connected SAFs obviously has implications 
for the role of the bureaucratic levels of decision-making in our original scenario. In the SAF framework, 
as a whole, the bureaucracy can have a number of roles depending on the situation and the interaction of 
SAFs. Generally, for example, at the unit level of the State, the State’s central bureaucracy can act as the 
State’s internal governance unit, supporting the State against challenges by new SAFs. As a major SAF 
itself, the bureaucracy (in the form of Japan’s central ministries in this dissertation) can act as an internal 
governance unit that provides routine administrative services, and as an information clearing house 
between outside SAFs and the political SAF layer, enforce or construct regulations and rules for the State, 
and monitor and control non-State SAFs, etc. Of course, under different circumstances, SAFs within the 
bureaucracy can act as incumbents, challengers or internal governance units, depending on the situation, 
especially, for example, when there is contestation within the bureaucratic SAF between incumbents, 
challengers and internal governance units.  
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5. Exogenous Shocks, Mobilization, and the Onset of Contention 
The interdependence of SAFs implies that the they are liable to be buffeted by actions both within them, 
and from proximate or even distant SAFs. Earlier, I alluded to the idea of a shock by one SAF on another 
as causing a cascade of reactions in other SAFs. The same applies within a particular SAF. A change in 
one SAF, then, can be the cause of changes rippling into (on, through?) other interconnected SAFs. 
Depending on the type and proximity (the relationships) between SAFs, those ripples may affect some 
SAFs and not others, setting up interference patterns.  
 Changes come in all sizes, and only rather large shocks are apt to send ripples of sufficient intensity 
to pose a real threat to the stability of proximate SAFs. Shocks can offer challengers opportunities to 
change their own power or position in an SAF, or even change the rules of the game within a SAF. 
However, as stated above, in settled SAFs, incumbents, generally speaking, will usually be well 
positioned to absorb, deflect, or subsume changes and challenges.  
 Saying that, an external shock to an SAF may also not necessarily lead to destabilization because 
challengers may have the perception that they cannot act because they feel the incumbents are too secure, 
for example. Also, incumbents, for example, can generally count on the support of loyal allies within 
internal governance units both internal to the SAF and also have allies embedded in proximate State and 
nonstate fields to support them. As noted and implied earlier, generally speaking, incumbents are 
positioned to survive and maintain the status quo.21   
 In the collection of SAFs that form a State, sometimes the considerable incumbent advantages 
possessed by the State may not be enough to prevent “episodes of contention.” In relatively rare cases, 
such pressures have the magnitude to virtually impose a crisis or a change on a SAF or a series of SAFs, 
especially those that stand in a vertically dependent relationship to the SAF in question. According to the 
SAF framework, exactly how much of a destabilization is possible within an SAF or proximate SAFs can 
be determined by a highly contingent mobilization process.  
 Here there are three linked mechanisms; collective attribution of threat or opportunity; social 
appropriation; and innovative action. For the first, the question is how do incumbents and challengers see 
the change? Is it destabilizing? Does it present opportunities for challengers to change something? Is it 
considered serious enough for incumbents to react to it? If enough players feel compelled to react, it is 
more likely that contention will arise. The collective attribution of threat or/opportunity is not, however, 
enough in and of itself always sufficient to ensure the onset of contention. For contention to arise, those 
perceiving the threat/opportunity must command the organizational resources, (termed social 
appropriation in the SAF framework) and prosecute effective innovative action needed to mobilize and 
sustain action. See Figure 14 below for a schema of this. 
 Then, for contention to take place that can potentially change the balance of power within the SAF 
(the power relationships between players), there needs to be sufficient heightened interaction involving 
the use of innovative (or perhaps even previously prohibited) forms of collective action, which is referred 
to as innovative action (as mentioned above). In this dissertation’s adaptation of the SAF framework, 
innovative action is combined with strategic action, because inter-ministerial bargaining, or trying to gain 
advantage over a rival ministry, (or, for example, METI trying to “hijack” the ONSP, etc. as we will see 
in 2012) may well require many micro-steps of innovative action. These may include, for example, 
dozens and dozens of informal meetings, talks, unofficial conferences, “town hall” meetings to set or 
                                                
21 Fligstein & McAdam (2012), pp. 19-21.  
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manipulate agendas, telephone chats, private lunches and dinners (again a form of nemawashi in the 
Japanese context) and all the instruments of informal relationships between individuals that are 
impossible to quantify. 
          Figure 14: Basic Schema of SAF Actor Behavior  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
  
Source: Author’s own adaption from Fligstein & McAdam (2012), p. 20. 
 
 However this impenetrability need not be a major problem. First, this lack, as it were, can be at least 
partially covered by fieldwork and interviewing. Secondly, of course, the motivations and behaviors of 
individual players or the groups or constituencies they promote or defend, while important, are inevitably 
bounded to a greater degree by the boundaries of agency, and the logics of appropriateness and 
consequences enmeshed in the responsibilities of the individuals within their SAFs, for example, their 
duties. In fact, this dissertation uses several dozens of interviews with key protagonists and 
representatives of key institutions at critical phases in the periods 1998-9, 2003, 2005-15.22 However, if 
challengers, for example, decide not to engage in innovative action that disrupts the mechanism or rules 
of the SAF, or find that they cannot gain traction, but press their claims using standard procedures for 
more marginal gains, according to Fligstein and McAdam, it is likely that the contention will not result in 
changes in the field.  
 
6. Episodes of Contention 
Often in the SAF framework, external shocks or pressure occur that are of sufficient magnitude to 
provoke or force strategic action by players in a SAF, leading to innovative and then strategic action. In 
the SAF framework, contention can be defined as “a period of emergent, sustained contentious interaction 
between … [field] actors utilizing new and innovative forms of action vis-à-vis one another.”23 Besides 
innovative action, episodes of contention occur when players share a sense of uncertainty/crisis regarding 
the rules and power relations governing the SAF. In stable SAFs, with well-established incumbents and 
                                                
22 This section on dealing with individuals is adapted from Fligstein & McAdam (2012), pp. 19-22. Many of the critical 
interviews conducted by the author appear in the footnotes of this dissertation, although more dozens of background 
interviews do not.  
23 Doug McAdam, “Legacies of Anti-Americanism: A Sociological Perspective,” pp. 251-272, in Peter Katzenstein and 
Robert Keohane (eds.) Anti-Americanism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007), p. 253. 
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challengers, the mobilization of both groups can be intense and sustained, and an episode of contention 
can last as long as the shared sense of uncertainty regarding the structure and dominant order of the SAF 
persists.  
 The internal dynamics of an episode of contention can contain within them mechanisms that intensify 
or sustain the contention as the motivations of players, or their behavioral calculus changes and adapts in 
an air of uncertainty about what the rules of the game are, what is up for grabs, what is possible and 
impossible. One example of such behavior is called framing. In this, different players try to seize the high 
ground, mobilize consensus around their particular conception of the SAF, and try to reconstitute it in this 
image. Incumbents on the other hand will try to maintain the current order, often calling on internal 
governance units to support them. However, of course challengers may also attempt the same action.24 
 
7. Settlement 
In line with classic institutional theories that assert that bureaucracies and organizations tend toward stasis 
and the reinstitution or reestablishment of familiar or old patterns of interactions and relationships, the 
SAF framework also states that SAFs in episodes of contention also contain the elements, or that SAFs 
always have internal mechanisms, that will eventually restore order or allow actors to come to a new 
equilibrium. Even the most violently boiled liquid will cool and settle once the heat energy supplied to it 
is stopped.  
 For example, incumbents will try to sublimate or absorb the shocks of the episodes of contention. Or 
successful challengers, executing a change, will then try to re-impose order on the SAF. Often, according 
to the SAF framework, the advantage enjoyed by incumbents may be enough to overcome crisis and 
restore order. But, also, in rarer instances, challengers successfully sustain mobilization and slowly begin 
to institutionalize new practices and rules, or new structures. In fact, most players have a stake in 
restoring the shared sense of order that will eventually lead to compromises and the reassertion of order, 
or a new status quo. No player wants to risk systemic breakdown or inefficiencies that make governance 
more difficult, affecting the status or ability to act or govern in the system as a whole. In the SAF 
framework this reestablishment of order (however impermanent it turns out to be in some cases) is called 
settlement. However, as noted, settlement, if it creates a newly constituted SAF, or a changed or newly 
configured SAF, may often contain the seeds of future contention within it or within other related SAFs, 
which will be tested when pressures (changes or shocks) are applied, again, either from within an SAF, or 
from other SAFs.  
 
 
 
Formation, Stability, Contestation and Settlement 
In reviewing the SAF framework, out of the main premises noted above, it is possible to split the SAF 
framework into two further frameworks; between the internal behavioral dynamics of SAFs, and three 
main phases of operations. This section focuses on the importance of the behavior of SAFs in relationship 
to other SAFs. That is to say, it is the dynamic behavior of SAFs that is also analytically useful for 
studying space policy transition over an extended period, because the SAF framework contains a built-in 
temporal dynamic (a narrative of events over time, containing phases or episodes) that can explain how 
the states of SAFs roil and change over a period of time, leading to a series of actions and reactions. On a 
                                                
24 Fligstein & McAdam (2012), pp. 21-22. 
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linear two-dimensional schema, this might be rather similar to a domino effect. But, in the SAF 
framework, as we have seen, the interlinkages of SAF fields means that decisions taken by players in one 
field may well impact proximate fields. 
 At this point, the SAF framework focuses its attention on the potential for stability and change in a 
particular SAF field. Rather like Punctuated Equilibrium Theory, in massive systems, for example 
political economies, SAFs are likely to be stable until a massive enough challenge occurs. However, 
many of the changes that occur in SAFs come from proximate SAFs. Changes however, can just as often 
reinforce the positions of incumbents as challengers.  
 Within the phases of the life of a particular SAF, Fligstein and McAdam determined three main 
states for SAFs: stable, contested and settled. Given that SAFs can be viewed as dynamic, each of the 
states contains sub-elements of change that can be further divided. For example, when a SAF is formed, it 
may well be the result of contention between different players, so that the seeds of future contention are 
always present. The next phase is called the onset of contention. This is by no means an inevitability, but 
possible if a shock or a pressure is forceful enough, which will then lead to successive waves or bouts 
innovative action, strategic action and contention, all eventually steering to some sort of (temporary/ 
[in]stable, etc.) settlement. So, then again, that settlement will also well contain the seeds of future 
contention. In this way, settlement might even be called a pre-contention phase.25  
As outlined earlier, in the SAF framework, the formation or emergence of a SAF is critical to 
understanding subsequent behavior. The SAF may arise through the imposition of a hierarchical power 
distribution by the assertion of another power (which can be a new law, for example), competition 
between stronger or weaker players, or cooperation, and, often, through a combination of all three, 
leading to a distribution of resources and a hierarchy and motivational matrix leading to the formation of 
a different or changed set of incumbents and challengers and internal or external governance units. 
Importantly, in the SAF framework, SAFs are often shaped originally by events (or SAFs) outside the 
emergent SAF.  
An emerging SAF, therefore, is a constructed arena occupied by two or more groups (or players) 
whose actions are orientated to each other. SAFs, then, are often the products of actions of proximate 
SAFs. If we view the State as an accumulation of interrelated SAFs, then state action at the higher levels 
of the state, for example, international relations (from negotiations that force changes in policies, 
organizations, etc., to wars), political decisions, new laws, economic crises, social movements, etc., all 
have massive potential to impact SAFs, or even, in extremis, to create new ones. When forming new 
SAFs, Fligstein and McAdam trace what they call emergent mobilization, which precedes innovative 
action, as a key factor in SAF emergence. In this construct, field emergence is often caused by some 
exogenous change that is perceived by at least two actors as having the potential to pose a significant 
opportunity (or threat) to them, and leads to rational behavior (attribution of threat/opportunity, leading to 
collective [strategic] action) that becomes the dynamic to construct the SAF.  
Usefully, Fligstein and McAdam also see the onset of contention in SAFs as primarily precipitated, 
again, by exogenous shocks to the field, for example major events that cause a sense of crisis, or changes 
in related, (often, but not always) proximate SAFs. For example, a national security crisis (in our case, for 
example, the Taepodong overflight) can have an effect that ripples down and through multiple decision 
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layers and through their related interconnected SAFs, so that in a particular SAF, the pressure applied to it 
may have cascaded down from, or through, a more distant event.  
During contention, the SAF framework generally concedes ground to conventional rational actor 
scenarios, but with the added analytical input that both challengers and incumbents will play games with 
internal and external governance units to seek advantage or forestall a loss. Within this dynamic however, 
incumbents are essentially motivated to try to seek settlement that will preserve as many of their previous 
privileges as possible, or accept changes that they can sublimate, for example. Challengers, meanwhile, 
will need to try to form winning coalitions, seek allies, use the existing resources and rules and, often, 
using power from other SAFs, try to fashion change or a new order. Challengers need often to cooperate 
with other players or other SAFs to succeed. Many of these themes have been examined in case studies by 
Kawabata and others, and referred to in case studies mentioned above. In fact, such tactics and games will 
form a critical part of this dissertation’s analysis. Such themes are introduced in the next section and then 
looked at in more detail later in the dissertation.  
In conclusion, however, the critical points about the SAF framework is the message of dynamism and 
interconnection of families of SAFs. The SAF framework in general, through the analytical framework of 
SAFs, accounts for changes in large systems that can be sporadic or piecemeal, or radical and profound. 
The SAF framework, in its bundling of players into SAFs, provides a way to understand the 
interdependent roles of many players up and down more formal decision trees. The SAF framework also 
suggests how actors within SAFs and SAFs themselves and interactions between SAFs can be expected to 
behave in different circumstances.  
 
Applying the SAF Framework to Space Policy 
 
Using an adapted form of the SAF framework, this dissertation traces the interdependent linkages that 
connect the seven (or eight, when public opinion is important) levels of relationships ranging from the 
international situation down to the grass roots (jobs, contracts, cash) that factor into Japan’s process of 
changing its space policy and institutional frameworks. Simply speaking, this can involve a process in 
which exogenous pressures such as international relationships or security pressures create reactions and 
behaviors that feed through the political levels of decision-making to the managing institutions (policy 
and budgeting ministries) and implementation through subgovernment agencies and contractors. There is 
bidirectional feedback at many of these levels. These levels can be seen in terms of decision-making 
levels. Take for example the following seven-layer model (Figure 15, below).  
In a real example that will be analyzed in detail in Chapters 5 and 7, in 1998, Japanese policy makers 
faced a decision about how Japan was to react to the 1998 Taepodong overflight, which catalyzed 
widespread concerns about the growing ballistic missile threat to Japan, so that there was a general sense 
of alarm that pervaded much of Japanese society, including the general public, which needed to be 
reassured. Politicians had to be seen to cater to public opinion, while addressing a worrying security 
concern. The overflight provoked public discussion, or brought into public debate topic that had already 
been thrashing around in parts of Japan’s intelligence, military policy and national security circles for at 
least several years about the need to reinforce and integrate Japan’s intelligence gathering abilities. In fact, 
the question over whether or not to procure or develop space-based reconnaissance ability was already on 
the table before the missile overflight, and it was immediately brought much more into the open 
subsequently.   
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Figure 15: Seven-Layer Analysis of Decision Making: Taepodong Shock 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Then, since security matters in Japan are dealt with in the context of the U.S.-Japan alliance, the U.S. 
would need to be consulted. As a junior partner in the alliance, the question would be whether Japan 
would purchase a U.S. system or develop its own. A cost-benefit analysis would show that buying from 
the U.S. would provide a much better system and the potential for new integrated capabilities, but this 
would infringe on the PPR and subject (or cede) that whole sphere of action and technology to the control 
of the U.S. with Japan as, once more, junior partner.  
Of course, in the weeks following the overflight, U.S. was anxious for Japan to buy superior 
U.S.-made satellites rather than domestic purchases, and made this clear, because the U.S. wanted to 
tightly control Japanese technology development in this highly strategic area. However, there was also 
another a greater cooperative diplomatic and strategic logic between the partners: provided that Japan’s 
ISR program could be harnessed by the U.S., then it would be to the benefit of both partners.  
On the other hand, if such a system of sufficient utility to provide good enough intelligence could be 
developed indigenously, then a made-in-Japan satellite-based capability would provide a big win for 
many domestic players, particularly in terms of budgets and investment and technology gains. In 
particular, and specifically, a domestically-built system would likely fall to the Science and Technology 
Agency (STA) and its implementation subgovernment organization NASDA, which was suffering from 
budget shortfalls and a loss of confidence. At the same time, industry was urgently requiring added 
government investment because it was cash-strapped. 
So, what should Japan do? Clearly the political decision whether or not to increase Japan’s 
surveillance capabilities is closely tied to meeting both internal and external considerations. While it 
might be possible to analyze Japan’s response using a two-level game scenario, this has its limitations, 
because the rocket overflight also impinged on Japan’s fundamental security policy and the normative 
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stance of the PPR. The overflight, in fact, set in train a series of arguments in Japan over how to manage 
its institutional and policy arrangements over a period of years. 
In the end, as we have seen, policy makers compromised between all the competing factors and 
decided to build a domestically-developed system seeded with U.S. technologies, and put the system into 
an office of the Prime Minister’s office so as not to infringe on the PPR. However, this compromise was 
to prove unstable, because the “shock” butted against an institutional and policy framework already under 
pressure.  
Putting these layers of analysis into interrelated and interdependent fields, each with their own 
characteristics, players and behaviors, and then putting those into a general SAF which we could call the 
General Space Activities SAF helps make sense of answering who did what, when, and why.  
If we think about the overall SAF, we can see that the Taepodong overflight was a major exogenous 
threat or pressure that disrupted the General Space Activities SAF and caused certain players to behave 
logically and opportunistically to the disruption. The Taepodong overflight can be seen as a major shock 
that set off a series of episodes of contention in the field as a whole, the General Space Activities SAF, 
and which fundamentally changed it through time through the strategic actions of challengers, incumbents 
and governance units.  
So, when setting up SAFs to create a framework to discuss and analyze the field of Japanese space 
activities, its players, the proximate and distant fields, the major task is one of identification of players 
and delineation of SAF relationships; of definition of each field and identification of its relationship with 
other fields; of identification of the incumbents, challengers and governance units. Then, an examination 
of how major shocks caused disruption, episodes of contention, strategic action and then partial 
settlement will follow. Put simply, following 1969, with the initiation of a formal national space program 
led by the SAC, it is possible to set up a General Space Activities SAF and then see how it behaved, and 
each of its subfields behaved (executed rational behavior according the motivational matrix explained 
above) through a series of episodes of contention and strategic action, to form today’s more-or-less settled 
new General Space Activities SAF. This will be the work of Chapter 6. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  89 
Chapter 4 
Outer Space as Governance and Security Issues 
 
This chapter establishes the importance of outer space activities and space policy as a global commons 
and a global governance issue, and as a security issue. Establishing the importance of space activities and 
technologies is necessary to this dissertation because, until recently, Japanese space policy and activities 
have been largely ignored by mainstream international relations and security scholarship, largely because 
of the PPR. A closer examination of space activities, however, shows that outer space activities have 
become an important and difficult new global governance issue, at least requiring some attention from 
Japan as a responsible leading liberal democratic state facing some very real national security challenges. 
In order to demonstrate these points, this chapter discusses some of the most pertinent issues involved 
with global governance, global environmental concerns, and global security issues.  
 
Outer Space as a Global Commons Issue 
The use of space facilitates the smooth operation of the international economic and political system built on 
telecommunications, PNT, and remote sensing services that increase the frequency, speed, and the 
reliability of cross-border transactions. Technologies and industries associated the use of space serve as a 
global infrastructure. The GPS system, for example, not only helps navigate but also precisely time 
financial transactions. Data from remote sensing satellites is routinely utilized in weather forecasting, 
disaster monitoring and recovery, and global climate change research, to name but a few general 
applications.  
 According to the Satellite Industry Association, there were about 1,000 working satellites in Earth 
orbit in 2012, producing revenues of US$168 billion. With a 6.7 percent annual growth rate, as of that 
estimate, the global space industry including government spending and commercial revenue had grown to 
over US$300 billion, with space activities providing a huge swath of economic, social and environmental 
benefits and uses, including communications, weather prediction environmental monitoring and 
navigation.1  
 
Outer Space and International Law and Governance 
Quite early in the history of space activities, the domain of space joined the high seas, the atmosphere, 
and Antarctica as being considered as res communis, that is to say, the common heritage of all humankind, 
not subject to the appropriation of sovereignty of any State, and thus subject to the Charter of the United 
Nations in terms of assessing the legality or otherwise of any activities in space.2 The domain of outer 
space is primarily governed by the 1967 OST, which grew out of a mix of treaties and customs, and 
whose articles are the result of early compromises between the first two space powers, the U.S. and 
Soviet Russia, at the dawn of the space race in 1957, when discussions began in the United Nations 
General Assembly (UNGA) to ascertain the relationship of the uses of space with international law.3  
                                                
1 Barry Kellman, “Space: The Fouled Frontier – Adjudicating Space Debris as An International Environmental Nuisance,” 
Journal of Space Law, Vol. 39, No. 2 (Spring/Summer 2014), pp. 233-35. 
2 GA Res 1721A (XVI), International co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space, UN Doc A/RES/1721A (20 
December 1961). 
3 An example of customary space law is the principle of free passage in space established in 1957 when Sputnik crossed 
over territories other than its own without protest from those countries. This principle dates back to 1955 in a decision 
memo forwarded to U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower noted, “A small scientific satellite will provide a test of the 
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 Early disagreements between the U.S. and Soviet Russia focused on the definition of what 
constituted the “peaceful” use of space, with the U.S. favoring defining “peaceful” as “non-aggressive” so 
that military activities in space are permitted so long as they are not expressly forbidden by international 
law. Soviet Russia initially sought to have the term “peaceful” interpreted as eschewing the use of all 
military activities in space. The need to debate these issues led to the establishment of the Ad Hoc and 
Permanent Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS) where the study of the 
peaceful uses of outer space was included as one of its tasks.4 Through several twists and turns, the OST 
was born through the eventual dropping of Soviet Russia’s opposition to the use of military hardware in 
orbit. This was made possible after it had succeeded in developing its own usable reconnaissance 
satellites. Thus, GA Res 1721A (XVI), adopted in 1961, became a key provision of the OST.5 
 The fundamental tenets of the OST are that no State can make territorial claims to outer space and 
the celestial bodies within it; that nations have free access to space; that all nations are free to conduct 
scientific investigation in space; that national rights to space objects launched by States are preserved; and 
that nations will cooperate in rendering assistance to crews of spaceships in emergencies.6 In the OST, 
Art. I paragraph 1 includes the phrase that outer space is the “...the province of all mankind.” It leaves this 
phrase undefined and unexplained, but it has been interpreted to mean “for the benefit of all mankind.” 
Paragraph 2 states that the territory in outer space, on the moon or other celestial bodies cannot be 
claimed by any nation. This prohibition does not extend to private individuals or legal entities. Art. III 
denotes that activities and must be “in accordance with international law…and in the interests of 
maintaining international peace and security.”  
 In Art. IV paragraph 2, the OST requires that space be used for peaceful purposes, and it is generally 
accepted that this means that the placing military installations, fortifications, maneuvers or the testing of 
                                                                                                                                                        
principle of ‘Freedom of Space.’ … Preliminary studies indicate that there is no obstacle under international law to the 
launching of such a satellite.” See NSC 5520, Draft Statement of Policy on U.S. Scientific Satellite Program, General 
Considerations, (20 May 1955), contained in Presidential Decisions: NSC Documents, (Washington, DC: George C. 
Marshall Institute, n.d.), p.10.  
4 As a result of these discussions, in 1958, the U.S. and the Soviet Union started considering the question of the peaceful 
use of outer space. This led to the passing of UNGA Res1348 (XIII) and UNGA Res1472 (XIV). See Question of the 
peaceful use of outer space, UN Doc A/RES/1348 (XIII) (13 December 1958), preface, para 1 (a) (b) & para 2; 
International co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space, UN Doc A/RES/1472 (XIV) (12 December 1959), preface, 
para 1 (a). 
5 A/RES/1884 (XVIII) (17 Oct. 1963), para 2 (a); GA Res 1884 (XVIII) was adopted which calls on all States “[t]o 
refrain from placing in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of 
mass destruction, installing such weapons on celestial bodies, or stationing such weapons in outer space in any other 
manner”.   
6 The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the 
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter the Outer Space Treaty] (ratified in 1967, 
the Outer Space Treaty was the first international space law treaty). See also, Michael J. Listner, “International Space 
Law: An Overview of Law and Issues,” New Hampshire Bar Journal (Spring 2011), pp. 62-71. 
 The OST is built on a series of other treaties: 1. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the 
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. 2. Agreement on the Rescue of 
Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Space Objects Launched into Outer Space. 3. Convention on 
International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects. 4. Convention of Registration of Objects Launched into Outer 
Space. 5. Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. See Agreement on the 
Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Space Objects Launched into Outer Space, Apr. 22, 1968, 
672 U.N.T.S.119 [hereinafter the Rescue Agreement] (outlines the duties of States towards the rescue and return of 
astronauts); Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Nov. 29, 1971, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 
[hereinafter the Liability Convention] (imposes a strict liability standard for damage caused by space objects); Convention 
on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, November 12, 1974, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15 [hereinafter the Registration 
Convention] (requires members to register a list of all spacecraft launched and the nature of the spacecraft with the U.N. 
Secretary General); Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Dec. 18, 1979, 
1363 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter the Moon Treaty] (governs the use of the moon and other celestial bodies). 
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weapons in outer space are forbidden. While the OST does prohibit the placement of nuclear weapons or 
any other weapon of mass destruction in the orbit of Earth or on any celestial body, it fails to specifically 
address the placement of non-nuclear weapons or those that are not capable of causing mass destruction.7 
Art. VI requires that a State or a nation be responsible for its activities in space or for the activities of 
NGOs under its jurisdiction, as well as detailing the nature of objects launched into space and the nature 
of any activities performed in space. Art. VII paragraph 1 imposes liability for any damages caused by a 
space object on Earth or to another State’s property. Art. VII paragraph 1 states that any space object 
launched continues to be the property of the State that launched it regardless of whether that object lands 
in sovereignless territory or the territory of another State. Art. IX specifies that States shall conduct space 
activities with due regard to the corresponding interests of all other States Parties and that they shall 
consult each other before doing anything that might cause harmful interference for other space users. The 
avoidance of harmful contamination of outer space and adverse changes in the environment of the Earth 
is generally accepted as a customary rule of International law.8 
 Against these provisions, the lack of specific definitions of many of the terms in the OST has made 
them difficult to enforce and subject to prolonged and intense argument and debate. Further, the question 
of whether international environmental obligations extend to space law as well is also debatable, causing 
legal scholars to argue that States’ assertion of individual sovereignty and the vagueness of the OST de 
facto mean that space law exists in a lacuna “where responsibility does not lie.”9  
 
The Space Debris Issue 
Facing this, specifically, the proliferation of space debris, now amounting to hundreds of thousands of 
objects circling the Earth, is understood to be a clear and present danger to both the space community and 
the global telecommunications infrastructure. Without a more robust governance regime, this situation is 
likely to worsen. Yet, while the OST obligates launching States to preserve the environment of outer 
space in the course of the prosecution of space activities, there is no follow-on treaty to further define that 
responsibility or the role that orbital space debris plays.96 Further, the openness and stability of the space 
commons are challenged by the inherent fragility of satellites and space systems. Debris the size of a pea 
hitting a satellite’s optics or solar arrays can prove disastrous.10  
 Five decades following Sputnik-1, the orbit around the Earth is cluttered, congested & competitive.11 
Currently there are now more than 700,000 items circling the Earth, of which only about 21,000 larger than 
10 cm in diameter are tracked, with another estimated 100 million particles smaller than 1 cm. The space 
environment up to the Geostationary Earth Orbit (GEO) that runs 36,000 km around the Earth now contains 
about 6,000 tons of materials alone. Low Earth Orbit (LEO- 200 km to 2,000 km) is congested with more 
than 14,000 objects (including more than 2,600 dead satellites) larger than 5-10 cm in diameter. In 2010, 
                                                
7 Art. IV paragraph 1 prohibits the placement of WMD in orbit. 
8 Article IX, OST; See Draft Articles provisionally adopted on Second Reading by the Drafting Committee (1998-2000), 
ad. Art. 19, par. 15; Legality of Nuclear Weapons, Dissenting Opinion. 
9 Kellman (2014) pp. 227-266; p. 231; see also, Li Juqian, “Legality and Legitimacy: China’s ASAT Test,” China 
Security, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Winter 2009), pp. 43-52.  
96 But see Liability Convention supra note 43 arts. 2-4 (where a State is liable when “... a space object causes damage 
someplace other than the surface of the Earth, i.e. outer space or another celestial body.”) 
10 Timon Singh, “Space: The Final Junkyard,” EU Infrastructure, 24 August 2008. 
11 Gregory L. Schulte, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy for the U.S. Department of Defense, 
“Schulte: Space is Congested, Contested, Competitive,” 27th National Space Symposium, Colorado Springs, June 2011. 
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about 43 percent of these objects were attributed to the Peoples Republic of China (PRC), 27.5 percent to 
the U.S. and 25.5 percent to Russia.12  
 NASA states that deliberate explosions account for much of the debris.13 As noted above, untracked 1 
cm or bigger particles that comprise 98 percent of objects in orbit are all potentially lethal. A 1 cm object 
moving at 7.78 km/second has the kinetic energy to debilitate or destroy a satellite. Worse, when large 
objects collide, they produce huge quantities of smaller debris. Current estimates of microparticulates are 
that they number between ten billion and one quadrillion pieces.14 There are now 30-50 untracked 
fragments for each one tracked.15 To understand how pressing the issue of orbital debris has become since 
2007, Figure 16 shows the alarming growth in debris 1962-2010, highlighting the impact of the 2007 ASAT 
test by the PRC (see below). 
 
Figure 16: Orbital debris growth 1962-2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16: The cataloged population growth, minus analyst satellites, has had three major phases: A. 1960-1996 during which the growth 
was fairly linear at a rate of 260/year; B. 1996-2006 during which time the cataloged population remained fairly constant largely due to 
implementation of debris mitigation guidelines and a hiatus in significant breakup events; and C: 2006-2010 during which two major events 
created a ~1250/year growth rate. You could also lump the entire space age together (1960-2010) resulting in about a 280/object per year 
catalog growth rate. Source: NASA/JSC, Orbital Debris Quarterly News, January 2010. 
 
 The orbital situation became measurably worse following the PRC’s January 2007 ASAT missile test 
on the Fengyun-1C weather satellite, which caused a debris “cloud” of more than 3,000 trackable and 
150,000 particles larger than 1 cm, many of which will remain a danger for over 100 years. This single 
event increased the number orbital debris particles in LEO by 15 percent.16 In 2009, a collision between the 
Iridium 33 satellite and Russian Cosmos 2252 satellite produced 1.5 tons and 2,000 tracked/100,000 
untracked debris objects. Combined, the two incidents increased debris in LEO by 60 percent. A next 
                                                
12 Megan Ansdell, “Active Space Debris Removal: Needs, Implications and Recommendations for Today’s Geopolitical 
Environment,” 2 June 2010, Princeton University. 
13 NASA Orbital Debris, Orbital Debris Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.nasa.gov/news/debris_faq.html 
14 Agatha Askers, “To Infinity and Beyond: Orbital Space Debris and How to Clean it Up,” University of La Verne Law 
Review, Vol. 33, Issue 2 (May 2012), p. 294. 
15 Heiner Klinkrad, “Space Debris Mitigation Activities at ESA,” Feb 2011; Donald J. Kessler, Nicholas L. Johnson, J.-C. 
Liou, Mark Matney, “The Kessler Syndrome: Implications to Future Space Operations,” AAS 10-016, Advances in the 
Astronautical Sciences, American Astronautical Society, Vol. 137 (2010), pp. 47-62. 
16 Frank Rose, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, “Space Sustainability 
Through International Cooperation,” International Symposium on Sustainable Space Development and Utilization for 
Humankind, Tokyo, 1 March 2012; “Limiting Future Collision Risk to Spacecraft: An Assessment of NASA's Meteoroid 
and Orbital Debris Programs,” 1 September 2011, National Research Council, p. 11. 
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catastrophic collision is likely to yield as many fragments as the Iridium-Cosmos collision and the 
Fengyun-1C breakup combined.17  
 Each year 30-40 launches inject 60-70 new objects into orbit. In a 182-page landmark report in 2010, 
the National Research Council reported that the orbital environment has already caused concern that the 
situation will reach a “tipping point” over the next few decades; the threshold of the so-called “Kessler 
Syndrome” in which there would be sufficient debris and junk to begin a cascade of collisions that will 
make LEO unusable.18  
 In LEO, trackable objects are likely to collide with each other every three to six years. One analyst 
predicts the doubling of the lethal hazard at the LEO 850 km orbital height, and the annual probability of 
collisions in the 650-1,000 km region may both occur as early as 2035.19 To cope with this, operational 
satellites are increasingly forced to maneuver around debris to avoid collision. Collision avoidance 
maneuvers by satellite operators have become commonplace in certain orbits.  
 
Space Debris and Global Governance  
UNCOPUOS cites orbital debris as perhaps the committee’s single most pressing governance challenge.20 
Efforts to deal with the issue of space debris date back to the 1970s. In 1979, NASA first set up an office to 
look into the issue.21 In 1980, the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA) became the 
first body to publish a comprehensive technical and policy assessment of debris issues. Through the 1990s, 
strides were made to set rules to limit debris creation, including setting up of the Inter-Agency Space Debris 
Coordination Committee (IADC) and the formation of mitigation guidelines. In 2002, the IADC set 
international guidelines to minimize debris, which were adopted by the UNCOPUOS. For example, the 
“25-year rule” states that all spacecraft missions in orbits of 2,000 km or lower reaching the end of their 
service lives should be put into a position where they deorbit (fall to Earth) in less than 25 years, and that 
GEO satellites reaching the end of their service lives have enough fuel to hoist themselves into “graveyard” 
disposal orbits 2-300 km above the geostationary belt. The Federal Communications Commission passed a 
similar regulation in 2004.22  
 UNCOPOUS also asked the IADC to develop international guidelines that were adopted by 
COPUOS in 2007 and endorsed by the UN General Assembly. However, the vagueness of the language 
has enabled space actors to make their own codes, and compliance with the guidelines is voluntary – so 
                                                
17 Alex Soons, International Association for the Advancement of Space Safety, “Active Debris Removal: An Essential 
Mechanism for Ensuring the Safety and Sustainability of Outer Space,” presentation at the International Symposium on 
Sustainable Space Development and Utilization for Mankind, 1 March 2012, Tokyo. 
18 Clara Moskowitz, “Orbital Debris Has Reached Tipping Point, Report Warns,” Space News, 5 September 2010, p. 13; 
Irene Klotz, “Space junk reaching "tipping point," report warns,” Reuters, 1 September 2011; no author, “Limiting Future 
Collision Risk to Spacecraft: An Assessment of NASA's Meteoroid and Orbital Debris Programs,” National Research 
Council, 1 September 2011. 
19 In addition, the geostationary orbital region also faces difficult issues. As of February 2010, there were 1,238 known 
objects in the GEO belt, of which only 391 were under some level of control; of these 594 were drifting; of the 21 GEO 
satellites reaching End of Life in 2009, only eleven were disposed of properly. Darren McKnight, “Pay Me Now or Pay 
Me More Later: Start the Development of Active Orbital Debris Removal Now,” Proceedings of the Advanced Maui 
Optical and Space Surveillance Technologies Conference, held in Wailea, Maui, Hawaii, 14-17 September 2010. 
20 Yasushi Horikawa, Former Chair of UNCOPUOS, Technical Counselor of JAXA, “Development of UNCOPUOS 
Guidelines for the Long-Term Sustainability of Outer Space activities (Current Status),” presentation to the International 
Symposium on Ensuring Stable Use of Outer Space, Tokyo, 4 March 2016. 
21 No author, “AIAA Position Paper on Space Debris: 30 Years On,” Orbital Debris Quarterly News, January 2012, pp. 
2-3. 
22 Federal Communications Commission, Mitigation of Orbital Debris, Second Report and Order, 19 FCC Rcd 11567 
(2004). 
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much so that only 11 of 21 GEO spacecraft that ended their service life in 2009 were disposed of 
properly.23 However, standards, even non-binding, developed by international organizations and public 
commitments by political leaders continue to be stalled by parochial self-interest. 
 Since existing frameworks, including the OST, do not have provisions on avoiding the destruction of 
space objects and actions triggering debris, international efforts have been under way recently for the 
creation of the International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities (ICoC) proposed by the European 
Union (EU).24 Recently, guidelines for the Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities of the 
Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of UNCOPUOS have attempted to address such matters.25 Because 
of the need to track debris, SSA, in addition to threats posed by ASATs and space debris on space assets, 
has become a priority for the U.S. and Japan (as already mentioned in Chapter 1 and further explored in the 
second half of this chapter). Clearly, the range of security issues posed by the space commons has become a 
critical environmental and security challenge.  
 In 2009, UNCOPUOS put long-term sustainability of outer space activities onto its agenda and has 
been trying in recent years to prepare a consolidated set of current practices, operating procedures, technical 
standards, guidelines, and policies dealing with debris to be applied on a voluntary basis.26 In 2010, the EU 
set out the ICoC, which was designed to be a comprehensive set of guidelines to minimize debris 
generation, in which it proposed as a basis of an international soft law regime.27 The language of the ICoC 
showed the tremendous difficulties involved in building consensus because it indirectly stigmatized the 
PRC’s 2007 ASAT test. But at the same time, for example, the ICoC allowed for the U.S. use of a 
sea-based ballistic missile interceptor to destroy the malfunctioning USA 193 spy satellite on the grounds, 
claimed by the U.S., that the stricken satellite’s fuel tank might present a human health hazard should it 
fall to Earth.28 The ICoC was rejected by both China and Russia, probably because they reserve the right 
to continue to retain the possibility to further develop and deploy various ASAT technologies (see below).  
 Space policy as a governance issue is, then, also subject of political and bureaucratic bickering. For 
example, the March 2014 ICoC update was intended to be the subject of negotiations at the UN in July 
2015, but this meeting was reduced from a negotiation to a consultation in which any number of nations 
could propose alternative texts, making the meeting useless.29  
                                                
23 Brian Weeden, “Dealing with Galaxy 15: Zombiesats and on-orbit servicing,” The Space Review, 24 May 2010, Part I, 
p. 8. 
24 International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities - Version 31 March 2014, European Union External Action 
website, https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/space_code_conduct_draft_vers_31-march-2014_en.pdf 
25 In 2007, the chairperson for UNCOPUOS proposed the discussion of the long-term sustainability of outer space 
activities in relation to civil space activities, so as to start the work of defining risk reduction strategies for the promotion 
of long-term sustainable activities and equal access to outer space. This enabled the Scientific and Technical 
Subcommittee of UNCOPUOS to set up a working group, which currently continues discussions for defining guidelines. 
26 Yasushi Horikawa, “Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities,” presentation at the International Symposium 
on Sustainable Space Development and Utilization for Mankind, 1 & 2 Mar 2012, Tokyo; United Nations Committee on the 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space: Scientific and Technical Subcommittee. See also Terms of Reference and Methods of Work 
of the Working Group on the Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities of the Scientific and Technical 
Subcommittee, Vienna from 7-19 February 2011; UN Doc. A/AC.105/C.1/L.307 of 24 January 2011. 
27 Council Conclusions concerning the revised draft Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities, Council of The 
European Union Brussels, 11 October 2010. 
28 While commonly seen as a tit-for-tat ASAT test to demonstrate U.S. technology, the U.S. claimed the destruction of 
USA 193 to be legitimate on a public health rationale; that it destroyed the satellite at a lower altitude to minimize 
persistent space debris, and announced its plans in advance. 
29 Michael J. Listner, “The International Code of Conduct: Comments on changes in the latest draft and post-mortem 
thoughts,” The Space Frontier, October 26, 2015. 
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 Thus, various updates have been including sets of standard processes but talks on even setting common 
guidelines by Sates have been stalled in UNCOPUOUS, with the earliest date for resolution set for 2018.30 
However, the opposition to the standards-setting approach can only be understood through examining the 
issue space as a security issue, in particular attempts by China and Russia to introduce binding legal 
agreements. Many of the difficulties experienced with coordinating issues to deal with the debris issue are 
replicated in governance issues dealing with space weapons and arms control in space. These points are 
discussed in the following section.  
 
Space as a Security Issue 
 
“Outer space has become a commanding height in international strategic competition. 
Countries concerned are developing their space forces and instruments, and the first 
signs of weaponization of outer space have appeared… China will keep abreast of the 
dynamics of outer space, deal with security threats and challenges in that domain, and 
secure its space assets to serve its national economic and social development, and 
maintain outer space security.”31 
 
While the debris issue constitutes a major global environmental and governance issue, it is also a subset 
of a range of other issues that can interfere with the use of space. In fact, the development and the 
proliferation of space technologies has created a moving target of issues for spacefairing nations and 
those that benefit from the use of space technologies. Space security, in terms of trying to assure the use 
of space, can encompass ensuring the viability of space systems from physical damage such as collision 
between satellites and other man-made objects (debris) and securing sufficient space in orbital slots 
between satellites, for example, or physical attacks by kinetic ASATs (missiles launched from the Earth) 
or co-orbital ASATs (hunter-killer satellites lurking in orbit), explosions, etc., and unguided objects such 
as meteorites, micrometeorites and Near-Earth Objects.  
 Space security also encompasses the assurance of functionality of space systems against non-kinetic 
externalities such as radio frequency interference, jamming, laser blinding, and cyberattacks, either of 
assets in space, or ground control, radar and tracking facilities, and communications systems and 
networks.32 Within this broad definition, however, for the purposes of analytical clarity, space security is 
used in this study as it relates to national security in the sense of preservation of space assets and their 
concomitant systems from intentional interference by actors, mainly but not exclusively States, in pursuit 
of national security or military objectives. Outer space has joined the air and maritime domains as global 
commons and global infrastructure but also as a military domain.33  
 
 
 
                                                
30 Horikawa (2011). 
31 China Information Office of the State Council, China’s Military Strategy, May 2015.  
32 This broad definition does not include, for example, the impact of severe weather conditions or natural disasters on 
ground systems. To see the wide range of issues associated with space security, see for example, The Space Security 
Index, which has been tracking seventeen indicators of space security since 2003: http://spacesecurityindex.org/. 
33 Abraham M. Denmark, James Mulvenon, Frank Hoffman, Lt Col Kelly Martin (USAF), Oliver Fritz, Eric Sterner, Dr. 
Greg Rattray, Chris Evans, Jason Healey, Robert D. Kaplan, (eds.) “Contested Commons: The Future of American Power 
in a Multipolar World,” Center for a New American Security (CNAS), January 2010, p.11. 
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Space Power 
Space technologies can produce a tremendous force multiplier in military action. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of 
Staff define “space power” as “the total strength of a nation’s capabilities to conduct and influence activities 
to, in, through and from space to achieve its objectives.”34 Space provides the “strategic high ground” from 
which global communications and remote sensing can be quickly transmitted to militaries around the world. 
A military that can effectively use outer space has a tremendous advantage in terms of in command, control, 
communications, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C3ISR), maneuverability, and firepower. 
 Today, advanced militaries are increasingly or largely dependent on satellites for long-distance 
communications and ISR, ranging from detailed intelligence collection, to detection of ballistic missile 
launches (EW) to real-time support of war operations.35 The U.S. regularly uses space ISR assets for 
targeting and battle damage assessment. In Operation Iraqi Freedom, the U.S. integrated space capabilities 
with its daily operations.36 Space assets help military commanders plan for operations and maneuvers to a 
far greater degree of specificity and confidence.37 GPS signals offer military commanders and warfighters 
an unprecedented level of accurate information, vastly improving situational awareness.38 
 According to U.S. strategic planners, the global commons form “the connective tissue of the 
international system and of our global society” that is built on the right, assumed by the U.S., of its 
unfettered access and freedom to these domains, primarily because, command of sea, air and space 
provides the U.S. with more useful military potential for foreign policy than offshore power.39 
 It’s capability to use a wide range of space technologies has enhanced U.S. security and has been a 
key element of warfighting for more than 30 years, to the point that U.S. national security is now 
dependent on it. The joint DOD-Intelligence Community National Security Space Strategy, published in 
2011, cited space capabilities as providing the U.S. and its allies unprecedented advantages in national 
decision-making, military operations, and homeland security, providing national security policy leaders 
and military commanders with global access and creating advantages in decision-making. Space systems 
are seen as essential in monitoring strategic and military situations as well as supporting treaty monitoring 
and arms control verification.40 Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates described the U.S. approach 
toward the global commons as follows: 
 
“Opening doors, protecting and preserving common spaces on the high seas, in space, 
and more and more in the cyber world. This presence has offered other nations the 
                                                
34 U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-14, Space Operations, (6 January 2009): GL-9. 
35 See, for example, Lt Gen Gary L. North and Col. John Riordan, “The Role of Space in Military Operations: Integrating 
and Synchronizing Space in Today’s Fight,” High Frontier, Vol. 4, No. 2 (February 2008), pp. 3-6 
36 Maj. John Thomas and Maj Richard Operhall, “Space, the ACCE, and the Joint Fight,” High Frontier, Vol. 4, No. 2 
(February 2008), pp. 29-33.  
37 Sir Peter Anson and Dennis Cummings, “The First Space War: The Contribution of Satellites to the Gulf War,” in Alan 
D. Campen, (ed.), The First Information War (Fairfax, VA: AFCEA International Press, 1992), pp. 121-135. 
38 Michael Wynne, “Space: The Ultimate High Ground Creating Strategic and Tactical Conditions for Victory,” High 
Frontier, Vol. 3, No. 4 (August 2007), p. 4. 
39 Michele Flournoy, “Stability Operations: A Comprehensive Approach to the 21st Century,” Comments at the 
Brookings Institution, (27 March 2009); Posen (2003) pp. 5-46, which quotes, “The United States enjoys the same 
command of the sea that Britain once did, and it can also move large and heavy forces around the globe. But command of 
space allows the United States to see across the surface of the world’s landmasses and to gather vast amounts of 
information. … Air power, ashore and afloat, can reach targets deep inland; and with modern precision-guided weaponry, 
it can often hit and destroy those targets.” 
40 U.S. Department of Defense and Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Space Security National Strategy, 
January 2011, p. 1. 
  97 
crucial element of choice and enabled their entry into a globalized international society. 
…We stand for openness, and against exclusivity, and in favor of common use of 
common spaces in responsible ways that sustain and drive forward our mutual 
prosperity.”41 
 
 As mentioned earlier, at the hard, practical end of business, outer space in particular has grown not 
only as a military infrastructure, but a major force multiplier in U.S. military superiority, as demonstrated in 
the 1991 Persian Gulf War, in 1994 in Yugoslavia, in 2001 in the invasion of Afghanistan, and the 2003 
invasion of Iraq. As former Secretary of the Air Force Michael Wynne once explained:  
 
“In World War II, it took 1,500 B-17s dropping 9,000 bombs to destroy a given target. 
Today, one B-2 can strike and destroy 80 different targets on a single mission using 
weapons guided by space-based USAF global positioning system signals.”42 
 
 As noted above, while the military use of outer space is recognized as a legitimate activity so long as 
it is conducted in accordance with international law, definitions of military activities remain vague, 
leading to a proliferation of technologies subject to disputes further regulate military space activities. 
Generally speaking, however, while space has been militarized in terms of its use as a medium to support 
military operations, for than four decades, as far as is known publicly, outer space  has yet to be 
weaponized, meaning that it is not yet a theater for warfare or for the placement of arms. The realm or 
domain of orbital space therefore remains, from a security perspective, a competitive global common.43  
 
Challenges 
Since currently no nation has announced that it has fielded a weapon in space, the debris issue might be the 
most serious obvious security issue. However, three recent developments, the successful flight test of the 
A–235 Nudol direct-ascent ASAT, China’s launch of a ‘quantum satellite’ designed to transmit hack-proof 
keys from space, and China’s loss of control of its Tiangong-1 space station demonstrate the varieties and 
complexities of security challenges outer space presents.44  
 On top of the debris issue, space is also becoming more accessible with the projected proliferation of 
smaller and smaller satellites, which as well as being used for conventional military roles, also posing the 
risk of becoming space debris, or even being weaponized as orbital ASATs.45 In addition, satellites can be 
extremely vulnerable to Electromagnetic Pulse attack.46 Further, evidence is accumulating that at least 
some military systems, and less hardened communications and navigation systems, are vulnerable to 
                                                
41 Robert M. Gates, Speech to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 31 May 2008. 
42 Michael Wynne, “Space: The Ultimate High Ground Creating Strategic and Tactical Conditions for Victory,” High 
Frontier, Vol. 3, No. 4 (August 2007), p. 4. 
43 Michael E. O’Hanlon, Neither Star Wars nor Sanctuary, (Washington DC: Brookings Institutional Press, 2004). 
44 For the A–235 Nudol direct-ascent ASAT, see Nicholai Litovkin, “Russia successfully tests new missile for defense 
system near Moscow,” Russia Behind the Headlines, 23 June 2016; Edward Wong, “China Launches Quantum Satellite 
in Bid to Pioneer Secure Communications,” New York Times, 16 August 2016; Josh Chin, “China's Latest Leap Forward 
Isn't Just Great—It's Quantum,” Wall Street Journal, 16 August 2016; no author, “In Case You Missed It: China Loses 
Control of Its Tiangong 1 Space Station,” Scientific American, 15 November 2016,  
45 Small satellites can be classed as those that weigh around 500 kg; microsatellites as those that weigh 10-100 kg; 
nanosatellites as those that weigh around 1-10 kg; picosatellites as those that weigh around 0.1 and 1 kg; and even 
femtosatellites, ranging between 10 and 100 g. See, for example, Elizabeth Buchen, Dominic DePasquale, “2014 Nano / 
Microsatellite Market Assessment,” Space Works Enterprises, Inc.  
46 Report of the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United Chapter from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack: 
Critical National Infrastructures, (April 2008), Chapter 10. 
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cyberattacks. A number of satellites have been interfered with through cyberoperations, which can not only 
disable space assets, but even take physical control of them, such as maneuvering them into collisions, 
degrading orbits, or deliberately overexposing solar panels. NASA has openly acknowledged that some of 
its satellites have been temporary cyber-highjacked.47 
 However, amongst all these challenges, it is generally acknowledged that the most pressing issue in 
terms of military technologies is that of ASATs. Just as space systems are vulnerable to debris, they are 
vulnerable to kinetic attack, with the likely costs of an escalating war in space involving kinetic 
anti-satellite weapons “analogous to fighting World War II in an environment where all the stray bullets, 
mortars and bombs do not simply fall to Earth, but continue to fly around the world for decades, 
rendering much of the surface of the Earth uninhabitable.”48 Conversely, U.S. reliance on space militarily, 
but also commercially, is commonly cited by U.S. defense sources as its potential Achilles heel. This has 
led to fears enounced publicly by senior U.S. officials warning of the necessity to maintain U.S. space 
superiority (or supremacy) and in order to prevent a U.S. “Space Pearl Harbor.”49 
 Therefore, because the U.S. is the preeminent global space power, with the most to lose from a 
deteriorating outer space environment, it is analytically useful to understand space security issues first from 
the U.S. point of view. It is also important to understand that the vagueness of the OST is actually a result of 
strategic military competition between the U.S. and its former rival, the Soviet Union.  
 The U.S. approach to global governance and space security issues has traditionally been to protect its 
space dominance built up through the end of the Cold War and cemented in the 1990s with the downscaling 
of capabilities of the space assets of the former Soviet Russia. However, given the alacrity of the debris 
issue, for example, the behavior of the PRC in space activities, and the evolving of and rapid development 
and deployment of a range of military and dual-use technologies and systems, the U.S. has become more 
flexible of late, primarily because of the need to address the increase in number and difficulty of space 
global governance and security issues. All this has caused DOD officials to argue that space has become a 
realm that is “congested,” “competitive,” and “contested.50 
 Realist-focused U.S. space policy allows for limited cooperation, provided such cooperation does not 
impede military strength and avoid conflict in space. As we have seen, initially, the U.S. designated outer 
space as a global common to allow for the U.S. and the Soviet Union to conduct space-based 
reconnaissance for both EW and confidence building measures. As noted above, the foundational GA Res 
1884 leading to Art. IV of the OST prevented the placing of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in 
space, or on any celestial objects, but it did not ban ICBMs from flying through space as long as any 
nuclear weapons placed on such ICBMS did not become stationed in orbit.51  
                                                
47  Paul Kyle Kallender, “Waking Up to a New Threat: Cyber Threats and Space,” Transactions of the Japan Society for 
Aeronautical and Space Sciences, Aerospace Technology of Japan, Vol. 12, (2014); Andrew Griffin, “Cyber-attacks on 
satellites could spark global catastrophe, experts warn,” Independent, 22 September 2016; David Livingstone, 
“Cyberattacks in Space: We Must Defend the Final Frontier,” Newsweek, 26 November 2014. 
48 Denmark et al. (2010), pp. 27-28. 
49 Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security, Space management and Organization, (11 
January 2001): viii; J. Michael McConnell, “Annual Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community for the House 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,” 7 February 2008, p. 33.  
50 Nancy Gallagher, “Space Governance and International Cooperation,” Astropolitics, Vol. 8, Issue 2 (May 2010), pp. 
256-279. 
51 WMDs are defined UN Commission for Conventional Armaments as atomic weapons, radioactive material weapons, 
lethal chemical and biological weapons, and future weapons that have comparable destructive effect to such existent 
weapons. See Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new 
systems of such weapons Report of the Conference on Disarmament, UN Doc S/C.3/32/Rev.1 (18 August 1948). See also, 
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 The OST, therefore, was drafted to explicitly prohibit very few national security activities except for 
the placement WMD in orbit. The accepted permissible military use of outer space also involved the 
implicit understanding that neither the U.S. nor the Soviet Union would vigorously pursue ASAT 
technologies, nor place pre-emptive strategic strike capabilities in orbit. The U.S., for is part, as far is 
publicly known and publicly stated, has, after stop-start research, restrained itself from pursuing ASAT 
technological development in the light of evidence of increased Soviet Russian capabilities, out of U.S. 
concern not to create an ASAT arms race, although this restraint declined during the Reagan 
administration, which led to the development of modern U.S. space dominance and use of space as 
military infrastructure and as a force multiplier.52  
 As with dealing with debris issues, the vagueness and difficulties in defining what constitutes the 
“peaceful” “non-aggressive” use of space, or indeed what constitutes “weaponization” of space have led 
to contestation between various groups of stakeholders as they formulate their own approaches to space 
security. Thus, the current U.S. perspective is to maintain its military preeminence through a policy of 
space deterrence to persuade potential aggressors that any benefits from attacking or interfering with U.S. 
space assets risks disproportionate costs. U.S. space dominance has brought its own problems as both 
Russia and China share concerns that it gives the U.S. too much of a free hand to involve itself in their 
respective spheres of influence.  
 Broadly speaking, the U.S. position led Russia and China to start from the 1990s pressing for a 
“Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space” (PAROS) in the Conference on Disarmament (CD). In 
2002, Russia and China jointly proposed such a treaty at the UN Conference on Disarmament. In PAROS, 
Art. III of the draft text proposed obligating signatories “not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects 
carrying any kinds of weapons, not to install such weapons on celestial bodies, or not to station such 
weapons in outer space in any other manner,” and, also, “not to resort to the threat or use of force against 
outer space objects.”53  
 The proposal would ban space-based systems but would have left signatories free to develop 
ground-based systems useful for attacking space-based elements, de facto enabling both Russia and China 
to preserve their own capabilities to engage in space warfare. In 2008, there was an attempt to introduce 
the “Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force 
against Outer Space Objects” (PPWT) as an international legally binding treaty that would outlaw the 
weaponization of space, or more specifically, that would extend the OST’s ban on WMD in space to 
prohibit placing all types of orbiting weapons there, and ban the threat or use of all types of force against 
space objects. However, these moves were rejected by the U.S. because the U.S. argued that there was no 
actual arms race in space, and that the PPWT, in particular, would outlaw U.S. space-based missile 
defense interceptors, but not debris-generating ASAT tests. Also in the opinion of the U.S. government, 
the PPWT would fail prevent the proliferation of ASAT capabilities, so the U.S. also rejected the 
initiative over additional concerns that verification would be difficult.54  
                                                                                                                                                        
U.S. Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Science [UN Senate], Outer Space Treaty Analysis and Background 
Data Staff Report (1967). The resolution allowed for the Soviet Union to continue to develop a Fractional Orbital 
Bombardment System (FOBS) since such a system would only orbit the Earth for a short time. 
52 Gallagher (2010). 
53 Working Paper Presented by The Delegations of China, The Russian Federation, Vietnam, Indonesia, Belarus, 
Zimbabwe And Syrian Arab Republic, United Nations Conference on Disarmament, CD/1679, 28 June 2002.  
54 Gregory Kulacki, “Chinese Intentions in Space,” Space and Defense, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Winter 2010), pp.101-113; Roger 
Harrison, et al., “Space Deterrence,” Space and Defense, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Summer 2009), pp. 1-30. 
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 In June 2014, just after EU completed consultations toward advancing the ICoC, the Russian and 
Chinese governments proposed a major (and the first major) update to the PPWT with an explanatory 
note stating that China and Russia regarded a legally binding ban on placement of weapons in outer space 
as one of the most important instruments of strengthening global stability. However, the updated version 
still did not mention direct-ascent (kinetic, ground launched), laser or co-orbital ASAT systems, despite 
the continued suspicion that China has performed a series of disguised ASAT tests. The PPWT also failed 
to mention the issue of space debris.  
 Further, the PPWT has been criticized for the rights it would give a State Party that seeks to protest 
activities of another to remediate space debris by claiming that it was a disguised “space weapon,” 
thereby perhaps potentially stifling debris mitigation efforts using satellites.55 Continuing today, the U.S. 
opposes any restrictions that seek to limit U.S. access to, or use of, space, and this largely explains the 
U.S.’s early reluctance to fully endorse the IcoC.56 The U.S. approach has therefore been primarily 
focused on voluntary measures proposed by allies, including dialogue and transparency and 
confidence-building measures (TCBMs), thereby allowing the U.S. to maintain its freedom of action in 
space.57  
 
China’s Space Program 
Both the U.S. and Russia both possess an array of tested ASAT technologies. Russia has access to a wide 
range of ASAT and dual-related technologies that it inherited from the Soviet era. However, it is the 
space program of the PRC that represents the major potential destabilizing factor in space security, as 
comprehensively delineated in annual reports by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review 
Commission.58 As the 2015 report bluntly stated, the U.S. viewed China’s space program as a means to: 
“…allow it to challenge U.S. information superiority during a conflict…China has asserted sovereignty 
over much of the East and South China seas, as well as Taiwan, and is engaged in a course of aggressive 
conduct to enforce those claims against its neighbors. Among other purposes, China’s space and 
counterspace programs are designed to support its conduct as part of its antiaccess/area denial strategy to 
prevent or impede U.S. intervention in a potential conflict.”59 
 In assessing the PRC’s space program, the review commission notes that the People’s Liberation 
Army (PLA) exerts deep and broad control over the program directly and indirectly, that space use is 
designed not only to enable China to win local wars via battlefield information superiority (defined as 
battlefield communication, battlefield surveillance and reconnaissance, meteorology, and precision 
guidance functions) but also to attain ‘‘space dominance,” achieved through developing ISR, ballistic 
                                                
55 “Draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer 
Space Objects,” United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, Conference on Disarmament, CD/1985, 12 June 2014. 
56 U.S. National Space Policy,” Fact sheet released 6 October 2006; Statement by the United States Delegation to the 64th 
Session of the United National General Assembly’s First Committee, 19 October 2009, p. 5. 
57 The Obama Administration for example let the Conference on Disarmament (CD) establish an ad-hoc working group to 
discuss, but not negotiate, cooperative steps to enhance space security because it was against starting negotiations about 
additional legal measures to protect satellites and prevent space weaponization. 
58 Since 2002, the commission has published comprehensive annual reports on China-U.S. relations covering economics 
and trade, foreign investment, cyber espionage and barriers to trade, security relations, and China’s policies toward global 
and regional security issues. In particular, the reports devote major sections to China’s space and counterpace and missile 
programs, indicating the seriousness with which the U.S. regards China’s progress. The 2015 Annual Report to Congress, 
17 November 2015 devotes 66 pages alone to China’s space program in Section 2: China’s Space and Counterspace 
Programs. 
59 2015 Annual Report, p. 272.  
  101 
missile EW, space launch detection and characterization, environmental monitoring, satellite 
communication, and PNT capabilities, in addition to jamming technologies, direct ascent and co-orbital 
ASAT technologies, computer network operations, directed energy (laser blinding), and electromagnetic 
pulse weapons.60 
 As a backdrop to this toxic soup, U.S. concern about the PRC’s motives has been steadily mounting 
for twenty years. Alarm began initially over suspected successful espionage of U.S. nuclear and other 
strategic data in the mid-1990s, which increased in 1998 when it was feared that the PRC had purloined 
data missile from a commercial U.S. space company, and then stoked considerably by the January 2001 
Rumsfeld Commission report, which postulated that the PRC had started an arms buildup to fight a space 
war, so that the U.S. might risk, in the future, risk a “Space Pearl Harbor,” as mentioned above.61 Since 
then, many analysts have looked at the PRC’s space program with differing opinions about its capabilities 
and intentions.62 
 Against this, Chinese analysts accuse the U.S. of paranoia; it is argued by some that U.S. has 
fundamentally misunderstood the intention of China’s space program. For example, that concern is 
unfounded because it is based on questionable information from a limited set of Chinese sources, many of 
them mass media, which are for propaganda purposes, often misquoting the intent of the PRC’s military 
leadership.63 
 It can be argued that that the PRC’s rationale for military space development, beginning in 1986 
following a personal appeal by a caucus of scientists to Deng Xiaoping to invest in seven key areas of 
advanced technology, was at least originally provoked by fear about of U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative 
(Star Wars), which, if developed, would easily make the PRC’s relatively small strategic nuclear force 
obsolete and redundant, growing U.S. and former Soviet Union ASAT capabilities through the 1970s, and 
then, through the 1980s, about U.S. prowess in using space technologies as a force multiplier, even before 
                                                
60 China had approximately 142 operational satellites in orbit as of September 1, 2015, compared to about 10 in 2000 and 
35 in 2008. As many as 95 of these satellites are owned and operated by Chinese defense organizations, including the 
PLA, the Ministry of Defense, and military related organizations. The Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) for 
objectives established in the State High-Technology Development Plan of 1986 (also known as the 863 Program) through 
2020 that are opaque and include undisclosed strategic military programs including advanced lasers and global strike 
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61 Originally concerns grew about the theft of nuclear warhead designs, then missile secrets following the disappearance 
of encryption microchips that control satellites in 1996, with these incidents and others detailed in the long-running 
Report of the Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic 
of China. See Report of the Commission to Assess U.S. National Security Space Management and Organization, 11 
January 2001, p. xiv and p. 22 
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and Onward: Technological Innovation and Organizational Change in China’s Space Industry,” The Journal of Strategic 
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advanced adversary in a future informatized local war, whether over Taiwan or the Senkaku Islands, maritime territorial 
disputes in the South China Sea, or elsewhere. See Michael S. Chace, Jeffrey Engstrom, Tai Ming Cheung, Kristen 
Gunness, Scott Warren Harold, Susan Puska and Samuel K. Berkowitz, “China's Incomplete Military Transformation: 
Assessing the Weaknesses of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA),” RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA (2015), p. 
114-16. See also, Tai Ming Cheung, “The Chinese Defense Economy's Long March from Imitation to Innovation,” 
Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 34, No. 3 (June 2011), pp. 325-354, which asserts that China’s plan for military space 
capabilities is to reach parity with the U.S. and the Russian Federation by 2020. 
63 Concern started building in 1999, when the Select Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives chaired by 
Representative Christopher Cox issued its Report on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) (the Cox Report), which claimed that the PRC had stolen or otherwise illegally 
obtained U.S. missile and space technology that had, or would, improve the PRC’s military capabilities. Gregory Kulacki, 
“Chinese Intentions in Space,” Space and Defense, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Winter 2010), pp. 101-113. 
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the outbreak of the first Gulf War. The U.S.’s relatively trouble-free decimation of the Soviet-armed Iraqi 
army and air force, in which space played a decisive (and highly public and propagandized role to 
demonstrate U.S. military superiority), is often cited as having its own decisive role in compelling the 
PRC to begin a radical rethink of its military and defense strategy and doctrine, spurring modernization, 
and inciting the PRC’s huge investment in space development.64  
 Also, along a slightly different tack, some Chinese academics have argued that the U.S. and other 
countries continue to misunderstand Chinese intentions, even intentionally, because of prejudice arising 
out of suspicion of the PRC as a socialist country, and to magnify concern about Chinese intentions in 
order to justify continued U.S. policy not to permit any challenge to its freedom of action and superiority 
in space.65  
 Nonetheless, the U.S. believes the PRC’s development of counterspace capabilities, particularly 
direct-ascent and co-orbital ASATs, computer network operations, ground-based satellite jammers, and 
directed energy weapons are not only designed primarily to deter U.S. strikes against China’s space assets 
and deny space superiority to the U.S., but also potentially to attack U.S. satellites. These developments 
suggest to U.S. eyes that China may be prepared to prosecute space warfare because China’s military 
strategists perceive the threshold for the use of counterspace capabilities to be lower than the use of 
nuclear or conventional capabilities, and – given the U.S. reliance on space – a more credible and flexible 
deterrent.66 
                                                
64 China’s focus on building a space reconnaissance system can be traced back to the 1986 ’State High-tech Development 
Plan’ (863 Program) as a response to Ronald Reagan’s 1983 “Star Wars” speech. Fear of growing U.S. power in space led 
China as early as the mid-1980s to push for a ban on all military use of space, but as an intermediary step to ban on the 
development, testing, production, deployment and use of any space weapons, and ASATs, leading to its later positions. 
Kulacki (2010). 
65 Xiaodan Wu, “China and space security: How to bridge the gap between its stated and perceived intentions,” Space 
Policy, Vol. 33, Part 1 (August 2015), pp. 20-28. Wu asserts that although China is exploring military space capabilities, 
the primary goal of the PRC’s space activities is not to gain asymmetric military advantages. So, although China is 
expanding its space-based surveillance, reconnaissance, navigation and meteorological and communications satellite 
constellations, the focus is on navigation and communication satellites rather than reconnaissance and signals intelligence 
satellites and microsatellites.  
 Further, according to Wu, Beijing consistently emphasizes the peaceful intention of its space program and claims to 
honor its obligations under the OST as shown through its White Papers on Space Activities, which repeatedly declares 
that one of the purposes and principles of its space activities is to utilize outer space for peaceful purposes. See First 
Section of the 2000, 2006 and 2011 White Papers on China's Space Activities issued by the State Council Information 
Office of the People's Republic of China. Xu also asserts that: 1. Because of prejudice, China must be seen to comply 
with international law to a higher standard than Western nations. 2. China’s violation of its international obligations (an 
oblique reference to the 2007 ASAT test) means that China is seen to threaten space security and that the U.S., which has 
more advanced counterpace capabilities uses these to stoke concern. 3. That the U.S. magnifies the climate of mutual 
suspicion. 4. That the U.S. fundamentally and perhaps purposely misattributes the fundamental Chinese philosophy of 
“active defense” and “hide our capabilities and bide our time,” which really mean that China will not attack unless it is 
attacked and that China is trying to be deliberately modest about its capabilities out of Confucian culture of humbleness 
as China being increasing assertive while hiding its real intentions.  
66 Kulacki (2010), pp. 284-285, 292-294. The greatest threat seen by the U.S. are China’s direct-ascent and co-orbital 
ASAT programs. The SC-19 missile test in 2007 followed two non-destructive tests in 2005 and 2006, additional SC-19 
tests in 2010, 2013, and 2014 demonstrating the ability to strike LEO, where the majority of the 549 U.S. satellites reside 
(including 30 military intelligence satellites), with the new DN-2, probably available in the 2020-25 timeframe 
technically capable of striking GPS and ISR satellites in higher medium Earth orbit. China’s suspected development of 
co-orbital ASATs (satellites armed with explosive charges, and/or fragmentation devices, kinetic energy weapons, lasers, 
radio frequency weapons, jammer, robotic arms and so on) since 2008 with the BX–1, the SJ–12, CX–3, SY– 7, and SJ–
15 satellites is seen as another major threat to space security, since they provide several advantages over direct-ascent 
ASAT, including their ability to target satellites in all orbital regimes, conduct attacks without geographical limitations, 
and their stealth. In addition, since 2000, China has launched at least 28 microsatellites which have lower observable 
signatures than larger satellites, making them harder to track.  
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 Concerns also exist about China’s space-based command, control, communications, computers, 
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) modernization, which has seen the launch of 
increasingly sophisticated feature electro-optical, SAR, and ELINT sensors on the Yaogan, Shijian, 
Gaofen, and Haiyang satellites, along with data fusion capacity, which when used in combination are 
crucial for locating, targeting and tracking targets. The Yaogan series, for example, can be used for MDA 
capabilities support of the PLA’s efforts to detect, track, and target foreign ships, such as U.S. carrier 
strike groups. The Shijian series is suspected of providing the building blocks for a space-based EW 
system, potentially enabling China to switch its military doctrine from ‘‘no first use’’ to ‘‘launch on 
warning.” The Gaofen series of sub-one-meter resolution reconnaissance satellites may be capable of 
supporting battlefield operations.67 
 Further, some U.S. analysts argue C4ISR capabilities are being supported by a growing fleet of 
secure, dedicated military communications satellites (Chinasat-1A, Chinasat-2A, Chinasat-20A, and 
Chinasat-22A) and a growing disaggregated fleet of commercial satellites that can be deputized in times 
of conflict. As noted at the beginning of this chapter, China launched the world’s first experimental 
quantum communications satellite in 2016. This may eventually enable the PLA to instantaneously send, 
receive, and decipher messages around the world using a virtually unbreakable encryption key to provide 
secure electronic transmission of sensitive information. China’s network of military communication 
satellites will be assisted by its Tianlian data relay satellite constellation, which will reduce the time the 
PLA must wait to receive data from its ISR satellites and thus enhance its ability to provide near-real-time 
ISR data to locate, track, and target adversary ships in the Pacific.68 Lastly, the 35-satellite Beidou 
regional satellite navigation system, when fully operational (the target year is 2020), will be able to 
provide the PLA with sub-10-meter accuracy targeting capability, friendly force tracking, and secure 
communications. The constellation’s accuracy will be further supplemented by an extensive network of 
ground stations throughout Asia and elsewhere.69 
 
U.S. Reponses  
The U.S. has since 2010 put forth efforts improve its own SSA capabilities, share more information with 
other space actors, notably Japan, and adding new capabilities, such a space-based surveillance satellite 
launched in September 2010 into a polar orbit from which it can scan all of GEO once a day. This section 
however, focuses on how the orbital debris problem and concerns about the PRC’s motives, behavior, and 
lack of transparency in its space program have become a major rationale for closer U.S.-Japan defense 
cooperation, especially in outer space – cooperation which has been increasingly and emphatically 
emphasized since 2010. In later chapters, this relationship will be analyzed in terms of the SAF 
framework, but for now, it is important to establish the fact that actions by China have caused a major 
evolution in the U.S.-Japan security relationship.  
                                                
67 Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin “Space, China’s Tactical Frontier,” The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 34, Issue 5 
(October 2011), pp. 733-761, in which they see China’s burgeoning electro-optical, SAR, and ELINT capabilities for 
MDA and C4ISR. They note that since 2001 China has launched 32 reconnaissance satellites that can be used directly or 
indirectly for military targeting and tactical support, 15-17 of which may be currently operational, including the Yaogan-2, 
Huangjing-1B, Shijian, Tianhui-1, Beijing-1 and Haiyang-2A satellites. Further, they assert that these capabilities may be 
able to enable the PRC to offer a “counter punch” to enable China to prosecute its (A2/AD) capability around its 
perimeter, particularly in a contingency involving Taiwan, or even possibly over the Senkaku Islands. 
68 Commission, 2015, pp. 299-301, 316-7. 
69 Ibid, pp. 301-302. 
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 In fact, in the field of concerns about space security, increasingly since 2007, SSA has become a 
major plank of U.S.-Japan security cooperation.70 The U.S. Joint Space Operations Center (JspOC), which 
coordinates most of the U.S.’s SSA assets has, over the last decade, significantly and deliberately increased 
not only its technical tracking and collision avoidance role, but also its cooperative engagement and 
diplomatic footprint. Technically, it has increased its capabilities so as to provide regular conjunction 
analyses for all active satellites against all objects in its catalogue. As a tool of U.S. diplomacy, the center, 
as of 2016, had forged legal agreements to facilitate data sharing with 16 commercial entities, and has 
been targeting sharing space surveillance data and costs with friends and allies, starting with Europe and 
more recently Japan. By 2017, JspOC had provided over 1,100 notifications to nations around the world, 
including Russia and PRC in 2011 alone, and in 2014 JspOC tracked more that 16,000 objects, only about 5 
percent of which were functioning payloads or satellites, 8 percent rocket bodies, and about 87 percent 
space debris, including inactive satellites.71 
 The 2007 ASAT shock must also be contextualized in the framework of the more conservative and 
unilateralist stance in the U.S. National Space Policy of 2006 that was adopted by the George W. Bush 
administration towards any proposals for new legal regimes on outer space or restrictions on military 
research and development. However, continued and growing U.S. concern about the PRC’s space program 
and motives meant that under the Presidency of Barack Obama, which pursued a less unilateral stance than 
his predecessor, and which was more focused on looking for areas of cooperation with allies on areas that 
do not impede with U.S. space supremacy, the U.S. has been working to more closely tie in and coordinate 
SSA efforts with allies.72 
 In this context, U.S. coordination with Japan to boost its SSA systems has become much stronger. In 
the first U.S.-Japan Space Security Dialogue in 2010 and following summits between President Obama 
and Prime Minister Noda in 2012, and with Prime Minister Abe in 2014, the U.S. made it increasingly 
clear that it expected increasingly integrated military space cooperation with Japan.73 For example, the 
June 2011 Security Consultative Committee (SCC), or the “two-plus-two” (2+2), consisting of both 
countries’ foreign and security ministers stated that the partners strengthen cooperation on “other 
evolving threats, such as to outer space” and specifically in SSA, MDA, QZSS, and dual-use sensors for 
ISR purposes.   
 This was followed by an SSA information sharing agreement in 2012. Then, an October 2013 SCC 
meeting called for the partners to more concretely promote SSA and MDA and cooperate on supporting 
the ICoC. The allies also established a bilateral Defense ISR Working Group to start the major step of 
involving the MOD in SSA activities. 
                                                
70 For a discussion on the growing importance of SSA, see Stefan A. Kaiser, “Legal and Policy Aspects of Space 
Situational Awareness,” Space Policy, Vol. 31, No. 5 (February 2015), pp. 5-12.  
71 Brian Weeden, “The Numbers Game: What’s in Earth’s Orbit and How do We Know?” The Space Review, 13 July 
2009; Jessica West (ed.) Space Security 2009, pp. 33-35; Jeff Foust, “A new eye in the sky to keep an eye on the sky,” 
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72 National Space Policy of the United States of America, June 28, 2010, Office of the President of the United States.  
73 Hiroshi Yamakawa, Space Security Working Group, Committee on Space Policy, Cabinet Office, GOJ, “Japan’s New 
Space Policy and the Sustainable Development and Utilization of Space,” presentation to the International Symposium on 
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 A following U.S.-Japan Comprehensive Dialogue on Space in March 2013 saw the partners agree 
that the QZSS system would backup GPS in the event of a conflict.74 Further, in the Second 
Comprehensive Dialogue on Space of May 2014, Japan’s space assets were declared “indispensable” for 
U.S.-Japan security and it was agreed that JAXA would provide SSA data to U.S. Strategic Command. 
Subsequently, the Third Comprehensive Dialogue of September 2015 stressed SSA and MDA bilateral 
cooperation, leading to the present revised Defense Guidelines.75 
 
Japanese-U.S. Cooperation 
As shown in Chapter 2, space development and policy in Japan was relatively ignored by mainstream 
international relations scholars because of the lack of a perceived connection to national security. 
However, as for Japan, the 2007 ASAT test provided another stark demonstration of Japan’s 
vulnerabilities to space-based capabilities. To the U.S., it signified the potential of the PRC to offer a 
broader challenge to the U.S.’s control of the global commons in space.76 Japanese policymakers are also 
concerned about the increasing integration of the PLA’s conventional and space capabilities to exercise 
military force and anti-access/anti-denial (A2/AD) across four domains of warfare.77  
In terms of a temporal empirical narrative, it is easily possible to see how space-related concerns 
have provoked changes and responses in Japan’s security stance. Aside from the IGS issue, in response to 
perceived security threats from North Korean ballistic missiles, the SDF quickly decided that the traveling 
of interceptor missiles through space was allowable and responded through the adoption of BMD as a 
defensive counterspace system. Such a system had, in fact, already been under study since the mid-1980s, 
as was discussed in detail in IDOJ. In 1998, Japan’s Security Council and the Cabinet agreed to joint 
technical research with the U.S. for components of a sea-based upper-tier system, the current Aegis BMD 
System. The 2001 MTDP declared Japan would continue to research BMD and the Security Council and 
the Cabinet on December 19, 2003 approved its introduction.78 Japan’s BMD capabilities have 
subsequently developed to consist of the completed deployment by 2010 of the ASDF’s Patriot 
Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) system, and the upgrading and testing with the U.S. from 2007 of the 
MSDF’s Aegis destroyer Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) BLK-IIA system, and plans for the augmentation of 
the MSDF’s Aegis destroyer fleet to number eight in total. Each year new enhancements are announced, 
but facing concern about the rapid advancement of North Korea ballistic missile capabilities and the 
possibility that North Korea may soon be able to launch a nuclear strike even on the U.S., Japan has 
decided to considerably bolster its BMD architecture with a third layer based on the Aegis Ashore system.  
Japan’s response in terms of using space technologies was, as we have seen, however, much more 
cautious. The evidence presented in the following empirical and analytical chapters will show that the 
2007 ASAT launch only played an indirect role, if any, in the drawing up of the 2008 Basic Law. The 
                                                
74 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan, Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee, Toward a Deeper and 
Broader US-Japan Alliance: Building on 50 Years of Partnership, 21 June 2011, pp. 7, 9. 
75 Department of State, Joint Statement from the Second Meeting of the Japan-US Comprehensive Dialogue on Space, 
May 12, 2014, Washington D.C.; “Japan, U.S. to Enhance Maritime Surveillance from Space,” Japan Times, 12 
September 2015. 
76 Japan Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2008, p.50.  
77 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2014 Report to Congress of the US-China Economic and 
Security Review Commission, Washington D.C., November 2014, pp. 322-328; Bōeishōhen, Bōei Hakusho 2014, pp. 40, 
107-108. 
78 Hideaki Kaneda, Kazumasa Kobayashi, Hiroshi Tajima, and Hirofumi Tosaki, Nihon no Misairu Bōei: Henyō Senryaku 
Kankyō Shita no Gaikō Anzen Hoshō Seisaku (Tokyo: Nihon Kokusai Mondai Kenkyūjo, 2006), pp. 91-104.  
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MOD became concerned – as in the aftermath of the 1990-1991 Gulf War and North Korean missile 
launches from the mid-1990s onwards – that it was effectively strategically blind without dependence on 
satellite reconnaissance, EW intelligence, and GPS provided by the U.S., so spelling risks of 
entrapment.79 However, after 2007, it becomes apparent from MOD policy statements that Japan had 
started to feel increasingly strategically vulnerable in terms of its limited access to space-based ISR and 
SSA – disadvantages that deprive policymakers of tactical and strategic autonomy over SDF deployments 
and commitments to support the U.S. in conflict situations.80  
In this context, it can be said that Japan took note of the 2010 U.S. National Security Strategy and the 
2014 Quadrennial Review that asserted the U.S.’s need to maintain superiority in space through more 
resilient systems, including diversified ISR, SSA, MDA, and space-based precision strike; and that the 
U.S. can in part achieve this through partnering with Japan, so the expansion of access to allied ISR 
systems and collaborative development of space capabilities suits both sides.81  
Thus, in discussing Basic Plan 2016, it is important to note that Japan precipitated a major defense 
enhancement through deciding to adopt BMD, which has close connections to military space. Basic Plan 
2016 fully endorses this bilateral balancing approach, devoting its crucial opening statements to how 
Japan must boost independent military space capabilities (jiritsusei kakuho) in order to fully support the 
U.S.82  
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Chapter 5 
Five-Phase Analytical Approach to Policy and Administrative Transition 1969-2016 
 
Introduction 
Japanese space policy transition is a product of both exogenous pressures and a blend of complex and 
particular domestic institutional, political and economic frameworks. Exogenous pressures include 
security concerns, which were initially focused on North Korea, and more recently over the past decade 
increasingly from the PRC. Other significant pressures include the U.S.-Japan alliance. Initially, U.S. 
concerns were to manage the direction of Japan’s space program. Latterly U.S. has wanted Japan to 
rebalance its security strategy to meet that of the U.S.’s “pivot.” In terms of internal balancing, an 
examination of domestic institutional, political and economic frameworks is also vital, as Chapters 1 and 
2 explain. The task from here on, then, is to identify and explain the relationships between the external 
and internal factors involved in updating space policy to meet these various needs, that eventually 
resulted in Basic Plan 2016. 
This chapter examines empirical evidence addressing Japan’s space policy change from the late 
1960s to the present using a five-phase process. Now that we have identified and confirmed that Japan 
faces serious security threats (exogenous threats), this chapter uses a conventional approach to explain 
Japan’s reaction to those exogenous factors and combine them with a brief explanation of the role of 
domestic factors.  
 
Policy Transition: A Conventional Five-Phase Narrative 
A comparison of Basic Plan 2016 against previous benchmarks can be used to discuss in what ways space 
policy has changed in terms of goals in a simple narrative. It is possible to trace the path toward today’s 
policy in terms of five distinct phases adjusting between domestic arrangements and exogenous 
pressures.1 In the first phase, from around 1969-1998, Japan was committed to a completely non-military 
space development policy, focused mainly on technological catchup with other space powers. The 
principal of civilian control was reinforced by deliberately divided and competitive institutional 
arrangements. At least until the mid-1990s, it can be said that Japan perceived few perceived urgent or 
serious security threats that required it to consider establishing a military space program, or to question 
the PPR. Policy makers, program managers and development agencies were largely happy to play the 
junior partner to the U.S., meanwhile steadily building up Japanese technologies and capacities. 
 A second phase, 1998-2005, saw tentative reforms and internal balancing to deal with increasing 
regional security threats and concomitant strains and tensions with domestic policy (the suitability of the 
PPR) and creaking institutional arrangements. The third phase, from 2005-9, saw a series of internal 
adjustments that led to the attempt to re-orientate space policy away from the PPR to one in line with the 
OST, while attempting to also re-orientate the administrative structure to achieve these goals, resulting in 
the Basic Law. A fourth phase from 2009-12 saw a period of on-off political pressure to implement the 
Basic Law, confusion, and bureaucratic resistance to change, which boiled down to a struggle for power 
between the politically-led attempt to assert Cabinet Office control over policy and budgeting from the 
incumbent power of MEXT in order to implement the Basic Law. This led in 2012 to the establishment of 
                                                
1 Paul Kallender, “Japan's New Dual-Use Space Policy: The Long Road to the 21st Century,” Asie.Visions, No 88, Institut 
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the ONSP and the SPC. This structure was eventually able to achieve a working compromise between 
itself and other bureaucratic actors, when the Cabinet Office finally managed to take control of the 
budgeting of the QZSS system. Finally, in the fifth phase, from 2013-15, another political intervention, 
U.S. pressure, and more assertive prime ministerial leadership were required to push to a more definitive 
policy and the best-effort compromise settlement between all the players that led to the timetabled 
implementation of many, but not all of the shopping list of programs and capabilities suggested as 
desirable in the Basic Law with the publication of Basic Plan 2016.  
 
The Phases in More Detail: Phase 1, 1969-1998 
In a more conventional narrative based on recognizing how Japan’s space policy transition can be seen in 
terms of balancing (with the analysis not beholden to a particular international relations framework), this 
phase can be split into (a) bureaucratic arrangements; (b) policy orientation, and; (c) the international 
situation. Regarding bureaucratic arrangements, Japan’s space program as designed in 1969 was 
deliberately enveloped in multiple layers of legal, diplomatic and institutional arrangements that 
hermetically sealed space development from security strategy, based on the PPR.2 Further, these 
arrangements also deliberately segmented implementation of space activities into a competitive 
institutional framework. JAXA’s precursor, NASDA, under the STA was tasked with applied research 
that would spur the growth of a domestic space industry, while the much smaller Institute for Space and 
Astronautical Science (ISAS) under the Ministry of Education (MOE) dealt with space science. The 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI, later METI) was deliberately excluded a major role. 
This normative framework was reinforced by the principal of civilian control; the SDF was strictly 
prohibited from any involvement in space activities.3  
 In terms of policy orientation, all these players were overseen by the Space Activities Commission 
(SAC), which reported directly to the prime minister and developed policy based on bidding from the 
competing ministries. Conventional interpretations see policy at this stage (the 1970s) in terms of broader 
status-enhancing industrial and technological strategy to enable Japan to “catch-up” with the U.S. and 
allow Japan to join the small club of advanced spacefaring nations.4 Also, during this period, one caveat 
was made to the PPR, a 1985 decision that the SDF be allowed to use space-based communications, 
observation and meteorological data that were already commercially available.5 
 Meanwhile, Japan comfortably sheltered under the U.S. security guarantee and faced no strong 
pressure to think about applying its space technologies to dual-use applications – although it did conduct 
                                                
2 Setsuko Aoki, “Tekiho na Uchu Gunji Riyo Kettei Kijun toshite no Kokkai Ketsugi no Yuyosei” [The Significance of 
the Diet Resolution in the Legitimate Standards for the Weaponization of Outer Space], Sogo Seisakugaku Working 
Paper Series, No. 68, Keio University (April 2005), esp. pp. 5-6, 16-22; Aoki (2004), pp. 1-6; Oros, p. 129. For details on 
PPR see: Waga Kuni ni okeru Uchū no Kaihatsu Oyobi Riyō no Kihon ni Kansuru Ketsugi, May 9, 1969; Setsuko Aoki, 
Nihon no Uchū Senryaku (Tokyo: Keio Gijiku Daigaku Shuppankai, 2006), pp. 174-177. 
3 Pekkanen & Kallender-Umezu (2010), pp. 21-34; Berner (2005); Pekkanen, Picking Winners? From Technology 
Catch-up to the Space Race in Japan (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), pp. 161-190; Suzuki (2005), pp. 
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daily lives and on how space development involves sophisticated generic technology, and propel developments in other 
fields, such as materials, computers, robotics, electronics, communications, and information processing. For the 1978, 
1984, 1989 and 1996 versions of the Fundamental Policy of Japan’s Space Activities, see JAXA, Fundamental Policy of 
Japan’s Activities, 24 January 1996, http://www.jaxa.jp/library/space_law/chapter_4/4-1-1-4/index_e.html. 
5 Aoki (2004), pp. 1-6. 
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extensive dual-use experimentation nonetheless, as was noted in Chapter 1.6 In general, the U.S. played 
the role as supervisor and focused on constraining as much of Japanese resources to support U.S. goals as 
possible by entrapping Japanese budget and manpower in the ISS program. Japan, for its part, pursued a 
gradualist approach to developing autonomous capabilities by building up its expertise in launch vehicles 
and broadcasting and communications satellites.7 
 
Phase II: Challenges to the 1969 Framework and Attempted Reforms (1998-2001)  
In Phase II, it is possible to trace a significant transition in space policy through considering the interplay 
of (a) domestic challenges; (b) attempted bureaucratic reforms developing into (c) irreconcilable issues 
that led to the formulation of the Basic Law.  
 In terms of domestic challenges, from the mid-1990s, Japan’s policy and institutional framework 
came under increasing strain, both internally and externally. Such pressures combined, almost feeding off 
each other, in way that forced institutional and policy changes that are the predecessors of today’s policy 
orientation and institutional framework. In terms of domestic issues, by the end of the century, Japan’s 
space development model appeared in deep trouble. Through the 1990s, NASDA suffered a series of 
high-profile program failures that severely damaged confidence in it, and led the MOF to cap spending, 
which had increased incrementally year-on-year for decades, to around ¥300 billion (~ US$3 billion). 
 Then, serious external security pressures emerged. In 1998, following the Taepodong “shock,” Japan 
quickly decided to develop the IGS program. As outlined earlier, deferring to the PPR, the satellites, 
presented as a “multi-purpose information gathering program,” were put under the control of CSIC in the 
Prime Minister’s Cabinet Secretariat – although the main customer was the SDF.8 
 As this occurred, attempted bureaucratic reforms came to have a major impact on space 
policymaking and the administration of Japan’s space program. In an attempt to rationalize the central 
bureaucracy and increase the power of the Cabinet Office and assert political control over spending, 
Prime Minister Hashimoto instituted his series of institutional reforms. Applied to space activities 
administration, SAC’s role was superseded by the Council for Science and Technology Policy (CSTP, 
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2008); Hughes (2004), pp. 85-8; Hughes (2009), p. 198; Aoki (2009), pp. 381-2; Sunohara (2005), pp. 15-46. Senior 
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perceived overreliance on the U.S. for space-based intelligence, even after having putting in place a SAR and optical 
reconnaissance satellite constellation, as the reasons for Japan to further its spy satellites and to consider space-based 
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now the Council for Science, Technology and Innovation [CSTI]) under the Cabinet Office; the STA was 
merged with the MOE to form MEXT; and then NASDA and ISAS were merged with the National 
Aerospace Laboratory (NAL) to form JAXA in 2003.9  
 Following this period, then, Japan attempted to make its first post-Cold War adjustment to space 
policy. From 2000, the CSTP made an initial attempt to assert greater strategic control over space policy 
with a series of basic space strategies released in 2001, 2002, and 2004. These represented initial attempts 
to fold Japan’s space program into a dual-use national security architecture. Reflecting this trend, policies 
published by the CSTP successively placed security and crisis management as first in the list of priorities, 
which also emphasized national autonomy, the development of the IGS constellation, maintenance of 
solid-propellant rocket technology, and the establishment of what was to become the QZSS system.10  
 The emergence of the CSTP, however, created new problems. The CSTP had no power to make 
budgets and served only in an advisory capacity. Yet SAC retained its authority to request budget. But, 
crucially, SAC’s authority extended to its role only as a committee in MEXT. However, MEXT, 
absorbing both ISAS and NAL, accreted enormous new budgeting and programmatical control amounting 
to over 60 percent of the annual space activities budget. But, against this, JAXA and MEXT lacked 
authority to execute a national or strategic strategy, while JAXA remained legally committed to peaceful 
purposes-only space activities.11   
 In other words, the attempted ministerial reforms of the late 1990s led to irreconcilable issues. 
Following 2003, successive problems arose that proved the new administrative framework inadequate, 
and policy reorientation outdated in the face of several competing pressures. First, in November 2003, 
JAXA’s new highly-advanced H-IIA rocket (designed to be Japan’s workhorse launcher for the decade) 
failed and destroyed two early IGS satellites at a combined development and launch cost in advance of 
US$1 billion. Then, interministerial and public-private sector disputes erupted over both the QZSS 
program and the Galaxy Express (GX) medium rocket program, both of which were designed to be 
partially funded by the commercial sector.  
 Regarding the QZSS, under the system where competitive ministries had individual budgeting 
systems, no one ministry would take control of the QZSS program, because doing so would require 
cannibalizing budgets already assigned to extant programs, amounting to a zero-sum game.12 The GX 
suffered a similar problem when METI tried to take on the project, partnering with the private sector, 
because the MEXT-dominated SAC was unwilling to use taxpayer money to subsidize METI-backed 
commercial demands for funds, among other issues.13  
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Phase III: The Basic Law 2005-2008 
To untangle these issues, Takeo Kawamura, MEXT Minister in 2003 during the H-IIA/IGS failure, 
established an internal National Space Strategy Planning Group (NSSPG) within the LDP. The NSPPG 
subsequently recommended the Cabinet Office take control of space policy, conduct an audit of the 
institutional framework, and recommended that Japan consider revising or scrapping the PPR to pave the 
way for a more flexible use of space for national security purposes and to create a new domestic 
procurement market (or as IDOJ put it, to create a domestic military market.)14 
 At the same time, from the late 1990s, the U.S. worked further to ease Japan into a more cooperative 
and active partnership. As we saw in Chapter 2, the Japanese space program had come the subject of 
various think-tank reports. The U.S. did not oppose indigenous IGS development, and allowed the use of 
key U.S. technologies on the Japanese-made satellites. Concomitant with IGS development, the U.S. first 
began to actively involve securing Japanese cooperation on joint BMD development. Through the 2000s, 
the U.S. swung around to support development of QZSS system to supplement and complement the GPS 
system. Initial steps toward today’s integration of the QZSS into a broader alliance dual-use strategy 
kicked off at the first U.S.-Japan Plenary Meeting on GPS Cooperation in 2001 and ten subsequent 
coordination meetings. 
 Then, the 2007 direct-ascent ASAT test precipitated international concern. Uncertainty surrounding 
Chinese intentions and the apparent burgeoning of Chinese counterspace capabilities such as 
laser-blinding and co-orbital ASAT technologies, but also the increasing integration of the PLA’s 
conventional and space capabilities to exercise military force and A2/AD across all four domains of 
warfare became a serious concern to the U.S., as noted in Chapter 3, drawing the allies together.15  
 Building on this narrative and interpretative framework, it is possible to understand much of the 
context of Basic Plan 2016 by tracing Japan’s response to a series of domestic initiatives, difficulties, and 
exogenous pressures, beginning with the Basic Law, which was designed to find a way to cope with 
external security pressures. As was noted in Chapter 1, in terms of policy reorientation, the Basic Law 
overturned the PPR by allowing the use of space for “defensive” rather than “non-military” functions, 
bringing Japan in line with common interpretation of the OST. However, more importantly, the Basic 
Law also mandated a revision of policymaking structures and the administrative framework in order to 
ensure implementation of the new direction.  
 Specifically, the Basic Law mandated the establishment of the Secretariat for the Strategic 
Headquarters for Space Policy (SHSP), formed from personnel drawn from the wider bureaucracy, 
industry, and academia, to draw up a new administrative framework and budgeting policy. The SHSP was 
                                                
14 Kawamura was MEXT minster during the H-2A failure of 2003 and incensed by it. For the NSPPG’s report, see 
Pekkanen & Kallender-Umezu (2010), pp. 83-40. See [国家宇宙戦略立案話会]	 報告書	 ー	 新たな宇宙開発利用
制度の構築に向けてー	 ２００５年８月	 国家宇宙戦略立案話会  [Report by the National Space Strategy 
Planning Group “– Toward establishment (sic) of new space development and utilization system –“ Report by the 
National Space Strategy Planning Group, August 2005], esp. pp. 5-13, 25-30, 61-66; Suzuki (2007), pp. 76-80. 
15 The launch caused an international outcry and became a major cause for concern in Japan’s national security 
establishment, as evidenced by the MOD. The MOD’s Defense White Paper since the late 1990s has contained a 
substantial section devoted to China’s military modernization but made its first mention of Chinese space capabilities in 
2008 following the ASAT, stating: “Moreover, in January 2007, when China conducted an anti-satellite weapon test, 
Japan expressed concerns in relation to the safe use of space and national security, and demanded China give explanations 
about the test and the country’s intentions. The Chinese government, however, did not give sufficient explanations about 
the details and intention of the test to allay Japan’s concerns.” Japan Ministry of Defense, Defense of Japan 2008, Tokyo, 
Urban Connections, 2008, p. 50. See also, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2014 Report to 
Congress of the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Washington D.C., November 2014, pp. 322-328; 
Bōeishōhen, Bōei Hakusho 2014 (Tokyo: Zaimushō Insatsukyoku, 2015), pp. 40, 107-108. 
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also legally obliged to draft a first Basic Plan for enacting the Basic Law’s new priorities within one year, 
and to review and restructure space-related agencies to concentrate on applications, industrialization and 
national security goals.16  
 The SHSP was supposed to construct a framework to give the Cabinet Office sufficient control to 
fund the QZSS program and GX rocket, and any new national security-connected budget lines. In an 
attempt to dilute MEXT’s power, the law stipulated that JAXA’s programs and policy goals reflect those 
of the Cabinet Office. JAXA would be co-administered by MEXT and MIC but with significant input and 
program jurisdictional rights from the Cabinet Office and METI. The Basic Law effectively, then, 
fundamentally pitted the SHSP against embedded ministerial domains and budgets. Thus, it is very easy 
in terms of a conventional narrative approach to characterize subsequent attempts to implement the Basic 
Law as a series of battles between different bureaucratic interests, notably intra-ministerial competition, 
resulting in successive failures to coordinate, that, in turn, resulted in the necessity to produce a series of 
reformulated Basic Plans.17 
 
Phase IV Contested Implementation (2009-12)  
In this context, Japan attempted to enact the Basic Law on three occasions, all of which suffered 
budgeting and bureaucratic opposition. Concomitant with that, several attempts to implement Cabinet 
Office control were attempted, with mixed results. The sum of these battles and subsequent compromises 
forms the mix from which Basic Plan 2016 was established. 
 The SHSP’s first attempt to formulate a new administrative arrangement produced four scenarios: the 
first only asked JAXA, which would remain administered by MEXT, to reflect on future Basic Plans; the 
second proposed boosting the role of the Cabinet Office to promote space utilization and give other 
ministries co-jurisdiction to promote their own projects, but would not give the Cabinet Office budgetary 
authority. The third proposed giving the Cabinet Office control of certain programs while allowing other 
ministries co-jurisdiction of their programs in JAXA; the fourth and most radical, would place JAXA in a 
new “Space Agency,” (an Uchūchō) within the Cabinet Office.18  
 However, the plans were shelved with the impending election of the Democratic Party of Japan 
(DPJ), which had supported the Basic Law, but which also wanted to exert more political control over the 
bureaucracy and cut what it identified as public waste. The DPJ’s radical agenda favored the Uchūchō 
option, pitting it squarely against MEXT.19 The result was the subsequent failure to implement both Basic 
Plan 1 of June 2009 and attempts by the DPJ to establish the Uchūchō. Basic Plan 1 set five-year 
development goals and ten-year targets for developing a dual-use land and ocean observing satellite 
system, (which was for a time to become an MDA system proposal), advanced telecommunication 
satellites, QZSS, and further reconnaissance systems. To fund the proposed observation system, and to 
                                                
16 Kazuto Suzuki, “A Brand-New Space Policy or Just Papering Over a Political Glitch? Japan’s New Space Law in the 
Making,” Space Policy, Vol. 24, No. 4 (November 2008), pp. 171-174; Kallender (2013). 
17 Suzuki (2008); Kallender (2013). 
18 Waga Kuni no Uchū Kaihatsu Riyō Taisei no Arigata ni tsuite <Chūkan Hōkoku> (An) ~ Ōmona Ronten [Concerning 
the Way Forward for Our Country’s Space Development and Utilization System <Interim Report > (Draft) ~ Principal 
Points];  Uchū Kaihatsu Riyō Taisei no Arigata ni tsuite Ikken (Monbukagakushō Teishutsu Shiryō) [Opinion on 
Concerning the Way Forward for Our Country’s Space Development and Utilization System (Submission by the Ministry 
of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology)]. MEXT argued it should retain control of JAXA and that JAXA 
be the main pillar of Japanese space development.  
19 Suzuki (2008); Kallender-Umezu (2013). The following paragraphs draw on these two papers and fieldwork conducted 
by the author at the time.  
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advance the QZSS system to a three-satellite configuration, Basic Plan 1 required increasing the overall 
space actives budget stepwise to around ¥500 billion annually.  
 Meanwhile, the MOD in 2009 released its own Fundamental Plan. Citing the need to respond to 
China’s ASAT test and other emergent space technologies, the plan recommended Japan research the 
necessity of a wide range of technologies, including: space-based ELINT and SIGINT capability and 
space-based EW; consider using the QZSS for positioning and targeting; introduce satellite hardening 
against kinetic, laser and electromagnetic attacks; bolster SSA capabilities, and; consider the development 
of new flexible launch systems together with new tactical satellites (TacSats).20 
 However, in December 2009, the MOF rejected funding for Basic Plan 1 because of the inability of 
the SHSP to coordinate the programs with ministerial actors, which had refused to cooperate while they 
awaited the new policy implementation proposals by the incoming DPJ administration of September 
2009.21 
Under the DPJ, relations with the bureaucracy proved difficult. First, in December 2009 the DPJ 
scrapped the GX, and targeted JAXA, arousing opposition from the bureaucracy.22 The following spring, 
in order to establish the Uchūchō – the least desirable option for MEXT – activist State Minister for 
Space Development Seiji Maehara attempted to bypass the SHSP by establishing a private committee of 
politically appointed reform-minded experts.23 A subsequent April 2009 report’s recommendation to 
establish an Uchūchō further deepened the resistance of MEXT and the LDP-appointed SHSP, which felt 
it had been sidelined.24 
 
Phase V: Domestic and International Balancing (2012-15) 
Subsequently, five years of coordination issues (or power struggles, to put it more bluntly) ensued. In 
December 2011, a newly DPJ-appointed SHSP changed tactics and decided to try to assert the precedent 
of Cabinet Office control by assuming programmatical, policy and budgetary authority for the QZSS 
program. And then, after further protracted discussions between MEXT and SHSP, a compromise was 
agreed in September 2011 to solve at least the QZSS issue. In this, the Cabinet Office would establish an 
ONSP, which would provisionally take control of planning and budget for the QZSS program as an initial 
settlement.  
                                                
20 Strategic Headquarters for Space Policy, Bōeishō Uchū Kaihatsu Riyō Iinkai, Uchū Kaihatsu Riyō ni Kansuru Kihon 
Hōshin ni Tsuite, January 15, 2009. TacSat programs are designed to utilize microsatellites, and affordable and 
quick-response launch vehicles to rapidly deploy capabilities to satisfy tactical imagery and data to military commanders. 
The U.S. ORS initiative since 2007 has employed the Minotaur and the Raptor and SPARK, or Spaceborne Payload 
Assist Rocket (Super Strypi) air-launch rockets. As noted in Chapter 1, Japan’s dual-use space programs directly mirror 
these efforts, with the Epsilon, as one of the world’s most highly advanced solid-fueled rockets, serving as a potential 
fast-access multipurpose launch vehicle for a range of military-use satellites. 
21 Strategic Headquarters for Space Policy, Basic Plan for Space Policy: Wisdom of Japan Moves Space, 2 June 2009, pp. 
7, 26; Kazuto Suzuki, “The first step of the new space policy - Assessment of the Space Basic Plan, July 2009,” Science 
Links Japan; Aoki (2009). 
22 Paul Kallender-Umezu, “Japan's GX Rocket Targeted for Cancellation in 2010,” Space News, 20 November 2009; 
Aurelia George Mulgan, “Round two of Japan’s government revitalisation,” East Asia Forum, 3 June 2010. 
23 Moltz (2012), p. 60; Democratic Party of Japan, Making Decisions to Get Things Moving. The Democratic Party of 
Japan’s Manifesto. Our Responsibilities for Now and the Future, Tokyo 2012, pp. 28, 31; Setsuko Aoki, “The Impact of 
the General Election on Japan’s Space Program,” Res Communis, 1 September 2009. 
24 Kongō no Uchū Seisaku no Arikata ni Kan Suru Yūshikisha Kaigi Teigensho [Regarding Future Space Policy, Experts 
Group Recommendations, April 20, 2010]; Paul Kallender-Umezu, “Japan Urged to Break Up JAXA and Establish New 
Space Agency,” Space News, 3 May  2010, p. 10; Paul Kallender-Umezu, “Profile Seiji Maehara, Foreign Minister, 
Japan: Building on Success,” Space News, 18 October 2010; See also, Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science 
and Technology (MEXT). Tatsuo, Kawabata, Monbukagakushō Daijin Kisha Kaiken Roku [Record of MEXT Minister 
Tatsuo Kawabata’s press briefing on 23 April of 2010]; Anan (2013), pp. 210-218, esp. p. 211. 
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 The ONSP was established in June 2012, when the Diet passed the “Partial Revision of the Cabinet 
Office Establishment Act.” Crucially, the Act also scrapped Article 4 of the JAXA Law, which still 
committed JAXA to peaceful purposes-only space development (a legal obstacle not tackled by the 
original Basic Law). This now allowed JAXA and MEXT to participate for the first time in non-offensive 
military space development. Apart from creating the ONSP, the legislation also abolished SAC and 
established the SPC reporting directly to the prime minister to provide policy, program prioritization and 
budgeting recommendations within the Cabinet Office.25 The new arrangements can be seen in Figure 1, 
Chapter 1. 
The subsequent Basic Plan 2 of January 2013 drawn up by the ONSP reformulated Basic Plan 1 and 
newly attempted to prioritize the global (now restyled as a “wide-area”) EO monitoring constellation 
which was to could be used for maritime surveillance (MDA) purposes. But this initiative, again, was 
rejected in late 2013, following more internal bureaucratic fighting. In this period, METI attempted to 
take control of ONSP internally, bypassing consultations with MEXT and MOD in particular, and 
substitute its ideas for the “wide-area” EO/MDA constellation.  
Crucially, however, the METI-backed wide-area proposal bypassed the SPC, abrogating the SPC’s 
coordination skills, expertise, and both personal and professional relationships necessary to smooth the 
way.26 Insufficient consultation also provoked the CSIC, the MOD and the MOF in December 2013 to 
reject the proposed wide-area EO program as unsuitable.27 Basic Plan 2 did, however, succeed in getting 
the QZSS development funded under the budgetary control of the Cabinet Office.28 But the failure to 
coordinate the wide-area EO constellation came at a critical time, just after the LDP returned to power, 
after a three-year hiatus, under Prime Minister Abe, who had established the NSC and NSS. The NSS put 
enormous policy pressure on the ONSP, and can be seen as the midwife of Basic Plan 2016.  
 Because the NSS mandated that the ONSP produce a fully coordinated space policy integrated with 
NSS policy, its publication had a profound impact. Further pressure came from the Abe administration in 
the form of Takeo Kawamura (again), and his deputy Hiroshi Imazu, newly elected chair of the LDP’s 
Special Committee for Space and Ocean Development, (SDSS), and a former Vice-Minister for Defense 
(and a former member of the SSSPG). Hearing about the impending failure of the METI-proposed MDA 
constellation, Imazu engineered the report “Recommendations for a Comprehensive Space Strategy to 
Implement Japan’s National Strategy” to put further pressure on the bureaucracy to work with the ONSP.  
 At this stage, U.S. coordination with Japan to implement the Basic Law became important. Following 
the first U.S.-Japan Space Security Dialogue in 2010 and subsequent summits between President Obama 
and Prime Minister Noda in 2012, and Prime Minister Abe in 2014, the U.S. made it increasingly clear 
that it desired increasingly integrated military space cooperation with Japan, as noted in Chapter 4 and 
above. The important new twist to this was the fact that the Abe administration was fully supportive and 
focused on the same, with Abe willing to take personal interest in the topics as a matter of priority.  
                                                
25 Naikakufu Sechi Ho Nado No Ichibu wo Kaisei Suru Hōritsu Dai- Sanju Go Go, [Partial Revision of the Cabinet Office 
Establishment Act Law 35]. 
26 For details on the Advanced Satellite with New system Architecture for Observation (ASNARO) program, see, for 
example, the Japan Space Systems (JSS) website. 
27 Author interviews with Satoshi Tsuzukibashi, Director of the Defense Production Committee, Keidanren, Masaru Uji, 
General Manager at the Society of Japanese Aerospace Companies, Takafumi Matsui, Professor Emeritus at the 
University of Tokyo and Deputy Chairman of the SPC, Hiroshi Imazu, Chairman of the LDP’s Special Committee on 
Space and Maritime Development, all in Tokyo. 
28 Strategic Headquarters for Space Policy, Basic Plan on Space Policy, January 25, 2013; Naikakufu Uchū 
Senryakushitsu, Uchū Kihon Keikaku.   
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 Reflecting all these pressures, Imazu (now Chairman of the LDP’s Space Policy Committee), 
published a report that urged the ONSP to establish a National Security Space Strategy (NSSS) directly 
linked to the NSS and suggested the founding of an Uchūchō controlled by the Prime Minster, which 
would control one single budget line. The report explicitly stressed the need for Japan to fulfill its SSA 
and MDA agreements and to deploy systems within three years, accelerate the fortification of ISR, begin 
work on signals intelligence and space based EW programs “as quickly as possible,” and, for example, 
even fundamentally reorient JAXA into a U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects-type role.29 This 
report acted as a political lever that pushed the ONSP to produce its August 2014 Mid-Term Statement 
(MTS), and subsequent Basic Plan 3.30 The MTS subsequently stated for the first time that Japan must 
indeed develop a NSSS. The MTS itself was significant as Japan’s first statement to explicitly place 
military space development as top priority.31 
 The NSS also prompted the MOD in August 2014 to revise its own Fundamental Plan. This plan 
called for the involvement of the MOD in extant and future dual-use technologies, including all EO-use 
satellites, IGS, SSA, and MDA. The MOD also stated it would use the QZSS for military purposes and it 
requested its own high bandwidth communications infrastructure. Last but not least the MOD proposed 
developing a missile detection sensor to be mounted on a dual-use JAXA reconnaissance satellite.32 
 The MTS provided the framework for Basic Plan 3 of January 2015, which was designed to be a 
fuller and complete (and implementable) version of the MTS with a five-year timetable and ten-year 
strategy. Openly referring to a “changing power balance in outer space, and shifting multipolarization of 
the previous U.S.-USSR bipolar structures,” necessitating a space policy response from Japan, Basic Plan 
3 squarely placed national security above civilian purposes and prioritized the need for Japan to fortify 
Japan’s ISR, MDA, and SSA capabilities, and develop QZSS into a regional GPS system.33 
 However, yet again, due to further internal struggles, despite a range of pressures placed on the 
ONSP, Basic Plan 3 failed to achieve approval of the MOF for full funding of the expansion of the IGS 
fleet and MDA development. At this point, the Abe administration, as part of its explicit effort to support 
the U.S. “rebalance” through the revision of the U.S.-Japan Guidelines for Defense Cooperation put 
further pressure on the bureaucracy to produce a fully-timetabled plan. Backed by the SCC Joint 
Statement of April 2015 that reiterated the importance of BMD, JAXA’s provision of SSA, and 
developing new and resilient space capabilities in line with the revised Defense Guidelines, through the 
ONSP, the Abe administration asked the ONSP to negotiated a fully budgeted plan with the assent of all 
the ministerial players. This necessitated further coordination to secure budget, resulting in Basic Plan 
2016, which provided clearer timetables for the development of critical programs, particularly the 
                                                
29 Among many other proposals, the document called for Japan to work for the ‘early establishment’ (sōki kakuritsu) of 
no less than an MDA constellation using the best combination of satellites (ranging from 2 ton to 500 kilograms and 100 
kilogram microsatellites), unmanned aerial vehicles, stratospheric aerial platforms and remotely controlled vessels and 
establish an Integrated SSA Monitoring and Analysis Center (Sōgō Kanshi Seta) working in close cooperation with U.S. 
military SSA assets. See Policy Research Council Liberal Democratic Party, Recommendation for a Comprehensive 
Space Strategy to Implement Japan’s National Strategy, August 26, 2014. 
30 Uchū Seisaku Iinkai, Kihon Keikaku Chūkan Matome (An), August 20, 2014. 
31 Ibid. Uchū Seisaku Iinkai Kihon Keikaku Chūkan Matome (An)” [Space Policy Commission, Basic Policy Committee, 
Mid-Term summary] see: Uchū Kaihatsu Riyō ni kan suru Kihon Hōshin ni tsuite (An) Bōeishō, Uchū Kaihatsu Riyō 
Suishin Iinkai, Heisei 26 Nen 8 Gatsu 28 Nichi; Paul Kallender-Umezu, ‘A New Direction For Japan’s Space Program?’ 
Aviation Week & Space Technology (hereafter AWST), May 6 2013, p. 36.  
32 Bōeishō Uchū Kaihatsu Riyō Suishin Iinkai, Uchū Kaihatsu Riyō ni Kansuru Kihon Hōshin ni Tsuite (Kaiseiban), 28 
August 2014. 
33 Uchū Kaihatsu Senryaku Honbu, Uchū Kihon Keikaku, January 9, 2015. 
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doubling of the IGS constellation. This latest plan, then, represents a renegotiated version of Basic Plan 3 
that provides more concrete funding pathways for today’s basket of dual-use national security space 
programs.34  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
34 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan, “Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee, A Stronger Alliance for a 
More Dynamic Security Environment: The New Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation,” 27 April 2015, p. 4.  
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Chapter 6 
 Application of the SAF Framework to Space Policy and Administrative Transition 
 
The conventional analysis outlined in Chapter 5 represents a synthesis of current scholarship that seeks to 
steer a middle course between various interpretive frameworks and my own research to account for 
internal and external balancing, while taking into account at least some of the layers (and players) 
involved in decision-making. In this conventional account, we can see security pressures and an 
action-reaction cycle developing in terms of Japan’s response to security pressures, modulated through 
the interplay between various players, particularly between politicians and the bureaucracy, and within 
the bureaucracy. To create a coherent picture that takes into account all the elements that combined to 
produce the particular features of Basic Plan 2016, this dissertation now applies an SAF framework that 
replaces the decision levels outlined in Chapters 1 and 3 with SAFs. 
 
Formulation of the General Space Activities SAF  
Phase I of the conventional narrative can be transposed into seven or eight sub-SAFs comprising most of 
the characteristics and elements required to understand the establishment of the overall General Space 
Activities SAF comprising both Japanese space policy and administration issues. I will call this SAF the 
Initial General Space Activities SAF. Within this SAF, there are precursor SAFs, which I will call SAFs 
numbers 1 through 7. Within these, SAF 1 composes the international situation (which could also be 
called the wider field environment); SAF 2 composes the U.S.-Japan security relationship; SAF 3 
delineates the internal political players; SAF 4 composes the bureaucratic players; SAF 5 composes the 
subgovernment players; SAF 6 composes industrial stakeholders, and; SAF 7 represents public opinion.  
 The description of the interplay between these SAFs will compose the Initial General Space 
Activities SAF. Following the SAF framework approach, the analysis of the Initial General Space 
Activities SAF, then, is a study of the composition of an SAF born out of tensions and catalyzed by a 
major externality pressure (an episode or episodes of contention). As implied, the task of this section 
looking at field formation is to establish the players, their motivational matrices, incumbents and 
challengers, and internal governance units, and identify sources of contention as well as the shock(s) or 
externalities that force change.   
 
SAF 1: International Security Situation  
Characteristics and contentions: During the formation of the Initial General Space Activities SAF, SAF 1 
played an indirect role in the orientation of the other SAFs. Against Soviet Russian and Chinese nuclear 
threats amplified by the militarization of space technologies, Japanese policymakers remained largely 
confident in the U.S.’s superiority and ability to moderate security dilemmas in the conventional, nuclear 
and spaced domains. Japan pursued minimalist external balancing through strengthening its conventional 
capabilities and commitments to the emerging U.S.-Japan alliance, obviating the need for internal 
balancing through the build-up of its own nuclear and space capabilities.  
However, China’s rapid acquisition of nuclear weapons, from a basic multi-kiloton level fission 
implosion bomb in 1964, to a deliverable multi-megaton fusion weapon in 1967, started to pose concerns 
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for Japan.1 Against this, international negotiations were proceeding through the UN towards the 
establishment of the OST with the emphasis shared by both space powers, the U.S. and Soviet Russia that 
the peaceful use of space would be interpreted along the lines of non-aggressive use, as explained in 
Chapter 4. 
Figure 17: Initial SAF 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SAF 2: The U.S.-Japan Security Relationship  
Characteristics and contentions: SAF 2 played a major role in the orientation of the other SAFs and the 
formation of the General Space Activities SAF. By the mid-to-late 1960s, the U.S. was becoming 
concerned about the military potential of Japanese space development, in particular, the potential for the 
convertibility of early Japanese solid-fueled rockets into ballistic missiles. U.S. documents declassified in 
March 1996 show that around September 1965 the U.S. assessed the growing technical competency of 
Japan’s solid fueled rockets and concluded that Japan would have the technology to develop ballistic 
missiles within three years following the January success of the Lambda L-3-2 rocket launch by the 
University of Tokyo to reach a 1,000-kilomber orbit. Its successor in July 1966, the L-3H-2, actually 
reached 1,800 kilometers.2 National security and U.S. State Department memoranda of the period 
emphasized the need to steer Japan away from the development of more capable ballistic missile 
capability by offering superior U.S. liquid-fuel technology. In 1965, U.S. President Lyndon Johnson sent 
Vice-President Hubert Humphrey and NASA Administrator James Webb to Japan with an offer extend 
space cooperation with this technology transfer as a primary goal.3  
 In terms of the SAF framework, the U.S.’s primary function in the U.S.-Japan relationship during 
this period especially can be characterized as acting as an external governance unit in which the U.S. saw 
(and to a greater or lesser degree still sees) its role in space activities as mentor (or at the least, senior 
alliance partner) to Japan. Given that the U.S. space program was born out of geostrategic rivalry with 
Soviet Russia and prosecuted for its strategic military value, the U.S.’s expected role in space cooperation 
would be to guide any emergent Japanese space program away from military potential (unless 
circumstances changed when it might need Japanese technologies or capabilities, as it indeed transpired). 
This governance relationship has persisted, arguably, to the present. 
                                                
1 For an overview of China’s nuclear weapons development see William Burr, Jeffrey T. Richelson, “Whether to 
‘Strangle the Baby in the Cradle”: The United States and the Chinese Nuclear Program, 1960-64,” International Security, 
Volume 25, Issue 3 (Winter 2000/01), pp. 54-99; Kallender and Hughes (2016). 
2 Brian Harvey et. al, Emerging Space Powers: The New Space Programs of Asia, the Middle East, and South America 
(Chichester, UK: Praxis Publishing, 2010), pp. 10, 15, 22; Ward W. Vuillemot, “Japan’s Space Development: Past, 
Present and Future,” Graduate thesis for the University of Washington, Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics and 
Technical Japanese Program, 2001, p. 9; Confirmed in an interview with Tsuzukibashi, 18 April 18, 2006. 
3 Pekkanen & Kallender Umezu (2010), p. 108. 
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(International Situation) 
Japan sheltering under U.S. 
security guarantee but some 
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China’s nuclear program. In 
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 The U.S., by trying to establish a global monopoly in space communications wanted to fold Japan 
and other allies within its strategic space technology sphere to act as a counterpoint to the Soviet and 
communist bloc. In 1964, the intergovernmental International Telecommunications Satellite Consortium 
(INTELSAT) was created, and in talks establishing INTELSAT, the U.S. insisted that not only any 
cooperation be for peaceful purposes, but that no technology was to be exported to other countries, and 
that Japanese technology be compatible with INTELSAT.4  
Figure 18: Initial SAF 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 The second growing concern of the U.S. during the late 1960s was the increasing stresses 
experienced by the U.S.-Japan relationship over the Vietnam War, as the U.S. was becoming increasingly 
embroiled in the conflict and wary of widespread Japanese reluctance to be seen to play any role in the 
war. In Japan, opposition to the war was led by the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) and backed by huge 
popular protests. In addition, discussions were underway during the late 1960s about the return of 
Okinawa to Japan, complicated by the fact that, despite widespread public opposition, U.S. bases on the 
island were being used to by the U.S. to prosecute the war.5  
 
SAF 3: Internal Political Stakeholders 
Characteristics and contentions: During the late 1960s, for the purposes of this dissertation, political 
stakeholders can be divided into two major camps: the LDP and the left. In terms of motivations of the 
actors, Prime Minister Eisaku Sato saw his main task regarding alliance management so as to create as 
little friction as possible with a view to negotiating a return of Okinawa to Japan. As far as conservatives 
were concerned, trade-related issues also bubbled along with the question of how, in the face of 
widespread public opposition to the Vietnam War, Japan could support the U.S. while maintaining the 
basic Yoshida Doctrine. Internally, however, concern about the PRC’s nuclear program and the future of 
the alliance led the JDA to quietly investigate the feasibility of Japan acquiring nuclear weapons, which 
was already technically feasible. A two-year internal study concluded that acquiring nuclear weapons was 
counterproductive, but that the capabilities to do so should be retained.6  
 The socialist and communist opposition, on the other hand, especially the pro-Soviet left, had an 
entirely different motivational matrix in that the hard left pressed against any support for the U.S. and 
                                                
4 Harvey (2010), p 24. 
5 Oros (2008), pp. 103-104, 119, 123, 129: Japan began to supply the U.S. in the Vietnam war; for example, Sony 
cameras used to guide missiles, but when the public found out, Akio Morita was forced to apologize publicly.  
6 Yuri Kase, “The Costs and Benefits of Japan’s Nuclearization: An Insight into the 1968/70 Internal Report,” The 
Nonproliferation Review (Summer 2001), pp. 55-68; Llewellyn Hughes, “Why Japan Will Not Go Nuclear (Yet): 
International and Domestic Constraints on the Nuclearization of Japan,” International Security, Vol. 31, No. 4 (Spring 
2007), pp. 76-77.  
SAF 2 
(U.S.-Japan Relations) 
Some degree of concern about 
Japanese space capabilities and 
about Japanese attitudes to the 
Vietnam War 
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against the use of U.S. bases in the prosecution of the Vietnam War. Aware of Japan’s growing 
technological capabilities, and with an eye on both the potential to develop nuclear warheads and 
military-use space technologies, the left was anxious for Japan not to stray from its commitments to 
Article 9. Concerns were also raised domestically by the left (ironically mirroring similar concerns by the 
U.S.) after Japan exported solid-fuel launch technology to Indonesia and Yugoslavia, arousing fears about 
Japan being involved in possible missile technology proliferation, and raising awareness of the growing 
requirement to put strong legal restrictions on technology exports.7  
The LDP was also balanced between the need to service the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance and the 
domestic need to stay in power, while facing restrictions on military spending. In the Lower House 
election of January 1967, the percentage of the LDP vote dropped below 50 percent for the first time 
since 1955, necessitating more careful consideration of any policy that could be turned into a vote winner 
or loser. At the same time, the election also saw the rise in the power of the Kōmeitō party, which 
advocated a graduated negotiated withdrawal from the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.  
Amid the popular mood, the Asahi Shimbun started a popular campaign against Hideo Itokawa (see 
below) and his insistence, against public criticism aired by NASA’s Webb, that Japan halt its solid-fueled 
rocket program. It was in this atmosphere that the adoption of the Three Principles on Arms Exports and 
Three Nonnuclear Principles were set in December 1967.8 In this setup, SAF 3 can be seen in terms of a 
governance unit as forming state policy and national security policy resting in the Cabinet.  
 
Figure 19: Initial SAF 3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
7 For a brief history of Itokawa and early Todai rockets, see Pekkanen & Kallender-Umezu (2010) pp. 103-8; Suzuki 
(2005), p. 14.  
8 Harvey (2010), p. 15; Oros (2008), p. 129. For the details of the Three Principles, see the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Japan website Japan's Policies on the Control of Arms Exports. For the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, see the Statement 
by Prime Minister Eisaku Sato at the Budget Committee in the House of Representative (December 11th, 1967): “My 
responsibility is to achieve and maintain safety in Japan under the Three Non-Nuclear Principles of not possessing, not 
producing and not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons, in line with Japan's Peace Constitution,” available at 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan. 
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SAF 4: Bureaucratic Stakeholders 
Characteristics and contentions: During this stage, there was also the prospect of significant contention 
between bureaucratic stakeholders and their related subgovernment groupings, which can be divided for, 
analytical clarity, quite simply into one incumbent and one challenger.  
 First, the initial incumbent was the MOE, under which the University of Tokyo (UT) had led Japan’s 
space program since the mid-1950s, beginning with Hideo Itokawa’s Pencil Rocket. Because of the 
power of the UT group, this player is discussed in SAF 5. As the incumbent, the MOE’s motivational 
matrix contained actions designed to retain its budget, autonomy and role for space development under a 
strong rubric of advancing space science for peaceful and scientific purposes, but also stressing 
autonomy. 
 Within this, another factor that must be included: the personal relationship of Hideo Itokawa, Japan’s 
leading rocket scientist and leader of the UT camp, and Prime Minster Sato. They were both friends, but 
disagreed on key elements of space policy and development issues. Itokawa strongly wanted Japan to 
retain an autonomous space capability founded on indigenous rocket research and looked to forestall U.S. 
interference on Japanese technology development at its formative stage.  
 Given the speed with which Japan had advanced with solid rocket technologies, research was already 
by the mid-1960s turning to the much more complex task of developing payload-friendly and powerful 
liquid engine technology that would be needed if Japan wished to launch increasingly capable (and 
heavier) satellites beyond LEO. Further, the UT’s motives for developing a space capability are 
commonly attributed as solely scientific and peaceful, but they also followed a logic of autonomy. 
Itokawa believed that Japan as a major scientifically-advanced nation should retain its own capability to 
launch and develop satellites, and behind that, maintain solid-fueled rocket technologies. (Thirty years, 
and generations of engineers later, ISAS managers often cited the maintenance of solid rocket technology 
and scientific autonomy as the primary reasons for the continued independence of ISAS within JAXA.)9 
However, against the MOE was a growing framework of institutions gradually established through 
the 1960s that were motivated to establish a coherent national space policy beyond the narrow confines of 
the UT’s scientific priorities. First, through the 1960s, it became gradually clearer that the STA was 
increasingly positioned as the main challenger. The STA had been set up in 1956 with the primary 
mission of advancing Japan’s nuclear electrical power generation program and was hungry for 
high-profile complementary new technical programs. From the point of view of the STA, space 
development looked the perfect fit.  
In terms of deep background, at the beginning of the 1960s, Japan had sent several high-level 
missions to the United States to meet with Eisenhower-era U.S. space authorities, concluding that 
research and investment into the area should become a national priority. However, following early 
pressure from Itokawa’s group, the National Space Activities Council in 1965 gave the go-ahead for an 
ingenious rocket program based on Itokawa’s ideas with the objective to launch a satellite using a solid 
rocket to be called the Mu, to succeed the Lambda.10  
In conjunction with this came the growing institutional power of a new framework that was 
developed to consider how Japan should gear up for a major national space program not under the aegis 
                                                
9 Oros (2008); p. 12. In 1962, Itokawa presented a Tentative Plan for a Satellite Launcher to the Science Council of Japan, 
which in 1963 started considering whether or not Japan should pursue indigenous or imported technologies. See Harvey 
(2010); pp. 15, 22.  
10 Oros (2008), p. 130. 
  122 
of the MOE (or, more exactly, Itokawa). This is jumping the gun a little, but when Japan was to 
reconsider its space policy objectives and the distribution of power among players to fulfil those very 
objectives, the STA, as will be seen, was ideally positioned to benefit from change. One element of this in 
SAF 2 was the presence of activist STA Minister Shirō Kiuchi, who personally looked towards space 
development as an opportunity to pursue the STA’s mission of advancing Japan as a first-ranked science 
and technology power.11  
Thus the STA was positioned, or positioned itself, to be the most logical choice to receive budgets 
and programs accrued to a less parochially-based research and development program that could lead to 
spin-on benefits for society and industry as a whole. Put more simply, after Itokawa had delivered the 
scientific and technological platform for Japan to begin a space program, it would be logical for those 
technologies, when ready, to diverted into a broader technological and/or industrial strategy. The STA’s 
mission was fundamentally different from that of another other obvious candidate ministry, MITI, whose 
job it was to promote new industries, because the STA’s mission was fundamentally based on technology 
development, not industrial strategy. 
But, unfortunately for MITI, the timing of this period, just when decisions could be taken whether to 
focus on space development from a technological or industrial strategy point of view, came when MITI 
was in crisis. In fact, in the late 1960s, MITI found itself overstretched and divided, simultaneously 
focused on a multitude of complex trade and exchange international issues, domestic industrial policy and 
management problems, and preoccupied by internal faction fighting. Last but not least METI bore public 
unpopularity over devastating pollution issues that surfaced in this period after the dash to industrialize 
from the 1950s. 
Instead of seizing the initiative when it could have played a challenger role, MITI was completely 
unprepared to assert innovative action to try to take control of any future funding for a broader space 
development program. As it turned out, MITI did not establish its own space office until 1979, but, 
following that, it did quite rapidly became another challenger player in SAFs 4 and 5, as will be analyzed 
in following chapters.12 
By the late 1960s, Japan was facing a crossroads as to its next steps in policy MOE’s relatively 
narrow focus was gradually brought in relief. In fact the origins of competitors to the MOE can be found 
sprouting  through the early 1960s, with the success of Itokawa’s sounding rockets and the growing 
scientific interest in space development and science causing Japan to set up the National Space Activities 
Council (NSAC) in 1960.  
The significance of the composition and reporting framework of NSAC is significant. Institutionally, 
it was composed of a broad array of individuals, and of the NSAC’s 29 members, eight were bureau 
chiefs from central ministries. The rankings of members later improved to feature representatives of 
vice-ministers and six new members from Keidanren (the Japan Business Federation, later to play a major, 
almost direct role thorough a series of episodes of contention). Further, NSAC reported to the prime 
minister, not a particular ministry, pre-installing the administrative principal that no matter what the 
                                                
11 The STA in particular, regarded having a space program as something of a “necktie” warn by members of the 
gentlemen’s club of most advanced industrial nations, Suzuki (2005). 
12 Ibid., p. 13; According to Johnson (1982), pp. 274-295: The year 1969-69 was the worst year in MITI’s history as it 
battled on from the “Pollution Diet” of 1967, contested mergers and industrial scandals, trade frictions with the Nixon 
administration and a general lack of confidence both internally and in terms of reputational competence for its industrial 
policy. 
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institutional implications employing subgovernment agencies represented by a particular ministry or 
ministries, that any future space program should be, in the final say, under a level of control up and above 
the ministerial level.  
 
Figure 20: Initial SAF 4 
SAF 4 
Bureaucratic Players 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SAF 5: Subgovernment Stakeholders  
Characteristics and contentions: In the buildup to the Initial General Activities Space SAF, we can also 
see a replication of SAF 4 in terms of one major incumbent and one major challenger. During this period, 
ISAS, as incumbent, was opposed to any interference of its prerogatives to develop an autonomous space 
capability, while the STA, as challenger, was in a better position to institute a broader research and 
development strategy not exclusively tied to autonomous launcher development and space science. Under 
Itokawa, the Avionics and Supersonic Aerodynamics (AVSA) research group at the Institute of Industrial 
Science at UT was the driving force of rocket development from the mid-1950s through the following 
decade.   
Itokawa’s group initially was able to use its pioneering role to secure increasing budgets, leading to 
the setting up of a dedicated launch site in 1962 in Uchinoura, Kagoshima, and to the establishment of 
ISAS in 1964. The fundamental orientation of ISAS can be, perhaps, typified as the pursuit of scientific 
excellence and highly advanced engineering solutions. In this respect, the successful launch of Sputnik in 
1957 may have had a totally different impact on Japan’s scientific community, with its rationality 
bounded to non-military and peaceful purposes, but also in the pursuit of scientific autonomy.13 
AVSA scientists and rocketeers developed the engine systems that powered the earliest series of 
Japanese rockets, named the Pencil and Kappa and later the Lambda, and Mu, series of solid vehicles that 
delivered Japan’s early satellite launches through the early 1970s, until liquid-fueled alternatives by 
NASDA using technology licensed from the U.S. took over. Within this, ISAS’s motives for developing a 
space capability are commonly attributed as solely scientific and peaceful, but (as earlier hinted at) they 
also followed a deeply embedded logic of autonomy so that Japan as a major scientifically-advanced 
nation retain its own capability to launch and develop satellites. In the event, at the end of the 1960s, 
                                                
13 This was certainly the impression the author received through dozens of interviews with leading ISAS scientists in the 
1990s. Typical was the attitude of Atushiro Nishida, then ISAS Director General, who said that he, like many ISAS 
scientists, was directly inspired to enter space science following the launch of Sputnik. See Paul Kallender, “Newsmaker 
Forum: ISAS Director General Atsuhiro Nishida,” Space News, 13 September 1997, p. 34. 
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ISAS failed to deliver the required demonstrable competence in the new highly-desired liquid-fuel 
technologies. Multiple failures of the relatively advanced four-stage Lambda came at a critical juncture, 
despite fact that ISAS was investing in new liquid technologies.14  
Against this, the STA’s interest in space development grew momentum through the early 1960s as it 
began to fund and organizational framework to pursue research with increasing support from Keidanren 
(see SAF 7), which itself was looking for larger and longer term investment in space technology. 
Particularly contractors, primarily from the former Mitsubishi zaibatsu companies led by MHI. for rocket 
systems, and Melco for satellite and applications technologies, were starting to look beyond merely 
extending their limited licenses to copy and redevelop U.S. technology. 
NAL was established in July 1955 as an auxiliary body to the Prime Minister’s Office, giving it 
access to and feedback from the political center. NAL opened an aerospace division in 1963 and 
developed large-scale test facilities, including the Kakuda Research Center in 1966 to allow it to conduct 
a wide scope of aerospace and space-related research. Since the late 1960s, most of NAL’s divisions have 
been focused on the research of key technologies for winged space transportation systems, which NAL 
considered essential to autonomous Japanese space activities.15 
The STA also began internal preparations to start developing its role as leading what it felt should 
new space-oriented research and development sector. Beginning in April 1962, the STA set up the 
Research and Coordination Bureau Aerospace Division; in April 1963, a Space Development Department 
was set up in the STA’s Aerospace Department; then in 1964 the STA established the Headquarters for 
Space Development Promotion (HSDP), the precursor to NASDA, in the STA’s Center for Research and 
Development Strategy. The HSDP included 23 engineers, including Tomifumi Godai, who was later to 
become the godfather of the (subsequently ill-fated) H-II launch vehicle, and later Executive Director of 
NASDA, and, still later, a member of SAC.16  
With respect to launch vehicles, the focus in the early stages was the development of small-scale, 
solid fuel rockets that could launch scientific satellites, for example the four-stage Q rocket. It was the 
general emphasis on getting into space as a whole, and strong pressure from industry to find a platform to 
invest more heavily in a broader and more strategic space program, that led to the creation of NASDA on 
October 1, 1969.17  
To signal NASDA’s new culture, it was headed by Hideo Shima, a big-project, high profile 
technocrat who was a direct counterpoint to Itokawa, and who was the primary planner and designer of 
the initial Tokyo-Osaka Shinkansen system in the early 1960s (before being forced to resign for the huge 
debt burden caused to Japanese National Railways). Following the international acclaim and credit 
                                                
14 Pekkanen & Kallender-Umezu (2010), p. 105. In 1971 ISAS set up its own cryogenic (liquid hydrogen/ oxygen) engine 
research in rivalry to NASDA, with ISAS developing a series of more powerful engines through 1973-1975. But it was 
too late. In the event, 1976 SAC, was forced to intervene between ISAS and NASDA to merge two different approaches 
to start the development of the LE-6 engine for NASDA’s H-I project, which was eventually implemented as a trilateral 
project in cooperation with NAL. 
15 Pekkanen & Kallender-Umezu (2010), p. 61 
16 佐藤靖、「NASA を築いた人と技術」 東京大学出版会 [Yasushi Sato, The People and the Technologies that Built 
NASA (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 2007)] 
17 五代富文 『国産ロケット「H-II」宇宙への挑戦』 徳間書店, 1994 年 [Tomifumi Godai, Domestic Rocket: “H-II” 
Challenge to Outer Space (Tokyo: Tokuma Shoten Publishing Ltd., 1994). 
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accruing to Japan from the success of the Tokaido Shinkansen, the appointment to NASDA of the 
suddenly reputationally rehabilitated Shima symbolized the scale and direction of NASDA’s ambitions.18  
 
Figure 21: Initial SAF 5 
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SAF 6: Industrial Stakeholders 
The origins of the early founders of Japan’s rocket program in AVSA were major wartime military 
contractors, including Fuji Seimitsu Company, which had evolved from Nakajima Aircraft, and which 
subsequently became Nissan Motors, and still later, part of the IHI group, which is a major propulsions 
systems provider and features heavily as an influential player. As already noted, Keidanren members 
signaled interest in space activities very early. As it became apparent that Japan was going to invest 
public money in building a space program, the business lobby became increasingly more active.  
 Keidanren had already established an initial committee in 1960 to look into and promote business 
and investment in space technologies. The Special Committee on the Peaceful uses of Outer Space was 
founded in 1961 to start lobbying for funds and investment. Members from industry accompanied 
fact-finding missions to the U.S., and from the second half the 1960s this interest grew and is attributed to 
adding pressure to form a subsidy and development framework to kick-start a research and development 
path toward building a future space industry.19 This means that corporate interests specifically, and more 
generally through the lens of the Keidanren, make it possible to characterize SAF 6 as consistently an (or 
persistently) opportunist and an active (challenger) SAF.  
 Experienced and able major companies such as MHI realized that Japan needed liquid-fueled engine 
technology in order to be able to launch larger payloads, to accommodate future communications 
satellites into geosynchronous orbits, rather than solid-fueled rockets, which are unsuitable for such 
missions. Thus, for SAF 6, it would be logical to support any pathway, institution or policy leaning 
towards sustained investment. Also, MHI, for example, was working with NAL, and the HSDP (then, 
subsequently, NASDA) to develop what was to become the small second-stage liquid LE-3 engine to be 
                                                
18 After a background of being a leading steam locomotive engineer at Japanese National Railways (JNR), Shima, had 
spearheaded the design and development of the all-electric megaproject Shinkansen system in the early 1960s, but had 
been forced to resign due to the enormous costs and debt burden accrued to JNR in building the initial Tokyo-Osaka link, 
which had required the building of 3,000 bridges and 67 tunnels.  
19 Interview, Ichiro Taniguchi, “Nihon no Uchū Kaihatsu Riyō to Bijinesu” [Business and Japan’s Space Development 
and Industrialization], 11 July 2007. 
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used on the N-I rocket in the 1970s, and had a direct stake in promoting advances (and investment) in 
launch vehicle technology.  
 
 
Figure 22: Initial SAF 6 
        SAF 6 Industrial and Commercial Interests 
 
 
 
 
 
SAF 7: Public Opinion 
Characteristics and contentions: As in other liberal democracies, the mid-late 1960s saw the rise of what 
has now become the old Left. In Japan, especially from 1966, anti-war, anti-American, and anti-militarist 
sentiment in Japan began to mount with waves of protests against a basket of issues, including 
environmental and industrial pollution and concerns about the direction of the country in general. The 
same year saw the Cultural Revolution begin in China and the start of the use of transport of U.S. military 
personnel from U.S. bases in Japan to Vietnam. In 1967, more mass demonstrations against the U.S. 
featured particular outrage by the left of the visit of the nuclear-powered U.S. aircraft carrier and 
consummate symbol of American power projection, the USS Enterprise (CVN-65), to Japan.20 Thus, 
given the demonstrable power of public opinion and political opposition to military activities of the time, 
it is possible to regard public sentiment as another governance unit acting at State level. 
Figure 23: Initial SAF 7 
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Putting the Fields Together  
 
A look at the connections and interrelationships between the SAFs that went to form the Initial General 
Space Activities SAF might, then, look something like this. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
20 Vuillemot (2001), p. 8 
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Figure 24: Pre-Initial General Space Activities SAF Relationships Summary 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Episodes of Contention  
According to the SAF framework, an essential element of SAFs are their inherent dynamism; instead of 
looking at the origins of groups of organizations through a historical narrative, or leaving the origins of a 
particular field of organizations as a given, a critical element of the SAF framework looks at how SAFs 
were established, usually out of a period of contention cause by a “shock” or “shocks” big enough to 
either change an extant SAF or provoke the formulation of a new SAF, which in turn, has its own internal 
dynamics that will make it unstable and prone to change if an shock or other pressures applied are 
sufficiently enough. 
 In the case of the formation of the General Space Activities SAF, I have ignored constructing a 
previous SAF in favor of showing how external shocks specifically acted in formation of the SAF which 
corresponds the initial post-shock and post-episodes of contention that led to the establishment of a 
“stable” General Space Activities SAF that lasted as a policy-administrative framework from 1969 until 
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2001, although under increasingly severe domestic and international pressures building from the 
mid-1990s. 
 The one absolutely definable shock that provoked a response, i.e. strategic action that cascaded 
through the interrelated SAFs 3, 4, and 7 was the January 1968 offer from the Johnson Administration of 
institutionalized cooperation in the field of space. While it might seem semantically extreme to describe 
the offer of Thor-Delta technology, with its dual-use nature (in terms of its ICBM-heritage) and its 
technical promise of transforming Japan’s ability to loft much heavier and capable payloads into GEO 
orbits, to Japan as a “shock,” the offer fully fulfills the criteria of being an external pressure great enough 
to cause a major impact on Japan’s space program and policymaking. Further, characterizing this 
externality in terms of the SAF framework shows the actions and reactions of the players to be logical and 
rational. The U.S. offer of cooperation in fact caused a major Diet debate as to how to react, with the LDP 
broadly supporting the idea and the leftists denouncing it.21 
 First, in SAF 2, the Johnson proposal seemed to offer win-win-win solutions through the matrix of 
problems posed by Japan’s space program. By offering the technology, the U.S. could directly involve 
itself in Japan’s space development and exercise a degree of guidance, monitoring and control, while 
offering Japan a managed pathway to becoming an advanced spacefaring nation. In the offer, critical 
technologies were black-boxed and, specifically re-entry technologies, a dual-use pathway to warhead 
re-entry technologies, were eschewed in a blunt statement that the launch vehicles were not designed for 
the transfer of dual-use technologies. The offer also fit into the paternalistic U.S. self-image and public 
propaganda image as altruistic mentor and guide to Japan, while fostering Japanese dependence on U.S. 
technology.  
 For SAF 3, the proposed cooperation was strongly opposed by the left, particularly the Japan 
Socialist Part, which denounced any idea of increasing Japan’s “war potential.” The subsequent debate in 
the Diet provoked by the Johnson offer was also significant for its discussion on the concept of civilian 
control. On the one hand, the LDP in general and Sato and Kiuchi in particular were highly positive about 
the offer. From the point of view of Japanese conservatives, the transfer offered the promise of 
fast-tracking Japanese science and technology development in a new frontier, leading to the creation of 
new a new industry. 
 Then, if cast in the light of Japan coming of age as a growing space power, the growing prowess of 
Japan would bolster its self-image and global brand. Accepting the offer could also be used to ameliorate 
frictions with the U.S., and help smooth negotiations about the return of Okinawa. And not least, with the 
technology, which provided the opportunity to launch much larger satellites at lower ballistic speeds 
(gentler rides for increasingly sensitive and delicate payloads) that solid-fueled rockets, Japan could both 
advance its space science in new areas and work on applications, for example, towards functional 
communications and EO satellites. Coming after the LDP’s recent election struggles, and the weight of 
                                                
21 Selig S. Harrison, “Japan and Nuclear Weapons,” in (ed.) Harrison S.S. Japan’s Nuclear Future. Washington D.C., 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1996), p. 23; Michael D. Swaine with Loren H. Runyon, “Ballistic 
Missiles and Missile Defense in Asia,” NBR Analysis, Vol. 13, No. 3 (June 2002), p. 9. For the original bilateral 
agreement, see: United States of America and Japan, “Exchange of Notes Constituting an Agreement Concerning 
Cooperation in Space Activities for Peaceful Purposes (with attachment),” Tokyo, 31 July 1969. Registered by the United 
States of America, March 4, 1970. As printed in United Nations, United Nations Treaty System 1970, no. 10342, pp. 
86-87. The details of this negotiation can be found in the memoire of US ambassador to Japan, U. Alexis Johnson. See 
Johnson U. Alexis, The Right Hand of Power (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1984.) Quoted in Sato, “A Contested Gift 
of Power,” p. 189; Shigebumi Saito, Nihon Uchū Kaihatsu Monogatari (Japanese Space Development Story) (Tokyo: 
Mita Shuppankai, 1992). 
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public opinion, the caveat was that public and political opinion needed to be assuaged about ensuring the 
non-militarization of the technology transfer. Simply put, by accepting the technology, Japan would cast 
itself as the country that repurposed U.S. ballistic missiles to peaceful purposes. Ensuring this track also 
provided a major role for the left in being seen to steer Japan away from any hint of rearmament. Thus, 
accepting the U.S. offer was easy way to appeal to voters, doves and opposition. This, then, is the 
political background to the PPR. 
 SAFs 4 & 5: At the time of the offer, the STA was making slow progress with research into 
liquid-fuel rockets, development of which actually had begun as early as 1954. A series of early rockets 
that involved MHI had been developed, but none of them was a match for the Thor-Delta technology on 
offer. The switch to U.S. technology, then, can be explained by a number of factors, one of them being 
the slow progress pre-NASDA entities had made with liquid-fuel research by NAL’s precursor, the 
Institute of Aeronautics Technology, and by the National Space Development Center (NSDC), which was 
established by the STA in 1964. NSDC’s main tasks had been to develop a liquid rocket with a guidance 
control system. The NSDC made steady progress, developing the two-stage LS-A and LS-C liquid-solid 
rockets. NAL meanwhile accumulated technology and experience. The Q Project was designed to develop 
a launch vehicle to put a 150 kg payload to a 1,000 km orbit by 1972; the N Project was to launch a 100 
kg satellite into a geostationary orbit by 1974.22  
 Against this modest progress, U.S. technology seemed to offer the potential of a lower-risk, 
faster-return pathway that entirely fit the institutional logics of the STA. Thus the STA jumped at the 
offer with Kiuchi publicly stating that “the idea of having the United States launch our satellites is 
pathetic…We have a strong wish to launch our satellites through research and development in Japan.”23 
 For the STA the offer was also win-win-win because should the transfer, opposed by MOE and ISAS, 
go ahead, then the STA, with its mandate of pushing back scientific frontiers, was the obvious recipient. 
The STA was also in a good position to take advantage of the U.S. offer because of its links with the MPT, 
which was responsible for telecommunications investment and advancement, thus creating a linkage to 
the future need to develop communications satellites. On the other hand, the opposition from ISAS and 
the MOE was also logical. The offer of cooperation was regarded by some, in fact, as something of a 
poisoned chalice; Itokawa and ISAS at first argued with Sato about the need to focus on indigenous 
development of a larger launch vehicle, but, arguably, could find no strong counter to the prospect of the 
leapfrog-shortcut advances that would be enabled by accepting Thor-Delta technology. 
 Then, SAF 6 developed into a challenger SAF during the late 1960s, and coalesced into an active 
SAF in conjunction with the Johnson offer as Keidanren members saw the opportunity for sustained 
long-term investment to develop a new sector and services. The emerging space sector offered a mix of 
government projects leading to commercial spinoffs such as communications satellites. Thus, in 1968, 
Keidanren established the Space Activities Promotion Council (SAPC) to set up an institutionalized 
                                                
22 See Pekkanen & Kallender Umezu (2010), pp. 108-12. The most notable early rockets were in the LS-A series, a 
two-stage rocket, with one liquid and one solid stage that was developed by MHI which was explicitly to make ballistic 
flight observations possible. The LS-A was a sub-orbital version of the Lambda and was launched four times between 
August 1963 and November 1965. Japan then went to make steady but unspectacular progress in developing the LS-B and 
later the LS-C rockets. The LS-C rockets, eight of which were launched between 1968 to 1974, were designed and tested 
for improving satellite launches. 
23 Yasushi Sato, “A Contested Gift of Power: American Assistance to Japan’s Space Launch Vehicle Technology, 1965–
1970,” Historia Scientiarum, Vol. 11, No. 2 (November 2001), pp. 176-204.  
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channel for industry to express its views to improve indigenous technology development and promote 
domestic production.  
 
Formation of the General Space Activities SAF  
Much has been discussed about the original goals of the PPR, and why the administrative structure was 
bifurcated, but the framework settled on in 1969 proves to be logical when viewed through the SAF 
model. As the first major step towards building a more strategic space development policy signaling 
Japan as a spacefaring nation (and thus a member of a highly exclusive club of leading advanced 
economies, and with a view to nurturing another export market and lessening reliance on foreign 
procurement in a new high-tech applications field, the government established the SAC in the Prime 
Minister’s Office in 1968.  
 While establishing the principal of political control, the SAC was given the authority to plan, discuss 
and decide comprehensive space policy. SAC’s decisions were to be submitted to and authorized by the 
prime minster, and once made, SAC’s decisions had also to be respected by the prime minister. In setting 
this administrative and political-policy arrangement, the strategic national technological importance of 
space development was recognized, but at the same time policymaking and strategy was also placed 
under the operational control of the bureaucracy, set one level above the competitive in-ministerial 
jockeying.  
 The decision to accept the U.S. offer was sealed in July 1969, in which the U.S. committed to 
exporting unclassified Thor-Delta technology for the development of Japan’s N-series launch vehicles 
and communications satellites, if used for peaceful purposes, and if re-entry technologies applicable to 
ICBM usage were excluded.24 This let the other pieces of the jigsaw fall into place with the formation of 
the policy and administrative structure that remained until 2001. The settlement included a clear 
normative and administrative framework, in the form of the PPR, which was designed to echo the earlier 
commitments of the three non-nuclear principles.  
 Regarding SAFs 1-3 and 8, the PPR fulfilled multiple objectives in satisfying both the needs of 
alliance management, the political left, Kōmeitō, and public opinion. To further cement the principle, 
following the establishment of NASDA under the control of the STA on October 1, 1969, a 
supplementary provision by the Diet stipulated that NASDA’s activities were also to be circumscribed to 
peaceful purposes in the guise of the PPR.25 
 In terms of SAFs 4 & 5, the outcome was as was to be expected. With its inherently advantageous 
position vs. the MOE and ISAS, and/ because space development was regarded as a national strategic 
technology development program whose results could be spun on to industry and society, the STA 
became the implementing agency under SAC, with the MOE, despite its higher ministerial status, left to 
manage its core competency of space science.  
 While the budget and the space science programs of ISAS within the MOE were to be respected and 
integrated as a fundamental part of the comprehensive space policy, the focus was to be on the STA and 
NASDA. The main power relationships of SAFs 4 & 5 were therefore through the SAC-STA-NASDA 
axis, although as the budget and research and technology expanded, following a classic institutional 
                                                
24 Harrison (1996), p. 23.  
25 Uchū Kaihatsu Jigyōdan Hō ni Tai Suru Kokkai no Futai Ketsugi” [Supplementary Resolution by the Diet Concerning 
the National Space Development Agency Law], 13 June 1969. 
  131 
model, ministries accrued a growing subgovermental layer of organizations receiving budgets to research 
and develop all sorts of applications. Because NASDA was the main organization tasked with developing 
satellites and launch vehicles, competitive bidding for complementary budgets and programs that were 
authorized were to be mainly built and launched through NASDA. The SDF, meanwhile, because of the 
PPR, was strictly forbidden from using space.26 
 For SAF 7, this field settlement offered a clear hierarchy for industry, focused on bidding for 
contracts from NASDA. The industry group can be split into three main smaller SAFs; a launch systems 
SAF; a satellite systems SAF; and a support/infrastructure SAF. In the launch systems SAF, a clear 
hierarchy of incumbent vs. challengers was established very early as MHI, with its U.S. license 
agreements became the major contractor for NASDA’s liquid fueled program, while IHI became a 
smaller subsystems provider. Nissan, deeply associated with Itokawa’s group, became Japan’s main solid 
rocket contractor, and also provided auxiliary boosters under license for NASDA launch vehicles. In the 
satellite systems SAF, through the coming decades, contracts were awarded to NASDA on a revolving 
carousel to Melco, NEC Corp. and Toshiba Corp. on the basis of trying to spread competencies around 
the three companies so as to build up the sector.  
 Regarding SAF 8, this, arguably, remained a dormant player in policymaking until the late 1990s 
when public outrage over the Taepodong incident and, following this, increasing public concern about 
North Korea, and then China began to surface. A basic post-1969 General Space Activities SAF could 
look something as in Figure 25. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
26 Aoki (2004), p. 4; Pekkanen & Kallender-Umezu (2010), p. 137. 
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Chapter 7 
Episodes of Contention, Shocks and Strategic Action 1990-1998 
 
Introduction 
This chapter uses the SAF framework to focus on specific episodes of contention that reshaped the 
General Space Activities SAF. The SAF framework approach holds that SAFs are often, even inherently 
ripe for contestation, and that they are dynamic, even when an SAF or SAFs appear to be settled. Given 
the complex interlinkages that exist in and between SAFs, if shocks or changes occur in one part of a 
given SAF, such influences may provoke actions that may well have consequences both in proximate and 
more distant SAFs. For example, if one player or influence initiates a strategic action that upsets the 
stability of one element an SAF, this may ripple through the SAF and then on to other SAFs. The purpose 
of this chapter, then, is to describe a how series of episodes of contention arose within the General Space 
Activities SAF that were to cause a series of innovative and strategic actions (actions-reactions-actions) 
among players, concomitant episodes of contention, and the subsequent rupture of the field, which is 
discussed in the following chapter.  
 
Episodes of Contention, Strategic Action in SAF 2 
One of the findings of this dissertation is that SAF 2 played a major role in both the stressing of the 
General Space Activities SAF, and an indirect role in field settlement in 2015, and that SAF 2 played a 
contributory but not decisive role in the dissolution of the General Space Activities SAF. In fact, U.S. 
actions in SAF 2 combined with the institutional logics of implementing agencies (primarily NASDA and 
JAXA) in SAF 5, and the rational behavior of the business lobby (SAF 7) do much to explain the 
“dual-use” technology approach that comprises Basic Plan 2016 as a workable compromise policy that 
takes into account all the needs, demands, parameters for actions, and behavioral logic of the various 
players.  
 An analysis of the actions of players before, during, and after the Taepodong “shock” suggests that 
rather than being a turning point for Japanese space policy, a “crossing of the Rubicon” towards the 
development of a national space security program, the decisions and actions of players (and, by 
implication, of Japan as a whole) were rather of formalizing and institutionalizing processes that had been 
in train for at least several years previously, and possibly since the early 1990s. On the other hand, the 
series of innovative and strategic actions taken by politicians to try to reorder the administration of space 
activities, covered in the next chapters, initiated fifteen years of episodes of contentions before field 
settlement was reached.  
 This chapter focuses on how SAF 2 provoked strategic action in SAFs 6 and 3, and also indirectly on 
SAF 4. In this, there were several episodes of contention: 1. The refusal to disclose more technical 
information to Japan for the N-II launcher. 2. The impact of the 1990 U.S.-imposed “satellite agreement.” 
3. The budget cuts of the late 1990s, which featured the breakdown of the funding mechanism for SAF 5, 
caused in part by the institutional failure of the incumbent player in SAF 5 (JAXA), which can be 
categorized as SAF 3 exerting strategic action on SAFs 4 and 5. And, 4. The Taepodong overflight, which 
precipitated strategic action by SAF 3 on SAFs 4 and 5. 
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1] Technology Management Contention 
As posed earlier, in terms of diplomatic history or international relations theory, the U.S. role in Japanese 
space policy could be described as one of contested management, with the U.S. emphasizing a control or 
guiding function, and the Japanese side parsing this into the opportunity to spin on autonomously 
developed technologies into new applications (industries). The following analysis looks more closely at 
SAF 2 field formation and dynamism in terms of formation, episodes of contention and strategic action, 
and the impact of these on both proximate and distal fields. 
 So, as noted, the offer of U.S. technological assistance in the late 1960s can be construed as a series 
of linked two-level games. On a bilateral security level (SAF 1), the Johnson Administration’s offer of 
Thor-Delta technology was logical because, if handled correctly, it both forestalled the perceived risk of 
the possibility of Japanese acquisition of ballistic missile technology in addition to Japan’s extant ability 
to produce nuclear weapons. The transfer also asserted a U.S. role in the seminal Japanese space activities 
sector, and the potential of a controlling hand over future technological development. This can be seen in 
terms of the SAF framework as the incumbent (the U.S.) using its social skill and taking strategic action 
to change the rules of the emerging Japanese space program, encompassing the space activities field of 
the bilateral relationship, in order for the U.S. to maintain its dominance in the overall partnership. 
Following this start, SAF 2 behavior has had a series of profound impacts on the General Space Activities 
SAF and has contributed both to contention, strategic action and settlement. 
 In SAF 2, the issue of social skill by the U.S. can also be portrayed as another two-level management 
solution by both helping the LDP and Japan push forward with scientific and technological advancement, 
while also controlling it. For Japan, the import of U.S. technology was a chance to create a new plank of 
cooperation and reassurance in the bilateral relationship, while gaining access to higher level technology 
in a strategic field. In terms of the objective of the U.S. to exercise management of the technology transfer, 
by putting severe restrictions on its use, the restrictions placed on the offer served to flip the perceived 
negativity of Japan initiating a full-blown space development program (due to its military potential) into a 
positive development.  
 This analysis is also useful in demonstrating the close connections that exist between SAF 2 and SAF 
7 in periods of stress or contention, as will be seen in subsequent events. The other SAFs have already 
been discussed. The logic behind the technology transfer translated into exerting control successively and 
managing Japanese technological gains so that they did not compete with U.S. interests, and constraining 
the acquisition by Japan of U.S. missile technology. The mix of expectations and the subsequent sense of 
frustration by the Japanese side later caused a series of interrelated actions and reactions in SAFs 5, 6 and 
4 that were to have profound and long-lasting consequences that rippled along the narrative history of 
Japanese space development through the 1970s and 1980s, and on until today.  
 The severity of the licensing restrictions placed on the offer, with considerable parts of key 
technologies “black boxed” can be seen in subsequent friction between the U.S. and Japanese engineers 
and program managers. The first liquid-engine launch vehicles, the N-I and N-II, used Thor-Delta 
technology, containing ballistic missile technology-derived components. N-I development was largely 
conducted by MHI and the launch vehicle design was based on the Thor-Delta launch vehicle from 
McDonnell Douglas Co., which was equipped with the highly capable MB-3 engine licensed from 
Rockwell/ Rocketdyne. The Thor launch vehicle was a major part of the U.S. Air Force’s early liquid-fuel 
propelled ballistic missile program. The original technologies were derived from the Rocketdyne LR79 
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(liquid oxygen and kerosene) engine, itself derived from the U.S.’s Jupiter and Atlas boosters. The Thor’s 
propulsion system quickly evolved to an MB-3 version used by IRBMs, especially by the United States 
Air Force’s Thor SLV-2. The N-I, launched seven times (all successfully) between 1975-82, enabling 
Japan to loft payloads of just over 100 kg into fairly accurate geostationary orbit. This was actually 
achieved with the launch of the Engineering Test Satellite I (ETS-I/Kiku-1) and lauded as a major 
milestone for Japan, especially since the second stage contained Japanese engineering based on the 
original Q rocket.1 
 The N-II was approved in 1976 so as to enable Japan to lift 350 kg payloads to geostationary orbit. 
The N-II featured nine strap-on solid boosters compared to three for the N-1, a longer first stage with 34 
percent more capacity, and a new engine, the Aerojet AJ10-118FJ for the second stage. The third stage 
was purchased from Thiokol Corp. of the U.S., and then built in Japan. Japan successfully launched all 
eight missions planned.2  
 Up until this point U.S. technology export restrictions required many of the vehicle subassemblies 
and components to be imported pre-assembled.3 Besides forbidding the technology transfer of N-I and 
N-II technology to third parties, U.S. restrictions made some of the technologies associated with the 
licenses classified to such an extent that engineers were not allowed to examine a range of components 
they were assembling. As Tomifumi Godai later noted: “The Delta rocket was originally developed as a 
medium-range missile. Thus, most of its technological information was strictly kept classified, and the 
purchasing country was allowed to import only the finished parts. Because of this, there was an increasing 
number of opinions in Japan in favor of developing domestically engineered rockets even before the first 
N-II rocket was launched.”4  
 The licensing restrictions, then, served to justify Japan to go it alone relatively quickly, in what was 
perhaps an unforeseen consequence by the U.S. The difficulties attached to gaining information for the 
N-II showed Japan that U.S. technology transfer was not providing the level of utility hoped for. This led 
to the decision in 1981 that Japan seek to completely kokusanka (indigenize) rocket technologies with the 
development of the H-I.  
 While kokusanka has remained a fundamental concept in post-war Japanese industrial and science 
policy in a number of strategic areas (notably, for example, integrated circuits, leading to the growth of 
the Japanese semiconductor industry that was from the latter 1980s to cause extreme trade friction with 
the U.S.) the decision was to have profound consequences for Japan’s space program. While the U.S. was 
increasingly concerned about managing Japan’s access to missile technology, NASDA’s mandate – its 
institutional logic – was to push forward science and engineering first and foremost, making sure that 
such technologies were strictly under the PPR. The result was that kokusanka was achieved, but at a high 
cost to the taxpayer, since the resulting rockets, particularly the H-II, were sophisticated to the point that 
they were over-engineered, expensive and impossible to commercialize.  
                                                
1 Following launches were also highly important steps for Japanese space technology with Japan rapidly acquiring the 
ability to launch a geostationary satellite, Engineering Test Satellite II (ETS-II) in 1977. ETS-2, or Kiku-2 established 
Japan as the third country in the world to launch such satellites. The N-1 launched seven engineering satellites between 
1975 and 1982 from a new facility at Tanegashima. 
2 Ryojiro Akiba, Hiroki Matsuo, and Tomifumi Godai, “A History of Japanese Space Launch Vehicles-From the Pencil 
Rocket to the M-V and H-IIA,” paper presented at the Sixth International Symposium, Propulsion for Space 
Transportation for the XXIst Century [AAAF 16_80_P], Versailles, France, 14-16 May 2002, pp. 1-6. 
3 Ibid.  
4 William D. Wray, “Japanese Space Enterprise: The Problem of Autonomous Development,” Pacific Affairs, Vol. 64, No. 
4 (Winter, 1991-1992), pp. 463-488, esp. 478-479; Harvey (2000), pp. 6-33, 52-78, 97-101. 
  135 
 The H-I program set this process in motion. Capable of putting 550 kg payloads into geostationary 
orbit, the 84 percent-Japanese designed and built rocket represented a significant technology jump. It was 
also the result of successful cooperation between MHI, IHI, NAL and ISAS, which resulted in the 
development of Japan’s first cryogenic engine, the LH-2, an extremely efficient, complex and…expensive 
design. On its maiden launch in 1986, the H-I successfully took three payloads into orbit, thereby 
establishing Japan’s ability to handle heavier missions. Between 1987 and 1992, the H-I took an 
additional eight satellites successfully into orbit amid an atmosphere of increasing pride and optimism, 
leading to the belief that the planned successor launch vehicle, the H-II, could compete commercially in 
the international launch market.5 
 The H-II, developed with twin goals of technological autonomy and, ostensibly, commercial service 
entry, succeeded only in the first. While technologically sophisticated with its highly efficient and 
complex engines, the H-II launch cost was about double that of European and U.S. commercial launch 
vehicles. Then, two successive failures in February 1998 and November 1999 (leading to the program’s 
cancellation one flight early) had multiple and disastrous consequences. First, the failures heavily 
damaged both Japan’s hard-won reputation for technological sophistication and reliability, and refocused 
doubts, already raised by successive satellite failures in the 1990s, about NASDA’s institutional and 
engineering competency. Second, the H-II failures also led to the cancellation hard won commercial 
orders for the successor H-IIA, built painstakingly by an industry consortium, with the orders based on 
the H-II’s reliability and the promise that the H-IIA’s launch price would be halved, to commercially 
acceptable levels.6 The two successive launch failures also impacted public opinion amid an atmosphere, 
ramped by the media, of a sense of general malaise in Japan, which had itself began spreading from the 
middle of the 1990s. This pressured opinion in SAF 3 (and elsewhere, in the court of public opinion, and 
in the MOF) that NASDA was undergoing institutional failure, which caused SAF 3 to initiate strategic 
action successively, which will be analyzed below and in Chapter 7.7  
 
2] The 1990 Satellite Agreement 
As has been indicated, the mentor-student relationship that the U.S. constructed in the late 1960s as the 
framework for cooperation between the U.S. and Japan in the arena of space development (and also in 
many other areas) was acceptable for Japan as long as it retained utility in aiding Japanese technological 
and industrial growth. Consequently, as we have seen, Japanese engineers and program managers soon 
became frustrated with the licensing agreement imposed on them for launch vehicle technologies, and 
began to pursue the kokusanka route. A roughly similar scenario emerged in the field of satellite 
                                                
5 Akiba et. al (2001), p. 8. 
6 For this story, see Pekkanen & Kallender Umezu (2010), pp. 77, 122; Paul Kallender, “Peer Reviews Could Reform 
NASDA, Bring Fiscal Change,” Space News, 2-8 February 1998; “Has the Sun Set on Japan's Space Industry,” Tokyo 
(AFP), November 16, 1999.  
 The H-II had a troubled development history. An accident during a test at MHI killed an engineer in August 1991 
but led, after difficulties led to the development of the advanced LE-7 first stage and LE-5 second stage engines, enabling 
the 260-ton H-II it to launch 2-ton payloads despite being only being about half the weight of its rival Ariane-4 and a 
third of the weight of the Proton. But its cost at around $165-$170 million per launch were prohibitive for commercial 
purposes, and the H-II remained captive to Japanese government payloads. The Japanese press lambasted NASDA and 
even the emphasis on lowering costs as main culprits for the failure. It thereby also called into question the future of 
Japan's space program as a whole. 
7 For a discussion of the failures, see Eiichiro Sekigawa and James R. Asker, “Japanese Satellite in Errant Orbit,” 
Aviation Week & Space Technology (hereafter AWST), 5 September 1994; Craig Covault and Eiichio Sekigawa, 
“Japanese H-2 Failure Ruins Satcom Research Mission,” AWST, 2 March 1998; and Paul Kallender, “Japan’s Satellite 
Success Rests on Launch of ETS-7,” Space News, 17 November 1997.  
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development, where U.S. manufacturers were quite content to sell Japan crucial parts and components as 
long as Japan kept its emerging market for satellites and services open to U.S. companies. However, 
difficulties that emerged in the 1980s with U.S. components (particularly apogee kick-motors used to 
maneuver satellites into their final orbits) forced, or gave a reasonable rationale, for Japanese industry to 
press for kokusanka for satellites and related services and technologies.   
 Specifically, in 1979 and 1980, two N-I launches for the experimental communications satellites 
Ayame 1 and 2 failed to reach orbit following malfunctions in the U.S. supplied apogee engines. However, 
the extant technology transfer agreements meant that the U.S. would not disclose technical details of the 
engines, meaning Japanese engineers were unable to determine the cause of the accidents. Then in 1990, 
Japan agreed to accede to a request from United States Trade Representative (USTR) to open up its 
domestic communications satellite market to international bidding – the so-called “satellite agreement.”8 
The effect of the decision directly impacted SAFs 6 and 7, but also indirectly SAF 6 in ways that were to 
have important reverberations later especially in the 2012-13 period when METI made a sustained 
attempt to bend space policy, in the form of Basic Plan 2, to its vision.  
 The satellite agreement, over the long term, made SAF 7 an increasing active challenger in the 
General Space Activities SAF, setting industry on a collision course with the fundamental research and 
development strategy of NASDA, and later, JAXA. In IDOJ, I identified the satellite agreement as one of 
the triggers that caused industry to ask Keidanren to scrap the PPR and create a domestic national security 
applications market, with this “military market” substituting for the failure of Japanese companies in 
Japan’s domestic commercial satellite broadcasting market. In other words, the satellite agreement played 
a major role in provoking innovative and strategic action by industry and policymakers to create a 
domestic market based on national security needs, i.e. with the fundamental orientation moving from the 
(commercial) market to the military.  
 Since the implied objective of the space development model of 1969 was based on the logic of 
“catch-up” until Japan was in a position to compete in the commercial space applications market, mainly 
for communications satellites, the 1990 satellite agreement had a profound impact. Until that point, 
sustained government investment in NASDA through the 1970s and the 1980s had focused on developing 
increasingly capable satellite and rocket technologies that were, when they were ready (and at least in 
theory), to be spun on to industry. The first market to justify sustained continued investment would be 
Japan’s domestic communications, broadcasting and applications market, with domestic satellite makers 
to use the technologies developed in conjunction with NASDA and other subgovernment organizations as 
a springboard to kokusanka.  
 The idea was that, sheltering under this protected market, Japan could then sell to itself. Then, given 
the extra investments and profits made through this, Japanese satellite makers could then consider an 
assault on the international market. Even if that was not possible, the internal domestic procurement 
market would at least ensure a stable series of investment, purchases, production and sales contracts that 
would sustain industry, particularly Melco, NEC and Toshiba.9 While this view remains fundamentally 
valid, a reinterpretation through the SAF framework better contextualizes the impact of the shock of the 
satellite agreement through the different fields as one of the episodes of contention leading to field 
                                                
8 Pekkanen & Kallender-Umezu (2010), pp. 78-81.  
9 The argument that the pressure of industrial interests on space policy, combined with realist pressures for Japan to scrap 
the PPR in the face of security threats and this recognition in political circles combined to create the fundamental 
rationale for the Basic Law was the basic premise of Pekkanen & Kallender-Umezu (2010).  
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settlement in Basic Plan 2016. Through the lens of the SAF framework, this shock can be characterized 
as follows. 
 SAF 2 characteristics and contentions: The satellite agreement can be seen in a number of ways. In 
terms of the incumbent, the U.S., through its industrial lobby of aerospace and space companies, was 
alarmed by the potential of Japan as a rising challenger and potential competitor in a growing space 
applications market. A second level of interpretation could construe the agreement as part of a 
longstanding effort by the U.S. for Japan to open its protected domestic procurement markets to more U.S. 
products, and one of the opening salvos in marked and increasing pressures by the U.S. through the early 
and mid-1990s on a number of fronts for Japan to open up its markets to U.S. competition. Some of these 
have been covered in great detail through two-level games analysis by Schoppa, for example, as 
mentioned in Chapter 2.  
 SAF 6 characteristics and contentions: By 1990, the three Japanese satellite makers – Melco, NEC 
and Toshiba – with technologies nurtured initially with transfer agreements from U.S. partners and 
through work with NASDA, were taking aim at both Japan’s domestic satellite applications market and, 
potentially, make inroads into the global market. Let’s quickly look at these players.  
 After it entered the space market in 1966 working with TRW, in 1969, Melco was chosen as the 
prime contractor for Japan’s first working satellite for ionosphere sounding, and built Japan’s first 
domestically produced communications satellite (CS-2A/B/ Sakura-2a/b) in 1983 and CS-3a/b in 1988. 
Melco then subsequently built Japan’s first large-scale EO satellite, the Earth resources satellite 
(JERS-1/Fuyo-1) in 1985. NEC’s roots were even deeper, with the company delivering a rocket telemetry 
transmitter-receiver system to a lab at the University of Tokyo back in 1956. In 1969, NEC established a 
Yokohama plant for its space business, building Japan’s first satellite Ohsumi, Japan’s first geostationary 
weather satellite, GMS/Himawari, in 1977, and then Japan’s first broadcasting satellite, BS-1/Yuri-a in 
1978. For its part, Toshiba built the ETS-III, BS-2A/Yuri-2a, BS-2B/Yuri-2b, broadcasting satellites, but, 
unfortunately, also an early record of failure with its BS satellites series in the 1980s, which were 
constructed with the help of General Electric (GE). The principal customer for these satellites was Nippon 
Hōsō Kyōkai (NHK). A variety of malfunctions plagued the BS-2A, and although Toshiba and GE were 
favored by NASDA to develop the next generation BS-3 series, NHK opposed the move, and the 
follow-on contract then went to NEC.10  
 Fast-forwarding to the 1990s, however, the direct impact of the satellite agreement was immediate 
and devastating for the three companies, which lost what was to emerge as a two-decade, 20+ satellite 
domestic procurement market to U.S. rivals. Because of the satellite agreement, in 1990, NHK chose GE 
to build its next Yuri (BS-3A) and BS-3H satellites, which would have gone to either NEC or Toshiba. 
Then, NASDA had planned a CS-4 project for communications satellites for NTT to serve the growing 
market for 1995 onwards, which would likely have gone to Melco, but this was again cancelled in 1990, 
with the satellites in that series replaced by the N-STAR satellites built by U.S. suppliers.11 
 From that point (1990) until 2005, around 25 satellites for communications and broadcasting were 
procured from the U.S. from a range of Japanese applications users, including NHK, and by the 
burgeoning digital satellite broadcasting market that emerged from the second half of the 1990s. This 
                                                
10 This paragraph is a summary of an overview of the three companies in Pekkanen & Kallender-Umezu (2010), pp. 
79-92. 
11 Michael Cross, “Japan drops satellite programme under US pressure,” New Scientist Print Edition, 31 March 1990; 
Michael Cross, “Space - Japan's new frontier,” New Scientist Print Edition, 21 April 1990. 
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barren market prevailed for fifteen years until finally Melco secured its first ever order for a 
communications satellite for one of its keiretsu affiliates, Space Communications Corporation, in 2005, 
using a bus system designed for a “research and development” communications satellite for JAXA, the 
DRTS/Kodama.12  
 Industry response to the impact of the satellite agreement and the loss of the NASDA springboard 
was rational. From the mid-1990s, Keidanren stepped up its lobbying for increased budgets and 
investment, while key members led by MHI, Melco, NEC and Toshiba, supported by IHI, worked 
extremely hard to use what technologies they had developed through the government procurement market 
to enter the commercial market. In 1996, Keidanren requested huge budgetary increases for space 
development, suggesting about ¥7 trillion in funding for space-related activities to cover space projects 
over the next fifteen years.13  
 At the same time, Melco, NEC and Toshiba switched strategies. Regarding the external market, the 
strategy was based on one major objective: to make the leap from being subsystems and components 
suppliers, which they had become successful at, to the ability to integrate and build complete systems, 
which in industry parlance meant winning prime contractorships for satellite systems, specifically a huge 
number of global communications constellations that were being proposed at the time. 
 Regarding SAF 4, satellite makers strongly supported a plethora of proposals for advanced 
communications and EO systems to substitute for the loss of the domestic commercial market (see below). 
Through the mid-late 1990s, all three companies made bullish (in fact wildly optimistic in some cases) 
press statements about their proposed or impending participation in a series of global communications 
constellations, and pushed forwards with investments in them. But when the market for these 
constellations disappeared after 1998 with the global glut of trunk fiber optical systems providing cheaper 
alternatives, the satellite makers were left with very little. Specifically, the collapse of several deals and 
stalled orders for a reduced NASDA market (again, see below) forced the consolidation of NEC’s and 
Toshiba’s space systems divisions, with NEC’s problems exacerbated by a major scandal when the 
company, desperate for profits from JDA and NASDA contracts, was found to have engaged in 
systematic padding.14  
                                                
12 Ellis S. Krauss, Broadcasting Politics in Japan: NHK and Television News (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
2000), p. 181; Melco, “Mitsubishi Electric Receives Order for Superbird 7 Communications Satellite from Space 
Communications Corporation,” press release No. 2373, 1 November 2005; Paul Kallender-Umezu, “Mitsubishi Electric 
to Build Superbird-7 for SCC—Deal is Japanese Maker’s First Domestic Commercial Satellite Contract,” Space News, 7 
November 2005.  
13 Nippon Keidanren, “Kokumin Seikatsu no Shitsu Kōjō ni Shi Suru Uchū Kaihatsu no Suishin o Yōbō” [A Call for 
Space Budget Increase—Improving Our Quality of Life on Earth], 21 June 1995. 
14 For example, NEC took aim at the Intermediate Circular Orbit (ICO) consortium and won orders for ground 
infrastructure and satellite phones and at the Teledesic “Internet in the Sky” global constellation proposed by Bill Gates, 
which at one point posited needing up to 840 satellites. But both business evaporated. Toshiba invested in building up its 
satellite facilities in 1997 and took aim at the 64 satellite Skybridge broadband communications constellation proposed by 
Alcatel as a direct rival to Teledesic, but failed in its bid, with the Skybridge proposal later collapsing due to lack of 
demand for satellites. Melco took a more cautious approach, heavily investing in its Kamakura factory, but was sustained 
by winning orders for the IGS constellation in 1998. In 1997 top NEC officials expressed confidence that the company 
was number one in Japanese space business and likely to become a top ten player in the global space business.  
 See, for example, Paul Kallender, “Interview with Hiroaki Shimayama, senior vice president, NEC Corporation,” 
reprinted in Newsmaker Forum, Space News, 14-20 April 1997; Paul Kallender, “Japanese Firms Poised to Enter World 
Markets,” Space News, 4 August 1997. On ICO Global Communications, see generally “Inmarsat Affiliate to Operate 
Medium-Altitude Satellite System,” AWST, 23 May 1994, p. 58; Bruce D. Nordwall, “Inmarsat Is Changing,” AWST, 23 
January 1995, p. 56; Joseph C. Anselmo, “Hughes Has Selected Launch Providers,” AWST, 4 November 1996, p. 92; 
James R. Asker, “Satellite Markets,” AWST, 1 December 1997, p. 21; Anthony L. Velocci, Jr., “Market Focus,” AWST, 2 
November 1998, p. 13; Bruce A. Smith, “Tough Times Ahead?” AWST, 29 March 1999, p. 23. NEC, “NEC Wins Ground 
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 Melco was partially insulated from all this. In the late 1990s, Melco’s space systems president Ichiro 
Taniguchi made it his life’s goal that Melco would enter the global satellite market. Melco in 1998 won 
the contract for IGS satellites, ensuring regular business for the coming decades, enabling it to become 
Japan’s primary satellite builder.15 In fact, as is shown later, the Melco-IGS development model became a 
flagship experiment towards a new working relationship between industry and government. In IDOJ, the 
IDG program was seen as the first stage, or template, for the switch to creating a domestic military 
applications market. In this dissertation, this transformation is characterized in terms of the government 
providing a national security market to sustain industry, which became formalized as strategic policy goal 
in the Basic Law, and became a major assumption in the basic working model behind Basic Plan 1 
onwards. In this light, the award of the IGS contract to Melco became the harbinger of the later domestic 
national security procurement market, of which the QZSS is now a main pillar.   
 The loss of the IGS contract to Melco also served to severely damage NEC, which had been 
successively injured by a series of earlier satellite failures and was unable to secure a sufficient range of 
tested technologies to build the sorts of larger satellite frames necessary to compete in commercial 
communications and broadcastings applications markets. This, in turn, as will be seen in Chapters 8 and 9, 
caused METI to push heavily to support NEC (which became a challenger to Melco’s incumbent 
position) as METI itself became a challenger to MEXT. Supporting NEC was also logical as part of 
METI’s industrial policy of supporting a viable and competitive space industry, which also seek to 
avoiding the development of a monopoly controlled by the Mitsubishi group.16  
 Mainly due to the satellite agreement and various subsequent impacts, including the budget cuts of 
the late 1990s that are explained in following section, according to one estimate, Japan’s space business 
shrunk by nearly 40 percent in the decade to 2005, and the number employed in the space industry fell by 
a third. By the close of the 1990s, Japanese industry was sufficiently concerned by the state of the space 
industry, once seen as so promising, that executives went public with their demands for increased 
funding. 
 However, overall, in terms of the SAF framework approach, it can be concluded that the experiences 
of the 1990s served to change the behavioral (and business) logic of players in SAF 6 into challengers in 
the form of aggressively lobbying for the revision or abandonment of the PPR, support for the Basic Law, 
                                                                                                                                                        
Systems Order for Global Mobile Satellite Communications Network,” press release, 3 March 1997, and also NEC, 
“ICO’s Handset Orders Go to NEC,” press release, 25 June 1998; NEC, “ICO System TT&C RFT Hand-Over,” press 
release, 15 October 1998; Paul Kallender, “NEC Aims New Satellite Platform at Teledesic,” Space News, 9 March 1998. 
“TRW Has Filed a Lawsuit,” AWST, 20 May 1996, p. 21; Michael A. Taverna, “ICO Stock Shortfall Raises New 
Questions,” AWST, 14 June 1999, p. 90; Joseph C. Anselmo, “ICO Faces Long Climb Out of Bankruptcy,” AWST, 6 
September 1999, p. 29; “The Former ICO Global Communications Emerged from Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Protection,” 
AWST, 22 May 2000, p. 20; Bruce A. Smith, “ICO Investments,” AWST, 17 July 2000, p. 23; Bruce A. Smith, “Merger 
Off,” AWST, 12 November 2001, p. 17; and Frank Morring, Jr., “Teledesic Pulls the Plug,” AWST, 7 October 2002, p. 46; 
Paul Kallender, “NASDA Bars NEC from Competing for New Awards,” Space News, 16 November 1998; “NEC 
Suspected of Cheating NASDA,” The Daily Yomiuri, 7 November 1998; “NEC to Calculate Refund Owed to Defense 
Agency, NASDA,” Japan Times, 19 November 1998. For an overview of Toshiba’s troubles, see “Loss of Satellite 
Sparks Complaint by Japan,” AWST, 21 May 1984; “Japan Broadcaster Wants Space Agency to Guarantee Satellite,” 
AWST, 7 July 1986; “Toshiba to Supply Space Systems/Loral with Satellite Solar Array Panels,” press release, 17 
November 1997. 
15 Melco, “Mitsubishi Electric Completes Japan’s Largest Privately-Owned Satellite Assembly and Testing Plant,” press 
release No. 0487, 29 October 1999. 
16 However, before this happened, Melco was later found to have engaged in multi-decade systematic padding of its 
NASDA/JAXA, IGS and MOD space and defense contracts, pointing to more fundamental difficulties for industry 
working for government in this sector. See Paul Kallender-Umezu, “Probe uncovers 40-year Japanese Contractor Fraud,” 
Defense News, 29 October 2012; Paul Kallender-Umezu,” Japan Still Calculating Cost of Defense Firm’s Padded Bills,” 
Defense News, 5 November 2012.  
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and for investment in a domestic security market. This challenger behavior was to play a major role in 
successive episodes of contention over the following decade.17 In this light, the actions by industry in 
SAF 6 appear constant and logical, with this SAF becoming a major contributory factor to pushing for a 
relaxation of the PPR in order to create a domestic procurement market for national security goals.18  
 
3] Budget Cuts of the Late 1990s 
SAFs 4 and 5 characteristics and contentions: The satellite agreement had a broad and catastrophic impact 
on SAFs 4 and 5, which eventually contributed to institutional failure by NASDA and the emergence of 
MITI as a challenger against the incumbent players in the form of the STA and NASDA. In this scenario, 
two decisive shocks had long-reaching consequences. Because of the satellite agreement, NASDA saw a 
good deal of its rationale to provide technologies that could be spun on to a closed Japanese domestic 
market severely undermined. NASDA faced the need to find a new rationale for development. NASDA’s 
institutional logic meant that it had no choice but to pursue increasingly challenging technological 
development, i.e. pushing the envelope as far as it could. 
 Following the cancellation of CS-4, NASDA was forced to develop only R&D satellites, which was 
to prove extremely problematical. This was because the NASDA development model was already long, 
painstaking, and bureaucratic. And this, in turn, was partly because of the difficulties of the new 
technologies required careful planning and testing. NASDA’s bureaucratic development system involved 
a complex procurement and building process that took up to seven years from initial design to launch. 
This process also gave makers little scope for profit. The long process also put further pressure on 
developers to try to leapfrog technologies, further increasing the risk of failure and the complexities 
involved.  
 The result of this hothousing was a series of satellites and systems that were to test advanced – 
sometimes highly advanced technologies – that might, if they had not failed or been delayed, have helped 
Japanese industry compete in the global commercial market. Overall, NASDA’s technological base and 
progress can be said to have been insufficient to have given industry the tools it needed to compete 
commercially. As noted previously, these failures did grievous damage to NEC and Toshiba. 
 The next shock was the decision by the MOF, under political pressure from, and in agreement with 
SAF 3, to stop raising the general space activities budget.  
 Through the early to mid-1990s, STA and NASDA and other players in SAF 4 and 5, amid rising 
budgets, coordinated with SAC to find ever-new non-military science and research projects to sustain 
funding. In this, the MPT became an increasingly important player (contender) through its 
Communications Research Laboratory (CRL). In addition the 1970s also saw a proliferation of a whole 
new layer of space development, research and implementation-related subgovernment organizations. The 
rising tide of budget floated more and more boats. This resulted in the MPT and the CRL becoming an 
increasingly ambitious players and challengers. This growth, and growth in ambition, and sense of 
entitlement by the MPT also resulted in a long series of requests for investment in massive and 
complicated programs by the MPT and its successors that continued through the following decade as the 
MPT (later the MHPT, then the MIC) proposed a series of ambitious orbital constellations of 
                                                
17 Keiji Tachikawa, “JAXA Vision—JAXA 2025, presentation to the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Japan, Tokyo, 28 
April 2005; Paul Kallender, “Japan Takes on Europe, U.S., Public Cash Infusion for Satellite Component Makers,” Space 
News, 23-29 March 1998.  
18 Samuels (1996), pp. 77-78; Pekkanen & Kallender-Umezu (2010). 
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communications satellites and successively more advanced communications and broadcasting 
technologies.   
 On the other hand, much of this planning, and efforts to get publicly funded communications and 
relatively high-resolution EO constellations into SAC’s Fundamental Plans were sabotaged by the 
combination of launch and satellite failures already mentioned. In addition, many were rejected by 
realistic appraisals by SAC acting as a responsible governance unit, and then impacted again by the flat 
budgets from 1996 onwards.19 
 On the expectation of continuing budget increases continuing through to the 2000s, NASDA had 
drawn up plans for an ambitious range of programs that would have seen Japan developing, for example, 
its own space shuttle to be based on the H-II Orbiting Plane-Experimental (HOPE-X) reusable orbital 
plane. However, successive failures in key programs, including the highly advanced ETS-VI/Kiku-6 
satellite and COMETS test satellites, which would have given NEC key next-generation communications 
technologies (the former when an apogee engine failed [again], the later through an H-II failure), and 
other high profile problems created severe reputational damage to NASDA.20  
 Nevertheless, the early 1990s had seen steadily rising space budgets, based on momentum built up 
during the 1980s.21 By as late as the beginning of 1996, NASDA was looking toward at least, on average, 
                                                
19 This was particularly seen, for example, through proposals such as the World Environment and Disaster Observation 
Satellite System and Global Observation Satellite System WEDOS/GDOS. For much of the mid-to-late 1990s Japan was 
awash with proposals to build a constellation of EO satellites for both environmental monitoring and disaster mitigation, 
mainly led through NEC, SJAC and CRL from 1987, and taken onboard by SJAC in 1989 to provide a constellation to 
provide continual environmental monitoring. Feasibility studies were conducted, in particular a 29-member mission to 
assess the needs of such a system for the Asia Pacific Region led by NEC officials, SJAC, MITI and, Keidanren, and 
executives and engineers from Toshiba, Melco, and NASDA, among other companies and organizations. After visiting 
various government agencies and laboratories, including 15 administrative and 16 research organizations around the 
region, unsurprisingly enough, perhaps, the committee concluded that an observation system deploying (Japanese built) 
satellites with 2-meter resolution infrared sensors and 5-meter resolution radars should be built.  
 By 1997 the proposal had morphed into a huge proposition that would have worked under U.N. auspices with the 
U.S. to include a disaster management and observation component, a regional satellite communications system, the 
development of small satellite technologies to support them. The main proposal to build 26 EO satellites in LEO with 6 
GEO data satellites to provide 2-meter resolution. For these projects, see, for example, “Proposal for an International 
Concept toward the 21st Century WEDOS World Environment and Disaster Observation System, Summary Report of 
East Asia Mission,” published by SJAC in October 1994; 1996 Workshop Report of the Japan-U.S. Science, Technology 
& Space Applications Program (JUSTAP), revised November 1997, p. 3, held by the author. 
 By the late 1990s NEC had published at least a dozen scholarly papers on the constellation. Typical examples are, T. 
Kuroda, T. Orii (Assistant General Manager, Space Systems Division NEC Corporation, S. Koizumi, Chief Engineer, 
Space Systems Division, NEC Corporation, “Concept of Global Disaster Observation Satellite System (GDOS) and 
Measures to Be Taken for its Realization,” IAF-9-C.3.03, 48th International Astronautical Congress, 6-10 October 1997, 
Turin Italy; Takaji Kuroda, Takeshi Orii, Shinkichi Koizumi, “Concept of Global Disaster Observation Satellite System 
(GDOS) and Measures to Be Taken for its Realization,” Acta Astronautica, Vol. 41, Nos. 4-10 (1997), pp. 537-549. 
20 See above footnote. In 1994 the ETS-VI, a highly advanced communications satellite which would have given Japanese 
companies a chance to develop commercial models was placed into an incorrect orbit. In 1996 Japan’s prototype, 
unmanned space shuttle development test model Hyflex sunk in the ocean when its flotation device failed, leading to the 
eventual cancellation of the program by the MOF. Then in 1997, ADEOS/Midori a flagship Earth observation satellite 
designed to showcase Japan’s global environmental contribution with a vast array of sensors and international 
contributions from NASA and Europe failed on orbit when the glue holding its solar array together failed. The following 
year, in 1988, another major communications test satellite, COMETS, the successor to ETS-VI was then injected into the 
wrong orbit by a second stage failure of the H-II. As noted above, the H-II, which was supposed to be Japan’s first 
commercial launch vehicle in 1999, then suffered a second launch failure in a row, destroying a major weather and 
international aviation control satellite, and was cancelled, while launch contracts for its successor from two major U.S. 
satellite makers were cancelled. 
21 Craig Cobalt, “Japan’s Growing Space Effort: Japan Challenging Western Leadership in Space,” AWST, 14 July 1986, 
p. 18; Roy Garner, “How Japan Is Finding Space for Private Enterprise,” Financial Times, 7 April 1988; “Advanced 
Technology Moves Japan Toward Launcher Market,” AWST, 9 March 1987, p. 132; Eiichiro Sekigawa, “Japan Boosts 
Budget for Space by 7.2%,” AWST, 7 March 1994, p. 23; Eiichiro Sekigawa, “Japan Approves $2 Billion in Space 
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10 percent per annum increases in its budget, perhaps highlighting the disconnect between NASDA and 
political and public sentiment.22 By the second half of the 1990s, it seemed to many observers that the 
confidence of the bureaucratic-dominated postwar development model that had, overall, helped deliver so 
many successes until the end of the 1980s, had run its course, as noted in Chapter 2, as Japan was rocked 
with a series of bureaucratic, financial and corporate scandals following the collapse of the real estate 
bubble, then a series of ministerial scandals encompassing the jūsen scandal and other issues such as the 
Ministry of Health and Welfare being found out when it tried to cover up its responsibility for allowing 
the import of HIV-infected blood. Japan it seemed, was facing structural economic issues, societal ills, 
and a crisis of government highlighted in the poor handling of the 1995 Kobe earthquake.23 
 In this light, NASDA’s performance in particular, and the necessity of maintaining ever-rising space 
activities budgets that could not be spun on into industrial and commercial gains, came into question, 
especially against a backdrop of rising Sovereign Debt, which passed ¥200 trillion in 1994 and doubled to 
¥427 trillion in 1998.24 This led Prime Minster Hashimoto to immediately find cost savings, and longer 
term, to try to rationalize the central bureaucracy. While SAF 3’s impact on SAFs 6 and 7 was to be the 
strongest strategic action on the General Space Activities SAF, and the analysis of it will form the final 
section of Part 2 of this chapter, the decision by the MOF that high single-digit or double digit annual 
budget creases were no longer sustainable, was a profound shock.  
 By 1996, the MOF, mindful of the public mood and facing severe pressure to cut spending, using 
NASDA’s string of expensive and high-profile failures as evidence, restructured the budget to nominal 1 
percent rises – a situation that remained until 2009. Along with technological problems, this action 
directly caused the delay or cancellation of many programs into the 2000s, causing further pain for 
industry.  
 Thus, in 1996 the total space activities budgets began to be curtailed, just at the same point when 
increased investments were needed to complete the new ambitious programs such as the HOPE-X. The 
space budget for fiscal year 1996 grew just 1.2 percent over that of 1995. For the fiscal year beginning 
April 1997, SAC put forward a 6.5 percent funding increase. Instead, NASDA received 1.7 percent and 
ISAS a 0.36 percent increase. In fiscal 1998, the space activities budget rose only about 1.4 percent over 
the previous year. 
 These cutbacks cumulatively led to the scaling back and delay of a slew of programs, including the 
Engineering Test Satellite-VIII/Kiku-8 (designed to give Melco satellite to portable phone 
communications capabilities for that market) the Solar X-ray Observing Satellite (Solar-B), the Advanced 
Land Observing Satellite (ALOS/Daichi), the OICETS (Kirari) laser communications satellite for NEC, 
                                                                                                                                                        
Agency Spending,” AWST, 18 March 1996 p. 58; Eiichiro Sekigawa, “Japan Seeks 6.5% Boost in Space Budget,” AWST, 
7 October 1996, p. 73. 
22 See comments by the former president of NASDA in “Newsmaker Forum: Takashi Matsui,” Space News, 8 January 
1996.  
23 Of all these the jūsen issue had captured the public’s attention due to the fact that seven housing loan companies had 
been allowed under the MOF to rack up ¥13.2 trillion in debts, while by 1998 the MOJ had conservatively put the extent 
of total bad loans in Japan amounting to ¥77 trillion, or approximately 14 percent of total domestic loans. Tomohito 
Shinoda, Contemporary Japanese Politics, Institutional Changes and Power Shifts (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2013), pp. 58-65. 
24 See Suzuki (2008).  
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and the SELENE (Selenological and Engineering Explorer/Kaguya) moon mission. The HOPE unmanned 
shuttle program was cancelled outright.25 
 
4] The Taepodong “Shock” 
Japan’s decision in 1998 to launch the IGS program is now analyzed from the point of the SAF 
framework to show that actions of Japan as a whole were entirely logical from the point of view of each 
SAF. Evidence shows that the overflight acted more as a “trigger,” or at least threw open a door to 
institutionalize, and to provide a funding and development framework to meet a long-growing demand for 
better and independent ISR capabilities, built on pressure from industry, the intelligence community, and, 
not least, the JDA.26 
 The main feature of the IGS program in terms of the SAF framework is the strong entry of SAF 3 in 
the form of activist political leadership that sought to cut through the possibility of bureaucratic 
entanglements, and the speed with which SAF 5 players fell into line, making sure that as many of the 
players were rewarded as possible. A sequential analysis of key movements, events and policies before 
and after the 31 August overflight is as follows: 
 
Table 4: Timetable of Decisions Before and After the 31 August 1998 Taepodong “Shock” 
 
 Year/Date  Event 
1984 SDF submits a budget for ¥70 million for acquisition of commercial remote sensing satellite images. 
Successive budgets grow to reach ¥8.87 billion in 1998.27 
05 February 1985 “Unified view” by the government that JDA could gain access to commercial satellite imagery and use 
commercial transponders for communications.28 
1985 JDA begins purchasing images from Landsat satellites focusing on the Soviet-held Northern 
Territories.29 
1987 JDA starts purchasing SPOT (French commercial imagery satellite) data.30 
1987 Japan starts monitoring Chinese activities in the South China Sea.31 
17 January 1991 Operation Desert Storm (combat phase ends 28 February 1991).  
                                                
25 Eiichiro Sekigawa, “Japan Forced to Cut Hope, Other Programs,” AWST, 4 August 1997, p. 28; Paul Kallender, “Japan 
Suspends Projects Due to Budget Proposal,” Space News, 3 February 1997; Paul Kallender, “Japan Cuts Spending: Hope 
Killed,” Space News, 21-27 July 1997; Paul Kallender, “Solar-B, Shuttle Denied Full Development Funding,” Space 
News, 12 January 1998; Gilbert Kirkham, “Japan’s Space Budget Request for JFY98: Little Change for Now,” Report 
Memorandum #98-04, Tokyo: National Science Foundation, 19 February 1998. 
26 For an overall analysis of the IGS see Johnson-Freese and Gatlin (2004), pp. 538-552; Oros (2007), pp. 29-48; Oros 
(2008), pp. 139–146; Hughes (2004), pp. 85-88; Hughes (2009), p. 198; Federation of American Scientists (FAS), “Space 
Policy Project/World Space Guide—Japan: Information Gathering Satellites—Imagery Intelligence,” available online at 
www.fas.org; Paul Kallender, “Lurching into Military Space, Japan Rushes to Develop Spy Satellites,” ACCJ Journal, 
March 1999; Paul Kallender, “Japan Considers Spy Satellite in Response to N. Korea,” Space News, 14 September 1998; 
Paul Kallender, “Firms Vie to Win Japan’s Biggest Satellite Deal,” Space News, 8 February 1999; Paul Kallender, “Spy 
Satellite Launch Marks New Era for Japan in Space,” Space News, 9 April 2003; and Paul Kallender, “Japan Aims for 
Operational Military Space Systems by 2006,” Space News, 2 September 2003. 
27 Aoki (2004), p. 4. 
28 Ibid, p. 4. 
29 “Jieitai no Eisei Riyo, Honkakuka; Supabado-B Tosai no Chukeiki 7 gatsu Kado” [SDF Use of Satellites Taking Shape; 
Transponder on Superbird-B Operational from July], Asahi Shimbun, 31 May 1992. 
30 Shunji Taoka, “Japan’s Turning Point Toward Spy Satellites and Information Independence; Decision Made to Launch 
Satellites in Four Years,” Area, 11 January 1999, pp. 46-80.  
31 No author, “Chugoku ga Seisanshoto ni Wan mo Kensetsu, Nanshoto de no Sakusen Yoi ni, Yomuri Shimbunsha ga 
Eisei Shashin wo Nyusu” [China Constructs Port on Paracel Island, Allows for Easy Operation in Spratley Islands; 
Yomiuri Receives Satellite Photos], Yomiuri Shimbun, 21 August 1993, p.4. 
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1991 Cabinet Intelligence Research Office (CIRO) is reported to have begun a study into the possibility of 
building a domestically developed, independent reconnaissance satellite capability.34 
06 March 1991 Commenting on Japan’s intelligence capabilities, MOFA Minister Taro Nakayama expresses support 
for the idea of Japan building its own reconnaissance satellite ability to the House of Representatives’ 
Foreign Affairs Committee, likening such a constellation as a gaikō eisei (“diplomatic satellites”).32 
May 1993  North Korea test launches Nodong missiles into the Sea of Japan. 
21 August 1993 Yomiuri Shimbun publishes images shown to it by a JDA official of a Chinese airfield and port 
construction on the Paracel Islands taken from NASDA’s Maritime Observation Satellite (MOS) 
satellite, revealing that the JDA has been using MOS images to monitor the Chinese military since at 
least 1985.33 
January 1994  The JDA Defense Policy Bureau finalizes a classified report “Outline for Photo-Reconnaissance 
Satellites,” examining the possibility of building an indigenous capability with the help of MHI, Melco, 
NEC and Toshiba, using the H-II or a future launcher at a total cost of up to ¥1 trillion. The report is 
leaked to the Mainichi Shimbun in August 1994 as the JDA was completing its next five-year MTDP.35 
August 1994 The Higuchi Report recommends that Japan should start building up its C4I capabilities, investigate a 
missile defense system, and incorporate mid-air refueling capabilities.  
Summer 1994  The Japan Socialist Party-led administration, which had spent the postwar era contesting the 
constitutionality of the JDA shelves this policy. 
January 1996 Return to power of the LDP under Ryūtarō Hashimoto. 
15 May 1996 The LDP Research Commission on Foreign Affairs and Research Commission on Security begins joint 
meetings on introducing an indigenous reconnaissance satellite capability. Meetings are attended my 
officials from MOFA, the JDA and NEC. NEC costs a two-satellite system based on technologies used 
on its ALOS satellite for NASDA with 30-cm resolution sensors, along with ground facilities, at ¥210 
billion.36  
Summer 1996 MOFA requests a ¥5.24 million investigation budget to review Japan’s options for independent 
reconnaissance satellites.37 
4 January 1997 The Defense Intelligence Headquarters (DIH) is established with an imagery analysis division.38 
August 1998 The SDF starts close monitoring the North Korean launch site in advance of an expected test of the 
Taepodong-1 missile. Japanese officials meet North Korean representatives in Beijing, urging them to 
refrain from conducting the test, which is subsequently tracked by a MSDF Aegis missile destroyer 
deployed to monitor the event.39 
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37 Sunohara (2005), p. 22 quotes a figure of about $50,000 in MOFA’s 1997-1998 budget allocated for the study of 
“international Information Gathering Satellites.” 
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15 August 1998 NEC submits a second study, proposing an initial three-satellite system with two reconnaissance and 
one data relay satellite for an initial cost of ¥210 billion.40 
25 August 1998 Melco President Ichiro Taniguchi presents a ¥210 billion, four-satellite system based on two optical and 
two radar satellites using improved versions of Melco’s MOS satellites to the LDP’s Science, 
Technology, and Information Roundtable Discussion.41 The U.S. reportedly offers satellites to Japan.42 
31 August 1998  Taepodong launched, overflies Japan 
06 September 1998 LDP Secretary General Yoshiro Mori and Takashi Fukaya, Chairman of the LDP’s executive council 
appear on TV independently discussing Japan’s reaction to the Taepodong overflight. Fukaya suggests 
Japan should launch spy satellites and work with the U.S. on BMD. Mori replies that the LDP was 
sending Tokuichiro Tamazawa, head of the LDP’s Research Commission on National Security and 
Taro Nakayama, head of the LDP’s Research Commission on Foreign Affairs, to the U.S. to discuss 
Japan’s reaction. The JDA Director General appears in several TV interviews saying that the SDF 
should be allowed to use satellites to gather intelligence, proposing that Japan should launch a 
“multi-purpose satellite system.”43  
The ALOS EO satellite being developed by NEC for NASDA rapidly emerges as a candidate reference 
design at the STA, and a senior NASDA engineer says that redeveloping ALOS for sharper resolution 
would not pose great difficulties.  
A consensus emerges in the LDP that Japan should push development of BMD and it is decided that 
Nakayama and Tamazawa, head to the U.S.44 Even at this point there is talk of developing 1-meter class 
optical sensor technology and infrared missile plume EW sensors. A U.S. official tells the author that 
the U.S. quickly released photos and intelligence to the JDA on the Taepodong launch, while a general 
at the SDF disputes this, saying, “Japan feels it has no eyes, and that’s the reason why we are pressing 
for (reconnaissance) satellite development.”45  
08-09 September Yukio Hatoyama, deputy leader of the Democratic Party, announces that the PPR would allow for the 
development and use of reconnaissance satellites, echoing comments from Chief Cabinet Secretary 
Hiromu Nonaka.  
On September 8, STA director General Yutaka Takeyama states that the agency wants to play a role in 
any new reconnaissance satellite program (despite the PPR). Earlier that week JDA administrative vice 
director Masahiro Akiyama said the JDA wanted to take part in the project.46 
10 September Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi announces that Japan might launch its own reconnaissance satellite, to 
bolster Japanese military capacity and to monitor missile deployments in North Korea, suggesting the 
government buy Japanese.  
Naoto Kan, the main opposition leader, endorses the idea, and a task force in the ruling Liberal 
Democratic Party headed by Nakayama begins conducting a series of meetings with ministries and 
contractors.47  
Melco’s proposal is a ¥197 billion program for two optical (1-meter resolution) and two radar satellites 
(1-3 meter resolution) orbiting at 500 km; NEC’s ¥200 billion proposal redevelops its 1996 plan, with 
the company pitching a maneuverable optical satellite capable of 1 meter resolution at 700km, but also 
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the ability to fly to 300 km to get 40 cm resolution, along with one 1-3 meter resolution radar satellite 
and a data relay satellite for quick access.48 
17 September  In an author interview, Shinya Ono, Chairman of the LDP’s Science and Technology Committee states 
that the prospective reconnaissance satellite program will not be in violation of the PPR.49  
Nakayama complains that several ministries are pursuing their own interests and not cooperating 
sufficiently to reach a consensus on what sort of indigenous system Japan should develop.50  
30 October The government draws up initial plans for development based on the two-plus-two system from Melco, 
names Melco as the candidate contractor.51  
In an article in the Nikkei, JDA insiders are vociferous in complaining that the system will be useless 
militarily and strategically if IGS fulfills its stated goal as a multipurpose system and make it clear that 
a geostationary infrared satellite is needed if Japan is to have EW missile warning capability.52  
Nakayama says he and six lawmakers will leave for the U.S. to discuss the possibility of importing U.S. 
satellites.53 
06 November The Cabinet decides to develop and launch four reconnaissance satellites to be put in orbit in fiscal 
2002, and placed the Cabinet Secretariat in charge of the program.  
The committee formed to hammer out implementation is headed by Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary 
Teijiro Furukawa and the Cabinet Information Research Office, the Foreign Ministry, the JDA, STA, 
MITI and the MPT. The decision, announced by Nonaka, says the four satellites (two optical and two 
radar) satellites will be Japanese built, the program cost will be ¥190 billion to ¥300 billion, and will 
able of observe the area around Japan at least once a day.  
Nonaka stresses that the 1985 interpretation of the PPR means that the JDA can have access to the data, 
and that there will be a supplementary bill to kick start research and development. A new Cabinet 
committee consisting of MOFA, STA, METI and other agencies will be formed to implement the plan.  
JDA head Fukushiro Nukaga says the agency will support the plan for indigenous development and 
later in the month that it plans to bolster its data processing staff from 31 to 74 to prepare.54 
08 November  Nakayama and the LDP Project Team on Information Satellites flies to the U.S and meet Kurt 
Campbell, Deputy Secretary of Defense for East Asia and the Pacific. Campbell tells Nakayama that the 
U.S. supports the move and offers technical support and staff training.55 Later in the month, Nakayama 
says Japan needs about 150 analysts to adequately handle data for the system.56 
09 December Melco’s proposed system appears to gain official approval over that of NEC.57 ALOS’ NASDA project 
manager Tsuguhiko Katagi reveals much of the optical and data storage technology, high precision 
attitude control system, radar and three-dimensional imaging technology will be developed from 
ALOS.58 
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21 December Keizo Obuchi’s Cabinet approves a draft budget for fiscal 1999 allocating ¥6.8 billion for the plan to 
start what will become the IGS program to the STA, and ¥1.4 billion for the Cabinet Office.59 
    1999  
11 January U.S. Defense Secretary William Cohen tells reporters that the U.S. strongly endorses passing defense 
cooperation bills that will allow Japan to offer rear-echelon support to U.S. forces abroad without 
revisions, but he suggests that while Japan has the right to decide whether to procure its reconnaissance 
satellites domestically, doing so would be far more expensive than buying from the U.S.60 
February CIRO says it will set up a special center to manage the IGS system and will initially staff it with 200 
people from the JDA and the NPA (National Policy Agency). A committee in charge of the IGS 
program will be staffed from the JDA, the NPA, and other ministries.61 
01 April   The Committee set up under Cabinet Secretariat staffed by the CIRO and bureau chiefs from MOFA, 
MITI, MPT, JDA and STA is chaired by Nonaka and Furukawa. At an April 1 press conference Nonaka 
tells reporters that Japanese technology is good enough to build the satellites.62 
April Final decisions are made whether to adopt derivatives of NEC’s MDS-1 bus, Melco’s JERS-1, or 
Melco’s DRTS bus designs. The decision has to be made by June or July 1999 in order to be on time for 
the following fiscal year’s budget request in August.63 Melco wins an initial ¥9 billion contract to start 
work on the satellite systems. Melco will also develop a propulsion system for maneuvering the 
satellites.64 
May The U.S. asks Japan to buy at least one satellite for the constellation, but such moves are rebuffed.65 
The satellite is rumored to cost between ¥20-30 billion.66 Later, in August, Cohen directly approaches 
senior Japanese figures including Minister of State for Defense Hōsei Norota saying the U.S. wants to 
assist Japan with the satellites, and the Japanese agree to U.S. assistance.67 
27 July  JDA releases its 1999 White Paper outlining the IGS system. The proposed system would cost $1.3 
billion. Cohen sates the U.S. will support Japan’s plans, that the U.S. is prepared to assist, and that 
plans for what parts and technologies can or should be transferred will be hammered out over coming 
months.68 
September Japan agrees to basic deal to buy some crucial U.S. components and subsystems for the IGS under an 
MOU.69 The purchase price is estimated over ¥10 billion.70 The Exchange of Notes occurs September 
29. The devices are for controlling the optical sensor angle designed to locate ground objects; data 
memory devices for transmitting the images to ground stations to enable analysis; and advanced optics 
materials.71 
December  Following the completion of Melco’s Kamakura Works refit and the building of the company’s large 
space chamber, Melco’s Taniguchi tells the Nikkei Shimbun, “The difference in technology between our 
company and such Western rivals as Hughes has narrowed.”72 
    2000  
January  CIRO reveals it will hire more people for IGS image analysis. About 100 will be responsible for image 
analysis and 200 for satellite operations management.73 
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August  SAC requests ¥99.2 billion for IGS program, which will include ground stations in Tomakomai 
(Hokkaido), Akune (Kagoshima), a data center in Kitura in Ibaraki, and a Tokyo control center.74 
    2002  
November Yukio Sato, former ambassador to the UN, says Japan has been over-dependent on the U.S. for 
intelligence and that Japan needs independent capability to assess threats from Japan’s neighbors and 
the Middle East. He says Japan has no intelligence on Chinese and Russian nuclear weapons.75 
    2003  
28 March  IGS-1a and 1b are launched by H-IIA into orbit.76 The news attracts international media attention. The 
blanket coverage preceding, covering and analyzing the launch and implications throws up several new 
facts, including plans to boost to 3,000 personnel from 2,100 staffers working on defense intelligence, 
and ¥50 billion in new funding to improve data reception and analysis.77 The launch is conducted under 
unusually tight security with hundreds of flack-jacketed police patrolling the Tanegashima Space 
Center and boats patrolling the waters around the Center. JAXA does not “christen” the satellites with 
Japanese names, and no pictures are released of the satellites showing their shapes.78 
29 November  The H-IIA#6 failure destroys IGS-2a and 2b, crippling the utility of the constellation for several years. 
 
 
A SAF-based analysis of the decision for Japan to initiate the IGS program, based on movements 
before the August 31 flyover and subsequent decisions is as follows: 
SAF 1 characteristics and contentions: The Taepodong overflight catalyzed awareness that Japan had 
limited independent means to monitor North Korea, and no means to counter ballistic missile attack, 
leading to the formalization of prior arrangements to bolster Japan’s reconnaissance capability and initiate 
research into ballistic missile defense. Subsequent decisions to initiate both programs appear to be logical 
reactions, pushing on from early studies into BMD systems initiated as far back as the 1980s.79  
SAF 2 characteristics and contentions: There was some opposition to and questions raised about 
Japan developing an indigenous system, but these were quickly overcome. First of all, it was clear that as 
the purpose of a domestic procurement would be for national security, the obstacle of the 1990 satellite 
agreement could be lifted. Following its traditional alliance (technology) management strategy, the 
actions of the U.S. were to support the development of an indigenous system with the offer of U.S. 
technical support. 
During the weeks after the flyover, the author was approached by U.S. State Department officials 
from the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo and told that that, for commercial and military reasons, and to save the 
Japanese taxpayer money, the U.S. would prefer Japan to buy U.S. systems with superior capabilities, 
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which could also be integrated better with U.S. systems. However, the U.S. understood the constraints of 
the “unified view” that Japan would benefit longer-term from domestic development. Taken in the 
context of the decision by Japan to start “research” into U.S. BMD systems, the U.S. was in support of 
Japan’s indigenous procurement of satellites because both offered the prospect of closer cooperation and, 
longer term, at least a pathway towards better forward C4ISR and deterrence functions for the alliance – 
as well as the prospect of some sales (primarily of BMD systems!) 
The SDF’s apparently minimalist response was framed by the PPR. The SDF has regarded space 
technologies as a useful addition to the prosecution of duties to the three main services and because of the 
PPR, the SDF pushed for BMD acquisition first. Within the defensive-defense posture of the SDF, there 
was no major normative/ policy logic for the SDF to develop a space program or research space 
technologies even if this had been legally possible. Thus, as a customer of the IGS, the SDF was 
opportunistic and willing to take advantage of any chance to gain extra ISR data. Being hermetically 
sealed away from space policy formulation, and institutionally distant from NASDA in particular, the 
SDF was content to become a customer.  
As is shown in Table 4, by the mid-1990s, the JDA had already become a primary customer of a 
growing high-resolution commercial imagery market using non-Japanese commercial satellites, serviced 
by a growing domestic purchasing and resale sector, with not only the JDA but also MOFA and the 
Maritime Safety Agency as major customers.80 Therefore, the SDF’s response must also be seen in the 
context of a long-standing interest in satellite imagery dating back to the 1980s, when Japan began 
purchasing both U.S. and French observation data, taking advantage of commercial technologies for 
ISR.81 
Within this framework, by the middle 1990s, alarm at North Korea’s missile program caused concern 
in the SDF about its reliance on data purchased from foreign commercial satellites, and its inability to 
have its own dedicated source, causing the SDF to look for ways to lessen its dependence on commercial 
satellite image data. This led to several proposals that Japan launch its own reconnaissance satellites, 
which would be conceivably legally possible under the Nakasone “dual-use” theory, if the system’s 
resolution did not surpass that already commercially available.82  
For example, in 1994, the Higuchi Panel had focused on the importance of the SDF improving its 
ISR capabilities and investigating the feasibility of BMD.83 In 1996, the JDA, with political support 
expressed by Prime Minister Tsutomu Hata, had then seriously considered the building of a 
made-in-Japan military reconnaissance network. Other agencies were also involved. According to budget 
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requests by MOFA, Japan had been studying indigenous development of space-based ISR since 1997.84 
Therefore, in one way at least, the IGS superseded a series of calls for already extant kokusanka 
space-based reconnaissance capabilities under discussion.  
SAF 3 characteristics and contentions: While Japanese media played up the drama and the crisis of 
the overflight, the actions within SAF were logical and marked by a strong sense of leadership to find an 
institutional and funding pathway for the formal initiation of an independent capability that had been seen 
as increasingly necessary since at least 1993. Dealing with SAF 2, delegations were flown to the U.S. to 
coordinate the procurement issue and agreement on the utility of initiating the program for both sides, 
with U.S. input and technological exchange was quickly agreed to.  
The actions of leading politicians were also notable for directly coordinating meetings with SAF 6 
members (industry, particularly Melco, as NEC, as we have seen, following the major procurement 
scandal that broke during the crucial decision-making period, was temporarily barred from bidding for 
contracts from NASDA) in order to quickly gain basic technical knowledge on the possibilities of 
developing an indigenous capability, sometimes bypassing SAFs 4 and 5 to do so. Additionally, key 
members of SAF 3 ensured that leadership was exerted to choose the Melco design quickly, further 
exerting pressure to make sure that the roles for individual players in SAF 4 were coordinated quickly.  
Leadership was quickly asserted by politicians through public statements confirming the legality of 
the proposed reconnaissance system, thus removing any institutional roadblocks, which was also 
important for gathering public understanding, or tamping opposition, in SAF 7. Despite the flat-line, 
minimal increase budgetary position of post-1997 space activities funding, it was made clear that new 
budget would be found for the new system, thus further reassuring both SAFs 4 and 7. When appropriate 
responses were gathered from SAF 4, critical decisions about the system were taken in time to find 
budget and workshare solutions by the end of December 1998, in time to start development the following 
April. Not least, key members of SAF 3 went to the mass media to repeatedly assure SAF 7 that 
appropriate actions were being coordinated.85 
It seems reasonable to assume, then, that the Taepodong incident also precipitated Japan’s 
long-standing wish to upgrade its ISR infrastructure, the need for which had been becoming increasingly 
apparent since at least 1993 and the launch of the Nodong-1. The SDF’s response must also be seen in the 
light of parallel administrative arrangements that had been developed in response to exogenous security 
pressures.  
One of these major institutional responses was the establishment of the Defense Intelligence 
Headquarters (DIH) in early 1997 to improve Japan’s autonomous gathering and analysis of 
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intelligence.86 Thus, the SDF can be seen to have been a willing beneficiary of the IGS program, which 
supplemented its independent commercial purchase of militarily useful data. In fact, as the emerging 
relationship of the SDF with the IGS shows, external pressures both in the shape of emerging security 
threats and a strong political consensus formed to allow the SDF to directly benefit from, if not to direct, 
Japan’s first military space program. 
However, the empirical evidence can also be interpreted to show that the SDF in fact took a 
minimalist approach. Interviews conducted in 1998 by the author with several SDF staff, including a 
Major General, also confirm remarkable consistency in terms of the SDF’s institutional and normative 
position on space technologies. SDF staff at the time saw the Taepodong incident as an opportunity to 
press the U.S. to release more and better-quality image data, increase image data acquisition budgets, and 
to improve the SDF’s intelligence gathering capabilities.  
Beyond that, in the face of U.S. pressure on Japan to import U.S. satellites, the SDF remained distant 
from the fray. The SDF would be happy to receive more data, but, in fact, according to one senior SDF 
official, Japan would be better off buying U.S. technologies than developing Japanese technologies, 
which were deemed as inferior and more expensive. If Japan pursued a kokusan path, then the SDF would 
use that data too.87 Thus, while politicians were able to use the “trigger” of the Taepodong overflight to 
establish Japan’s first dual-use national security space program, the SDF’s response was rather minimal, 
and in that, entirely logical. 
SAFs 4 and 5 characteristics and contentions: Under strong political pressure, each player in SAF 4 
fell into line relatively quickly because the prospect of new budget for an indigenous system meant that it 
was in each player’s institutional interest to cooperate. Regarding the positions of the STA and NASDA, 
once they assured that the systems were legally allowable, the STA played a relatively smooth 
coordinating role with other players including the JDA, CIRO, DIH and MITI and MOFA. Coordination 
was assisted through the experience and availability of the CIRO, which was already installed in the 
Cabinet Secretariat, which provided the logical home for management and coordination of the system. 
These arrangements meant the STA and NASDA could lead the design and development of the system 
with extant technologies available.  
Within this, the STA was positive towards developing the system because both the proposed system 
from Melco used technologies developed by NASDA (the MOS satellites built by Melco, and a relatively 
sophisticated optical sensor under development for the ALOS satellite being integrated by NEC) as a 
technological base. Further, the program, because it was new and challenging suited NASDA’s 
institutional logic of research and development! For the JDA and CIRO, the proposed system 
institutionalized arrangements that had developed over the prior decade, while partially assuaging JDA 
concerns that it was over-reliant on U.S. and commercial sources of data.  
                                                
86 Norihide Miyoshi, “Integrated Security HQ Set Up by Defense Agency to Enhance Operations,” The Daily Yomiuri, 25 
January 1997; “Japan’s New Spy Agency Consolidates Five Units,” Wall Street Journal, 21 January 1997; Derek de 
Cunha, “Japan Pushes Hard to Beef Up Its Military Intelligence,” Straits Times (Singapore), 4 July 1996; Masahiko 
Sasajima, “Information Is Power When Responding to Emergencies,” The Daily Yomiuri, 23 April 1998; Nao Shimoyachi, 
“Spy Satellites Part of Intelligence Quest,” Japan Times, 27 March 2003. For an overview of Japan’s intelligence trends 
and policy structure, see Andrew L. Oros, “Japan’s Growing Intelligence Capability,” International Journal of 
Intelligence and Counter Intelligence, Vol 15., No. 1 (January 2002), pp. 1-25. 
87 Interviews on background with SDF officials in September/ October 1998. 
  152 
SAF 6 characteristics and contentions: The decision for domestic procurement met the demands of 
industry to find a new, protected, domestic market. Budgets for a multi-decade and multi-satellite 
constellation with concomitant ground systems and infrastructure would at least ensure sustained 
investments and launch opportunities benefitting both satellite and launch vehicle makers.  
In the event, Melco’s system became the default choice after NEC was suddenly embroiled in its 
contract padding scandal, giving Melco a major advantage in its subsequent corporate strategy of 
investing in a modernized satellite manufacturing facility, from which it was able to bid for new domestic 
security procurement from a position of advantage, and, thanks to the sustained investment by the 
government, secure sufficient funds to adapt some of its designs to make inroads into the commercial 
satellite market.  
SAF 7 characteristics and contentions: In this incident, the role of public opinion was important as 
the flyover caused a media sensation and aroused and focused public alarm about a growing potential 
threat from North Korea. To assuage public opinion about concerns about militarization of space, the 
satellite system was initially labeled a “multi-purpose satellite system.” While it was understood that the 
intelligence and defense community would be the major customers, the IGS program management was 
put under the control of a new body, the CSIC in CIRO, thus distancing the system from the JDA and 
SDF. 
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Chapter 8 
 Episodes of Contention, Shocks and Strategic Action 2000-2011 
 
Introduction 
This chapter describes strategic action taken by SAF 3 to try to assert Cabinet Office control over space 
policy and administration. This followed strategic action asserted through the Kawamura initiative and its 
instrument, the Basic Law, and then subsequent episodes of contention within SAF 4 over the Basic 
Law’s implementation. Following this, Chapter 9 focuses on the establishment on the new form of 
Cabinet Office government control of policy through the ONSP, and further episodes of contention before 
field settlement. This chapter is divided into three main sections focusing first on three episodes of 
contention that led to strategic action, and subsequent episodes of contention. Two important episodes of 
contention between 1998 and 2009 took place outside the General Space Activities SAF, but had direct 
impacts on it. These were the strategic actions by prime ministers Hashimoto and Koizumi to establish a 
greater degree of Cabinet Office leadership over policy and even budgeting.  
 
Episodes of Contention 1: SAF 3 vs. SAF 4: Function of the Cabinet Office and Political Control 
The attempted reforms of Japan’s central ministries by Hashimoto represented strategic action by SAF 3 
that caused the malfunction of the General Space Activities SAF through the loss of the coordination 
function of the SAC. In terms of the SAF framework approach, the reinstatement of a body with superior 
authority to coordinate budgets constituted one of the overall primary strategic actions of SAF 3 players, 
necessitating the Basic Law. This dissertation also delineates, newly, an analysis of how the Cabinet 
Office gradually asserted through its own strategic action, partial incumbency and superiority over other 
SAF 3 players, especially MEXT.  
 The essential issue with the CSTP policy, as pointed out in Chapter 5, was that there was no overall 
control function for budgeting for new space programs. This lack led to conflict within SAFs 3 and 4. 
However, a contextual analysis of the background and motivations behind the Hashimoto reforms through 
SAF 3 analysis is also important to understand the changing behavior of SAF 3 actors through to 2014. 
 As noted in Chapter 3, the Hashimoto reforms to institute more political control over policymaking 
and to cut the budgets, powers and prerogatives of the central bureaucracy were the latest in a long line of 
attempts and the attempted various actions of a series of Administrative Reform Councils (ARCs) whose 
recommendations were often sublimated or repurposed by the targeted ministries for their own purposes 
(or watered down/ rewritten or deflected). According to Shinoda, when Japanese politicians have tried to 
change the balance of power between politicians and the civil service and assert more political control, 
they have always had to overcome veto players, which can be either individual ministries, or through their 
zoku proxies, ministers in the Cabinet specifically, or, indeed, in the Diet. 
 The essential issue was that in Japan, the Constitution vests executive power in the Cabinet, not in 
the prime minister, so that authority over administrative operations was divided among various ministers. 
This allows ministries to serve as veto players when their interests conflict with the prime minister’s 
policy initiative.1 Further, under the accepted version of the Cabinet Law, prime ministers have refrained 
from instructing ministers without the unanimous consent of the entire Cabinet.2 
                                                
1 Shinoda (2013), p. 5.  
2 Ibid., p. 66.  
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 Hashimoto’s main action was to revise the Cabinet Law to try to reinforce the policymaking power, 
or at least the initiative, of the prime minister in the Cabinet Office. Just one month after the October 
1996 general election, Hashimoto inaugurated his newly-minted version of the ARC, forged in such a 
way as to bypass the civil service. To make it effective and to avoid ministerial veto power, Hashimoto 
set it up without new legislation, appointed himself chairman, packed it with his own appointees, and 
avoided populating it with staff from the civil service. In other words, the ARC was set up as what I call a 
“guerilla” unit. On May 1, 1997, to create leverage for the principle of political control, the ARC 
recommended that the prime minister be allowed to directly instruct ministries in times of crisis, and that 
a new position, that of Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Crisis Management be established. More 
importantly, the ARC proposed the establishment of a more powerful Cabinet Office that would be in 
charge of coordinating different interests among ministries on behalf of the prime minister.  
 After various battles, by September 1997, the ARC called for drastic plans to establish a Cabinet 
Office function reporting to the prime minister, and among other proposals, that postal savings and 
insurance services be privatized and that central government ministries be streamlined to 13 from 23. 
While Hashimoto lost power through a series of scandals and political opposition from yusei zoku, 
bureaucratic opposition and public discontent, his strategic action established the tactic of short-cutting 
bureaucratic influence through creating “guerilla” committees, and of the of principal of the role of a 
more powerful (or potentially more powerful) Cabinet Office in policymaking.3 
 
    Table 5: Summary of Hashimoto Reforms 1998-2001 and the Cabinet Office Establishment Law 
 
1. Reduce ministries from 23 to 13. 
2. Revise Article 4 of the Cabinet Law to allow the prime minister to propose basic policy. 
3. Give Cabinet Secretariat to plan and draft national policy. 
4. Prime Minister given authority to appoint five assistants to support the Chief Cabinet Secretary (CCS). 
5. Appoint three assistant CCS at vice-minister level.  
6. Prime Minster has authority to add more secretaries. 
7. CCS given chief role as mediator between ministries (elevation of CCS to approximately same potential power 
as the U.S. White House Chief of Staff).  
8. The Administrative Deputy CCS to chair administrative vice-ministerial meetings which set agendas for Cabinet 
meetings. 
9. Cabinet to approve all higher ministerial officials from bureau chiefs upwards. 
10. Establishment of the Cabinet Office headed by the prime minster and administered by the CCS and CCS 
deputies (Cabinet Establishment Law), and the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy (CEFP) taking over from 
the Economic Planning Agency, allowing the prime minster to initiate the budgeting process by proposing the total 
size of the budget and proposing major spending items, taking away the initiative of budget formation from the 
MOF.4  
 
         
 The most critical element of the Hashimoto strategic action was the Cabinet Office Establishment 
Law. Following this, many of the subsequent elements of contention in the attempts by politicians 
(primarily Kawamoto, Maehara, and Imazu) in space policy and administration were founded primarily 
on MEXT specifically attempting to stop the Cabinet Office taking more control of space policy and 
                                                
3 Ibid., pp. 68-70.   
4 Ibid., pp. 79-83: For the Cabinet Office Establishment Law, see 内閣府設置法平成 11 年法律第 89 号 [Naikakufu 
Sechi Hō Heisei 11 nen Hōritsu Dai 89 Gō] Cabinet Office Establishment Act Law 2002 Law No. 89, 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/cyuo-syocho/990427honbu/naikakuhu-h.html. 
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therefore budgets, and why, with the initial establishment of the ONSP, the Cabinet Office was only able 
to take control of the QZSS system directly.  
 
   Figure 26: SAF 3 vs. SAF 4 Revision Under Hashimoto Reforms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 Following Hashimoto’s strategic action, Koizumi went further in attempting to enact his own 
versions of the ARC’s recommendations. The SAF 3 contentions between Koizumi with LDP yusei zoku 
and SAF 4 players over a series of episodes of contention further established the principal of prime 
ministerial leadership and Cabinet Office control, providing a “how-to” example or template for the DPJ 
later. This might also be called an operating system or example framework that was a model for the DPJ 
later and adapted once more by Maehara. While many of Koizumi’s initiatives were perhaps products of 
the specific timing and his personal style and popularity, it has been said Koizumi was able to introduce 
for the first time, albeit temporarily, a “Westminster-like” top-down decision-making process that enabled 
him to ram through legislation unpopular not only with ministries and the subgovernment, but many in his 
own party.5  
 Koizumi’s charismatic administration also differed from those of his predecessors in a number of 
important ways. In Koizumi’s administration, most key foreign policy initiatives were taken by the prime 
minister, the CCS and Cabinet Office officials, with some input from confidants from MOFA and other 
ministries.6 Notably, however Koizumi pushed on from Hashimoto, using refined tools that employed a 
staged approach to achieve his goals regardless of the bureaucracy to initiate postal privatization, and 
attempt to cut down budget for the vast subgovernment sector, this time through proposing the 
privatization of 77 special public corporations in SAF 5, particularly the Japan Highway Public 
Corporation. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
5 Hughes and Krauss (2007), pp. 157-176 
6 Tomohito Shinoda, Kantei Gaikō: Seiji Rīdashippu no Yukie (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha, 2004), pp. 9-50. 
Prime Minister 
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Table 6: Koizumi Tactics to Deal with SAFs 3, 4 & 5 
1. Used the CEFP as a battering ram by packing it with outside experts not collectively owing loyalty to a 
particular ministry. Personally set the agenda of the CEFP by setting a honebuto no hōshin (basic principles) and 
made its deliberations available to the public.7  
2. Hired outside experts, notably Heizō Takenaka, to take over key positions such as Minister for Economic and 
Fiscal Affairs and consulted with a narrow circle of outside experts to make the honebuto no hōshin. 
3. Established a “guerilla unit” – an inner circle of aids to keep the initiative on Koizumi’s side in the form of a 
Postal Privatization Preparation Office (PPPO, Yusei Mineika Junbishitsu) in the Cabinet Office’s secretariat, 
consisting of 80 academics and officials not collectively loyal to any one ministry.8  
4. Ordered the Cabinet Secretariat to take charge of legislation and draft bills but fired bureaucrats who had 
deliberately tried to rewrite bills to the Cabinet not in line with the PPPO’s orders.9 
5. Bolstered the CEFP with further supplicatory councils and completely sidestepped the Cabinet Secretariat 
when it proved unreliable. 
6. Sidestepped traditional internal review processes (jizen shinsa) in the LDP General Council, forcing it to adopt 
legislation without the need for a unanimous vote.  
7. Authorized the Cabinet to approve legislation without endorsing its content, sidestepping the Administrative 
Vice-Minsters’ meeting.  
8. Elevated loyalists to key positions in the LDP, for example Tsutomu Takebe to LDP secretary general.  
9. Sent envoys to personally negotiate with opposing implementing bodies set up to carry out plans. 
10. Reversed the decision-making process in the LDP’s Policy Research Council where sub-committees vetted 
policy and got permission from coalition partners first.   
 
An analysis of Koizumi’s tactics to install a new internal governance unit at the heart of 
policymaking was basically attempted through sidestepping the civil service and grasping the initiative in 
policy proposal and report delivery through guerilla units. However, the mixed successes and failures of 
Koizumi’s attempts also highlighted the defense-in-depth that SAF 3 and SAF 4 players could wield. 
From the point of view of SAF 4 incumbents facing challenges, it is possible to delineate various layers of 
defenses from initiation of policymaking to implementation in the following failure modes: 
 
1. Compromise planning by installing bureaucrats who will not draw up desired legislation in the spirit it 
was meant. 
2. Rewrite recommendations or use prior drafts favorable to incumbent ministerial players. 
3. Lobby zoku politicians to exercise veto power in the Cabinet. 
4. Reinterpret legislation using discretionary powers to water it down or bring it more in line with the 
institutional goals of the incumbent ministry. 
5. Staff implementing agencies or influence them in other ways to oppose, reinterpret and/or stall 
legislation.10 
  
                                                
7 Heizō Takenaka, Kōzō kaikaku no Shinjitsu: Takenaka Heizō Daijin Nikki [A Testimony about Structural Reform: The 
Diary of Minister Takenaka Heizo] (Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shinbunsha, 2006), pp. 216-18; 152. Much of the discussions 
about the tactics used by both Koizumi and Takenaka, and various SAF 4 players is taken from this monograph.  
8 Ibid., pp. 156-57. On April 26 that year, Koizumi himself helped write the office’s signboard in its opening ceremony, 
showing how much he backed it, an important ceremonial signifier of prime ministerial will that was also to be used by 
Prime Minster Noda in 2012 in the establishment of the ONSP.  
9 Ibid., p. 176. 
10 All these tactics were used with some success by SAF 4 and SAF 5 players in opposing both Koizumi and Takenaka. 
There are several clear examples that serve to demonstrate how difficult strategic action by SAF 3 players is in Japan in 
general. For example, the MPHPT’s insertion of loopholes into the Letter Delivery Service Bill (LDS, Shinsho-bin Hōan) 
of 2001; leaking of information by PPPO insiders to the MIC; MIC staffers in the Cabinet Secretariat leaking information 
to the MIC; attempts by Japan Post to claim it would take three to five years to build a computer system to prepare for 
privatization; watering down of implementation in later administrations. 
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However, as we have seen, there was no CEFP for space policy. Instead, ironically, the Hashimoto 
reforms had the unintended consequence of creating both a power vacuum and a super-powerful 
subgovernment agency in the form of the MEXT-JAXA combination all in the same shake of the dice. As 
pointed out in Chapter 6, the consolidation of SAFs 4 and 5 put space policy under the auspices of the 
CSTP. While this folded space policy into a national strategy, scrutinized by a wider community of 
experts linked to the Cabinet Office, the CSPT’s remit was limited to national science and technology 
policy, not national security or industrialization.  
As we have seen, the consolidation of ISAS, NAL and NASDA created JAXA, accounting for 
around 60 percent of the entire general space activities budget as an Independent Administrative 
Institution (IAI) with the ability to plan its own five-year programs, giving it far more policy input than 
NASDA than NASDA had ever enjoyed, and making it accountable to MEXT. The CSTP’s policymaking 
parameters were further narrowed by the fact that the CSTP’s last reference for space policy had been 
published by SAC in June 2001 just after SAC’s policymaking function had been switched to JAXA, but 
it was treated by CSTP as if it had been a guideline for a comprehensive national space policy.11 Thus, 
until the Basic Law, Japan’s space policy was owned, lock, stock and barrel, by MEXT.  
 
Episodes of Contention 2: The QZSS Program; the GX Program; and the Loss of the IGS Satellites 
The inability to coordinate budget for the QZSS system is cited by Suzuki, along with the GX problem, as 
two of the fundamental causes for the Kawamura initiative, with the specific trigger of the failure of the 
H-IIA in November 2003 and the inability of Kawamura, who was the incumbent minister of MEXT at 
the time to find a single institution that would take responsibility for the accident. This study 
contextualizes the events in the SAF framework in terms of shocks or pressures, leading to social 
appropriation, innovative and strategic action, and episodes of contention. This study also seeks to show 
that the contours and specific policy and implementation strategies found in Basic Plan 2016 can be 
better understood by looking at the wider field, i.e. the characteristics of SAF 3 action based on past 
president, not just only at the institutional logics and malfunctioning of SAF 4 and SAF 5 players.  
 One of the challenges and rewards of the SAF framework is the way that the actions of proximate 
SAFs play on each other. Thus, understanding the dynamics and motivational matrix of SAF 3 field 
dynamics, or put more simply the modes and limits of action available to SAF 3 players, is critical to 
                                                
11 IAIs had originally been established as part of a process begun in 1996 to start cutting government waste and debt so 
that research institutions, national hospitals and museums among other organizations were supposed to function rather 
like semi-independent firms and required to submit management plans of 3-5 years to increase their scrutiny and 
accountability. IAIs became a newly designed type of legal body for Japanese governmental organizations regulated by 
the Basic Law on Reforming Government Ministries of 1998. The IAIs are not under the National Government 
Organization Act that provides for Japanese Ministries and administrative organizations.  
 Originally proposed by the Administrative Reform Council, IAIs were created based on the concept of separating 
governmental ministries and agencies into planning functions and operation functions. Planning functions remain within 
government-based ministries and agencies while operating functions are transferred to IAIs.  
 Under the reforms, IAIs were supposed to utilize management methods of private-sector corporations and are given 
considerable autonomy in their operations and how to use their budgets. In April 2001, the Japanese government had first 
designated 59 bodies as IAIs. So, as we saw on the administrative level to the merging of STA and MOE to MEXT and 
the creation of JAXA, amalgamating NASDA under STA and ISAS under MOE to form JAXA as an IAI under MEXT. 
However, an essential problem arose in that R&D organizations such as JAXA couldn’t become for-profit ventures and 
the reforms were roundly criticized as mere window-dressing, especially considering the continued prevalence of 
amakudari. See, in general, Richard A. Colignon, Chickako Usui, Amakudari: The Hidden Fabric of Japan’s Economy 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003); “The Same Problem Under a Different Name,” Asahi Shimbun, 20 
December 2001. 
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understand why Japan had to go through three contested Basic Plans before reaching settlement in Basic 
Plan 2016. 
 
Episodes of Contention: The QZSS system 
SAF 1 and 2: The strategic need for guaranteed access to PNT, or rather the prospect of degraded access 
and reliance on GPS at the whim of the U.S. became a concern for Japan following the first Gulf War. In 
addition, through the 1990s as the utility of GPS became apparent and diverse applications markets using 
GPS started to develop, the development of a Japanese PNT system was framed in terms of its economic 
and social benefits.  
 SAFs 4 and 5: In the 1990s, the STA, METI, and the MPT in particular, looked to develop a PNT 
that would cover a large swathe of Asia. In March 1997, the STA asked NASDA to move ahead with 
research into the highly accurate, satellite-mounted atomic clocks needed for a high-precision PNT. By 
2001, NASDA had proposed idea of a quasi-geostationary satellite system (the precursor to QZSS), 
involving three satellites, while MEXT was busy working on applications. 
 Following 2003, however MEXT’s remit only covered research and development, and that of METI 
covered business promotion, while the prospective user ministries, MIC and MLIT, could not afford to 
manage the system without massive new funding, for which no mechanism or pathway existed. By 2004, 
the CSTP had endorsed the idea of an autonomous and/or GPS-complementary PNT system, but was not 
able, in turn, to approve a mechanism to run the program. In July 2005, a coordination committee was set 
up in the Cabinet Office between the four major ministries to address the issue, but the committee had no 
power to take over management. In 2006, Japan’s Diet passed the Basic Act on the Advancement of 
Utilizing Geospatial Information (AUGI), which was enacted in 2007 to invest ¥75 billion for JAXA and 
Melco to develop an initial satellite. But a decade after planning started, the project lacked a strong lead 
institution to manage a large constellation of satellite program whose users and applications would 
involve a wide swath of ministries and private sector players.   
 SAF 6: The inability of ministerial players to coordinate Japan’s PNT program intensely frustrated 
industry, which, led by Melco, had been researching technologies for it as early as the 1970s. Industry put 
successive pressure for the government to subsidize the system. In 1999, Keidanren proposed a 
QZSS-type system focused on communications. In 2002, it then established of a special Promotion and 
Investigative Committee to push for funding. In 2000 Itochu, NEC, and Toshiba proposed the Japanese 
Regional Advanced Navigation Satellite (JRANS) concept. 
 To try to gain partial government funding to build at least an R&D satellite and declare the system 
public infrastructure (to avoid the satellite agreement) and get the government to become an anchor tenant, 
in 2002, more than fifty Japanese companies, led by Mitsubishi Corporation, founded the Advanced 
Space Business Corporation (ASBC) to facilitate public participation and investment in the QZSS, in the 
expectation that the government would pay about half of the estimated ¥170 billion development and 
launch cost. But the consortium quickly collapsed when the CSTP was unable to find a coordinating 
mechanism, leaving the administration of the system locked in the four-year dispute mentioned above.  
 
The GX Rocket  
The GX project presented another major issue, because, again, no one ministry could manage the program. 
Originally conceived in the late 1990s by the STA as a cheaper replacement for the J-1 rocket, which had 
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been heavily criticized for its costs, the GX was positioned as a potentially commercially marketable 
JAXA-alternative to the solid-fueled M-V launch vehicle built by Nissan Aerospace (later merged into 
IHI) that had been developed for ISAS. The GX was also designed to provide an alternative to the H-IIA 
for the launch of smaller satellites. As conceived by NASDA, the GX was supposed to have combined the 
first stage of Atlas launcher supplied by Lockheed Martin Corporation, engines from Russia, and a 
second-stage liquid natural gas (LNG) engine developed by NASDA, thus, as far as NASDA was 
concerned, justifying its participation. 
 The basic framework of the project was approved by SAC in August 1999, and the development of a 
technology demonstration launcher was started. Following the second H-II failure in November 1999, 
however, it was decided that resources and efforts should be concentrated on the development of the 
H-IIA, and GX funding was suspended. In 2000, sensing an opportunity to create a commercial launch 
sector and to provide a backup for the H-IIA, METI decided to try to promote the program with funding 
from the private sector, particularly IHI, on the premise that the GX could be used for commercial 
launches, as well as a backup for domestic government use. 
 The GX became locked in a conundrum. JAXA’s stated policy following 2003 was to have the H-IIA 
as Japan’s primary launcher as part of a privatization agreement with MHI, IHI’s direct commercial rival. 
Independently, the powerful ISAS group in JAXA was developing its own cut-price launcher, which was 
to become the Epsilon, whose first stage was to be supplied by IHI and subsequent stages from H-II 
derived technologies from MHI. While the GX’s role in the government market was contested, it was 
estimated that it required up to three test launches, which IHI could not afford, to certify its reliability, if 
it was to stand any chance of being accepted by the commercial market.  
 By 2005, the GX program had morphed into a zombie project scarred by a series of running disputes 
between IHI and SAC over not only who was going to pay for it, but its overall utility. A fatal blow was 
delivered after the GX’s development schedule was disastrously delayed when JAXA revealed it was 
having severe difficulties with the LNG engine. Further, the MEXT-controlled SAC was unwilling to 
fund a project that was under METI control, and rejected funding for test launches.12 
 
The H-IIA Failure 
The perception of institutional failure of the old NASDA, and that the whole development paradigm of 
the 1990s had run its course and needed to be rationalized, was reinforced when the new flagship H-IIA, 
painstaking redesigned and rechecked so as to be made as reliable as possible, failed on its sixth mission, 
destroying two IGS satellites in November 2003. It is worth repeating the fact that episode cost the 
taxpayer in advance of $1 billion and severely delayed any national security utility of the IGS program for 
several years.  
 To put it bluntly, JAXA blew it. As noted in the conventional narrative, the disaster personally 
incensed then-MEXT Minister Kawamura.13 Enough was enough. It was at this point that Kawamura 
began a personal campaign that continues to this day to impose more political leadership on Japan’s space 
program, with Kawamura playing an activist, interventionalist role.14 In this sense, it is quite appropriate 
                                                
12 For historical details on the GX program, see Pekkanen & Kallender-Umezu (2010), pp. 78-79, 175-77. 
13 Author interview, Takeo Kawamura, former minister for Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology (MEXT), 
Tokyo, 28 March 2006. 
14 Apart from forming the NSSPG, Kawamura began active lobbying toward building a caucus within the LDP through 
committee participation and leadership beginning with his assumption of vice chairman of the LDP’s Special Committee 
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to identify the H-IIA failure of 2003 as a major shock that caused that led to social approbation and 
innovative action (the gathering of the NSSPG) then strategic action in the form of the Basic Law.  
 
Strategic Action 1: The Kawamura Initiative and the Basic Law 
SAF 3: The panoply of problems led Kawamura in 2005 to set up the NSSPG within the LDP to, over the 
course of ten meetings in August that year, recommend that through the establishment of the legislation 
that was to become the Basic Law that the Cabinet Office be put in control of planning and budgeting of 
the space program under a state minister within the Cabinet superior to all other ministries, particularly 
MEXT. The report recommended Japan should refocus on national security, industrialization, and 
promote the use of space as a diplomatic and foreign policy tool. It also recommended that PPR be 
scrapped and the generally-observed OST position on military space be adopted. Following this, the 
Space Development Special Committee of the LDP in April 2006 drew up a draft version of the Basic 
Law.15 
 The NSSPG report sought to fundamentally reorient Japan’s space program into a strategic security 
role, although it was careful to couch the fundamental change in language that mentioned “applications” 
and industrialization, rather than national security (i.e. military) use. It also formed the normative, 
ideological, institutional and policy framework for Basic Plan 2016. Not only was the Basic Law founded 
upon it, but its recommendations form the template of Japan’s current space development institutional 
framework. From an institutional approach, the report discussed the following options: 
 
1. Appoint a Director General within Cabinet Office for specific fields/offices and make coordination of 
space development and utilization policy as a key policy of the Cabinet, as indicated in article 4, clause 2 
of the Cabinet Establishment Law. The Cabinet would then appoint a Minister of State for Special 
Missions, as long as it concerned the Cabinet’s key policy. 
2. Establish an office in the Cabinet Secretariat with a director within the office of the Deputy Chief 
Cabinet Secretary.  
3. Combine the Cabinet Secretariat and the Cabinet Office Bureau/Ministers of State for Special 
Missions. 
  
 In the event, the NSSPG recommended that the Cabinet Office take control of space policy by 
passing a Basic Law that would appoint a State Minister for Space Development, and that would establish 
an authoritative “Space Strategy Headquarters” within the Cabinet Office. The new body would have the 
authority to make a national space policy in close collaboration with the National Security Council and 
the Disaster Prevention Council, represent Japan in international negotiations and coordination on space 
policy and cooperation, and, in cooperation with SAC and the CSTP, establish medium- and long-term 
plans that would be guiding principles governing JAXA’s own plans. The intention of the NSSPG was to 
create a brand-new structure, given authority by a State Minister, with policy control. From an 
institutional dynamics approach, this can be seen as a fairly bold strategic action because behind this law 
was to be used to wrest significant power from the incumbent ministry (MEXT). Critically, however, for 
                                                                                                                                                        
on Space Development in 2005 through September 2006; chairman of the same committee through to September 2008; 
and then Chairman of the Special Committee of Space and Maritime Development from 2014 to present.  
15 Pekkanen & Kallender-Umezu (2010), pp. 83-40; 国家宇宙戦略立案話会	 報告書	 ー	 新たな宇宙開発利用制
度の構築に向けてー	 ２００５年８月	 国家宇宙戦略立案話会 [Report by the National Space Strategy Planning 
Group “– Toward establishment (sic) of new space development and utilization system –“ Report by the National Space 
Strategy Planning Group, August 2005], esp. pp. 5-13, 25-30, 61-66; Kazuto Suzuki (2007), pp. 76-80. 
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implementation of the Basic Law, both the recommendations and the Basic Law did not recommend 
giving budgeting authority to the Cabinet Office, only a policy coordination role. 
 
Strategic Action 2: The Space Basic Law of 2008 
The Basic Law was passed on 27 August 2008 and can be divided into two main areas. The first 
comprised the following six key objectives:  
 
1. To promote the peaceful use of outer space (Articles 1 and 2).  
2. Use space to improve the lives of Japanese citizens, which includes advance the purposes of ensuring a 
‘safe and secure’ society, to ‘mitigate disasters, poverty and various other threats to the survival and lives 
of humankind’, and to maintain ‘international peace and security; and to increase the national security of 
Japan’ (Article 3).  
3. Promote commercialization and industrial development of Japan’s space technologies.  
4. Use outer space to promote the prosperity of human society (Articles 5, 6, 7).  
5. Promote more effective international cooperation.  
6. Promote space development that does not degrade the space environment (Article 20).  
 
 The second comprised a whole slew of legislation to achieve a reduction in the power of MEXT, 
institute Cabinet Office control over policy, and downgrade the independence JAXA to become a tool of 
the totality of space policy under the Cabinet Office. Articles 24-34 reset administrative oversight, 
particularly Chapters 3 and 4, which delineated the role of a new Space Strategic Headquarters for Space 
Development (SHSP) in the Cabinet Office to control of national space policy. Article 2 scrapped Article 
4 (Objectives of the Agency) of the JAXA Law of 2003 stating that “Space Development and Use shall 
be carried out in accordance with treaties and other international agreements with regard to Space 
Development and Use including the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the 
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies, in accordance with 
the pacifism of the Constitution of Japan.” 
 
 Asserting Cabinet Office control, key stipulations included that:  
 
1. JAXA’s programs reflect user needs.  
2. JAXA’s mid-term goals reflect those of the Cabinet Office.  
3. That JAXA would be co-administered by MEXT and the MIC, but with significant input and program 
jurisdictional rights from the Cabinet Office and METI.  
4. Significantly, the MOD could also assume dual control of JAXA if it so wished to, a point we return to 
later.   
 
The Basic Law was designed, then, to give a strong mandate to introduce Cabinet Office control 
over space policy formulation, superseding MEXT. To achieve this, the Basic Law contained three layers 
of interlocking and reinforcing mandates. First, the General Provisions in Article 2 set the stage for 
scrapping JAXA’s commitment to the PPR. Next, Article 3 (Improvement of the Lives of the Citizenry, 
etc.) and Article 4 (Advancement of Industries) introduced the concept that national security and 
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promotion of industry were the top two primary goals for space policy. This, additionally, clearly 
mandated a change in approach from the MEXT/JAXA R&D-oriented policy. To reinforce the change, 
Article 12 (Reform of Administrative Organizations, etc.) mandated the “reform” of “administrative 
organizations” …to improve executive management in implementing measures with regard to Space 
Development and Use.”  
Second, Chapter III (“Basic Space Plan”) and Chapter IV (“Strategic Headquarters for Space 
Development”) introduced two new layers of interlocking and reinforcing legislation to achieve several 
goals. They appeared to give a mandate for the stripping away of power from MEXT to institute Cabinet 
Office control over policy and downgrade the independence of JAXA to become a tool of the totality of 
space policy under a superseding and superior body. Chapter III (“Basic Space Plan”) made it clear that 
the SHSP was to formulate a “Basic Plan” to implement the changes with concrete goals and clear time 
frames, and that the SHSP had the power to monitor, review and change the Basic Plan if it was not being 
implemented.  
Further, to effect administrative reform, the Basic Law provided the SHSP with clear targets and 
timetables so that it had to draft the first Basic Plan to form the blueprint to enact the Basic Law’s new 
priorities within one year. Secondly, the SHSP was mandated to review and restructure space-related 
agencies to refocus space development on applications, industrialization and national security goals, and 
investigate how JAXA could be used to promote these. Perhaps one unwritten assumption was that the 
Cabinet Office through the Cabinet Secretariat would be given much clearer executive authority, not only 
to design the Basic Plan.  
Central to this, in the Basic Law’s Supplementary Provisions, three articles clearly provided the 
rationale to effect a new command and control system over space policy to not only redirect policy away 
from R&D and space science as pursued by MEXT and JAXA, but also to assert control over the new 
policy of supporting industry and applying space technology more directly to defensive national security 
goals. Within three provisions, Article 3 mandated a review of JAXA within one year; Article 4 mandated 
the SHSP to create an administrative structure to effect the Basic Plan; and Article 12 mandated the 
reform of Japan’s space administration to improve “executive management.”  
An analysis of the Basic Law shows it to be the legal implementation document of the NSSPG’s 
recommendations. The Basic Law mandated the establishment of the SHSP, formed from personnel 
drawn from the wider bureaucracy including MEXT, METI, JAXA, MIC, industry and academia. METI, 
which had long been interested in promoting the industrialization and commercialization of space but had 
been unable to implement programs in JAXA, for example, with the GX, was now at the top table. Even 
the MOD, since 1969 completely divorced from space policy, would be given a role – if it wished.  
 
Setting Up the Post Basic Law General Space Activities SAF 
 
In terms of the SAF framework, the Basic Law can be seen as strategic action in the legal sphere, while 
the establishment of the SHSP can be seen similarly in the administrative implementation sphere. In terms 
of the life cycles of SAFs, the SHSP can also be seen as marking a provisional stage towards a final 
settlement of the contested SAFs that had emerged from the administrative reforms of the 2000s. It was 
the SHSP’s task to build a working governance unit for the field that would be able to assert incumbency 
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powers over all the other actors. In conventional terms, the SHSP’s function and relationship can be 
shown in Figure 27. 
    Figure 27. Conventional Chart: Japan’s Space Establishment, August 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Pekkanen and Kallender-Umezu (2010), p. 56 
 However, an SAF framework-based description would show the SHSP’s position almost as a 
transitional “guerilla” unit designed to enforce, or at least work out a redistribution of power back from 
MEXT into the Cabinet Office, as follows. 
  Fig. 28 Transitional (Contested) General Space Activities SAF 
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In this schema, SAF 3 is aware of the growing need to balance stronger U.S. demands (SAF 2) for Japan to 
contribute to the U.S. pivot, while meeting public and industry expectations to take control and assert 
direction for space development and policy. The SHSP in the Cabinet Secretariat was formed to find a way to 
control SAF 4, and to impose Cabinet Office control on SAFs 4 and 5, where MEXT and JAXA are 
incumbent players, vastly imbued with budget and resources but also facing increasing public and political 
discredit stemming from the steady series of failures experienced almost successively since 1994. Against 
them is METI and USEF acting as more aggressive challengers, looking for a way to assert strategic action or 
gather power to enable collective action. The story of the period 2003 to 2012 is actually how a series of 
challengers in SAF 4 and SAF 5 tried to establish new rules for the General Space Activities SAF against the 
incumbent power of MEXT. The primary actors were politicians and METI. The SHSP, connected to the 
Cabinet Office, designed to be a new governance unit, was actually to be a challenger. When it was absorbed 
and deflected by SAF 4, SAF 3 stepped in with more strategic action in which Maehara formed his own 
“guerrilla” unit with the Matsui committee. 
 
 SAF 3: As the experience of previous strategic actions under Hashimoto and Koizumi have shown, 
the success of strategic action when tackling Japan’s central bureaucracy depends on overcoming an 
extensive defense-in-depth that was listed in the failure/resistance modes mentioned above. In enacting 
the Basic Law, this would mean exerting effective control of the Cabinet Secretariat, or, more 
specifically:  
 
1. Ensuring powerful political leadership in the SHSP, for example creating a top leadership structure 
responsible to the Cabinet Office and not SAF 4 and SAF 5 actors, and to avoid it from being packed by 
MEXT or MEXT-sympathetic civil servants.  
2. Replicating this structure through the Cabinet Secretariat as much as possible (creating leadership at 
each decision level).  
3. Carefully selecting staff, either by appointing non-bureaucrats (outside experts) or bureaucrats not tied 
to a particular ministry.  
4. Controlling any implementation or discussing committees.  
5. Setting the agenda for such committees or pre-programming them in ways to produce the desired 
results.  
 
 The success of the SHSP would also depend on continuity of leadership and purpose not only once 
the SSHP delivered its recommendations, but also through the engagement of the State Minster for Space 
Development. In short, close control and management of the SHSP would be required during at least a 
one year period. Given the experience of previous SAF 3 vs. SAF 4 contests, SHSP would need to be 
tightly controlled for the initial entire two-year period until it actually deliver a reformed structure. 
Following that, close supervision by the new “Space Strategy Headquarters” would probably be required 
for another year to ensure actual implementation of the first Basic Plan.  
 In terms of setting up the SHSP, these requirements were well understood by Kawamura, an old hand, 
who, as we saw (and as he told the author in 2006) felt he had been given enough of the runaround by the 
civil service. Following the passing of the Basic Law, the LDP immediately in August 2008 established 
the SHSP, formed from personnel drawn from line ministries including MEXT, METI, JAXA, MIC, 
industry and academia. In line with the Basic Law’s fundamental rationale of establishing political 
oversight, Prime Minister Taro Asō was instituted as Director-General and no less than Kawamura 
himself as CCS, became the senior Deputy Director-General, with Seiko Noda assuming the 
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newly-created Minister of State for Space Policy portfolio (following a two-month tenure by Fumio 
Kishida from June to August).  
 In terms of political control, the SHSP appeared at the outset to be fully equipped and specifically 
designed to deal with the tasks at hand as envisaged by Kawamura, as both Asō and Noda had no strong 
positions on the direction of space policy. Also, the SHSP’s Director-General was former METI 
executive Masakazu Toyoda. 
 The functional and programmatical tasks of the new body would be to make critical choices on 
where to focus investment. A close reading of the NSSPG report leaves the clear impression that the 
intention of the authors was to solve the QZSS issue as soon as possible by setting up a Cabinet Office 
control and a funding mechanism. Solving the QZSS issue in this way would have knock-on benefits. The 
proposed system would involve, eventually, a seven-satellite constellation in need of spares and 
replenishment. Since Melco could provide its proven DS-2000 bus, NEC, which excelled in ground 
stations and communications systems, could be given at least a portion of the program for infrastructure 
and communications systems. Thus the QZSS would provide the framework for a two-contractor 
manufacturing base, sustaining both Melco and NEC.  
 The elephant in the room, though, would be a global EO monitoring system, which, as we will see, 
was to be placed as the first priority of Basic Plan 1 in 2009. If a funding and program management 
system could be established, then this system would actually represent a massive “net add” to Japan’s 
space program, as the IGS constellation was already embedded as a fixture, and a pathway towards the 
QZSS system, no matter how contested and problematical, had already been set up.  
 Critically, however, there was, no extant broad-based “national” or public infrastructure rationale for 
a new dual-use global EO system, for which significant new funding would have to be found. As we have 
seen, extant plans for EO systems lay through the old MPT-NASDA framework. This is where we can see 
the importance of METI’s SOD system, mentioned in Chapter 1. As will become clear, METI regarded 
what was to become the Basic Law as its chance to become a major space player and bend the 
development and policy logic of combining national security with industrialization to its vision. We 
return to this below.   
 In terms of the SAF framework, then, the SHSP can be seen as strategic action by SAF 3 to set up a 
new, provisional internal governance unit, so that contestation would occur until settlement. But until it 
succeeded through either innovative or strategic action in assuming control, (put more conventionally, if 
the SHSP could be kept clear of compromises or entanglements with SAF 4 actors), the SHSP would be 
seen as the challenger, with the possibility of the creation of a series episodes of contention until 
settlement was finally achieved. If, however, the SHSP became entangled with SAF 4 players, it would be 
become the subject of strategic action between SAF 4 players for control, or put bluntly, a football.  
 SAF 4: In terms of challengers and incumbents, the Basic Law set the SHSP as the cauldron for 
contests between MEXT, the previous incumbent and future challenger, the SHSP itself (unless it could 
be directly or indirectly controlled, manipulated, sublimated or blocked by MEXT) and METI, which saw 
the Basic Law as an opportunity to fundamentally transition a considerable portion of development to 
industrialization under its control. In other words, from an SAF framework-based analysis, the creation of 
the SHSP was both a threat and an opportunity for MEXT, and an opportunity for METI. Logically, 
MEXT would attempt innovative and strategic actions as incumbent to protect its position, while METI 
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would attempt innovative or, if it could, strategic action to take advantage of the opportunity availed by 
the advent of the SHSP.  
 In the event, the challenge to MEXT was immediately urgent and critical since the Basic Law had 
specifically mandated an investigation of JAXA’s role in the new administrative and policy paradigm. 
This, in the wrong hands (activist politicians intent on really challenging the status quo) the Basic Law 
could possibly be interpreted by MEXT as a declaration of war. Thus, it is possible to see from an 
institutional framework point of view how MEXT, path dependent on a track fundamentally different 
from the new paradigm faced, potentially, a crisis (or to use neoinstiutionalist terminology, a critical 
juncture.) 
 METI’s position, on the other hand would be to maximize its gains through innovative and strategic 
action. Normatively, METI’s raison d’être was promoting industrialization. Crucially, however, as we 
have seen, in 1969, MITI had been excluded from the business of developing Japan’s space program in 
favor of the STA. However, MITI had been pressing for a bigger role in space policy, budget and 
authority ever since the late 1970s. MITI first established its Space Industry Office in 1979, then 
upgraded it to a Space Industry Division in 1987. In July 1997, MITI merged its aircraft and space 
divisions both under the Machinery and Information Industries Bureau, into the Aircraft, Ordnance and 
Space Division.16  
 MITI had carefully built up its own space program through its research arm, the Institute for 
Unmanned Space Experiment Free Flyer (USEF), which had played a major role in developing a series of 
dual-use technologies that were potentially useful to the new policy paradigm, working with industry, 
notably Melco and NEC. Next, METI would need to defend the GX program. Third, in terms of industrial 
policy, METI had taken the decision through USEF to support NEC. Through its work on IGS and the 
DRTS system, Melco had managed to develop large satellite technologies that were becoming 
commercially sellable. Through the loss of COMETS however, NEC had lost its own route to developing 
large communications satellite frames. This led METI through USEF, and working with NEC, to find 
ways to secure funding for NEC, which was to emerge in the form of funding for the Advanced Satellite 
with New System Architecture for Observation (ASNARO) project in particular.  
 In IDOJ, I identified USEF as METI’s major development arm designed to build lobbying 
momentum for the creation of a domestic national security market. Established in 1986, USEF was 
METI’s main space organization. Its publicly-stressed role was to fund satellite programs that promoted 
cost-cutting and commercialization of the Japanese space industry. Privately, USEF saw itself as an kind 
of antidote to NASDA, as METI saw itself as the antidote to MEXT. Where NASDA would take seven 
years to research and launch a satellite for several hundred million dollars, USEF and MEXT wanted to 
do the same in five years or shorter, at a fraction of the cost. Further, behind the scenes, USEF also played 
a major role in developing quite aggressive dual-use technologies, including the USERS-SEM re-entry 
system. In terms of the SAF framework, USEF can be seen as an overall attempt by METI to assert 
strategic action as a challenger to STA/NASDA, and then JAXA. 
 While, as is explained in IDOJ in detail, USEF was typically led by retired Melco executives, 
following METI’s strategy of supporting a wide industrial applications base. But USEF took a decision to 
                                                
16 Saadia Pekkanen, Picking Winners? From Technology Catch-up to the Space Race in Japan (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2003), pp.172-173; Norihiko Saeki, “COTS Policy & ‘Space on Demand’ in Japan,” METI, Aerospace 
and Defense Industry Division, Manufacturing Industries Bureau, Tokyo, 29 October 2007, slide 2.  
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actively support NEC by awarding it contracts to build ASNARO. Thus, supporting the ASNARO system 
for EO (dual-use ISR/MDA) systems became a major priority, or perhaps even the fundamental plank for 
METI to mount a strong challenger bid, then strategic action to place itself as a chief beneficiary of any 
policy change and administrative reorganization.17   
 Working with NEC, in anticipation of the major policy and administrative reorientation proposed by 
the Kawamura initiative, METI in 2007 had commissioned NEC to build this relatively high-resolution 
dual-use ASNARO satellite program designed to be a fraction of the price of the IGS satellites, which 
METI planned to propose as a major component of the new dual-use markets to be created as a result of 
the Basic Law.18 In fact, METI Senior Vice-Minister Hachirō Okonogi was one of six authors of the 2005 
NSSPG report. As a backdrop to this, in that year, 2005, Okonogi had struck a major trade agreement 
with Vietnam designed to help Vietnam’s accession to the WTO. In 2011, METI was to lead a landmark 
deal selling two of the satellites, JV LOTSUSat-1 and JV LOTSUSat-2, based on ASNARO technology, 
to Vietnam as Japan’s first-ever major ODA agreement to feature space technologies.19 In terms of the 
SAF framework, all these actions can be cast in terms of innovative, then strategic action by METI to 
insert, and then assert itself as a major part of what it hoped would be Japan’s new space policy and 
administrative paradigm.  
 Thus, it is probably reasonable to assume that METI’s wishes were writ large in, or that it expected a 
positive outcome, from Basic Law. Then, if the Cabinet Office was in control of policy, METI should 
expect to play a role both in planning and therefore execution of the new opportunities afforded in the 
Basic Law. METI’s logic, in the competitive field in institutional dynamics would therefore for be to 
maximize its opportunity. Ideally, or ambitiously perhaps, METI’s game plan would be to move from a 
challenger to incumbency. This is exactly what it tried.   
 SAF 7: As noted in SAF 3, industry as a challenger played a major in setting up the post-Basic Law 
General Space Activities SAF. As a general field of action, Keidanren consistently pushed not only for 
investment for their members but also for relaxations on restrictions, particularly the PPR.  
                                                
17 Pekkanen & Kallender Umezu (2010), pp. 68-9, 97. Behind the scenes, USEF even investigated the development of a 
HiMEOS (高度なマヌーバビリティを有する地球観測監視衛星 or High Maneuverability Earth Observation Satellite) 
that had similar capacities to the just launched Tsubame. This program was rejected in the mid-2000s by the MOF 
because the MOF could find no-nonmilitary justification for the program.  
18 Paul Kallender, “Japanese Firms Urged to Cut Satellite Costs—Institute Proposes Mission to Test New Parts,” Space 
News, 20 April 1998; Paul Kallender, “Japan Takes on Europe, U.S., Public Cash Infusion for Satellite Component 
Makers,” Space News, 23-29 March 1998; Under Fire, President Quits,” New York Times, 25 March 1998; “Losses and 
Scandal Claim Mitsubishi Scalp,” BBC News Online—World: Asia-Pacific, 25 March 1998; “Interview, Ichiro Taniguichi, 
‘Nihon no Uchū Kaihatsu Riyō to Bijinesu’ [Business and Japan’s Space Development and Industrialization],” 11 July 
2007, available online at www.jaxa.jp; also see Saeki, (2007), esp. slides 5-9, 14-20; Ministry of Economy, Trade, and 
Industry (METI), Uchū Sangyōka Wakingu Gurupu—Chūkan Hōkoku [Space Industrialization Working 
Group—Midterm Re- port] (Tokyo: METI, August 2004), pp. 3-4. For details of the dual-use spy satellite program, called 
Advanced Satellite with New system (sic) Architecture for Observation ASNARO, which was to become very important 
to METI in the coming years, see http://www.jspacesystems.or.jp/en_project_asnaro/. 
19 国家宇宙戦略立案話会	 報告書	 ー	 新たな宇宙開発利用制度の構築に向けてー	 ２００５年８月	 国家
宇宙戦略立案話会, 国家宇宙戦略立案話会のメンバー, p. 49; Paul Kallender-Umezu, “Japan, Vietnam Sign Deal for 
Two Radar Imaging Satellites,” Space News, 4 November 2011; Press release, “Signing of Japanese ODA Loan with the 
Socialist Republic of Vietnam –Supporting Sustainable Development through Climate Change Measures and Economic 
Growth–” Japan International Cooperation Agency; Prof. Doan Minh Chung, Director Space Technology Institute (STI) 
Vietnam Academy of Science and Technology (VAST), “Earth Observation Satellite Program of Vietnam and 
applications for disaster management,” presentation to the UNESCAP – ICC & HLDM Meetings, Bangkok, 26-28 
November 2013; Aaron Mehta and Paul Kallender-Umezu, “With New Rules, Japan Emerges in Pacific,” Defense News, 
3 May 2015. 
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 On top of regular calls on the government for more funding by USEF, whose presidents, as we saw, 
were traditionally retired leaders of Melco’s space division, Keidanren made specific calls for both 
sustained investment and the relaxation of the PPR. Keidanren’s actions regarding space policy and 
investment were entirely logical. Specific concerns in lobbying selected LDP politicians from 2003 
onwards included getting the H-IIA back to work, funding the QZSS system, and, for example, relaxing 
export restrictions so MHI that could sell various rocket engines overseas.20 
 In June 2006 Keidanren let the government know that it strongly supported the enactment of what 
was to become the Basic Law because Keidanren deemed it indispensable to moving forward from 
development to what Keidanren framed as “three new pillars” for Japanese space industry, namely; 
national security, industrialization, and research and development. It further lobbied for the setup of a 
“space development strategy headquarters” with the prime minister at its head. In July 2007, Keidanren 
again urged the necessity of a “basic space law,” calling for a unified space promotion system that would 
smooth the path of the Japanese space industry and take it to a new stage.21  
 Also, as for the MOD, Imazu was one of the authors of the NSSPG and there is little doubt that the 
report reflected many of the MOD’s concerns. However, institutionally, as noted, the then JDA was 
separated and distant from the civilian space program and, until the PPR was changed, the SDF’s logical 
strategy might be framed along the lines of promoting any new system that could give it better 
deliverables with the minimum risks and costs. If we adopt this logic of the MOD’s behavior would be to 
transform its position from distanced customer to participant, when it suited it, but mainly as to one as 
beneficiary, much of the MOD’s subsequent actions can be explained in terms of its individual 
institutional logic.  
 As with other ministries, the MOD took the Basic Law as an opportunity to consider its space-related 
activities more systematically.22 In 2008, the MOD moved to establish an outline for its potential needs. 
The first step was to establish preliminary institutional and decision-making structures. As discussed 
earlier, this was necessary because the MOD lacked any formal structures to deal with funding space 
activities except to deal with its commercial arrangement renting transponders for communications, and 
for the purchase of image data. As an institutional novice, then, the MOD had to begin with the 
foundational work of establishing committees and offices. This was achieved with a small space office, 
the Committee for the Promotion of Outer Space Development and Utilization (CPSDU), a Space and 
                                                
20 Author interview with Takashi Inoue, manager of Space, Energy and Technology Policy Group, Nippon Keidanren, 
Tokyo, 19 May 2004. LDP backers included, for example, Fukushiro Nukaga, who was appointed Director General of the 
Japan Defense Agency in July 1998. He subsequently headed the LDP’s PARC and was thus in a position to guide the 
LDP’s policy on a number of fronts, including defense and constitutional reform. Interviews, Kobayashi Minoru, Director, 
Space Systems Department Aerospace Headquarters, MHI; member, Planning Subcommittee of the Space Activities 
Promotion Council, Tokyo, 17 June 2004, and 6 July 2004. See also Paul Kallender-Umezu, “Industry Wants to Allow 
Japanese Military to Use Space Technology,” Space News, 21 June 2004; Nippon Keidanren, “Looking to Japan’s Future: 
Keidanren’s Proposal on Constitutional Policy Issues,” 18 January 2005. 
21 Interview, Tsuzukibashi, 18 April 2006; Uchū Kaihatsu Riyō Suishin ni Muketa Dai 3 Ki Kagaku Gijutsu Kihon 
Keikaku ni tai suru Yōbō [Request Regarding the Promotion of Space Development and Utilization in the Third Basic 
Science and Technology Plan], 2 March 2005. 
22 Ministry of Defense (MOD), Nihon no Bōei (Tokyo: MOD, 2009), p. 105; CPSDU, “Uchū Kaihatsu Riyō ni kan suru 
Kihon Hōshin ni Tsuite [Concerning the Basic Policy on Space Development and Utilization], 15 January 2009, pp. 1-13). 
Committee on Promotion of Outer Space Development and Use (CPSDU), “Uchū Kaihatsu Riyō ni kan suru Kihon 
Hōshin ni Tsuite (Gaiyō)” [Concerning the Basic Policy on Space Development and Utilization (Outline)], 15 January 
2009; “Space-Related Defense Policies and Future Topics for Consideration” (Tokyo: MOD, November 2008), slides 2-7. 
See also Paul Kallender-Umezu, “Japan Military Space Guidelines Identify Capabilities but Lack Planning Specifics,” 
Space News, 16 February 2009.  
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Maritime Security Policy Office, and a Space Technology Planning Office in the Technical Research and 
Defense Institute (TRDI) weapons laboratory.23 
 After conducting an audit of its potential defensive military space needs, the MOD published the 
2009 Basic Guidelines for Space Development and Use of Space on January 15, 2009. The Guidelines, 
following a series of meetings conducted through late 2009 from September chaired by Vice Minister 
Seigo Kitamura, as we have seen, the MOD identified a significant number of space-related technologies 
and programs as being critical to the development of an integrated C4ISR infrastructure based on the need 
for improved imaging satellites and a dedicated military communications satellite system. Other items of 
interest included EW, small and low-cost satellites that can be launched on short notice (TacSats), 
space-based SIGINT, independent PNT, satellite protection, and SSA capabilities.24  
 To understand the MOD’s position, in line with prior comments made in earlier chapters, it is 
probably best to consider it again, as with IGS, fundamentally still as a customer ministry rather than as 
an activist challenger. In terms of budgets and programs, the MOD had been a notable beneficiary of the 
Taepodong “shock” through the establishment of Japan’s BMD architecture, providing budgets and 
weapons platforms for both the Maritime Self-Defense Forces (through a growing flotilla of Aegis 
cruisers) and the Ground Self-Defense Forces (through PAC-3 batteries). At the same time the SDF was 
also receiving some benefit from data provided by the slowly evolving IGS system. 
 From this perspective it is unsurprising that the NDPG of 2004 omitted mention of space-related 
capabilities with the exception of BMD. However, reflecting the potential opportunities afforded by the 
Basic Law, the revised NDPG of 2010 identified Japan’s need to respond to new challenges for access to 
outer space as part of the “maintenance of the global commons,” and for the SDF, as part of the concept 
of the Dynamic Defense Force (DDF) concept developed in the NDPG, to develop its ISR capabilities, 
including the use of space technologies. However, no major budget lines were established, except for 
some small R&D budgets to study space-based EW.25  
 The MOD’s careful approach, again, can be explained on two more levels. While post-2007 the SDF 
had become concerned about the PRC’s ASAT test and the growing potential of a PRC ASAT threat, the 
MOD felt it could do very little about it, except to invest some R&D into satellite hardening by making 
satellites better able to withstand laser blinding or, more extremely kinetic attacks, presumably from 
co-orbital or direct-ascent ASATs. Secondly, the MOD remained reluctant to spend more than a minimal 
amount of money researching space-based EW because of budget and technology constraints, its 
unfamiliarity with the realities of space development and its lack of established doctrine for the defensive 
utilization of space. With all this in mind, unless there was a major shock and a strong political decision 
and the support of the U.S. in establishing an independent EW system, the MOD’s main goal was remain 
a customer – but an increasingly sophisticated one.26 
 
 
 
                                                
23 Paul Kallender-Umezu, “Japanese MoD Unveils First Ever Space Budget,” Space News, 8 September 2008.  
24 See Ministry of Defense, Basic Guidelines for Space Development and Use of Space; Paul Kallender-Umezu, “Japan 
Military Space Guidelines Identify Capabilities but Lack Planning Specifics,” Space News, 16 February 2009, p. A4.  
25 Japan Ministry of Defense, National Defense Program Guidelines for FY11 and Beyond, 17 December 2010, pp., 3, 4, 
15. 
26 Oe interview, ibid. 
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Episode of Contention   
Following its establishment, the SHSP quickly initiated three primary bodies, the Experts Research 
Committee on Space Development Strategy (Experts Committee, or Special Committee on Space Policy), 
which became the motor driving the SHSP’s work, and with two working groups: a Working Group on 
the Study of the Restructuring for the Organization for Space Development and Use (also referred to as 
the Working Group for Restructuring of Space Related Organizations, or Restructuring WG) and the 
Working Group to Study a Space Activities Act (also known as the Working Group for Legislation on 
Space Related Activities, or SAA WG).  
 Of these, the two former groups were tasked with both formulating the “Basic Plan” (Basic Plan 1) 
and executing the administrative reform strategy. As soon as December 2008 the SHSP released a 
“Vision” version of the Basic Space Plan, which was initially to be formalized by May 2009, that set out 
a new “Basic Strategy” that initially delineated “five pillars” for future space policy: 
1. Improving the Welfare and Safety of Daily Life.  
2. Strengthening the [sic] International Security by applying the [sic] Space Technology.  
3. Performing Constructive International Roles through Space Technology.  
4. Developing the Private Sector as the Strategic Industry in the 21st Century.  
5. Inspiring People to Dream and Investing in the Future.”27 
  
 Following this, the SHSP subsequently released its first Basic Plan for Space Policy, or Basic Plan 1: 
“Wisdom of Japan Moves Space,” on 2 June 2009. This was formulated on Article 24 of the Basic Law. 
Basic Plan 1 set out development goals on principles specified in the Basic Law:  
 
1. Ensure a Rich, Secure and Safe Life. 
2. Contribute to (sic) Enhancement of Security. 
3. Promote the Utilization of Space for Diplomacy. 
4. Create an energetic future by promoting R&D for the forefront areas [sic]. 
5. Foster Strategic Industries for the 21st Century.  
 
 To fulfill the basic targets, five-year development goals and ten-year targets for five satellite systems 
were set. These were: 
 
1. A land and ocean observing satellite system to contribute to Asia and other regions.  
2. A global environmental change and weather observing satellite system.  
3. An advanced telecommunication satellite system.  
4. A positioning satellite system.  
5. A satellite system for national security. 
 
 In addition, there were four R&D programs; a space science program, a human space activities 
program, a space solar power program and a small demonstration satellite program. After only six 
meetings ending August 2009, the SSA WG set itself the goal to draft by January 2010 a fully-fledged 
law governing space activities by September 2010.28  
                                                
27 Yasuyoshi Komizo, Ambassador, Permanent Mission of Japan to the International Organizations in Vienna “Japanese 
Space Policy – Basic Space Law-“ COPUOUS Legal Subcommittee 48th Session.  
28 The Legal WG, also called the Working Group for the Space Activities Act (SAA WG) met six times between October 
2008 and August 2009, and drew up a final report in preparation for a bill that would have led to the SAA, but that was 
never submitted to the Diet; see Setsuko Aoki, “The National Space Law of Japan: Basic Space Law and the Space and 
the Activities Act in the Making,” presentation, Galloway Symposium, The National Center for Remote Sensing, Air and 
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 Then, on 17 March 2009, the SHSP’s restructuring WG released its mid-term report on delivering the 
institutional organizational review.29 As noted before, the WG came up with four basic options. The first 
option represented a virtual “do-nothing scenario,” suggesting that JAXA to reflect its priorities based on 
the Basic Plan while maintaining the jurisdictional control of its programs under MEXT. The second 
option suggested adding the role of the Cabinet Office to promote space utilization and giving other 
ministries co-jurisdiction to promote their own projects. The third option would see the Cabinet Office 
take control of certain programs while allowing other ministries co-jurisdiction of their programs in 
JAXA. The fourth option suggested a much cleaner break with the past placing JAXA completely under 
the Cabinet Office, in other words de facto setting up a completely new executive Space Agency, some 
form of an Uchūchō within the Cabinet Office.  
 Basic Plan 1 retained a significant focus on R&D in four major areas and left MEXT and JAXA’s 
extant global environmental monitoring programs intact, but with major additions: a dual-use land and 
ocean global EO system, and budgeting for the QZSS navigation system. Meanwhile, the IGS 
reconnaissance satellite program was kept in place, and kept separate. In other words, Basic Plan 1 was 
designed to add two dual-use and strategic programs to the status quo, with a stated funding pathway of 
increasing the overall space actives budget to around ¥500 billion annually from the ~¥350-billion level 
that had been set as a budget ceiling by the MOF.  
 A closer look at the five programs already, as noted above, however, shows that Basic Plan 1 was 
clearly a huge ask, particularly in terms of the first program, for which there was no precedent. The 
inclusion of the concept of the land and ocean observing satellite system being oriented to contribute to 
Asia clearly signifies that this program was to be based on the METI-ASNARO-NEC program, which 
would require major lifting to enact. First, USEF plans for this constellation would involve around eight 
ASNARO satellites and would require the convincing of MEXT and JAXA to fundamentally reconsider 
their own plans and programs. Secondly, funding such a program would require a major boost in annual 
funding; if this could not be achieved, then someone else, probably MEXT and JAXA, would have to pay 
by shedding some programs. So coordination of this program necessitated an executive authority with 
sufficient policy or budgeting power in whatever new administrative structure that would be established 
to push the program through, probably against the opposition of MEXT, which would feel its incumbency 
threatened.   
                                                                                                                                                        
Space Law at the University of Mississippi School of Law The Journal of Space Law and the International Institute of 
Space Law, 6th Eilene M. Galloway Symposium on Critical Issues in Space Law, a Comparative Look at National Space 
Laws and Their International Implications, 1 December 2011. 
29 See 宇宙開発利用体制検討ワーキンググループ	 第６回	 議事次第 平成 21 年 3 月 17 日（火）」Uchū Kaihatsu 
Riyō Taisei Kento Waakingu Gurupu [Agenda of the 6th Meeting of the Working Group on the Study of the Restructuring 
for the Organization for Space Development and Use, 17 March 2009 (Tuesday).] The WG produced four reports; a 
summary; a schema of the proposed restructuring; a detailed report; and an opposition “opinion” by MEXT, which was 
already moving to resist encroachment on its budget and program by the CO. The summary: 我が国の宇宙開発利用体
制の在り方について< 中間報告> (案) ~主な論点~」Waga Kuni no Uchyū Kaihatsu Riyō Taisei no Arigata ni tsuite 
<Chūkan Hōkoku> (An) ~ Ōmona Ronten [Concerning the Way Forward for Our Country’s Space Development and 
Utilization System <Interim Report > (Draft) ~ Principal Points](案) 我が国の宇宙開発利用体制の在り方について 
< 中間報告> (An) Waga Kuni no Kuni no Uchū Kaihatsu Riyō Taisei no Arigata ni Tsuite <Chūkan Hōkoku > [(Draft) 
Concerning the Way Forward for Our Country’s Space Development and Utilization System <Interim Report >]; 
MEXT’s opposing opinion: 宇宙開発利用体制の在り方についての意見（文部科学省提出資料 Uchū Kaihatsu Riyō 
Taisei no Arigata ni tsuite Ikken (Monbukagakushō Teishutsu Shiryō) [Opinion on Concerning the Way Forward for Our 
Country’s Space Development and Utilization System (Submission by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, 
Science and Technology)]. MEXT argued it should retain control of JAXA and that JAXA be the main pillar of Japanese 
space development. See SHSP website at: http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/utyuu/working/dai6/gijisidai.html. The 
author’s interpretation is based on his translation of the Japanese.  
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 Basic Plan 1, then showed a clear attempt by the SHSP to deliver a new approach to space policy. 
First, Basic Plan 1 established the SHSP as the coordinating institution for space policy. Secondly, by 
delineating outlines for five-, and ten-year timescales, the SHSP had attempted to place clear parameters 
for the utilization agenda specified as a goal in the Basic Law. However, Basic Plan 1 also contained 
fundamental flaws. First of all, in its Appendix 1, schedules were written as a “reference” and therefore 
not considered to be binding. Further, Basic Plan 1 was riddled with caveats regarding specifics, such as 
“…will be considered,” and “…will be targeted.”  
 Second and most critically, Basic Plan 1 failed to specify the overall budget for implementation and 
did not clearly show which programs should enter research and development from the current or the next 
fiscal year. Far from the CEPF model, the SHSP did not have the power to force the MOF to approve the 
long-term funding required to start the dual-use global monitoring system, or fund the QZSS.30 
 This was also because, without having established a definitive new structure within the Cabinet 
Office as stipulated in the Basic Law, work-sharing and agreement between MEXT, the incumbent, and 
METI, which wanted Japan to purchase its ASNARO satellites, remained contested. As the MOF retained 
the authority to sanction budget increases without coordination with the SHSP, and as no clarity existed 
on the feasibility and schedules in Basic Plan 1, the MOF, following its own institutional, normative and 
legal logic, declined to fund the major budget increases Basic Plan 1 requested. In simple but dramatic 
terms, Basic Plan 1 was still-born.  
 Regarding the restructuring WG outcome, it is also possible to see classic stalling tactics within the 
SSHP. Instead of coming up with a definitive new structure, the restructuring WG had come up with four 
options, and only two of them approached the outcome desired by the NSSPG and implied as the 
objectives of the Basic Law. As noted previously, the first option only asked JAXA to reflect its policy in 
a future Basic Plan, and failed to provide a policy control body superior to MEXT, which would retain 
control of JAXA.  
 The second option also left ministries with jurisdiction over their own projects, and again did not 
implicate the necessity of establishing a superior policymaking body. On the other hand, the other two 
options favored the new direction, i.e. were closer to that intended by the NSSPG. The third option 
anticipated a partial solution that would place control over industrialization and national security-related 
programs under the Cabinet Office. The fourth, and most radical, represented a fundamental change in 
terms of wresting control of space policymaking away from MEXT and into the Cabinet Office, which 
could be interpreted as being fully implementing a decisive break from the past.  
 A second main overall issue, and one was not addressed in the Basic Law, was budgeting authority. 
While it can be reasonably anticipated that the Uchūchō-based solution would enable a new agency to 
produce its own final budget line and the authority to present budget requests to the MOF, as the old SAC 
had done, none of the other three options suggested this power, de facto potentially leaving budgeting up 
to competitive bidding. As the history of Japan’s bureaucracy shows, and as institutional theory often 
points out, protection of budgets is the sine qua non of any administrative organization.  
 What had happened?  
 Of the eight members of the WG, chaired under professor Akihiko Tanaka of the University of 
Tokyo, six were affiliated to MEXT through their professorships or organizational affiliations, and only 
two directly to private industry, suggesting that the WG’s conclusions were a compromise between 
                                                
30 Suzuki (2009). 
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different institutional actors within the field of the Cabinet Office. Whatever deeper motives may have 
existed in the restructuring WG, during the summer of 2009, politics intervened. The LDP-led SHSP was 
running out of time. By the spring of 2009, it was apparent that the DPJ would probably win the 
upcoming Diet elections, with surveys of the three hundred single-member districts by major daily 
newspapers conducted prior to the general election had predicted that the DPJ would likely receive over 
three hundred seats.  
In fact, by 2008 the LDP faced widespread loss of its political mandate with voters following a 
succession of increasingly unpopular prime ministers since the premiership of Koizumi, and the broad 
perception both domestically and internationally of the failure of the LDP’s economic and fiscal policies. 
This probably explains the fast one-year timetable to complete restructuring (as does the fact that budget 
negotiations usually begin in mid-summer in time for bidding requests to the MOF each August).31  
The next critical issue confronting the tasks involved in implementing the Basic Law was the fact that 
the DPJ had its own vision for instituting a command-and-control function, by establishing an Uchūchō 
and Cabinet Office committees to control all aspects of policy and budget-making. 
 
Episode of Contention: Non-Compliance of SHSP with DPJ 
SAF 3: The electoral victory of the DPJ in September 2009 added a fundamentally new variable to the 
analytical framework; the field of political dynamics. The 16 September 2009 inauguration of Yukio 
Hatoyama as prime minister, and only the fourth non-LDP prime minister since 1955, also brought Japan 
its first substantial change of government since 1955. The victory was a landslide, with the party securing 
308 out of 480 seats in the House of Representatives, leaving the LDP with only 119 seats, a complete 
reversal from four years earlier, when the LDP secured 296 seats and the DPJ 113. The DPJ’s huge 
majority was hailed as an “historic watershed” by commentators.32  
It also appeared to give the DPJ a political mandate for its policies, or failing that, to try a new 
direction along the lines of the DPJ’s promises of seiken kōtai (“regime change”) and seikatsu dai-ichi 
(quality of life first).33 Another major platform was the jigyō shiwake investigations to attack “public 
waste,” i.e. to open up and publicly scrutinize/ audit the more obviously opaque or pork-barrel projects 
lurking in the vast budget consumed by the subgovernment.34 The advent of the DPJ was to have a major 
                                                
31 Following the 2006 ouster of Koizumi, the major factor in the LDP’s 2005 victory, the electorate faced the return of 
“politics as usual” with a succession of three prime ministers unable to deliver on the party’s 2005 manifesto. The 
administration of Prime Minister Taro Asō was criticized in particular for its economic stimulus program, which seemed 
only to increase debt but deliver no improvements in quality of life. Japan’s ranking in per capita gross domestic product 
(GDP), which was third in the world as recently as 2000, fell to 19th in 2007, while during the 2000-7 period of export-led 
growth, Japan rose to second in the world in its poverty rate, which measures the number of people who earn less than 
half the median income. Over the same period, the number of non-regular employees rose to more than a third of the 
Japanese labor force. Tobias Harris, “How will the DPJ Change Japan?” Naval War College Review, Vol. 63, No. 1. 
(Winter 2010). 
32 Hiroshi Izumi, “Historic Victory, Ticklish Transition,” Tokyo Foundation, 7 September 2009.  
33 One Asahi Shimbun poll found that only 24 percent of respondents felt that “regime change”—that is, a DPJ victory 
—would make Japanese politics better; 56 percent felt the DP would leave things unchanged. Another Asahi poll asked 
respondents to comment first on whether the LDP would be able to pay for its promises, then whether the DPJ would be 
able to pay for those it made. The numbers were the exact same for both parties: 8 percent felt that each party would have 
the funds to cover its promises, while 83 percent were skeptical; Asahi Shimbun, 20 August 2009.. 
34 Regarding cutting waste, which Kato called a “review of governmental programs” the DPJ brought in the 
Governmental Revitalization Unit (GRU) within the Cabinet Office to no less than attempt to reform no less than… “The 
overall national administration, including the budget and system of national administration,” “from the people's 
standpoint, and also to review the division of roles among the national government, local public authorities, and private 
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impact on the SHSP because the DPJ attempted and failed to assert its political control of space policy 
over MEXT by attempting to establish an Uchūchō.  
The DPJ’s stance on political control was far more radical than that of even Koizumi, was heavily 
informed by the policies of Hatoyama’s own grandfather Ichiro Hatoyama, and lessons learned by DPJ 
members who had experienced their own powerlessness during the abortive 1993-4 seven-party coalition 
government of Morihiro Hosokawa fifteen years earlier.35  
The techniques to be employed in the pursuit of seiken kōtai favored by the DPJ in 2009 were 
outlined by Katsuya Okada, the DPJ’s first foreign minister and Hideki Kato, who in October 2009 
became secretary general of Japan’s Government Revitalization Unit.36  
 These were, first, echoing Koizumi, to strengthen the Cabinet Office at the expense of the 
bureaucracy. Second, cutting waste meant introducing a new policymaking system led by top-down 
political leadership by the Cabinet to take control of the allocation of the ¥207 trillion budget, while 
attacking budget pork through the jigyō shiwake hearings.37 In an October 26 speech to the 2009 
Extraordinary Diet Session, Hatoyama laid out his vision to institute a “bloodless Heisei Restoration,” 
                                                                                                                                                        
companies.” See “First Meeting of the Government Revitalization Unit,” Prime Minister’s Office, 22 October 2009 
http://japan.kantei.go.jp/hatoyama/actions/200910/22sassin_e.html 
35 Hatoyama’s grandfather Ichiro Hatoyama, the 52nd, 53rd and 54th Prime Minister of Japan had noted the central 
bureaucracy’s own “transfer of power” from political parties to the military before World War II and then to the U.S. 
occupation forces after the defeat of Japan in 1945, during which the bureaucracy had re-enhanced its own power in a 
“divide-and-conquer strategy” taking advantage of the Occupation’s General Headquarters’ heavy reliance on the 
cooperation of Japanese administrators, to construct a sectionalist structure that made it indispensable to formulate and 
administer stable policy resistant to political or military control.  
 When Hatoyama ousted Yoshida and took over as prime minister, he found himself stymied by the sectionalism that 
Yoshida had built as a bulwark to protect the bureaucracy. The Hatoyama Cabinet had devised a variety of reforms 
intended to break down sectionalism that included Ichiro Kono, who served in a number of cabinet posts during his career, 
including that of minister of construction, as a battering ram to try to effect a massive reallocation of budget funds to 
benefit the rural prefectures. Hatoyama had also tried to impose his agenda at meetings of administrative vice-ministers, 
and set up conferences among the heads of related ministries and pushed for a budget office directly under the prime 
minister. He also tried to increase the number of political appointments in the government. Many of these tools were to 
become the basis of the weapons that the DPJ attempted to deploy after September 2009.  
 Half a century later, the DPJ’s approach was also to be informed by lessons learned by DPJ members who had 
experienced their own powerlessness during the abortive 1993-4 seven-party coalition government of Morihiro Hosokawa, 
which had conspicuously failed to find a practical way to form policy not independent from the bureaucracy, undermined 
by a weak cabinet that the bureaucracy was able to ignore. See Tetsuya Murai, “The DPJ’s True Mandate,” The Tokyo 
Foundation, 26 November 2010, http://www.tokyofoundation.org/en/articles/2010/the-dpj2019s-true-mandate. 
36 In a major speech held in conjunction with the 16th Annual Japan-U.S. Security Seminar, Hideki Kato, who in October 
2009 became Secretary General of Japan’s Government Revitalization Unit within the Cabinet Office, and in April 2010 
became president of the Tokyo Foundation, laid out the tasks as he and the Hatoyama Administration saw them. As he 
put it, under Japan’s system, the central ministries did not implement policy formulated by Cabinet ministers able to 
construct policy above bureaucratic sectionalism, but the ministries “came first,” taking control of policy formulation and 
implementation, so that ministers were “effectively figureheads and forced to implement extant policies, making effective 
parliamentary control to effect drastic policy shifts.  
 To assert control, the DPJ would introduce a council of three political-level appointees comprising the minister, 
senior vice-minister, and parliamentary secretary to enable ministers to take the lead, and this council would meet on its 
own terms, banning press conferences by administrative vice-ministers—the highest-ranking bureaucrats, lessening their 
abilities to set agenda. 
37 Katsuya Okada, Seiken Kōtai, (Tokyo: Kodansha, 2008), pp. 218-23; Democratic Party of Japan Election Manifesto, 
July 2009, available at www.dpj.or.jp/special/manifesto2009/pdf/ manifesto_2009.pdf. In an October 26 speech to the 
2009 extraordinary Diet session, Hatoyama had laid out his vision to institute a “bloodless Heisei Restoration,” in terms 
of conducting a “major cleanup” of waste, boosting social spending and strengthening political leadership within 
ministries by dissolving the administrative vice ministers’ council, among other measures. For Hatoyama’s speech, see第
１ ７ ３ 回 国 会 に お け る 鳩 山 内 閣 総 理 大 臣 所 信 表 明 演 説 , 平 成 ２ １ 年 １ ０ 月 ２ ６ 日 , 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/hatoyama/statement/200910/26syosin.html. See also Ichiro Ozawa, Ozawa-shugi (Tokyo: 
Shueisha, 2006), pp. 101-104; Naoto Kan, “Minshuto seiken no mezasu kuni no katachi,” Chuo Koron (July 2009), pp. 
172-73. 
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and talked in terms of conducting a “major cleanup” of waste, boosting social spending, and 
strengthening “political leadership” within ministries by dissolving the Administrative Vice Ministers’ 
Council, among other measures. 
 The DPJ attempted a six-prong attack on extant practices. First it set up a new National Strategy 
Bureau (NSB) headed by a senior Cabinet minister and staffed with roughly 30 appointees, including ten 
Diet members, to try to take over direction of the budgeting process with Naoto Kan, simultaneously 
serving as deputy prime minister, at the helm. Second it established an “inner sanctum” of like-minded 
senior figures, with Okada as MOFA Minister and Hatoyama confidante Hirofumi Hirano as Chief 
Cabinet Secretary, Kan as Deputy Prime Minister and NSB chief, and Hirohisa Fujii as MOF Minister to 
distance decisions from interference from the Administrative Vice Ministers’ Council. Third, the DPJ 
then duly abolished the Administrative Vice Ministers’ meetings and replaced them with Parliamentary 
Vice Minister’s meetings, while establishing regulations governing contact between bureaucrats and 
politicians not holding Cabinet or subcabinet appointments. Forth, new regulations required bureaucrats 
to list the contents of all requests from Diet members known to their ministers and, in principal, banned 
efforts by bureaucrats to influence Diet members. Fifth the DPJ mandated that bureaucrats save records 
related to requests for subsidies, licenses and contracts from backbenchers or their secretaries. Sixth, 
Cabinet ministers would be free to choose their own deputy ministers and parliamentary secretaries.38 
 SAF 4: The DPJ’s attempted strategic action on SAF 4, not only in space activities but on this whole 
layer of decision-making power immediately turned it into a challenger. In terms of the General Space 
Activities SAF, the new administration was also a challenger, and the LDP-appointed SHSP flipped its 
role to that of incumbent.  
 The DPJ’s challenge also rapidly brought it into conflict with both industry and METI in particular 
when the jigyō shiwake investigations that began in November 2009 under the control Yukio Edano, State 
Minister in charge of Administrative Reform in December 2009, decided to end the GX program.39 The 
cancellation immediately served notice on not only JAXA and MEXT but also METI and the SHSP that 
the DPJ intended to follow its manifesto. The second round of screenings in late April and late May then 
focused on the vast subgoverment network of IAIs, which included JAXA, and Public Interest Institutions. 
In a move that reached the national news, JAXA had its PR facilities shuttered amongst several other 
high-profile cuts experienced by major IAIs, which had previously considered themselves untouchable.40 
 
 
                                                
38 DPJ Administrative Preparations Committee, Kokumin to tomo ni Kōdō suru “Atarashi Seifu” no Kakuritsu ni Mukete, 
25 September 2003; Office of the Prime Minister, “Roles and Responsibilities of Politicians and Bureaucrats,” 16 
September 2009. 
39 Paul Kallender-Umezu, “Japan’s GX Rocket Targeted for Cancellation in 2010,” Space News, 20 November 2009. 
40 In the event, the publicly televised hearings developed a show trail atmosphere, with bureaucrats, unused to being 
challenged and questioned, clearly discomforted as they attempted to defend various projects in the full glare of TV 
cameras. According to commentators, the DPJ’s unstated motives actually were to examine the IAIs’ relationships with 
their supervising ministries and particularly check for collusive relations between corporations and ministries with respect 
to amakudari as well as the salaries and expenses of amakudari-appointed officials, focusing on the Japan Foundation, the 
Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), JICA, the Agriculture and Livestock Industries Corporation (ALIC), the 
Japan National Tourism Organization (JNTO) and last but not least JAXA, which had its PR facilities cut along with 
tourism services for foreign visitors to Tokyo provided by JNTO, overseas offices of ALIC, and the cutting of programs 
and/or lending activities by Japan the Housing Finance Agency Agriculture, the National Institute for Biomedical 
Innovation and the Forestry and Fisheries Industries Trust Fund, as well the scaling down of the international business 
support program of JETRO. See Aurelia George Mulgan, “Round two of Japan’s government revitalisation,” East Asia 
Forum, 3 June 2010. 
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Strategic Action by Seiji Maehara: Formation of a Guerilla Unit  
The DPJ then faced the task of implementing its Uchūchō concept amid upheavals that were out of its 
control. First, in December 2009, the MOF rejected a slew of funding requests including funding 
ASNARO proposed by METI, which by now had openly become the platform for METI to attempt 
strategic action to challenge MEXT and JAXA.41  
 Then, as part of a move to institute the Uchūchō, activist DPJ Minister for Space Development Seiji 
Maehara attempted what amounted to a coup, adopting the guerilla tactics employed by Koizumi and 
Takenaka a decade earlier. Completely bypassing the SHSP, in February 2010 Maehara constituted a 
small (five member) independent expert panel under Takafumi Matsui, Professor Emeritus of Tokyo 
University and Director of the Chiba Institute of Technology’s Planetary Exploration Research Center, 
tasked with radically overhauling the administrative policymaking structure.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As with the earlier Koizumi-Takenaka tactics, the makeup of the committee was crucial. Matsui, a 
friend of Maehara, had a strong interest in government reform while preserving space science in ISAS, 
views broadly shared by fellow member Taizo Yakushiji of the Japan Science and Technology Agency. 
Yakushiji had also been a CSTP member back at the turn of the century and had a long interest in 
bringing space policy under a national strategy. Joining them were Hiroshi Yamakawa, an elite scientist 
and engineer from ISAS who had played a key role in the celebrated Hayabusa asteroid mission and who 
                                                
41 Aoki (2009). While the main business of the SHSP ground to a halt following the election of the DPJ, some new 
progress was made early into the DPJ administration, but only with the low priority and politically less contentious Lunar 
Exploration Panel, which met regularly through 2009-10, producing its conclusions on 30 July 2010.  
 Notably, METI had tried to include its ASLET air-launch project designed as small-satellite launcher (but with also 
a dual use potential direct ASAT application) as an R&D program in the original August budget request, but this 
disappeared by December. For some details on ASLET see Seiji Matsuda, Hiroshi Kanai, Takayoshi Fuji, Motoki Hinada, 
“An Affordable Micro Satellite Launch Concept in JAPAN,” paper presented to the 6th Responsive Space Conference, 
April 28–May 1, 2008 Los Angeles, CA Launch Concept in JAPAN (AIAA-RS6-2008-5004). 
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was to became the Director-General of the Secretariat of the SHSP under the DPJ; and Shinichi Nakasuka, 
a University of Tokyo scientist and the father of Japan’s university-led microsatellite program.42 
Their product, “Suggestions for Japan’s Strategic Space Policy” or Matsui Plan, were drawn up after 
only half a dozen meetings and released on 20 April 2010. The five-page plan advised that an Uchūchō be 
controlled by a small executive committee of around five experts that would report directly to Hatoyama 
and Maehara.  
The new system proposed breaking JAXA up into smaller units and reorganizing the whole 
administrative and institutional into project groups focused on specific objectives under the control of a 
small Space Policy Commission. All this was to be effected immediately, in time for the annual budget 
request due August. Therefore, in creating a parallel track to the LDP-era SHSP, Maehara had sought to 
re-orientate the implementation of the Basic Law to the most radical direction.43 
The Matsui Plan provides the first compelling empirical data that sustains one of my research’s key 
points; that beginning 2009 a new approach to government and political-bureaucratic relations was 
attempted by the DPJ that was partially successfully implemented in space policy and administration. The 
Matsui Plan was radically different both in presentation and semantic approach to any other space policy 
document seen by this researcher. It was written in under five pages, in clear and straightforward 
language, and contained simple diagrams and lists of objectives proposed, in stark contrast to the dozens 
and hundreds of pages of vague and sometimes florid content that had composed the Fundamental Policy 
of SAC in 1996.  
In terms of programmatical priorities, the Matsui Plan sought to reset the dial back to the Basic Law, 
re-concentrating focus on interlinking industrialization with national security by pushing forward with the 
dual-use land and ocean observation program as the first priority, communications satellite development 
as the second, and the QZSS as a triptych of three top-priority programs. In terms of programmatical logic, 
it is already apparent to see the direct impact of both U.S. pressure and concern about the behavior of the 
Chinese PLAN on policymakers, testifying to power of SAFs 1, 2 and 3 on Japanese space policymakers.  
In terms of implementation and administrative strategic action, however, most critically, the Matsui 
Plan proposed that the Uchūchō would centralize control of program management and budgeting for all 
Japan’s taxpayer-funded space programs, effectively reducing JAXA to a reporting role to a small body 
of commissioners in the Uchūchō. In effect, JAXA and MEXT might have to go cap-in-hand to a superior 
body. If Maehara’s strategic action in setting up the Matsui Committee could be interpreted narratively as 
an attempted a coup over SAF 4, the Matsui Plan could be characterized as an attempted follow-up 
revolution.44  
SAFs 4 and 5: The Matsui Plan fundamentally challenged the SHSP’s previous recommendations 
and was immediately opposed by the SHSP, which treated the plan as a private and personal initiative by 
Maehara, and not an official SHSP product.45 Indeed, Matsui Plan was self-styled as intentionally radical 
                                                
42 今後の宇宙政策の在り方に関する 有識者会議	 提言書	 平成	 ２２年	 ４月	 ２０日 Kongō no Uchyū 
Seisaku no Arikata ni Kan Suru  Yūshikisha Kaigi Teigensho [Regarding Future Space Policy, Experts Group 
Recommendations, April 20, 2010]. See: http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/utyuu/seisaku_kaigi/dai7/gijisidai.html; Paul 
Kallender-Umezu, “Japan Urged to Break Up JAXA and Establish New Space Agency,” Space News, 3 May 2010, p. 10. 
43 Interviews with Shinichi Nakasuka, 25 April 2010, and Matsui, 27 April 2010.   
44 Author interview with Matsui, 27 April 2009.  
45 “We have no official English name for 今後の宇宙政策の在り方に関する有識者会議, which was held on Feb 23rd 
this year for the first time, and was held seven times until April 20th…The committee was established to make a report to 
Mr. Maehara, Minister for Space Policy, not by Strategic HQ for Space Policy. So far we have not made any decision at 
government level about [a] "Space Agency". [The] Space Basic Law requires the government to make a necessary law in 
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by Matsui himself, who stated, “This is a revolutionary scheme that says we [the political leadership 
advised by specialists and the user community] will make the plan and they [the bureaucracy] will just 
implement the projects.”46 For Maehara, the Matsui Plan was the only way he felt able to advance the 
DPJ’s manifesto to assert Cabinet Office control. In terms of the SAF framework, this move represented 
strategic action by SAF 3 to assert control over SAFs 4 and 5. The Matsui Plan transformed the SHSP 
from challenger to incumbent.47 
 
Episodes of Contention  
The implementation of the Matsui Plan however immediately fell victim to political instability. By 
October, Maehara was gone, promoted to Foreign Minister, and the Matsui Plan was shelved by the 
SHSP, as it was directly opposed by MEXT Minister Tatsuo Kawabata, exposing a fundamental flaw in 
the NSSPG’s plans, and the Basic Law. Without a further major revision of the Cabinet Office law, or 
without the deliberate selection of Cabinet ministers all supporting a prime minister and not behooved to 
protecting the budgets, powers and prerogatives of their own ministries, the sanction power of a single 
minister in the Cabinet trumped all others. In the event, the results of the experts’ discussion were first 
shelved and then ultimately abandoned. Subsequently, the restructuring WG did not meet for one year 
following the DPJ’s election.48  
 Following the failure of the Matsui Plan, and with the original 2009-era “option four” proving 
impossible to realize, the challenger (guerilla) group established by Maehara then began a long series of 
innovative and strategic actions seen through a long-drawn out process of open public meetings and more 
formal negotiations with MEXT, with the guerilla group periodically recalibrating its innovative action, 
replicated in a series of mini-episodes of contention until the guerilla group achieved its strategic goal. In 
narrative terms, this led to the establishment of the ONSP and (partial) field settlement. Towards this, the 
guerilla unit launched forward and attempted “option four” (establishment of the Uchūchō), but would 
eventually be pegged back to restructuring “option three”, Cabinet Office control, and only of the QZSS 
system.  
 Subsequent the departure of Maehara, the DPJ and the guerilla group changed tactics. This meant 
more innovative action. In order to use the SHSP to implement the DPJ’s policies, the SHSP was 
scrapped and decisive strategic action was taken by the DPJ as it created a “Mk. II” version of the SHSP, 
reconstituting it with new DPJ appointees, with the guerilla unit developing the strategy of taking control 
                                                                                                                                                        
order that affairs concerning the HQ shall be processed within Cabinet Office, to review and take necessary measures 
concerning the JAXA and other agencies related to space development and use and administrative organs that are the 
competent authorities of them within approximately one year after the coming into effect of the law, and to carry out a 
review concerning the administrative organization in order to promote measures with regard to space development and 
use,” Email exchange with Hirohisa Mori, Senior Coordinator, SHSP, to the author, 27 April 2010.  
46 Author interview with Matsui, Tokyo, 27 April 2010 (unpublished version).  
47 “You have to remember that the recommendation report is by Prof. Takafumi Matsui and other experts. The 
recommendation was aimed at increasing the transparency of Japan's space development strategy and policy, and to look 
at how to unify both our decision making and budget under one authority. In order to urge and promote that idea, we were 
proposing to establish a space Agency under the control of the Cabinet Office. Currently the Ministry of Education, 
Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, which has jurisdiction over JAXA; the Cabinet office, the Ministry of Economy 
Trade and Industry, the Ministry of Defense; and other ministries and various other space-related organizations each have 
their own space budget. Our role is to combine them all together. In order to fulfill our commitment to making an 
effective national strategy, it is necessary to unify all these into one system, we believe. Originally this was written in the 
DPJ's manifesto.” Paul Kallender, “Seiji Maehara, Foreign Minister, Japan,” Space News, 18 October 2010. 
48 Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology. Kawabata Tatsuo Monbukagakushō Daijin Kisha 
Kaiken Roku [Record of MEXT Minister Tatsuo Kawabata’s press briefing on 23 April of 2010]. See: 
http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/daijin/detail/1293106.htm; Anan (2013), pp. 210-218, esp. p. 211. 
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of the QZSS as an initial wedge to establish the principal of Cabinet Office control over at least part of 
Japan’s space program.  
 The QZSS program, having already faced a fifteen year struggle to free itself from interministerial 
infighting, was chosen as the battering ram, or as Matsui once framed it to the author, the “thin end of the 
wedge.” Before this innovative action could begin, or at least as part of establishing the groundwork to 
work towards this goal, there were several layers of remodeling of the SHSP necessary. First of all, the 
Experts Committee, the main decision-making body in the SHSP, was scrapped. Following the failure of 
the Matsui Plan, the Experts Committee last met in May 2009 with its recommendations on the Basic 
Plan. It then did not meet again until October, when it dealt with reports on issues of secondary 
importance, while accepting a report from the SAA WG. When it did subsequently reconvene on 20 
December 2010, after a fourteen month gap, it was as a group of DPJ appointees and with personnel 
deemed reliable in their desire to implement the DPJ’s vision.49   
 However, disastrously for the DPJ’s reform attempts, while all this was happening, in July 2010, the 
DPJ lost control of the Upper House, severely damaging the administration’s political and policy leverage. 
From this point on, many of the subsequent modalities of the DPJ’s relationship with the SHSP can be 
understood against two overall factors: 1. The continuing opposition by MEXT and JAXA to resist 
change to the reformulated “Mk. II” SHSP, and the long and coordinated series of discussions by DPJ 
appointed members to take control of the QZSS program as a wedge to achieve at least part of option 
three for establishing Cabinet Office control. 2. Instability within the DPJ, which on top of losing the 
Upper House, saw three Prime Ministers, five cabinets and four State Ministers for Space Development 
serve office in the course of just over three years. 
 In fact, the difficulties faced in taking control of space policy echoed the larger problems the DPJ 
failed to resolve overall. First, the Hatoyama administration had quickly discredited itself in the eyes of 
the U.S., and in the face of a conservative media assault, lost tremendous credibility in the court of public 
opinion through its inability to work with the U.S. on the Futenma Base issue in Okinawa. This 
mishandling contributed to the DPJ’s disastrous election losses in 2010. Then, the Naoto Kan 
administration was forced to deal with the national crisis of the 11 March 2011 Great East Japan 
Earthquake and Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant accident, with the magnitude of these issues meaning 
that the overstretched DPJ and civil service remained in crisis management mode for much of the 
following spring and summer. In these circumstances, prosecuting the DPJ’s agenda in space policy and 
administrative change was drowned in a tsunami of other more pressing issues.   
 Meanwhile, more narrowly in the SHSP through 2010, as mentioned above, efforts by the DPJ to 
institute a command and control function could not be solved while they faced the implacable opposition 
by MEXT Minster Tatsuo Kawabata, whose mission was to protect MEXT’s budget and any attack on 
JAXA.50 In summary, 2010, instead of being a transformational year, became a transitional year for the 
SHSP. 
 
 
 
                                                
49 Subsequent information is based on a close analysis of the Experts Committee and QZSS working group meeting and 
reports documented in detail at the SHPS’s website, and also numerous interviews with key figures in the SHSP, 
including Matsui, Hiroaki Akiyama, Taizo Yakushiji, the key members of the (“Mk. II”) Experts Committee, and 
subsequent Space News and Defense News articles.  
50 Interview with Matsui, 17 January 2012. 
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Episodes of Contention and Strategic Action: Formation of the ONSP 
The following year was to become the year under the DPJ when the Cabinet Office finally exerted some 
control, by taking over the QZSS program in a compromise that roughly followed “option three” of the 
original SSHP WG recommendations. In effect, in 2011 was to finish off some of the uncompleted work 
of 2009.  
 SAF 3 Proxy Position: Following the failure of the Matsui Plan, the DPJ attempted to rebuild the 
SHSP to assert Cabinet Office control over the QZSS program, at least. This strategic action was to be 
accomplished in phases of innovative action. The first phase was to establish what became the ONSP. 
This required re-amending the Cabinet Law. However, negotiating the Cabinet Law would require 
tremendous resources to avoid the common failure modalities of every other action – stalling committees 
and/or the packing of them with noncompliant appointees, turning them into talking shops, etc. 
Understanding the range and depth of hurdles ahead, allies of Matsui and Matsui himself, as we have seen, 
decided the best strategy was to take control of the QZSS program as the leverage towards establishing 
the principal of (at least some) Cabinet Office control. If this principal could be established, then it might 
be possible then to coordinate the Earth and marine observation program. The follow-on objective was 
then to reset the Basic Plan 1 into a more feasible Basic Plan 2, that was at least able to fund the QZSS 
program and, if possible, the more ambitious global observation program that had been listed at the top of 
priorities in Basic Plan 1. 
 SAF 4: As well as the challenge of taking on the incumbency of MEXT, the post-Maehara SHSP 
itself was also subject to a challenge by METI, which was becoming increasingly impatient to maximize 
its opportunity, as it saw it. As noted, METI’s position was to place its long-prepared NEC-ASNARO 
dual-use satellite program, carefully nurtured in USEF as an alternative or addition to the Melco-based 
IGS constellation for EO. It is around this time that the global observation constellation also started being 
positioned for an MDA role as U.S. pressure on Japan to cooperate in this sphere began to wax. As we 
have seen, METI’s plan, offering what it saw much needed support for the struggling NEC, was to 
promote ASNARO as the basic constellation framework for the dual-use global observation system, 
already stalled through MEXT opposition because of the failure of the SHSP to coordinate the programs 
in 2009-10. Logically enough for METI, the ASNARO constellation could also be proposed for MDA. 
METI’s actions in the following episodes of contention can be described as moving from innovative 
action to attempted strategic action.  
 The subsequent direction of the SHSP to establish the principal of Cabinet Office control over part of 
the space program is best explained through the actions of the new and powerful 14-member Mk. II 
Experts Committee, chaired by Yoshiyuki Kasai, former Chairman of the Central Japan Railway 
Company, with the team behind the Matsui Plan (Matsui, Yakushiji, Nakasuka) at the core, with Hiroaki 
Akiyama, a microsatellite developer at Wakayama University, and with industry represented by MHI 
Chairman Kazuo Tsukuda, to retackle implementation of the Basic Law.  
 Behind this, there lay the will of Hirofumi Katase, an activist, committed senior METI officer, who 
had been appointed SHSP Deputy Secretary-General. Katase had a strong personal will to impose what he 
called “new thinking” on JAXA, which he regarded as over-bureaucratic and institutionally incapable of 
adapting itself to the new policy paradigm demanded by the Basic Law. Katase set out to, as he saw it, 
bring MEXT and JAXA into line to fulfill the industrialization objective of the Basic Law, with somewhat 
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of a personal mission to use the QZSS as a battering ram to establish a new principle of control over 
MEXT and JAXA.51  
 Out in front, and first of all, Yamakawa, one of the Matsui Committee’s principal actors, was put in 
charge of SHSP, becoming the Director-General, and set about steering the new direction with Katase 
pushing constantly toward the new direction. Thus, under the new leadership of one of the Matsui Plan 
insurgents, the SHSP and decided to take collective and innovative action. For just one example, the 
SHSP decided to publicize a deadline to bring a conclusion to restructuring command and control by 
August 2011, putting MEXT under public pressure.  
 In an interview with the author at the beginning of his leadership of the SHSP, Yamakawa stated 
directly the deadlines and the objectives of the Mk. II SHSP to effect change. Diplomatically, Yamakawa 
blamed “political instability,” or a lack of leadership for the defeat of the original Matsui Plan. But in 
February 2011 Yamakawa publicly reset the deadlines as, again, August of that year to achieve the 
reorganization.  
 
Question: What’s the biggest challenge the SHSP faces?  
Yamakawa: The SHSP was created to coordinate activities among the 10 ministries 
involved in drafting budgets for space activities. Our challenge is that we have no 
authority to coordinate the budget, just policies. Another issue is the conservative 
nature of the ministries. If we come to them and say, “This can be done this way 
instead,” or, “This is more efficient or effective,” they still have the right to 
coordinate their own budget. So of course, the budget cannot be optimized for space 
policy. 
Question: A DPJ-commissioned report last April recommended breaking up the Japan 
Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) and establishing a new Cabinet-level space 
agency. What is your position? 
Yamakawa: I have my own solution in terms of the reorganization, but as 
Secretary-General I cannot say what it is. Officially, I have to say the discussions 
continue at the special commission. I should add that there is not going to be a 
solution that will make everyone happy. We cannot think about the merit of one 
ministry. We have to think about the return for the country as a whole. There were 
four options in last year’s report. The most conservative option was to strengthen the 
SHSP, and the most radical option was to merge everything into a single agency 
within the Cabinet Office. My personal opinion is that it would not be wise to undo 
the 2003 merger that created JAXA. But I think the whole governmental organization 
has to be optimized under a new agency. That’s all I can say for now. I know I said 
50-50, but by this summer some kind of reorganization can be done. Something will 
be done in that direction. 
Question: What other issues is the SHSP wrestling with? 
Yamakawa: The Basic Space Plan assumed an annual budget of 500 billion yen ($6 
billion) for 2009-2013. This year’s budget is 300 billion yen and change, so there is a 
real gap between the projected figure and the real figure, and there is not enough 
money to do what was called for in the Basic Space Plan. We are in the middle of the 
first five-year plan now, so we have to revisit the Basic Space Plan as we prepare the 
budget proposal for next year. That is another very important task we have to 
complete by August. 
Question: How strong is the DPJ’s support for the SHSP?  
                                                
51 In a February 17, 2012 interview, Katase said that he had been struggling hard for over a year to “change the culture” 
of MEXT in the SHSP and toward space policy in general, and to impose “new thinking” on it. In the interview, Katase 
gave a strong impression that MEXT and METI had fundamentally different cultures and mindsets, and that it would be 
METI that would impose its culture on the SHSP and space policy.  
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Yamakawa: I was one of the five members of the SHSP last year grappling with space 
policy and I met Foreign Minister Seiji Maehara, who was then state minister for 
space, and talked with him seven times. I thought we were following the same 
direction. Since this time last year, the number of DPJ politicians showing strong 
support for space is increasing. Their support is very strong. 
Question: Will that support translate into a bigger space budget? 
Yamakawa: If the reorganization succeeds, then doubling the budget, or at least 
reaching 500 billion yen, may be feasible. Reorganization and the budget increase are 
tied together. Without the reorganization, the other is impossible and nothing will be 
changed. Reorganization is not the final target. The final target is to maximize 
Japanese space activities, and to do that we need more budget. If we stay on the same 
trail as before, then nothing can be done. 
Question: How soon could Japan’s space spending grow to 500 billion yen? 
Yamakawa: At the moment, the government can afford only about 300 billion yen. 
The remaining part can be partially bridged by growing Japan’s private-sector space 
market. The private sector is facing a critical juncture. They have to launch a 
minimum of, say, four or more satellites and rockets a year to maintain their base. To 
do that, they have to rely on the government, but they also have to look to create new 
markets. The government is now strongly supporting these activities to expand the 
market. The final target of the Japanese government’s annual space budget, together 
with the nongovernment market size, has to be about 500 billion yen, and that will 
take some time. Until we can get to that, we need a mixed strategy that includes 
government supporting industry.52 
 
 As with the first incarnation of the SHSP, the Mk. II Experts Committee wasted little time in trying 
to implement changes toward solving the administrative reforms and redesigning Basic Plan 1 towards 
what it hoped would be a more workable, coordinated Basic Plan 2. The first major move of the Experts 
Committee, in attempted innovative action (or an attempt to marshal resources to pursue collective action), 
was to constitute two new groups; one to investigate Japan’s remote sensing needs to try to coordinate the 
global Earth and ocean observing constellation; and the QZSS Utilization Investigation Working Group 
(QZSS WG). This latter group was to become key to using the QZSS program as the wedge to establish 
partial Cabinet Office control, and featured the strong backing of Keidanren. 
 Thus, facing strong opposition from MEXT and JAXA to the Matsui Plan, the Mk. II Experts 
Committee staged a series of innovative actions targeted towards taking control of the QZSS program.53 
With the August 2011 deadline in mind, the Experts Committee embarked on innovative action in 
engaging in a comprehensive series of hearings from industry, ministries, academia and the user 
community build the authority and sense of competency of the leadership, and the process of negating 
MEXT.  
 This new approach reflected the attempted new style of political interaction by the DPJ with the civil 
service that was showcased through the very public nature of the jigyō shiwake hearings initiated at the 
beginning of the first Hatoyama administration, preluded by the explosive simplicity of the original 
Matsui Plan.  
                                                
52 Paul Kallender-Umezu, “Profile: Hiroshi Yamakawa, Secretary General, Strategic Headquarters for Space Policy: 
Overhaul Overdue,” Space News, 14 March 2011, p. 30.  
53 The various committees and reports are fully available in Japanese on the SHSP and CO website. Matsui has described 
the CO taking control of the QZSS to establish the precedent of CO control of a major space program, a vital wedge in 
levering MEXT from its position.  
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 In the 1990s, minutes of SAC meetings were publicized amid very little interest to the media. The 
author would sit in committee after committee listening to the fine detail of the technical struggles with 
one program or the issues of another as the only journalist present. However, through the process of 
establishing control of the QZSS system, the innovative action by the DPJ-installed guerilla unit was to 
deliberately and explicitly involve much more public openness regarding documentations, meetings and 
proposals. At least in spirit, the guerilla unit sought to reflect the DPJ’s desire to make policymaking 
more transparent by publicly opening the processes and progress of decision-making in committees. In 
terms of innovative action, the new approach can also be seen as part of a process of gaining leverage 
over MEXT. Thus, after scrapping and rebuilding the Experts Committee, the next innovative action stage 
for controlling the civil service response was setting up and populating with suitable staff a new experts 
committee, and making the progress of deliberations open to the public.  
 Having taken innovative action in setting up the QZSS WG, the staged approach involved using the 
committee to construct a pathway towards putting the Cabinet Office in control. The next key inflection 
point came in April 2011 when the QZSS WG recommended that Japan develop a robust satellite regional 
PNT system as an essential part of Japan’s long-term space strategy. To enable this, the Experts 
Committee then conducted an exhaustive re-analysis of the opinions of ministries and industry. 
Discussions and coordination for this, particularly with MEXT, lasted until fall, when the Cabinet Office 
announced a scheme where it would at least be able to control budgeting and planning of the QZSS 
system, immediately backed by an initial ¥4.1 billion budget request for the following fiscal year to start 
building satellites.  
 Under the plan, the Cabinet Office initially set the goal by 2020 to build an initial system of four 
satellites that would provide 24-hour coverage that would provide the ability to offer regional 
augmentation to GPS, before moving on to building a seven-satellite system, with one or more satellites 
in geostationary orbit. Doing so would give Japan its own full independent PNT services. In terms of an 
SAF analysis, this report was highly significant because it also showed the new style of business 
involving direct political intervention at decisive moments. 
 In other words, the guerilla unit in the Cabinet Office was purposely fulfilling its mandate to build up 
power so that it could gain incumbency and achieve “option three” of the 2009 restructuring plan, and to 
reflect the wish of the original NSSPG of 2005 of direct political involvement in policy formulation. The 
decision therefore was sealed with a Cabinet Order under the new administration of Prime Minister 
Yoshihiko Noda on 30 September in the “Basic policy on the implementation of the operational 
Quasi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS) project.”54  
                                                
54 Paul Kallender-Umezu, “Report Recommends Upgrading QZSS from Demo to Key System,” Space News, 2 May 2011. 
The September decisions, including all-important Cabinet decisions on the QZSS and the future of the CO can be found 
in a raft of reports on the CO website: 実用準天頂衛星システム事業の推進の基本的な考え方（本部決定） Jitsuyō  
Juntenchō Shisutemu Jigyō no Suishin no Kihon-teki na Kangaekata (Honbu Kettei)  [Regarding the Basic Idea for the 
Promotion of a Practical Quasi-Zenith Satellite System (Headquarters’ Decision); 宇宙空間の開発・利用の戦略的な推
進体制の構築について（本部決定） Uchyū Kūkan ・ Riyō no Senryaku-teki na Suishin Taisei no Kōchiku ni Tsuite 
(Honbu Kettei) [Regarding Building a Strategic Framework to Promote Development and Utilization of Outer Space 
(Headquarters Decision)]; 実用準天頂衛星システム事業の推進の基本的な考え方（閣議決定）Jitsuyō  Juntenchō  
Shisutemu Jigyō no Suishin no Kihon-teki na Kangaekata (Kakugi Kettei) [Regarding the Basic Idea for the Promotion of 
a Practical Quasi-Zenith Satellite System (Cabinet Decision)]: and 宇宙空間の開発・利用の戦略的な推進体制の構築
について（閣議決定）Uchyū Kūkan ・ Riyō no Senryaku-teki na Suishin Taisei no Kōchiku ni Tsuite (Kakugi Kettei) 
[Regarding Building a Strategic Framework to Promote Development and Utilization of Outer Space (Cabinet Decision)] 
at http://www8.cao.go.jp/space/decision/kettei.html.  
  184 
 The resolution devised in the Cabinet Office in the context of programmatical control and budgeting 
was at least highly significant, as costs for the system ranged from ¥170 billion for a four-satellite system 
to ¥260 billion for the seven-satellite system, meaning for the first time that the MOF had agreed to a 
significant amount of increased budget. This was designed, as we have seen, to be the first step toward the 
strategic goal of the Basic Law of finding pathways to increase the combined space activities budget to 
around ¥500 billion per year. In terms of a practical achievement in resolving the crisis of leadership in 
the early 2000s by installing new and superior body (the Cabinet Office) over the ministries, the taking 
over of the QZSS by the Cabinet Office was also propagandized as a breakthrough in establishing a new 
budget line that was not controlled by one particular ministry. The settlement did appear to be a 
significant gain. However, on the other hand, compared to original Basic Law’s objective of a more 
thorough reform, this gain may also be characterized as a far from decisive step.55  
This is because this step was to prove unrepeatable when, in 2014, the METI dominated successor to 
the SHSP, the ONSP, tried to repeat the maneuver with the long-planned global EO program. In the 
shifting sands of institutional dynamics in the field of interministerial competition, the gain achieved by 
the Cabinet Office in achieving coordination over the QZSS had not, as of December 2017, translated 
beyond the QZSS.  
The progress in achieving a Cabinet-level decision had been considerably aided by the incoming 
administration of Noda, who had played a major role in the DPJ’s support of the Basic Law, and who had 
maintained a keen appreciation of the strategic value of space development, thus bringing the balance of 
the DPJ Cabinet in favor of reaching a long overdue but final decision. It was this extra pressure that 
forced a compromise. The September announcement, therefore, was a breakthrough in achieving at least 
one element of the Basic Law, as acknowledged by Prime Minister Noda himself: “Space development 
offers unlimited potential for the security of Japan and I have promised to develop a functional system in 
the second half this decade,” Noda told the Japanese Diet in a nationally televised question and answer 
session held on 5 October 2011.56   
Matsui cast the achievement as a step towards a broader goal of establishing the principal toward the 
Cabinet Office at least “coordinating” space policy. As he said at the time: “The…Michibiki was the first 
major step, and now the September 30 decision was a major step toward a fully-functional [global 
                                                
55 See “Basic policy on the implementation of the operational Quasi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS) project,” Cabinet 
Decision on September 30, 2011, Cabinet Office: http://www8.cao.go.jp/space/english/basicpolicy.html. The text in 
English reads as follows: “The Quasi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS) will strengthen industrial global competitiveness 
and make industry, daily life, and public administration more sophisticated and efficient. The QZSS will also contribute 
to the welfare of the Asia-Pacific region, an enhancement of Japan’s presence there, strengthening the Japan-U.S. 
partnership, and a broad range of security including the improvement of the capacity to respond to natural disasters. 
Given the fact that other countries are already developing navigation satellite systems, the Government of Japan has 
decided to accelerate the deployment of the operational QZSS as expeditiously as possible. More specifically, four 
satellites constellation shall be established by the late 2010s. In the future, seven satellites constellation shall be 
completed to enable sustainable positioning. The Cabinet Office shall develop, deploy and operate the operational QZSS, 
based on the achievement of the first QZSS satellite (named "Michibiki"), and shall submit a budget request to cover 
relevant costs. The Cabinet Office shall coordinate with relevant ministries, agencies, and industries to promote this 
project at each stage of development, deployment, operation, utilization, and global dissemination. Legal amendments 
shall be made in order for the Cabinet Office to fulfill such a role in time for budget implementation. The implementation 
section in the Cabinet Office should be carefully established so as to avoid excessive organizational expansion of 
government administration.” 
56 Paul Kallender-Umezu, “Japan Commits To Deploying Satellite Navigation System by 2020,” Space News, 17 October 
2011, p.14. 
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navigation satellite] system. In addition, the Cabinet is able to exercise leadership that crosses over 
interministerial responsibilities. Our function is now to coordinate these.”57 
MEXT publicly supported the decision. But MEXT saw the September 30 Cabinet decision in terms 
of a battle lost, or a concession from a position of power, not a major defeat. According to Goro Onoyama, 
then Deputy Director of MEXT’s Space and Aeronautics Policy Division, MEXT supported the Cabinet 
decision to the extent that it would enable MEXT to prosecute its role in development of the QZSS 
system: “We recognize that user ministries, the Cabinet Office at the core, will collaborate on the QZSS 
of practical use. We will help them effectively use what has been proved through the operation of the first 
QZSS.” Beyond this, Onoyama declined comment. This limited response spoke volumes. In effect, 
MEXT agreed because it could gain more budget.58 
In fact, gaining MEXT approval in the September agreement had only been achieved after highly 
public arm-twisting. What had happened was that an increasingly exasperated Special Committee had 
read MEXT the riot act. On June 30, the committee had published a mid-term report that represented 
carefully constructed ultimatum. After spending most of the spring and early summer engaging in 
innovative action in building consensus and negotiations with MEXT, building pressure to achieve an 
outcome so as not to fail, the SHSP felt it had no choice to call MEXT’s bluff. The June 30 mid-term 
report suggested that if MEXT failed to support the principle of Cabinet Office control of QZSS, the 
Special Committee would have no choice but to revisit the Uchūchō concept. The report was also 
remarkable because it directly “named and shamed” MEXT, stating that if nothing else could be done, the 
Cabinet Office would also take over about 30 percent of MEXT’s budget.59 
The key point in this episode of contention was whether the Cabinet Office’s implementation 
function of QZSS would mean jurisdiction over JAXA. As Anan put it: “Those in favor of centralizing 
the implementation and command functions in the Cabinet Office insisted that the Cabinet Office needed 
both functions to be a powerful organization leading Japan’s space policy. Those against centralization 
insisted that implementation be separated from command for a neutral and fair evaluation of the 
organization’s activities. This unresolved debate meant the (QZSS) report was not issued by the 
summer.”60  
The reaction to the June 30 report by MEXT was also direct and visceral, with a senior MEXT 
official telling the author directly that it was wholly unacceptable. The June 30 ultimatum therefore set 
the stage for a considerable amount of interministerial discussion, particularly by MEXT, to preserve its 
control over JAXA, and by METI to increase its influence, but with the process under considerable 
pressure by the DPJ to effect a settlement.61 In wresting agreement for the Cabinet Office to take over 
QZSS through the threat of engaging in a more fundamental reorganization and setting up a more 
                                                
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid. 
59 According to the minutes of 17th meeting of Special Committee held on June 30, 2011 [See: 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/utyuu/senmon/dai17/gijiyoushi.pdf], the Office of Space Headquarters was willing to 
finish coordinating the content of the report with the Special Committee members and related ministries by late July. 
However, the Special Committee did not finish the report by the deadline, and it is unclear why it did not. The key points 
must have been conveyed to related ministries because the Cabinet made a decision on 30 September 2011.  
60 Anan (2013). 
61 According to the minutes of 17th meeting of Special Committee held on June 30, 2011, Space Minister Koichiro Genba 
said, “I have heard of the current situation that [the discussion about space policy] is difficult to conclude and move 
forward. I would like to start the political process in order to decide the direction of the policy during my term [as Space 
Minister].” The strong-arm tactic was probably the work of Katase, who had grown extremely impatient with MEXT. 
Interview with SHSP senior figure who asked not to be named, 24 September 2014, Tokyo. 
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powerful Uchūchō directly attacking MEXT’s budget, and in order for the necessity to show at least some 
progress, MEXT felt it clearly could yield a point of concession, the QZSS, but then shift the debate to 
protecting as much of its budget and control in the following debates towards deciding the role of the 
Cabinet Office in other areas.  
Thus, the background to the September 30 decision might be characterized as something of a poker 
game between the guerilla group against MEXT in particular. There is one more point: the competing 
visions between the DPJ-backed leadership in the SHSP. 
Said Matsui of the September 30 Cabinet Decision: 
 
“It’s almost everything we planned in terms of our “Plan B” [Plan A being the 
establishment of a small Uchūchō]. The budget is almost fixed. We will proceed on 
the basis of the understanding that we need to change the Cabinet Office. The first 
step is to reach a Cabinet Decision, this is essential. It’s a step-by-step process. We 
will start working on the new structure of the space department within the Cabinet 
Office.  
 We need to discuss JAXA’s position; which agency has the role control it. 
MEXT wants to control JAXA. The Cabinet Office will be a main ministry. We need 
to change the law to accommodate this, and JAXA’s law. So now a “Department for 
Space” or something like that will be set up to control Japan’s GPS system. Once that 
is started it is a step-by-step process. Prime Minister Noda is the person who will 
promote the new space law in the DPJ and he is willing to establish a new law. To do 
this we need to submit the law by the end of this year and need to change the law of 
the Cabinet Office. This process will start this month in October and be submitted 
early next year. 
[Regarding the “Space Office:”]  
 The size and structure is subject to discussion. The debate will be held within our 
committee on promotion. Initially it is to control the QZSS but this is the first step of 
the very large bifurcation that will be established. The concern of MEXT was to reach 
a compromise and just get through the first step. Our concern is to initially control 
QZSS and try to expand and then start a new discussion and government effort to cut 
the number of IAAs under the Government Revitalization Unit.62 
 
Said Yamakawa:  
 
“This Cabinet decision strengthens the functions of the SHSP on two points. First is 
the SHSP will coordinate policy and second it will have strengthened powers of 
implementation. It is not a full agency, however. The law will be passed in the next 
Diet session, maybe in April, maybe later, which will set up an office in the Cabinet 
Office. Right now, the SHSP belongs to the Cabinet Secretariat, nearer to the Prime 
Minister. Offices in the Secretariat are considered more tentative whereas offices in 
the Cabinet Office are considered more formal. We will have to establish a 
preparatory office as soon as possible.  
 It is essential to increase the QZSS to four satellites, with one in geostationary 
orbit with the possibility of a (military) encrypted signal. At least four are required for 
24-hour coverage and at least seven are required for an independent and sustainable 
GPS system not only for Japan but for the South East Asian and Oceana region.63 
 
                                                
62 Author interview with Matsui, 5 October 2011, Tsudanuma, Chiba, Japan. 
63 Interview with Matsui, 6 October, 2011, Tokyo. 
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In summary, the period between the September decision, a 30 November 2011 pre-final, and a final 
13 January 2012 Experts Committee meeting saw the concluding negotiations that led to a legal 
framework that would establish the ONSP.64 Behind the discussions, however, the Special Committee and 
Cabinet Office adopted a new consensus that the Cabinet Office and Space Headquarters would decide 
the basic direction of organizational reform, an apparent significant advance showing how pressured 
MEXT felt, in what appeared to be a significant concession by it.65  
However, the failure to establish the principal of further institutional restructuring beyond 
establishing the control over the QZSS lay in the details of the post June 30 debates. This was because, 
following June 30, discussion subtly shifted ground on three premises:  
 
1. That the Cabinet Office not be established through the consolidation of all space-related organizations;  
2. That the Cabinet Office should consider “neutrality and fairness” when it decided how to divide the 
command and implementation functions among the administrative organizations, and; 
3. Regarding jurisdiction over JAXA, the government must ensure the Cabinet Office had the authority to 
exercise its command function effectively considering the achievements that MEXT has already made as 
JAXA’s main competent ministry.  
 
All this implied that MEXT would maintain its authority as the main competent ministry over JAXA 
while the relationship between the Cabinet Office and JAXA required yet more negotiation. From this, it 
is possible to interpret that MEXT’s negotiating position became one of ensuring that the Cabinet Office 
would only have a partial say over JAXA as one of a number of ministries, thus potentially diluting the 
Cabinet Office’s influence.  
Following these debates, in January 2012, the Special Committee’s final report on the restructuring 
of the administrative arrangements for space policy indicated that JAXA be open to cooperation other 
ministries. To achieve this, a Cabinet Order was necessary to introduce a new mechanism in which 
competent ministers in addition to the MEXT minister would have a say on the policy direction of JAXA, 
including METI and MIC. The legislation would also include the provision that the MOD could join as a 
competent minister if it required later. In this setup, the competent ministers at least had the right to 
initiate development programs using JAXA.  
 
Establishment of the ONSP 
On 20 June 2012, Japan’s Upper House passed the “Partial Revision of the Cabinet Office Establishment 
Act, etc.” (Law 35 of 2012) enabling Cabinet Office to take more control of the planning of Japan’s 
                                                
64 The interpretations of these events, particularly using CO control of the QZSS as a battering ram are based on a series 
of interviews with Matsui, 30 August 2011, 6 September 2011, 8 September 2011, 3 October 2011 and 17 January 2012. 
Within these the all-important pre-final decision on the shape of the bill and thus the law, was reached by the January 13 
decision announced at the 「宇宙開発戦略本部	 宇宙開発戦略専門調査会 第 21 回会合	 議事次第」“Uchyū 
Kaihatsu Senryaku Honbu Uchyū Kaihatsu Senryaku Senmon Chōsakai Dai 21 Kaikaigō [Strategic Headquarters for 
Space Policy Space Development Strategy Experts Committee 21st Meeting Agenda],” with the key announcement being
「宇宙空間の開発・利用の戦略的な推進体制について(専門調査会報告書案)」“Uchyū Kūkan ・  Riyō no 
Senryaku-teki na Suishin Taise ni Tsuite (Senmon Chōsakai Kōkousho An) [Regarding Building a Strategic Framework 
to Promote Development and Utilization of Outer Space (Report by the Experts Committee)]” at: 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/utyuu/senmon/dai21/gijisidai.html.  
65 Uchu Kūkan no Kaihatsu / Riyō no Senryaku Teki na Suishin Taisei no Kōchiku ni Tsuite [About the establishment of 
the strategic promotion regime of the development and use of outer space], Tokyo, 30 September 2011. See: 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/utyuu/pdf/honbu_taisei.pdf.  
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government space programs.66 In terms of administrative and institutional dynamics, the law enabled the 
Cabinet Office to set to set up the SPC reporting directly to the Prime Minister that was to be tasked to 
provide policy, program prioritization and budgeting recommendations for the overall space program. 
The ONSP was given the power to redraw Basic Plan 1 and communicate budgetary prioritization to the 
line ministries.9767  
 The legislation clearly represented a break from the past, as seen in the final rounds discussions of 
the fall of 2011. But it also involved a compromise between competing aims and objectives of SAF 3 and 
SAF 4 interaction. The principal of direct intervention of SAF 3 over SAF matters had been established 
by Prime Minister Noda. This was to be repeated subsequently in the following Abe administration where 
senior figures in the ONSP, including Matsui, would personally update the Prime Minister at dinner 
appointments. Such actions show at least how important implementing the Basic Law had become to Abe, 
and how important space policy had become to national security and the U.S.-Japan alliance. 
Backtracking a little, the establishment of the ONSP also arguably can be seen as a partially but not fully 
successful strategic action because it failed to give the ONSP full power of incumbency over MEXT. To 
explain this, Chapter 9 analyses the law and its implications regarding the administrative dynamics 
between the ONSP and, in particular MEXT and METI in resolving the balance of responsibilities 
between them, and of the retention of power of MEXT’s influence over JAXA in relationship to the 
ONSP and METI, and lastly, METI’s attempt to exert its own influence in the ONSP. 
 The law setting up the ONSP can be divided into several sections dealing with the establishment of 
the SPC and the legislation required to amend the role of the Cabinet Office to accommodate the change; 
setting up the ONSP, those delineating its new role, and those showing necessary shifts in the extant role 
administration and legal framework to accommodate the changes. A major proportion of the law dealt 
with the intricacies of establishing ONSP authority to enable it to prosecute its coordination duties.  
 The law appeared to grant the ONSP a much greater role in planning of space development and space 
applications in line with the Basic Law; the authority to coordinate all the other space related government 
organs involved in space; and the authority to promote programs and development except for those 
belonging to each specific ministry. The law also underscored the ONSP’s authority by establishing the 
SPC within the ONSP so that, via the SPC, the ONSP would make key recommendations on program 
prioritization, scheduling and budget. The SPC was to serve as the top advisory committee for space 
policy with support from the ONSP and comprised seven or fewer part-time expert members and to 
investigate and deliberate on the follow-on Basic Plan 2 and budgetary prioritization in response the 
                                                
66 Author’s translation: the actual name of the law is「内閣府設置法等の一部を改正する法律	 法律第３５号（平成
24 年）」Naikakufu Sechi Hō Nado No Ichibu wo Kaisei Suru Hōritsu Dai- Sanju Go Gō,  [Partial Revision of the 
Cabinet Office Establishment Act Law 35]”which was based on, and almost completely unchanged from a bill sent to the 
Lower House on 14 February 2012. Both the bill「内閣府設置法等の一部を改正する法律案（閣議決定）」 Naikakufu 
Sechi Hō Nado No Ichibu wo Kaisei Suru Hōritsu An (Kakugi Kettei) [Partial Revision of the Cabinet Office 
Establishment Bill (Cabinet Decision)] and supplementary materials, including preceding legislation (Japanese only) can 
be downloaded at Secretariat for the Strategic Headquarters for Space Policy (SHSP) homepage: 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/utyuu/index.html. A convenient summary of the Cabinet Office’s new role and 
responsibilities can be found at: 「内閣府設置法（抄）」 Naikakufu Sechi Hō (Shō) [Cabinet Office Establishment Act 
(Excerpt)] at: http://www8.cao.go.jp/space/cao/jurisdiction.html. 
67 Space Policy Commission and Space Strategy Office are the author’s own translation of the Japanese「宇宙政策委員会」
Uchū Seisaku Iinkai and「宇宙戦略室」Uchū Senryaku Shitsu, respectively. The investigation in this study was based on 
brief overview provided by the SHSP: 
(http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/utyuu/kettei/120214/gaiyou.pdf)  
(http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/utyuu/kettei/120214/youkou.pdf) 
(http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/utyuu/kettei/120214/an_riyu.pdf) 
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Prime Minister’s requests. Importantly, while the Prime Minister would be final arbiter, the opinions and 
recommendations of key ministers were to be heard in the SPC. Against this, the SPC’s recommendations 
and opinions did not have legally binding power.68 
 The legislation also contained revisions that impacted MEXT and JAXA to accommodate the 
changes. The law sought to (and seemed to) put JAXA specifically in a new relationship with the ONSP 
and other ministries. This was part of the attempt by the authors to dilute the relationship between MEXT 
over JAXA, so that JAXA’s policy formulation could be better coordinated (or integrated) with that of the 
Cabinet Office. In the context of strategic policy formulation beyond JAXA, this, it was hoped, would 
smooth the formulation of a workable Basic Plan 2. The law also contained several key stipulations that 
seemed to direct that JAXA’s programs be aimed away from R&D and more towards applications that 
“reflected user needs,” and stated that JAXA’s mid-term goals reflect those coordinated by the ONSP. 
The legislation also abolished the venerable SAC.69 Subsequently, in July 2012, the Cabinet Office 
moved quickly to set up the ONSP with just over twenty members and a seven-member SPC, in time for 
the new structure to begin its work preparing for the 2013 budget.70 
 In detailing the nuances and complexities of the clauses of the ONSP establishment law and their real 
meanings for shifting balances of power in policymaking away from MEXT and JAXA it can already be 
seen that, from the point of view of the overall objective of asserting ONSP policymaking over MEXT, 
the law had many insufficiencies. In yet more detail, it can be seen that law lacked in a level of 
specification required to definitively delineate any one institution as controlling JAXA, which was to be 
co-administered by MEXT and the MIC, but with significant input and program jurisdictional rights from 
the ONSP and METI. From the point of view of the Cabinet Office, then, the law implied that MEXT 
ceded some of its exclusive control of JAXA and space policy through loosing SAC and accepting the 
input of other ministries. But on closer examination, it became apparent that MEXT would continue to 
play a key role in recommending policy for JAXA, while the Cabinet Office would try to exercise a much 
stronger coordination and policy role.71 
 In terms of the context of the four options for administrative reform formulated by the original SHSP 
restructuring WG report of 2009, the conclusions reached in 2011 appeared, then, to deliver something 
not quite as conclusively taking power away from MEXT as intended in the original “third option.” But it 
did imply a not insignificant shift of power to the Cabinet Office through the ONSP. Thus, the ONSP was 
given two key functions, coordination and implementation. 
 This was interpreted by ONSP as giving it the means to stop JAXA from proposing a specific 
mission or program if that program was not adjudged to be in line with the ONSP’s priorities, which were 
to be drawn up in Basic Plan 2. Ultimately, ONSP saw itself in the position to exercise the last say over a 
                                                
68 This section also contains some interpretation of the significance of the elements of the law, based on a series of 
interviews with Yamakawa and Matsui.  
69 Interview with Hiroshi Yamakawa, 16 January 2012.  
70 Paul Kallender-Umezu “Japan Moves to Relax Restrictions on Military Space Development,” Defense News, 23 
January 2012; Paul Kallender-Umezu, “Japan Passes Law Permitting Military Space Development,” Defense News, 22 
June 2012; Paul Kallender-Umezu, “Japan Passes Overhaul of Space Management Structure,” Space News, 2 July 2012; 
and Paul Kallender-Umezu, “Japan Centralizes Control Of Nation’s Space Programs,” Space News, 23 July 2012.  
 The Space Policy Commission members were formally announced July 20 on the Cabinet Office’s website: 
http://www8.cao.go.jp/space/index.html. 
71 In fact, Suzuki argues that the Cabinet Office had already taken administrative control of budget negotiations with the 
Ministry of Finance in the 2011 budget formulation. However, without the enactment of the law and the setting up of the 
Space Strategy Office and the SPC, the Cabinet Office lacked the teeth to make major alterations to JAXA and MEXT 
space policy and budget. Author interview with Suzuki, 16 April 2012. 
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certain program. While vague, the authority to control the budget and the planning of operation of 
projects promoted by multiple ministries was interpreted as giving the ONSP control of QZSS promotion, 
and, more significantly, the ONSP was given the power to propose its own programs. But this was hedged 
with an important caveat: that the program not be confined to a single ministry. This caveat was to prove 
a critical issue when the ONSP under METI leadership tried to extend its control over the global land and 
EO system, combining both JAXA and METI satellites. This coordination crisis was to become a major 
episode of contention and lead to the necessity of more strategic action by SAF 3 in the form of the Imazu 
intervention.  
 Regarding JAXA, in the fine detail of the law, the interpretation was understood along the lines that 
the MEXT Minister would still officially deal with JAXA as was, but, with the caveat that JAXA should 
remain Japan’s core space development organization, and MEXT would retain significant power over it 
as a lead ministry. Thus, despite the strong push of the Executive Committee through 2011, the 
amendment did not change JAXA’s competent ministry. In fact, Item 1, Paragraph 1, Article 26 of the 
amended JAXA act remained intact and stipulated that only MEXT managed matters relating to 
executives and employees, finance and accounting, and other administrative management.  
 Within this lay the point negotiated in the Executive Committee which explored the possibility of 
giving authority to the Cabinet Office as a second main competent ministry, but ended up acquiescing to 
the general rule that there should be only one competent ministry. Thus, instead of becoming a competent 
ministry, the Cabinet Office through the ONSP gained authority to participate in the jurisdiction of JAXA 
by virtue of the Prime Minister becoming one of the competent ministers.72  
 Under this understanding, since the Prime Minister is the chief of the Cabinet Office, the Cabinet 
Office through the ONSP was given authority to oversee JAXA via the Prime Minister so that together 
with the ministers of the MEXT and MIC, the Prime Minister was given the power to direct the 
promotion of space use through JAXA. Thus, under the new regime, with the co-jurisdiction other 
ministries, other ministries, notably METI, would be able to promote their own programs using JAXA, if 
approved by the ONSP. The Prime Minister as head of the Cabinet Office, and both METI and MIC 
Ministers were entitled to submit their opinions dealing with future planning.  
 Within this, however, lay yet another important caveat. In order to gain leverage over JAXA, the 
ONSP would have to gain a consensus among other ministries using JAXA-developed satellites. And 
under this lay yet another trapdoor: for space science, the ISAS portion of JAXA promoting astronomy 
and asteroid exploration, continued to be exclusively under MEXT’s jurisdiction.  
 All this can be summarized as putting the ONSP in a difficult position in terms of executing full 
incumbent control over SAF 4. In terms of the SAF framework, it can be said that a rolling series of 
episodes of contention had, instead of leading to field settlement, resulted in another contested area in 
which the ONSP would need to see if it could then develop a strategy to budget the stalled global ocean 
and EO program. However, tactically, the ONSP’s main priority was logically, first and foremost, to 
secure adequate budget to promote the QZSS. Then second, more strategically, it was behooved to draw 
up a new Basic Plan – this time with MOF approval. Thus, Basic Plan 2 and its budgeting and 
implementation became the next episode of contention between MEXT/JAXA and what was to play out 
as a failed attempted strategic action by METI to take over the ONSP. 
 
                                                
72 Anan (2013), p. 212. 
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Chapter 9  
Contention, Strategic Action & Field Settlement 2012-16 
 
Introduction 
This chapter is basically the story of how a new version of the SAC was established to take control of 
space policy and planning after a decade of confusion, and how space policy was fundamentally changed 
to become an important part of national security strategy.  
The establishment of the ONSP was achieved through a final push involving the direct intervention 
of Prime Minister Noda. But as noted, the establishment of the ONSP, rather than representing field 
settlement, was perhaps only really another significant step toward field settlement as represented in the 
compromises that comprised Basic Plan 2016. In a nutshell, when the ONSP failed in 2012 to achieve 
workable workshares between competitive ministries, specifically MEXT and METI, once again another 
prime minster, Shinzō Abe, stepped in decisively, meeting members of the SPC and telling them they 
only had a certain amount of time to draw up a Basic Plan that met the LDP’s new requirement, or face 
further sanction. As was suggested at the end of the previous chapter, the actions of the sitting prime 
minister in the Cabinet Office would be vital to suggest new programs in JAXA through MEXT, as the 
prime minister himself (or herself) had become a competent minister. In this way, the SPC, as an 
“evolved” SAC, represented a new phase in policymaking in Japan, where the principal of direct prime 
ministerial involvement could be extended deeper into SAF 4 and 5 – at least in theory.  
In more precise analytical terms, the strategic action within the SHSP by the core group of DPJ 
appointees and Katase to form the ONSP marked a brand-new stage in Japan’s space policymaking and 
administrative framework. From it, it is possible to create a new General Space Activities SAF, similar to 
the schema shown in Chapter 1. The most salient point about this SAF is that it represents a settlement – 
but a potentially unstable one – in which an activist prime minster may be needed to break deadlock in the 
future. This chapter, then, comprises an analysis exploring the characteristics of the new General Space 
Activities SAF born out of the episodes of contention that formed it, the competitive tensions within in it, 
the resultant episodes of contention, and the partial field settlement.  
In conventional narrative terms, this is the story of how the bargaining and compromises made in the 
writing of the Partial Revision of the Act for Establishment of the Cabinet Office that created the ONSP 
allowed it to take control of managing and budgeting the QZSS system, but basically also left further 
extension of its policymaking powers “up for grabs.” The narrative is as follows: as the ONSP was 
formed, the next major episode of contention was over the funding and control of the global EO/ maritime 
observation system, which had been shelved since 2009; then there was the attempt by METI to take over 
the ONSP and the program and bend space policy its way. The failure to coordinate this then led to 
strategic action by SAF 3 in the form of the Imazu intervention, which led to today’s (perhaps partial) 
settlement.  
A closer look at the following schema shows the essential problem the SPC faced (and, perhaps, 
faces). Apart from the inclusion of the MOD, the all-important point is the “triple” ministerial control 
over JAXA by MEXT, MIC and METI, indicating the potential complexities of coordination and the fact 
that JAXA is supposed to “respond” to the requests of other ministries. But JAXA was still very much the 
creature of MEXT, and the “dual control” of JAXA functionally means the opposite. Because JAXA is 
the main implementing agency with its own built up and embedded rules, procedures and norms, working 
through it may only serve to bolster its power. Looking at the preponderance of dual-use programs 
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controlled by JAXA in 2017-2018, this very much looks to be the case. JAXA and MEXT look very 
much to have become the benefactor of the logic of consequences.  
 
Figure 30: Space Activities Policy and Coordination Framework 2012~ 
SAFs 3 and 4: The critical point here is the compromises that were agreed to boiled down to the fact 
that the ONSP had only negotiated control of the QZSS system, so this left budgeting and control of the 
global maritime and EO system as an area of contestation for the next Basic Plan, Basic Plan 2. In short, 
this pitted MEXT against METI, or rather METI against everyone else, as METI attempted and failed to 
exert its own strategic action to take control of the ONSP. The failure to resolve disagreements between 
MEXT, METI and the ONSP over which satellites to use and how to fund the global maritime and EO 
system led to a major defeat of Basic Plan 2 when the MOF refused to fund that specific proposal, noting 
disagreement and discord between the competing ministries.  
The first generation ONSP was set up with senior METI official Junya Nishimoto, previously Deputy 
Director-General for Industrial Science and Technology and Environment, and former Director of 
METI’s Space Industry Office, as Director-General. This signaled a more direct and activist role by 
METI in the ONSP. Yamakawa, while notionally from MEXT, was at core an ISAS man and a scientist, 
and used to the culture of ISAS, in which small committees of expert scientists make decisions – very 
different from the bureaucratic culture of the NASDA culture which permeated JAXA.  
Nishimoto’s background was pure METI, which had been increasingly anxious through the mid 
1990s onwards to garner more funds for applications to support satellite makers in particular. This 
translated, following the Basic Law, into a broader strategy where METI wanted play a major role in the 
new policy paradigm of industrialization. Nishimoto’s appointment was balanced, however, by the fact 
that his Deputy Director-General was a senior MEXT official, Yoshinari Akeno, who was formerly 
Director of MEXT’s Nuclear Safety Division.  
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The composition of the SPC, announced July 20, chaired by Kasai, who also chaired the SHSP’s DPJ 
Mk. II Experts Group, also signaled that the ONSP was designed to deliver a space policy that fulfilled 
the Basic Law. Under Kasai, for its remaining six members, the SPC retained fully three authors of the 
2010 Matsui Plan (Matsui, Yamakawa and Nakasuka). They were joined by Keio University’s Professor 
Setsuko Aoki, a leading international space law exert, to attempt to move forward with the coordination 
of the Space Activities Act. The final member was former JAXA astronaut Naoko Yamazaki.  
Administratively, the SPC was tasked to complete Space Activities Act by the end of fiscal 2012 
(March 2013) and in 2013 draw up Basic Plan 2, which was subsequently delivered in January 2013. The 
“Space Diplomacy and Security, Topics and Future Consideration” policy document drawn up by the 
SHSP in September 2012 showed that the ONSP was setting new priorities. The key hierarchy of policy 
was as follows: 
Table 7: Key Priorities for the ONSP in 2012 
OVERALL PRIORITIES 
1. Strengthen cooperation with the U.S. 
2. Form and build partnerships with developing countries by using space investment and technology transfer to   
  mitigate threats. 
3. Flexibly use the range of space technologies already developed to improve ISR & BMD. 
KEY RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Improve and supplement reconnaissance functions for earlier warning and threat analysis over a wide 
  geographical area. 
2. Improve military communications for the MOD. 
3. Investigate use of QZSS by the SDF. 
4. Create an integrated, multi-country platform for space based disaster monitoring and security  
  applications. 
5. Improve the ability to detect ICBMs. 
6. Improve the ability of IGS. 
DIPLOMACY 
1. How to execute the 12 June 20011 2+2 agreement to cooperate more closely on SSA, satellite navigation, 
  space-based MDA and the utilization of dual-use sensors. 
2. Promote the International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities promoted by Europe in October 2012 while 
  supporting the U.S.  
3. Promote “package solutions” for technology transfer, infrastructure and partnership building with developing 
  countries.  
 
The resulting Basic Plan 2 was divided into four main chapters, which clearly reflected the new 
influence of both METI and the original Matsui reformers in its objectives, structure and program 
prioritization.1 Basic Plan 2 could be called a “METI-flavored” version of Basic Plan 1. First of all, as if 
to signal the desired direction of the new policy goals under the new regime, Basic Plan 2 opens with a 
preamble explaining the fact the Prime Minister is now a competent minister of JAXA, and even though 
JAXA is positioned as the core development agency, the Prime Minister and the MEXT Minister “play a 
major role in promoting industry through JAXA.” This new addition shows the importance placed by the 
ONSP on the idea that the ONSP was ultimately serving the prime minster, and by inference, not MEXT.  
 
 
 
                                                
1 This summary comprises the author’s own translation in conjunction with English based briefing papers provided to the 
author by the ONSP and the budgetary and planning document 「新たな宇宙基本計画について	 平成２５年２月	
内閣府宇宙戦略室, ‘Arata-na Uchū Kihon Keikaku ni tsuite, Heisei 25 nen 2 gatsu Naikakufu Uchu Senryaku Shitsu, 
Concerning Japan’s Basic Plan for Space, Office of National Space Strategy, Prime Minister’s Cabinet Office, February 
2013.’ The English language version is called the “Basic Plan on Space Policy, 25 January 2013, Established by Strategic 
Headquarters for Space Policy, Government of Japan,” http://www8.cao.go.jp/space/plan/plan-eng.pdf. 
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Table 8: Points Emphasized to Enact the Basic Law in Basic Plan 2 
Chapter 1 Rights and obligations of the various entities involved with space development, with ONSP 
positioning itself as the final arbiter of which programs were to get developed and when, and JAXA 
the main implementing agency serving the needs of the Cabinet Office, MEXT, MIC and METI.2 
Chapter 2 Overall Goals 
1. National security and disaster management. 
2. Industrial development. 
Six Main Pillars 
1. 1. Peaceful use built on strengthening C4ISR, bolstering the IGS system, apply national security- 
related technologies; bolster SSA. 
2. 2. Improvement of lives through QZSS. 
3. 3. Development of industry which has shrunk to ¥260 billion and 7,000 employees from ¥350 billion 
and 10,000 workers in the latter 1990s. 
4. 4. Prosperity of human society through space science.  
5. 5. Promotion of international cooperation and emphasise disaster monitoring in Asia through PPPs and 
support the ICoC. 
6. 6. Environment- address the space debris problem.  
Chapter 3 Four Social Infrastructures Program Priorities 
1. QZSS Social Infrastructure for expanding the use of space and ensuring autonomy, but also enhancing 
the U.S.-Japan alliance with a 5-year goal and 10-year development plan. 
2. Emphasise building a regional Asian observation system in partnership with private business focusing 
on the ASNARO system. 
3. Focus communication satellite technologies to support national security and disaster management. 
4. Rockets: discuss the need for an H-III and the role of the Epsilon; look into air-launch; re-entry 
systems, hypersonic flight.  
Chapter 4 Promotion of Measures 
1. JAXA with making a mid-term goal (5 years) based on Basic Plan 2. 
2. Procedures to more effectively cost and evaluate space programs. 
3. Ensure all government stakeholders (again CO, MIC, MEXT, METI) cooperate. 
4. Assess the efficiency of implementation of space programs. 
5. Link space policy effectively with defense needs and the Science and Technology Basic Plan.3 
 
The point that an entire chapter of Basic Plan 2 is devoted to the rights and obligations of the players 
is more than semantically interesting. The chapter reads almost as if it is a mission statement and a 
declaration of intent by the drafters to lay down officially, almost to propagandize, the concept and the 
reality (it was hoped?) of the ONSP’s rights to exert policy influence over JAXA. In this sense, or in 
terms of the SAF framework, the opening chapter appears to be a conscious act of social appropriation 
leading to innovative collective action, as described back in Figure 14. A more interesting question might 
be to ask whether the ONSP was really at this point the challenger or the incumbent. It could be argued 
that until Basic Plan 3 was fully timetabled in Basic Plan 2016, the ONSP itself might be characterized as 
the challenger and MEXT the incumbent in practical terms.  
                                                
2 The complete text reads: “Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) has been positioned as the core organization that 
provides technical support for the entire governmental development and utilization of space projects. It is stipulated in law 
that JAXA’s Mid-Term Goal should be based on the Basic Plan on Space Policy. (Article 19, Law concerning the Japan 
Aerospace Exploration Agency). JAXA is therefore supposed to make necessary contributions to the governmental space 
policies specified in the Basic Plan. On this basis, the Prime Minister, as the head of the Cabinet Office which is responsible 
for the administrative work for the promotion of space utilization, has now become one of the competent ministers of JAXA. 
(Articles 18 and 26, Law concerning the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency). In addition, JAXA has begun to do support 
work, such as giving advice to private enterprises upon their requests. Now the Prime Minister and the Minister of Economy, 
Trade and Industry play a major role in promoting industry through JAXA in cooperation with the Minister of Education, 
Culture, Sports, Science and Technology and the Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications. (Articles 18 and 26, 
Law concerning the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency).” 
3 For the NDGP, see below. For the full English translation of the AUGI (Act No. 63) of 30 May 2007, see Basic Act on 
the Advancement of Utilizing Geospatial Information on the Geospatial Information Authority of Japan’s website: 
http://www.gsi.go.jp/kokusaikoryu/kokusaikoryu-e30004.html.  
  195 
Then, in terms of the semantic interpretations that can be applied to the policy hierarchy, the 
inclusion of the idea of “disaster management” and “industrial development” look very much like code 
words for the METI-ASNARO program, since “disaster management” was a very important rubric of the 
system’s proposed rationale. This is also reinforced further by the idea of the promotion of international 
cooperation and the emphasis on “disaster monitoring in Asia,” which again, very much conforms to 
METI’s vision (supported by Keidanren) of also selling ASNARO systems to emerging economies, 
especially (but not exclusively) focused on South East Asia.  
SAFs 1-3: As we have seen, as part of its rebalance strategy, the U.S. had been requesting that Japan 
coordinate its space policy with U.S. strategy, and following the June 2011 Japan-U.S. Security 
Consultative Committee (2+2), space policy coordination started to become a key alliance agenda item, at 
least for the U.S., with the U.S. in particular requesting Japan to improve its SSA contribution and work 
on an MDA solution with the U.S.4 In the 2011 meeting, the U.S. and Japan agreed to examine 
cooperation between the countries on PNT systems (basically this meant integrating the QZSS system 
with GPS), SSA, adding a space-based component to MDA, and utilization of dual-use sensors, mainly in 
the context of space-based early warning systems, to enhance BMD. This platform, then comprised the 
U.S. response, a sort of shopping list of demands in the face of an emerging consensus between Japan and 
the U.S. that Japan’s space activities should support the U.S. on security issues, and on how to implement 
the space security policies of the two nations based on the Basic Law. 
SAF 3 & 4: “METI’s Basic Plan:” As noted a few paragraphs above, Basic Plan 2 reinstituted and 
reinforced a hierarchy of importance that pushed JAXA’s traditional space science and human spaceflight 
programs to second-order priorities. Secondly, as so many of Japan’s first-priority programs were to be 
inherently dual-use and adaptable for national security purposes, Basic Plan 2 had travelled some clear 
distance beyond Basic Plan 1 in emphasizing national security and the promotion of industrialization. 
Thirdly, the influence of closer coordination with the U.S. was seen with SSA cooperation.   
As noted, promoting industrialization and national security combined the interlinked goals of adding 
and extending the global EO/ ocean-cum-“disaster monitoring” observation system to the QZSS program 
under the Cabinet Office through promoting METI’s support of the ASNARO system and its builder, 
NEC, working in tandem with JAXA satellites. This effectively meant that the global EO/ maritime 
observation system was the next discussion topic. The elephant in the room, or the main point of 
contestation would be which player would get the budget. This then brought METI into a direct 
confrontation with MEXT through a proxy battle waged in the ONSP. 
Further METI influences and the input of industry can be seen everywhere in Basic Plan 2, in the 
personnel, the structure of the SPC, and in the Space Industry Subcommittee, which played a critical role 
in promoting the successor to Basic Plan 1’s global EO maritime observation system, now renamed in 
English the “wide-area monitoring” program, which, under METI preference was to use a combination of 
ASNARO and other satellites as a new, and in the context of the overall scale of Japan’s space 
development standards, a massive nine-satellite project.  
This change was effected by METI’s packing of the ONSP with its staff. For the 2012-era “Mk. II” 
ONSP, METI had seconded six, and the MOD four staff, respectively, to the twenty three-member office, 
with MEXT only providing four members (with the remainder shared by other ministries). Key industrial 
                                                
4 The texts of the various agreements can be found on MOFA’s webpage: “Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee 
(2+2)” at: http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/. 
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interests also populated the twelve-member Space Industry Subcommittee, including former Melco and 
USEF Chairman Setsuhiro Shimomura, who led Keidanren’s SAPC, and former NEC Senior Vice 
President, and Keidanren Space Development Applications Promotion Committee Application 
Subcommittee Chairperson Tomonori Nishimura.5 Industrialization and national security space were at 
the core of policy. Fieldwork with ONSP officials at this time confirmed the METI flavor of the ONSP. 
In interviews conducted during these developments, seconded METI official and ONSP director Hirotoshi 
Kunitomo was openly and frankly highly dismissive of both JAXA and MEXT’s position. Kunitomo 
called the upcoming Basic Plan as a “last chance” to invest strategically in industry, primarily through 
QZSS and wide-area monitoring constellation.6 Following the establishment of the ONSP, as noted, the 
MOD seconded four staff to begin, for the first time, to be involved in daily planning and coordination of 
space policy. The foundation of the ONSP gave the MOD several options: 
 
1. It could try to more directly work with JAXA for major new military space programs. 
2. If it wished could join the MIC and METI ministers, for example, to assert “dual control” over JAXA 
and use it as a tool to develop new research or development programs.  
3. It could also use JAXA expertize to assess programs it seeks to research or develop “in house.” 
 
 Another option for the MOD would be to directly work with favored contractors, employing JAXA 
in a technical and advisory/ consultative role. However, the MOD’s main strategy was to forge 
connections with JAXA to learn how the two very different organizations, with completely different 
cultures and approaches, could work together, while the MOD spent a minimal budget and focused on 
researching technologies.7 The MOD’s logical strategy, then, was to piggyback off the new institutional 
and policy structures, i.e., specifically to make sure another ministry paid, reflecting the MOD’s 
arms-length stance.  
 In addition, for the MOD exclusively, Basic Plan 2 did help produce one major deliverable, a Private 
Finance Initiative funding scheme that minimized the MOD’s budget outlay for a dedicated, hardened and 
modern communications satellites with improved bandwidth and encryption, ending the SDF’s 30-year 
relationship of leasing commercial transponders.8 Further ongoing negotiations would also lead to the 
QZSS regional-wide PNT system with an encrypted channel providing it with its own 
centimeter-level-capable (at least over the Japanese archipelago) PNT and, for the U.S., a backup to GPS. 
The MOD would also be a primary customer for the emerging dual-use “wide-area” MDA constellation, 
for example, if coordination could be achieved; and the MOD would cooperate on SSA.  
 However, unsurprisingly, the ONSP’s internal coordination failed. The ONSP held dozens of 
meetings in the arrangements leading up to the budget request for Basic Plan 2 in which the MOD 
                                                
5 宇宙政策委員会 宇宙産業部会 委員名簿 Members List of the Space Industry Subcommittee, Space Policy 
Commission: http://www8.cao.go.jp/space/comittee/sangyou-dai1/gijisidai.html. 
6 In a series of interviews with Kunitomo (12, 26 March, 02 April 2013. For a profile of Kunitomo and interesting facts 
on ONSP’s view of QZSS, see “Michibiki Enables New Positioning Services, The Office of National Space Policy and 
the Development of the Quasi-Zenith Satellite System,” Hirotoshi Kunitomo, Director, Office of National Space Policy: 
http://www.jaxa.jp/article/special/michibiki/kunitomo_e.html. 
7 Kunitomo stressed that it would be “no problem” for the MOD to attach a senior defense bureaucrat, or even the defense 
minister himself or herself to utilize JAXA should it be necessary, for example, if a decision was taken to embark on a 
major new development program requiring JAXA’s extensive expertise and competencies.  
8 Paul Kallender-Umezu, “Japan Asks Industry to Finance Military Support Satellite,” Space News, 13 February 2012; 
Defense Programs and Budget of Japan, Ministry of Defense Overview of FY2014 Budget, p. 16.  
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participated, but MOD never wavered from its two main priorities; improved ISR and communication as 
first priority, while supporting the ONSP in its attempts to control the QZSS system, which would be 
highly beneficial for the MOD, as shown by the unchanging contents of the MOD’s submissions through 
the lengthy coordination attempts. As the METI-centric ASNARO-based wide-area (dual-use for MDA) 
constellation proposal advanced though, the MOD joined MEXT in expressing its own frustrations with 
the project, which, from the points of view of both MEXT and METI, seemed more designed to service 
METI’s needs than those of the MOD. Thus, institutional competition and stovepiping acted as a major 
brake on policy advancement, even though it was fully in the MOD’s favor to have access to more ISR 
data, particularly in the maritime field, where since 2010 the situation with the PRC, particularly the 
frequency of its air and maritime probing, had been worsening.  
 SAF 6: Fieldwork conducted with industry shows that it was highly satisfied with Basic Plan 2. For 
example, a simple summary of major procurement plans shows that Melco, the largest beneficiary of a 
long-term procurement policy for the IGS constellation, would be able to look forward to steady work 
through the 2020s for QZSS. Similarly, NEC would be able, after a twenty year struggle following its loss 
to the Mitsubishi group of the chance to bid for IGS, to recover its position as a major satellite provider 
through procurement of ASNARO based satellite systems. METI’s informal industrial policy of 
maintaining at least an oligopoly of satellite companies rather than the de facto Mitsubishi oligopoly 
would then have been achieved. In the event, this was not to transpire, but NEC would secure the 
extensive ground systems contracts for the QZSS system.9 
 
Episode of Contention: Failure of METI to Coordinate the Wide-Area Monitoring Network 
The inability of the METI-led SHSP to control a budget line for the wide-area observation system based 
on its ASNARO proposal was to be a disaster for Nishimoto. Crucially, the proposal bypassed 
coordination in the SPC, which reported directly to Prime Minister Abe, abrogating the SPC’s 
coordination skills, expertise, and both the personal and professional relationships necessary to smooth 
the way. The uncoordinated wide-area proposal was also opposed, unsurprisingly, by MEXT, which felt 
sidelined in the massive new program. A recalibrated proposal then connected the constellation to the IGS, 
but this was rejected as being too METI-centric by the CSIC. The MOD also felt that, as a customer 
ministry, it had not been fully consulted and that the solution proposed by ONSP advanced METI’s agenda 
but did not fulfill the MOD’s needs. The MOD’s rejection of the METI-backed ONSP proposal in the fall 
of 2013 proved decisive, giving the MOF the excuse to reject the program as poorly coordinated. The 
MOF duly reduced the ambitious wide-area program to an R&D project at a tenth of the budget 
requested.10  
 As noted before, the MOF’s objective viewpoint can be seen as entirely valid. In a sense the METI 
framework using the ASNARO-NEC proposal in the end only suited METI. The proposed constellation 
was, to put it a different way, neither fish nor fowl. First it was designed as a pan-Asian disaster 
monitoring network. Then it was a global observation network. Then it had an MDA function tagged on. 
                                                
9 Paul Kallender, “A New Direction for Japan’s Space Program? Japanese space programs face strict new reality,” AWST, 
6 May 2013. 
10 This fieldwork is the result of interviews with protagonists, including several Space Policy Commissioners on 
background including; interview, 16 June, 2014, correspondence 23 June 2014, email interview 27 June 2014, interview 
17 September 2014; Tsuzukibashi, 12 & 23 June 2014, 18 November 2014; Uji, SJAC, 23 April 2014, 23 July 2014, 09 
September 2014; Matsui, 5 September 2014; interviews Imazu, 28 August and 9 October 2014, 27 January 2015, all in 
Tokyo. 
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But from the beginnings of Basic Plan 1 it was always inconceivable that MEXT or JAXA would easily 
cede such an opportunity for budget and programmatical power to an upstart such as METI. Further, had 
the constellation been approved, it might have upset the entire history of MEXT and JAXA, the heirs of 
the STA and MOE, NASA and ISAS, which had monopolized space development for forty years. Second, 
the introduction of METI and its ASNARO approach would have put Melco and JAXA in the position of 
potential competition with a rival building satellites both significantly faster and more cheaply. Third, as 
will be demonstrated later in this chapter, in the event, the ONSP was utterly unprepared, understaffed 
(lacked the organizational, institutional and political linkages) required for the “all of government” 
coordination issues required to conceive and launch a maritime-use (MDA) solution.  
The failure to coordinate the wide-area observation constellation was somewhat repeated in Japan’s 
approach to SSA, despite this becoming a major priority for the U.S. Here again, the MOD kept its 
distance between the coordination difficulties experienced between the ONSP and JAXA, which was 
committed to a maintaining a civilian-led approach and protecting its prerogative. Despite strong U.S. 
pressure, and its 2009 statement that the U.S.-Japan security partnership would benefit from debris 
monitoring, without development funding for SSA in the next MTDP, which failed to emerge, the MOD’s 
default policy was to stay on the sidelines. This reluctance was reflected internally where there were 
apparent divisions between the ASDF, the Defense Policy Division and the new, small Space Policy 
Group, which did not regard SSA as a priority.  
In fact, the MOD decided to play a multi-level game with SSA, where it was officially in favor of 
SSA being promoted, but in fact this public mask masked its real position of wanting to be a beneficiary. 
As one protagonist put it: “The Ministry of Finance does not understand the role of SSA in defense, and 
will not provide budget for it unless it is properly managed and explained. The MOD is unable to provide 
an answer, because it is not so interested, but needs to appear to be enthusiastic for alliance purposes. It’s 
thinking is comparatively traditional and narrow.”11 
    
   Figure 31: The Attempted Takeover of the ONSP by METI  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
11 Interview with senior SSA negotiator, on condition of anonymity, 8 January 2013, Tokyo. 
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These failures, however came at just, exactly, the wrong moment for METI – in fact just as the 
second Abe administration had developed the new NSS in December 2013, which had mandated that the 
ONSP produce a fully coordinated space policy that was integrated with the new national strategy. The 
failure also had a profound effect on the credibility of the ONSP in the eyes of the LDP as it came just as 
Japan formulated its first NSS. The lack of decisive leadership and beggar-thy-neighbor interministerial 
competition regarding the wide-area constellation was all too reminiscent of the struggles faced by the 
QZSS. The ONSP had been established, but it had not delivered the basic requirement of the net addition 
of a global observation constellation program to Japan’s space activities, as intended by the Kawamura 
initiative, expressed through the Basic Law, and the first stated priority of Basic Plan 1.12  
While the ONSP’s failure to coordinate the wide-area constellation could not have come at a worse 
time in terms of domestic strategy making, it was also ill-starred in terms of alliance politics, because 
represented a poor outcome for U.S.-Japan cooperation, as Table 10 demonstrates.  
On Level 2, in the U.S.-Japan cooperation SAF, the year 2013 shows the increasing pace of 
coordination and cooperation between Japan and the U.S. on outer space matters. Perhaps at Levels 2 and 
3 this should not be seen so much as alliance pressure on Japan because the Abe administration appears to 
be a willing partner on the issues. In this light, as we have seen, 2013 saw Japan and the U.S. negotiate a 
third major policy statement, the Joint Statement by U.S.-Japan Comprehensive Dialogue on Space of 11 
March 2013, apparently dovetailing with the Basic Plan 2’s reformulation of Basic Plan 1 into a more 
dual-use national security direction. The Joint Statement clearly expressed both sides’ desire for further 
integration of Japan’s space assets and technologies into the broader U.S.-Japan regional security 
framework. This was followed by the June 4 Strategic Budgeting Plan for 2014 by the ONSP which 
provided the ONSP’s policy response to the March agreement.  
The significance of QZSS has been noted as the prime deliverable desired by the Basic Law, but 
behind this many in the security and the space community in Japan agreed with the U.S. over the growing 
need to improve maritime surveillance (MDA), and of course SSA. The need to improve SSA capabilities 
for all satellites, not least Japan’s commercial communications services and EO programs had been 
highlighted in 2007.  
On top of this, specifically, after 2010, MDA was seen as a major security concern of Japan 
following the marked upswing in specific Japan-China tensions focused on the Senkaku islets dispute as 
one of the nastiest serrated edges wounding relations between Japan and the PRC. It is possible to trace a 
turning point in 2010 following a collision between a Chinese fishing trawler and a Japanese Coast Guard 
vessel off the coast of the disputed Senkaku islets. This was part of a series of increasing and sometimes 
escalatory incursions occurring after the Government of Japan acquired ownership of the islets from what 
had been private ownership, which the PRC government chose to become incensed about. Through 
2010-13 it became obvious to Japanese planners not only in space activities but more generally that Japan 
increasingly felt pressing need to improve its ability to observe and counter what Japan sees as 
increasingly problematic Chinese PLAN and paramilitary intrusions (mass incursions by fishing fleets 
flanked by Chinese coastguard gunboats) into Japanese territorial waters – all this of course also of great 
                                                
12 Ibid. 
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concern to the U.S., which wanted Japan to bolster its C4ISR capabilities for both partners and adopt a 
more robust deterrence posture. 
Table 9: Full List of Comparative Dimensions of Key Policy Benchmarks  
 
Policy Basic Law Basic Plan 1 Basic Plan 2 LDP Strategy Mid-Term Plan Basic Plan 3 
Purpose Foundational Implement Basic 
Law 
Revise Basic Plan 
1 following 
failure to secure 
budget 
Root-and-branch 
reorientation 
following failure 
of MDA 
constellation 
Reorientation of 
Basic Plan 2 to 
confirm national 
security direction 
Implementation 
of NSS reflecting 
LDP Strategy 
Date August 2008 June 2009 January 2013 August 2014  August 2014 January 2015 
Details End PPR; normalize 
military space use in 
the OST. Make a Basic 
Plan within 1 year. 
Focus on industry & 
security rather than 
R&D. Review JAXA 
role in 1 year. Establish 
a new policy & 
administrative 
executive to effect 
Basic Plan & override 
MEXT. Draft a Space 
Activities Act in 2 
years.  Increase budget 
from ￥300B to  
￥500B. Employ space 
development as a 
strategic policy tool to 
counter China in Asia. 
 
Six basic principles, 
5-year goals, 10-year 
targets for 5 satellite 
systems: land/ ocean/ 
environment, Earth 
observation, weather, 
telecoms, QZSS and 
IGS. Four R&D 
programs: space 
science, human space 
activities, space solar 
power R&D, and 
microsatellite 
development.  Boost 
annual budget to 
￥500B  by 2013. 
Focus specifically on 
QZSS and ensure 
regular launches of 
student and university 
microsatellites. 
Focus on: (1) a 
regional QZSS system; 
(2) continuous global 
monitoring system; (3) 
integrate new satellite 
systems into national 
security; (4) more 
flexible space access; 
(5) downgrade JAXA 
R&D for science and 
space exploration, 
human space flight.  
Improve SSA, MDA 
and unify all Earth 
observation data into 
one infrastructure. 
Promote a 
pan-ASEAN disaster 
monitoring 
constellation. 
Integrate space policy 
with NSS & create 
NSSS; integrate NSSS 
with U.S. NSSS; 
investigate 
establishment of 
Uchūchō with a single 
budget line;  increase 
budget by up to
￥200B/ year (to
￥500B)  for military 
space; double IGS 
constellation;  create 
MDA constellation; 
deploy space-based 
EW & ELINT 
satellites;  create  
space infrastructure at 
the service of MOD; 
evolve JAXA to take 
DARPA-type role; Set 
up an independent 
think tank. 
Space’s primary 
purpose is national 
security; cooperate 
with the U.S.; 
cooperate with 
ASEAN; create a 
long-term plan to 
enhance industrial 
base. Specific policies: 
1. Infrastructure: (a) 7 
satellite QZSS (b) 
boost IGS, EO (c) new 
data relay & optical 
data relay satellites (d) 
H-3  
2. Utilization: (a) SSA, 
MDA, coms, EW, fast 
flexible launch, high 
flexibility satellites (b) 
revolutionary pico and 
nanosats. 3. Strategic: 
(a) improve planning 
and policy (b) finish 
Space Activities Act. 
Policy guided by NSS; 
National security top 
priority along with 
U.S. cooperation. 
China openly stated as 
destabilizing factor. 
Programmatically, 
QZSS, IGS funded to 
2025; IGS to be 
bolstered; two high- 
data, including one 
military dual use 
optical data relay sats 
funded; needs for SSA 
and MDA  to be 
worked out in 2-year 
studies. QZSS GPS 
backup. JAXA works 
closely with MOD 
ALOS to host MOD 
EW sensor; JAXA 
dual-use tacsats and 
SLATs funded.   
  
Outcome Ongoing Failed Overtaken Partial failure 
necessitating 
(Basic Plan 3) 
  Ongoing Mediated 
Solution  
About to be 
implemented with 
strong military focus as 
a result of Basic Plan 3. 
Uchūchō delayed 3 
years; compromises 
expected over 
10-satellite IGS 
constellation, etc. 
MOF rejects 
budget-doubling and 
takes advantage of 
DPJ disorganization 
and ministerial in- 
fighting. Policy 
moves on autopilot 
until Basic Plan 2. 
CO takes partial 
control via QZSS but 
fails to tackle 
infighting; loses 
credibility over MDA 
failure. METI 
withdraws; JAXA 
moves in.  More 
military emphasis. 
Established to end 
infighting and 
coordinate better 
following MDA 
failure. In MTP, 
ONSP worked on 
coordination with 
NSS with MOD and 
dual-use actors. 
Decision on an 
Uchūchō shelved. 
To result in Basic 
Plan 3 but talk of an 
Uchūchō quietly 
shelved. Depth of 
subordination of 
policy to NSS within 
NSC unresolved. 
Ministerial 
opposition expected. 
Uchūchō shelved; 
phased increase in 
IGS constellation 
numbers; ONSP’s 
MDA plans shelved 
in favor and 
multi-year 
negotiation required 
to deal with 
continued 
inter-ministerial 
discussions. 
 
U.S. 
Position 
  2+2 June 2011 1st Comprehensive 
Dialogue on Space 
2+2 Oct. 2013 
 
2ndComprehensive 
Dialogue on 
Space 
Defense 
Cooperation 
Guidelines 
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Bolster cooperation 
on ISR, BMD, outer 
space and 
cyberspace; 
specifically, in 
space in 4 areas: 
SSA, QZSS, MDA, 
dual-use sensors. 
March 2013; 
collaborate with 
GPS/QZSS, SSA, 
MDA, TCBMS for 
International Code 
of Conduct; May 
2013 Exchange of 
Notes concerning 
SSA Services. 
2013: BMD: Deploy 
SM-3 Block IIA, 2nd 
AN/TPY-2 radar: 
SSA, MDA, 
cooperate on an 
International Code of 
Conduct for Outer 
Space Activities; 
establish bilateral 
Defense ISR 
Working Group. 
May 2014:  
Japan’s space 
assets 
indispensable for 
U.S. Japan 
security; 
provision of SSA 
data from JAXA 
to U.S. Strategic 
Command. 
First update since 
1997; establishes 
“seamless” 
cooperation on 
outer space and 
cybersecurity 
cooperation 
 
Defense 
Strategy 
1st Abe 
Administration 
(2006–7) 
Fukuda Cabinet 
(2008) 
2nd Kan Cabinet 
(Sep. 2010 – Jan. 
2011) 
2nd Abe 
Administration  
(1st Cabinet) 
2nd Abe 
Administration 
 (1st Cabinet) 
 
Nov. 2006:  
Established Council on 
the Strengthening of the 
Functions of the Prime 
Minister’s Office 
Regarding National 
Security.  Feb. 2007, 
proposed establishment 
of the NSC; abandoned 
due to July 2007 House 
of Councillors election 
and Abe’s resignation. 
May 2007; 
establishment of the 
Advisory Panel on 
Reconstruction of the 
Legal Basis for Security 
(Yanai Commission) to 
consider rights of CSD. 
Shelves the 2008 
Yanai Commission 
that recommended 
allowing limited 
CSD under existing 
legal system without 
a constitutional 
amendment, with 
the exercise allowed 
under 4 scenarios, 
including to protect 
a U.S. naval vessel 
in seas near Japan 
and shooting down a 
missile passing 
through Japan’s 
airspace targeting 
third countries. 
NDPG MTDP 
(Dec. 2010): To 
provide continuous 
steady-state ISR 
activities of the 
land, sea and air 
space around Japan; 
hold Japan-U.S. 
consultations to 
advance 
cooperation on 
space, cyberspace, 
maritime security, 
etc. SDF will build 
an enhanced 
X-band satellite 
communication 
network. 
 
Dec. 2013: Establish 
NSC and NSS; called 
for integration of 
space policy into the 
NSS; NDPG. The 
SDF to strengthen 
ISR through space 
with “diverse” 
sensors; strengthen 
C3I capabilities with 
sophisticated X-Band 
satellites; actively 
promote SSA; pursue 
R&D satellite 
protection; seek more 
extensive cooperation 
and training with the 
U.S.  
July 2014, reinterpret 
Article 9 of the 
Constitution to allow 
for limited rights of 
collective 
self-defense. Through 
2014 extending 
through 2015, work 
towards “seamless” 
cooperation including 
the defense of U.S. 
naval assets, etc. and 
the deeper integration 
of Japanese and U.S. 
defense capabilities, 
interoperability, etc.  
 
MOD Space PPR Era military 
space: IGS & BMD 
Basic Plan 
2009 
Participation in 
planning & policy 
Increased 
participation. 
Revised Basic 
Plan 2014 
 
 No official interest 
in military space 
except for 
communications 
(reinterpretation of 
PPR by Nakasone 
Cabinet 1985) but 
full use of IGS and 
other EO data; 
deployment of 
two-tier BMD. 
Basic Law causes 
MOD to launch an 
investigation into its 
needs.  
Response to Basic 
Law: Laundry list 
of potential 
applications: 
dedicated comsats, 
space based EW, 
ELINT, SIGNINT, 
QZSS, alternatives 
to IGS, smallsats, 
air-launch, fast 
launch, satellite 
protection, 
hardening, etc. 
Begins research, 
particularly for 
EW. 
Continued 
research into 
space-based EW; 
increased 
participation in 
CO planning and 
Basic Plans; 
coordination with 
other ministries; 
decision to launch 
a dedicated 
X-band 
milsatcom 
constellation 
through PPP, 
discussions over 
SSA and MDA.  
Increased 
participation at all 
levels of planning 
and coordination; 
rejection of 
ASNARO-based 
MDA 
constellation for 
lack of utility. 
Increased private 
sector and 
think-tank activity 
on space based 
applications.  
Closer ties to 
JAXA and METI.  
Response to 
MDA failure, 
U.S. demands, & 
NSC & NSSS. 
Three-domain 
strategy: 
Operational- 
improve ISR, 
boost IGS, 
integrate dual-use 
EO with ISR, 
develop fast 
response, flexible 
tacsats, MDA; 
Infrastructural- 
dedicated coms 
and QZSS; 
Responsive- EW, 
space based 
BMD EW R&D 
with JAXA, SSA. 
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This is the context therefore, for understanding why the global EO initiative was, along with SSA, 
one of two major new space-based security-bolstering measures agreed by Japan as part of the June 2011 
meeting and subsequent U.S. Japan negotiations, particularly the Joint Statement by U.S.-Japan 
Comprehensive Dialogue on Space on 11 March 2013, in which both sides agreed to bolster cooperation 
in SSA, PNT (integrating the QZSS with GPS), a possible Japan-developed space-based component for 
MDA, and utilization of dual-use sensors. In addition, as we saw, with orbital space security has become 
a major strategic and geopolitical global commons issue, not least for the U.S., for which SSA has 
become arguably one of the major global space policy issues of the decade, as it has indeed become for 
Europe and other major space powers. It is not surprising that SSA was placed as top priority by the 2011 
2+2 statement. 
 
Strategic Action: The Imazu Intervention 
At the point of the ONSP’s coordination failure, SAF 3 initiated strategic action. The LDP intervened, 
with Kawamura, architect of the Basic Law and his deputy Imazu, newly elected chair of the LDP’s SDSS 
piling on pressure on the ONSP and the civil service to coordinate effectively. From January 2013 to 
September 2014, it is possible to see a highly competitive dynamic in institutional behavior under two 
new pressures; politically from the LDP, and diplomatically from the U.S.  
 The political pressure was extreme, and can be called an attempt at decisive strategic action by Imazu, 
an attempted ippon-waza. Over the course of ten meetings the SDSS published an initial (mid-term) 
“Recommendations for a Comprehensive Space Strategy to Implement Japan’s National Strategy” 
(hereafter, the Strategy) on 5 June 2014.13 
 The Strategy recommended that:  
 
1. Within three years that Japan establish an Uchūchō with one budget line, i.e. the authority to request 
budget for all line ministries;  
2. That Japan as quickly as possible establish a Japanese version of the U.S. military’s National Security 
Space Strategy, a Japanese NSS (JNSS), and that the JNSS be drafted with and in close coordination with 
the newly-formed NSC and NSS. 
 
 In terms of policy development, the Strategy emphasized the need to deploy SSA and MDA satellite 
constellations to bolster not only regional security but also service U.S.-Japan alliance commitments. In 
terms of technological and programmatical development and deployment, the Strategy was explicit. It 
recommended that Japan must work for the “early establishment” of an MDA constellation using the most 
suitable combination of satellites available (ranging from 2-ton to 500 kg and 100 kg microsatellites), 
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, Stratospheric Aerial Platforms, and remotely-controlled vessels, and that 
Japan establish an integrated SSA Monitoring and Analysis Center working in close cooperation with U.S. 
military SSA assets.  
 The Strategy also urged that Japan urgently bolster the four-satellite IGS constellation, deploying 
constellations of 100 kg-500 kg microsatellites dedicated to monitoring specific areas of concern, and that 
                                                
13 自由民主党政務調査会 宇宙・海洋開発特別委員会「国家安全保障宇宙戦略 – 提言（案）—」2015 年 9 月 
[Jiyū Minshuto Uchū S ō g ō Senryaku Shōiinkai, Uchū・Kaiyō Kaihatsu Tokubetsu Iinkai “Kokka Anzen Hosho Uchū 
Senryaku – Teigen (An)].” The following paragraphs are the author’s translation of the report.  
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the data needs of security architecture be serviced with a concomitant advanced data relay satellite 
architecture. Next, the Strategy recommended that Japan begin research immediately on new direct 
military (MOD) usage of image intelligence (reconnaissance), SIGINT and a space-based EW capability 
and that, moreover, both the direct-use military spy, signals and EW assets should be specifically 
integrated to work real-time with their equivalent U.S. military space assets.  
 Turning to launch vehicles, the Strategy recommended that Japan develop specifically military-use 
vehicles. Further, Japan should ‘review’ its previous priorities to develop a new basic rocket system 
technology, and urgently upgrade the capability of its Epsilon for national security launch purposes for 
rapid deployment of small LEO space assets (TacSats). Next, the Strategy recommended that Japan 
quickly redevelop JAXA’s Tanegashima launch site, boosting security and ‘hardening’ facilities. On top 
of this, the Strategy recommended that JAXA’s mission be adjusted to that of U.S. DARPA-type role to 
service the new national security space last. Last but not least the Strategy recommended the foundation 
of a space-security think tank to conduct future strategizing and policy planning.  
 The creation of Imazu, the Strategy was designed to be utterly decisive. Stronger and bolder than the 
September 30 ultimatum to MEXT regarding accepting ONSP control over QZSS, the Strategy is quite 
remarkable in that it not only dusted of the Uchūchō option as a kind of sledgehammer threat, but in the 
radical way and language that it proposed to overtly militarize space policy. Had the Strategy been 
implemented as proposed it would have transformed Japan into a major strategic military space power 
more quickly and completely even than predicted in IDOJ.  
 Further significance for the Strategy lay in the fact that Imazu’s committee was institutionally 
important within the LDP hierarchy because it was a subordinate committee of the LDP’s Special Space 
and Maritime Committee, chaired by no less than Kawamura, reporting directly to the LDP’s PARC. 
Because Imazu is Kawamura’s kohai (junior) and because Imazu, as former JDA vice minister, was one 
of the authors of the original NSSPG report, it is logical to assume that the Strategy also represented the 
will of Kawamura, a point confirmed by Imazu himself over the course of three interviews.  
 In a strong echo of Kawamura’s expressed opinion in an interview conducted nearly a decade earlier 
with the author, Imazu made it clear that the ONSP’s inability to coordinate its wide-area constellation 
budget was regarded as a major failure and that he felt the administrative and institutional reorganization 
framework set up in 2012, i.e. the ONSP with its policy coordination role but inability to directly control 
JAXA, was inadequate. The evidence, suggested Imazu, was that the ONSP lacked the authority to enact 
policy change. Therefore, concluded Kawamura and Imazu, the only way to induce policy change was to 
adopt only an Uchūchō-based agency in the Cabinet Office, but also to give it budgetary power. In other 
words, Imazu and Kawamura had reached a similar conclusion to that of Maehara in 2009-10.14 
 Yet, when the SDSS released its final report in August, there were two significant changes. First, the 
insistence that the Cabinet Office be given budget authority was deleted, but that this should be 
considered. Second, the final Strategy specifically stated that the IGS constellation be more than doubled 
to ten satellites from four.15 
                                                
14 Author interviews with Hiroshi Imazu in October 2014, April 2015, in Tokyo. See also, Paul Kallender-Umezu, 
“Profile, Hiroshi Imazu, Space News, 2014; Paul Kallender-Umezu, “Japan Begins National Security Space Buildup,” 
Defense News, 13 April 2015; Paul Kallender-Umezu, “Interview: Hiroshi Imazu Chairman, Policy Research Council's 
Research Commission on Security, LDP of Japan,” Defense News, 21 April 2015.   
15 “Recommendation for a Comprehensive Space Strategy to Implement Japan’s National Strategy,” 26 August 2014, 
Policy Research Council, The Liberal Democratic Party. 
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Strategic Action: The ONSP 
Eighteen days after the second, “watered down” version of the Strategy was published, the ONSP 
convened a Fundamental Strategy Committee (FSC) led by Nakatsuka, one the original Matsui 
Committee members, to coordinate the ONSP’s response in a new Basic Plan – Basic Plan 3 – that was to 
be drawn up no later than December, so that the plan be budgeted for the following April.16 The FSC then 
again immediately delivered its own updated medium-term space policy, the “Fundamental Policy 
Committee Mid-Term Summary” (MTS) on only its second meeting, on August 20, 2014.17 A week later, 
the ONSP delivered its budget request for 2015 formally requesting the MOF for funding of the 
implementation of the MTS.  
 Behind the events, several more two-level games were occurring. First, fully and quickly disclosed 
minutiae of building the FSC’s platform show the ONSP’s standard operating procedure when trying to 
advance a new agenda and stake out its position. The first documents established the membership of the 
committee to demonstrate its will and credibility.18 Second, the FSC had immediately produced, on only 
one page, its foundational purpose and rationale, objectives, and timetables for reaching them.19 Third, on 
one page, the FSC clearly delineated exactly what information would be demanded from which 
organizations to what timetable to produce the policy product, deadlined for August 8.20  
 The next section contained presentations made by all the players; the final sections categorically 
stated the FSC’s legal and administrative right and power to do all these things, including setting the 
parameters for discussion and the timetables, the principal that the meetings are behind closed doors but 
that FSC members must give press briefings and respond to enquiries by the press; that for transparency 
and accountability a summary of the meetings must be publicized to the general public; and that later full 
minutes be published, along with all documentation and briefing materials.21 Here again, as with the 
opening chapter of Basic Plan 2, we can see the conscious and open adoption of attempted social 
appropriation. And, finally, there was a one-page statement of the FSC’s power and role within the 
policymaking power of the ONSP as a whole.22 
 In terms of a two-level game analysis, the difference between the June and August versions of the 
LDP’s Strategy, and the alacrity and clarity of the ONSP’s response, indicate that the LDP had used the 
tactic, certainly with support from key members of the ONSP, of using the threat of creating an Uchūchō 
with budgeting authority as a battering ram to force change within the ONSP, but that the LDP was 
prepared to negotiate to reach a compromise position where it dropped the Uchūchō scenario in favor of a 
                                                
16 宇宙政策委員会 基本政策部会 第１回会合 議事次第.   
See: http://www8.cao.go.jp/space/comittee/kihon-dai1/gijisidai.html. 
17  宇宙政策委員会 第２６回会合 議事次第宇宙政策委員会	 基本政策部会	 中間取りまとめ（案） available 
at:  http://www8.cao.go.jp/space/comittee/dai26/siryou1.pdf).  A quick and easy summary, 宇宙政策委員会	 「基本
政策部会	 中間取りまとめ（概要）」showing a ‘before and after’ and immediately crystallizing the military refocus is 
available at: http://www8.cao.go.jp/space/comittee/dai26/siryou2.pdf.   
18 資料１  宇宙政策委員会	 基本政策部会	 委員名簿:  
See: http://www8.cao.go.jp/space/comittee/kihon-dai1/siryou1.pdf 
19 資料２  宇宙政策委員会	 基本政策部会の設置について（平成２６年６月２６日決定） 
See: http://www8.cao.go.jp/space/comittee/kihon-dai1/siryou2.pdf 
20 宇宙政策委員会	 基本政策部会の今後の検討の進め方（案） 
http://www8.cao.go.jp/space/comittee/kihon-dai1/siryou3.pdf 
21 参考資料１  宇宙政策委員会の運営について（平成２４年７月３１日決定） 
See: http://www8.cao.go.jp/space/comittee/kihon-dai1/sankou1.pdf 
22 参考資料２  宇宙政策委員会の今後の検討体制について（平成２６年６月２６日決定） 
See: http://www8.cao.go.jp/space/comittee/kihon-dai1/sankou2.pdf 
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negotiated settlement with the ONSP and MEXT if at least they would be able to coordinate and press  
forward with a clear national security focus based on at least pressing for doubling the number of IGS 
satellites.  
 This had been the result, through spring 2014, of were described to the author as dozens of 
coordination meetings and possibly dozens more of other unofficial meetings not only between the SPC 
and the ONSP and the LDP, including a series of dinners between Matsui and Prime Minster Abe, but 
also within the ONSP and the SPC and between the ONSP and SPC and ministries and within line 
ministries themselves to coordinate a response. The discussions particularly involving MEXT and METI 
focused on how to dilute or defeat both the establishment of the Uchūchō and/ or its budgeting power. 
There was, therefore clearly a two-level game within the ONSP and the representatives of ministries 
within the ONSP.  
 After careful coordination and bargaining, the final and official version of the June Strategy 
document was watered down the timetable for the Uchūchō and the demand for a single budget line, 
stating that only a decision would be made within three years on the fate of the Uchūchō, perhaps a case 
of tana-age (shelving the issue). At the same time, then the ONSP’s two-level game was to accommodate 
the LDP but at the same time produce a significant change in policy direction vs. MEXT, METI and 
MOD in particular. In other words, the ONSP had to produce a new policy that at least endorsed most of 
the Strategy’s points, minus the creation of an Uchūchō with budgeting authority.23  
 The MTS mostly seemed to achieve what had been demanded by the LDP. In fact, the MTS is 
probably historic in terms of Japanese space policy documents because it is the first to directly endorse 
national security clearly and explicitly as the fundamental first priority of Japanese space activities. While 
essentially a mediated (diluted) version of the Strategy, the MTS nonetheless reads like a defense strategy 
policy document. The opening paragraphs could very well have been lifted directly out of the NSS, for 
example, by clearly putting MDA as the top agenda item. Superseding prior statements, the MTS directly 
stated that while Japan’s space policy to date founded on the Basic Law scraps science and technology as 
the main goal and substitutes it for industrialization and national security; put simply it said that, 
following the NSS, Japan’s space policy must adapt to a new paradigm. Primarily, it denoted a 
fundamentally changed recognition of the role of Japanese space policy in that:  
 
1. Space should play an essential role national security 
2. That the U.S.-Japan Alliance had reached a ‘New Era’ (almost directly borrowing the terminology 
from the LDP), and that space technology was a critical component for the U.S. to deter aggression and 
help its power projection in the Asia-Pacific Region, and that should the U.S.’s space-based capabilities 
be eroded or degraded Japan must be in a position to support the U.S.; and  
3. That is was essential that that space policy support long-term investment in space development.  
  
 Specifically, the MTS stated that the full seven-satellite QZSS system be built as quickly as possible; 
that the IGS constellation be improved and the new data load handled by an improved communications 
infrastructure, including an orbital data relay system; and that Japan develop a new capstone rocket 
program focused on fast responsiveness and from hardened facilities. In terms of utilization, the MTS 
urged that national security related programs were top priority, focusing on SSA, MDA, communications, 
                                                
23 Author interview with ONSP executive, Tokyo, 7 September 2014.  
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space-based ballistic missile early warning, and rapid response.  
 
Towards Contested Settlement 
With a strong mandate from Prime Minster Abe himself to draw up a new Basic Plan (Basic Plan 3) in 
December in time for the following year’s budget preparations, the ONSP went to work. The resulting 
Basic Plan 3 clearly seemed to endorse the new national security first direction. Building on the MTS, 
Basic Plan 3 clearly stated that Japan must actively develop a national security space program with the 
military use of space in tune with the new NSS, strengthen the IGS reconnaissance satellite constellation, 
develop a space-based MDA capability, boost Japan’s communications and PNT for national security 
purposes, bolster SSA capabilities, and link Japan’s space assets in the service of U.S. security strategy to 
support its deterrent power. Further the full seven-satellite constellation QZSS system was positioned to 
serve as a regional positioning system specifically as a backup to the GPS in case that system is 
“degraded.” For the first time the MOD was to be directly involved in a budget mission development 
program under the general space activities budget in the form of to its experimental EW sensor on a 
newly developed ALOS satellite developed by JAXA. 
 In fact, Basic Plan 3 was completely similar to Basic Plan 2016 in most respects. So why the need 
for Basic Plan 2016? The fact was that MDA satellite constellation again failed to find funding due to 
coordination issues and a decision on the makeup of the constellation was still under discussion, for 
finalization in 2017. Secondly, Basic Plan 3 contained no concrete figure on the future size of the IGS 
constellation, despite that being a clear goal stressed by the August LDP Strategy document, which was 
apparently endorsed by the MTS. One major criticism of the Basic Plan 3 in terms of deliverables 
compared to the LDP Strategy document was the lack of clear timetables. After extensive coordination, 
an agreement was reached with MOF that the IGS and IGS-related infrastructure would be funded.24 
 From now, mention of an Uchūchō was dropped. After waving the “big stick” of an even more 
fundamental institutional reorganization, with the prospect that better coordination would be achieved 
through Basic Plan 3, the LDP withdrew the threat. Significantly, however, Basic Plan 3 did contain a 
clause mentioning that if coordination problems continued, meaning that the ONSP and ministries did not 
come to a satisfactory conclusion regarding the MDA and the IGS constellations in two years, alternative 
administrative arrangements would be reconsidered. This can be interpreted as meaning that as far as the 
LDP was concerned, the Uchūchō idea might be dusted off again, but held back as a future threat, should 
the ONSP not produce the desired results. 
 As it transpired, the difficulties in coordinating MDA turned out to be more difficult as those for the 
QZSS. In fact, it appears the main reason for ONSP’s failure to coordinate the MDA solution fully in time 
for Basic Plan 2016 is that it not only required careful coordination with the U.S. but a genuine 
all-of-government approach by both sides, with the U.S. side only just coordinating what it needs for 
cooperation itself. It may be that the Japanese attempt to press forward to launch a constellation under 
METI’s initiative was not only premature and uncoordinated internally, but also premature and 
uncoordinated or out of sequence with the steps required by the U.S. 
 The complexity of coordinating a space-based MDA system is apparent by the number of 
stakeholders. Against this, 2014 did see the beginning of tangible progress towards cooperation on MDA, 
according to a senior U.S. negotiator on the effort. For example, in March 2014, U.S. representatives met 
                                                
24 Author interview, Uji, SJAC, Tokyo, 23 July 2014.  
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with their Japanese counterparts at a Table Top Exercise (TTX) on the use of space for MDA attended by 
representatives from over a dozen Japanese ministries and agencies, and numerous U.S. departments and 
agencies, the TTX was projected as a “whole-of-government” affair, consistent with the U.S. doctrinal 
definition of MDA, which defines it in terms that encompass include safety, security, the economy and 
the environment. However, at that time, none of the ministries or agencies represented at the TTX were 
ready to endorse the concept. “No surprise, since the topic had never been considered on a 
whole-of-government basis, and because security had historically been vested solely in the military and 
intelligence community entities,” said the U.S. interlocutor.25 
 The major outcome of the TTX was a commitment “to build a foundation of knowledge and 
experience” regarding the use of space for MDA, engaging all maritime stakeholders.26 This commitment 
was re-affirmed in May 2014, at the 2nd U.S.-Japan Comprehensive Dialog on Space; then in July, 2014, 
over a dozen representatives of the Government of Japan traveled to Alameda, CA, where the U.S. Coast 
Guard (USCG) briefed their maritime domain awareness activities at the national level, with a visit to the 
Maritime Intelligence Fusion Center – Pacific, and at the local level, with a visit to the USCG San 
Francisco Sector operations center.   
 In the same timeframe, representatives from Japan visited the USCG Maritime Intelligence Fusion 
Center – Atlantic, and the Joint Interagency Task Force – South.27 The U.S. noted that it was only at the 
end of 2014 that the Japanese side began to feel itself ready to talk to the U.S on a more formal basis, and 
in December, the Japanese Coast Guard was finally involved. The U.S. position at the time, recognizing 
the inability Japan to coordinate a new space-based constellation, was that Japan should focus on using 
existing systems and sharing information. For the moment, the U.S. seems content on just data sharing 
with JAXA’s ALOS-2 satellite, which carries both an Automatic Identification System (AIS) receiver and 
a SAR capable of wide-area maritime surveillance, an idea confirmed by a senior MEXT bureaucrat.28  
 The concluding chapter, Chapter 10 updates the fate of the global constellation program originally 
posited in Basic Plan 1 nearly a decade ago, showing it to be probably a bridge too far. In this way both 
the progress and the limits to the changes that have been achieved in the post Basic Law phase of policy 
and institutional reform are revealed.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
25 Author email interview with John Mittleman, Naval Research Laboratory, 9 March 2015. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid.  
28 Ibid. Author interview with Yoshiyuki Chihara, Director, Research and Development Bureau, MEXT, Tokyo, 30 
March 2015.  
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Chapter 10 
Conclusions: Contextualizing Japan’s Space Policy and Administrative Transition 
 
The major purpose of this investigation has been to use a new approach, the SAF framework, to move 
beyond trying to label where Japan’s space policy and administrative structure fits into conventional 
international relations paradigm-type assessments of Japan’s security strategy. This dissertation’s goal has 
to be to try to understand space policy and administrative change reflecting the full breath of external and 
internal pressures, responses and bartering, while emphasizing the interconnected nature of all these 
relationships, and the logicality of player (or stakeholder) behavior.  
Analytically, for scholars of Japanese politics and security studies, or more generally for those 
interested in seeing how Japan makes important strategic decisions, this focus on (a) space policy and (b) 
a non-traditional framework approach is suggested as valid and new in a number of ways.  
In terms of newness of subject matter, the topic of Japan’s space development and its relationship 
with national security is new. It is also demonstrably and now self-evidently an important one; and one 
that is the subject of close cooperation between the U.S. and Japan. And, if we are to understand the 
significance and importance of the Basic Law through its implementation, then, to the author’s knowledge, 
this is the first full-scale analysis in academic literature about how deeply or successfully the Basic Law 
has been implemented in terms of both in policy and institutional reform.  
The importance of Japan’s space program and the move – increasingly decisively during the second 
Abe administration following the publication of the NSS and the establishment of a more hands-on 
politically controlled NSC – to fold Japan’s space program into Japan’s national security policy has now 
been identified. Further, the significance of the Basic Law in Japanese polity is not adequately understood 
without understanding how it was implemented. Attempting to understand this has been a major focus of 
this dissertation. 
In terms of answering the primary research question, first it should be noted that the change in space 
policy in scrapping the PPR represented a challenge to a core part of Japan’s postwar identity as a 
peaceful country focused on trade and economic advancement. Adjusting space policy in the field of 
space technologies has to be seen in terms of its historical and strategic role; of being inherently dual-use, 
born out of superpower rivalry and developed primarily for strategic military advantage. But Japan’s 
normative and institutional framework had been deliberately positioned, via the PPR, to avoid developing 
the very military strategic advantages afforded by the use of outer space. This normative block on any 
form of militarization was reinforced deeply on the implementation side by an institutional framework 
designed explicitly to pursue the same.  
 
So, why did it take so long to implement the Basic Law?  
The attempt to redistribute policymaking and budgeting power into the Cabinet Office was only partially 
successful at best. Much of the answers to the first two research questions are embedded, after all, in the 
institutional logics of the bureaucracy.  
As the institutional portion of Chapter 2 has shown, when Japanese politicians have sought to 
challenge the power of Japan’s civil service and subgoverment network, a Japanese version of the law of 
unintended/unanticipated consequences seems to apply, as pointed out by Kawabata and others who have 
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studied the institutional logics involved.1 In the Japanese version, the result is more often than not either 
an unexpected drawback or a perverse result; that the civil service repurposes any change or challenge to 
the status quo as an opportunity for gain, often at the expense of the original purpose.  
In the case of policy and institutional change, a series of shocks, emerging security concerns and U.S. 
pressure forced Japan to re-examine its commitment to the PPR. In the case of space policy, changes were 
admissible by the bureaucracy provided institutional changes did not disrupt access to budgets and 
programs that make up the core of the business of the civil service. The Basic Law, in attempting to place 
a Cabinet Office that was oriented to implementing the will of politicians, rather than being yet another 
bureaucratically-controlled coordination body, amounted to a direct and major challenge to the reality of 
bureaucratic control as exercised by MEXT. 
Looking for answers to the first research question, the crux of the matter was whether MEXT, 
intuitionally wed to a peaceful purposes-only technology development paradigm, could be prevailed upon 
by political pressure to accept the new policy and institutional paradigm. In the event, MEXT acted 
entirely logically and resisted political pressure. Progress was made only after it was assured of retaining 
its role as the core implementation organization for the Basic Law, which was guaranteed in Basic Plan 3 
following the defeat of the METI-backed “wide-area” EO constellation and the default, as it were,  
distribution of the lion’s share of dual-use national security programs into JAXA budget lines – a result 
which was exactly what MEXT’s overall strategy was all long   
The answer to the second research question is quite strongly connected to the first. The successful 
prosecution of the aims of the Basic Law and find funding for two new satellite constellations – the QZSS 
and the global EO constellations – would have required mastery over budget coordination by the Cabinet 
Office, probably through the establishment of an Uchūchō. In the event, the Cabinet Office, after a long 
series of battles, only succeeded with the QZSS. The aborted bid by METI to fund its version of the 
global EO (wide-area) constellation was defeated by the implacable opposition of the incumbent player, 
MEXT.  
Regarding the third research question, the partial success and partial failure of the Cabinet Office 
also shows the limits of the power of this institution over incumbent ministries. In terms of the dynamics 
of power struggles between politicians and the bureaucracy, perhaps result was a, perhaps a draw. 
A temporal analysis of key events is may at first be helpful in explaining the answer to the first 
research question in a little more detail. First of all, one of the roots of the many of the troubles can be 
found in the Cabinet Office Establishment Law and the subsequent failures of the NSSPG, the Basic Law 
and the Partial Revision of the Cabinet Office Establishment Law in 2012 to establish detailed, superior 
budgeting authority in the Cabinet Office, as mentioned. 
The original Law passed by the Hashimoto administration gave the prime minister a role to propose 
basic policy and initiate budgeting processes, but not fuller powers. Following this, the NSSPG report 
recommended that the proposed “Space Strategy Headquarters” in the Cabinet Office appoint a Minister 
of State to “consolidate discussions” and set “medium and long term strategic aims” that would be 
regarded as “guiding principles” for JAXA, i.e. stopping at a coordination role.  
In reality, this meant MEXT would effectively retain its power as veto player. As the Basic Law 
failed to mandate the creation of an Uchūchō with its own complete and superior control of budgeting and 
                                                
1 Robert K. Merton, “The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action,” American Sociological Review, Vol. 
1, No. 6 (December 1936), pp. 894-904. 
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policy, and relied on promoting the Cabinet Office as a powerful policy coordination role, MEXT and 
JAXA would be able to resist any changes MEXT, through its minister in the Cabinet did not want to 
sanction. Very unsurprisingly, this is exactly what subsequently happened, with MEXT Minister 
Kawabata stolidly defending his patch against all attempts to challenge MEXT’s accumulated budgeting 
and programmatical dominance.  
More precisely however, progress towards implementing the Basic Law looks to have been 
significantly impeded by defense-in-depth tactics within the SHSP in 2009 by the offering of the “four 
options,” among which, in the context of the potential veto power of MEXT, only the Uchūchō solution 
would have been sufficient to gain the authority to force the necessary coordination to make a timetabled 
budget request to secure the necessary funds for the new programs targeted in the Basic Law from the 
Ministry of Finance.  
The depth of the entrenched resistance to institutional and policy change can be seen in the glaring 
failure of interministerial coordination in time for the August 2009 budget request, signaling that, as far as 
the bureaucracy was concerned, space administration would continue as normal (or on autopilot) unless 
something different was negotiated or imposed. Crudely put, the bureaucracy (MEXT in particular) 
simply outwaited Kawamura.  
The prospect of the indefatigable resistance in many forms by the bureaucracy also probably explains 
the DPJ’s immediate assumption of guerilla tactics and the Uchūchō option in the knowledge that this 
would be only way to foist change. But again, stalling, the bureaucracy simply outwaited the activist 
Maehara.  
Then, it may have been a tactical failing of the challenger group in the Cabinet Office, led by the 
Matsui Committee members, to subsequently choose the QZSS system as a battering ram to assert the 
principal of limited direct (single program) coordination and budgeting power by the Cabinet Office, and 
not to target the global observation system. But this decision to choose QZSS over the global EO system 
probably reflects the acknowledgement of Matsui and co. of the size of the task of coordinating the EO 
against the veto power of MEXT, compared to using the QZSS system as an attempted lever to establish 
the principal of Cabinet Office control and budgeting for “new” programs.  
What the challenger group in the DPJ-era lacked was strong leadership from a prime minister to 
intervene or appoint Cabinet ministers who would support change. Until that happened, all the innovative 
actions and attempted strategic actions in the world would have come to nothing until a prime minster 
intervened. When this did happen, under Noda, it did produce a significant shift in supporting the Cabinet 
Office’s assumption of control of the QZSS, but it is significant that it took a Cabinet decision to force 
this relatively minor concession out of the incumbent MEXT.  
The subsequent Partial Revision of 2012 only reflected the muddled solution proposed by the 
restructuring WG that JAXA be open to cooperation with other ministers, which, in reality implied that 
MEXT would retain its authority as the main competent ministry over JAXA. While the ONSP would be 
granted a much greater role in planning and prioritization through the SPC, with the prime minister as 
final arbiter (and a competent minster over MEXT), the SPC’s recommendations did not have legally 
binding power.  
Because of this, MEXT was able to ignore even the powerful strategic action by METI and what 
might be called its attempted hijacking of the ONSP and defeat through non-cooperation with METI’s 
“wide-area” EO program, no matter what the first chapter of Basic Plan 2 stated.  
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It was only the threat of the Uchūchō sledgehammer, backed by a stable and committed LDP 
administration with the force of the newly appointed and powerful NSC and the NSS as a strategic 
national security policy superior to space policy, backed further by U.S. pressure, that exerted enough 
force to produce the pathway to Basic Plan 3; and even that suffered from coordination issues until Prime 
Minister Abe intervened again.   
The next main point I would like to stress here is that policy and institutional reform existed in a 
symbiotic relationship. As became obvious in the early 2000s, the former – policy change – could not be 
achieved without a degree of the latter, administrative reform. Judged by such metrics, the strategic action 
behind framing and passing the Basic Law, and the struggles for its implementation or realization can be 
seen in conventional terms of domestic politics as LDP and DPJ politicians battling against the incumbent 
civil service to prevent a perverse result. The key reason for the delay in implementing the Basic Law was 
the entrenched position of the civil service, which would not allow a changes in policy and institutional 
arrangements to succeed until it was assured that the net balance of power and budgeting remained as 
little changed as possible.  
In terms of the SAF framework, the struggles or inter-SAF episodes of contention (so many of 
them!) to implement the Basic Law, indeed the buildup to it, and the contests after it, can be explained 
thoroughly in terms of field formation, internal and exogenous pressures leading to field instability, 
innovative and strategic action, episodes of contention, cycles of these, and, finally field settlement. When 
the institutional framework was all shook up, the pieces fell slightly differently, but MEXT’s budget and 
power within the space program were if anything, even larger.  
In many cases, as perhaps scholars of the institutionalist school might keenly appreciate, the crucible 
of the critical SAF interaction was demonstrably between SAFs 3 and 4, with SAF 5 inextricably or 
symbiotically linked to SAF 4. But it is also readily apparent that resonances and ripples (episodes of 
contention, starting in this study with the Johnson Administration’s offer of black-boxed ICBM 
technologies, ironically perhaps to forestall Japan’s ability to develop solid fueled ballistic missiles) first 
come from SAFs 1 and 2. Thus, the SAF framework succeeded in linking (or detailing the links) between 
exogenous pressures and domestic responses in a framework that logically explained the motives, modus 
operandi, and behavioral logic of all the players, and how they interrelated.  
This study also demonstrated then, that a SAF-based rational actor framework is able to show 
something of the whys, whens and the hows of space policy and administrative change (without being 
party to the many hundreds of meetings involved during debates between protagonists in committees or 
elsewhere) over time, based on rules (albeit borrowing heavily from rational actor scenario-based 
assumptions about behavior) that predict how players in SAFs, and their component institutions and, even, 
individuals will behave in a given circumstance. Thus, because the SAF framework can be extended to 
cover both international political events and domestic bureaucratic behavior, it is possible to see Japan’s 
space policy and administrative change over time as a collection of coherent rational responses to 
particular inputs.  
By setting up space policy and administration as an SAF, constructing a series of SAFs, and placing 
the players into three main categories (incumbents, challengers and governance units) it was possible to 
explain the behavior of a given player or SAF at a given time. Generally speaking, we can see the General 
Space Activities SAF constructed in 1969 as subject to a series of shocks, periods of contention and 
strategic action by players at certain points to try to take control of the field. External shocks or pressures 
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on the SAF had impacts and resulted in behavior that was entirely rational; incumbents tried to stay in 
power (and did!), challengers sought to engage in collective action to take control (and won a bit), and 
governance units attempted to govern.  
The simplest story is that the General Space Activities SAF suffered shocks that disrupted its 
functioning, and through a contested strategic action (the Hashimoto reforms following 1998) lost its 
governance unit, SAC. The result was contestation in which players engaged in episodes of contention 
until the governance unit was restored in the form of the ONSP gradually asserting control over a 
misplaced incumbent (MEXT).  
In terms of political and administrative analysis, then, Basic Plan 2016 is very simply a logical 
outcome of SAF field dynamics, a complex compromise between many different forces ranging from 
strategic security and alliance politics down to the desire by NEC corporation to get more budget to keep 
its satellite building business running. 
Focusing on the third question, an analysis of Japan’s space policy and administrative change is very 
interesting because it does show something of the possibility of a new form of governance emerging. 
More than the traditional politicians vs. bureaucrats conflict model, the story of the ONSP’s formulation 
shows how a small group of experts, piggybacking off the desire of the LDP to exert more political power 
over the bureaucracy, were able to effect change.   
In the light of this, it may be useful to ask in the context of all the factors involved, how can we can 
measure the degree or judge how substantive a change in policy has been achieved.  
 
How Different is Today’s Space Policy Compared to Prior Practice?  
There have been some substantial changes. Ten years ago, Japanese space development was for 
exclusively peaceful purposes-only applications. Any idea that the MOD would be flying an experimental 
EW sensor on a JAXA satellite would have surprised many. Fast-forward to the present, and many of 
Japan’s strategically militarily useful technologies are being deputized and may later be very useful in 
supporting the U.S. “pivot” to constrain China. This answers the question, “is space policy important? Or, 
to put it another way, “Why bother exploring space policy?” 
So, generally speaking, it seems reasonable to conclude that space policy change has undoubtedly 
been accomplished to an extent that might surprise scholars of the constructivist school. Beyond the 
abandonment of the PPR, the direct and realist-type language of Basic Plan 2016, and the basic 
assumptions of the necessity of Japan prosecuting a national security space program in the face of 
worrying regional security challenges shows this. For evidence in favor of this assertion, perhaps one 
document sums this up more than any other.  
On 25 May 2017 the SPC published a document listing up a schedule of its national security related 
tasks and programs. That list contains no fewer than 31 items, noting which programs are national 
security-, national infrastructure (dual-use)- or basic technology development- related. For simplicity’s 
sake I will note these as “S” for national security, “I” for national infrastructure and “T” for basic 
technologies.2  
 
                                                
2 「宇宙政策委員会宇宙安全保障部会関連工程表一覧表（平成２９年度）平成２９年５月２５日内閣府	 宇宙
開発戦略推進事務局」Space Policy Committee Space Security Committee Related Process List Table (Heisei 29) May 
25, Heisei 25 Cabinet Office Space Development Strategy Promotion Office. 
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    Table 10:  Space Policy Commission National Security Space Programs as of May 2017 
 
 Program Role 
1 Development, maintenance and operation of QZSS system S, I 
2 Promotion of utilization of QZSS system S, I 
3 IGS Optical  S 
4 IGS Radar S 
5 Adaptable small TacSats S 
6 Advanced optical radar satellite S, I 
7 Geostationary weather satellite I 
8 Remote sensing advanced sensor technology 1 S, I, T 
9 Remote sensing advanced sensor technology 2 S, I, T 
10 Optical data relay satellite S, I 
11 X Band defense satellite communications network S 
12 Firing range usage (S), I 
13 Quick launch for TacSats  S 
14 SSA S, T 
15 MDA S, T 
16 Space-based EW S 
17 Mission assurance for space systems S 
18 Components quality assurance strategy T 
19 Utilization of space assets to realize a vibrant future  I 
20 Promotion of a unified approach to realize the Basic Plan S, I, T 
21 Strengthen collaboration between JAXA and the MOD S 
22 National Space Act S, I, T 
23 Legal framework for remote sensing  S, I, T 
24 Anti-jamming countermeasures for QZSS  S, I 
25 Realization and enhancement of the rule of law in outer space S, I 
26 Building a multilayered cooperative relationship with foreign countries S, I 
27  Joint public-private development of satellites, piggybacking S, I, T 
28 Promotion of international cooperation through industry-academia-government participation S, I, T 
29 Promotion of space cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region S, I, T 
30 Other efforts to secure space security S 
31 Other efforts to strengthen industrial and technical base I 
 
 
So, from the perspective of measuring or testing to see if substantive change in space policy has 
occurred, then, it is helpful to look at the breadth of the programs that the ONSP is involved in, as laid out 
in Table 11. As demonstrated in the table, enacting the Basic Law has represented a fundamental 
reorientation of Japan’s space policy. And, as noted in Chapter 1, a decade on from a time when the MOD 
was expressly excluded from any role at all in policy or development, the MOD is working with JAXA, 
an agency dedicated for nearly 40 years to expressly non-military space technologies, on a strategically 
important space based EW system.  
Focusing on the areas of absolute advance toward the goals of the Basic Law, the biggest single 
achievement of the ONSP has been to take control of and fund the QZSS, and then, arguably, moving the 
IGS constellation to a ten-satellite system. In terms of two-level analyses, these can all be described in 
terms of Schoppa’s win-sets, for the ministries and for the satellite makers, and, of course, in terms of 
policy outcomes, for the Basic Law.  
Behind this, there is another elegant solution in that the provision of the advanced high-bandwidth 
data-relay and optical satellites to support the data communications architecture satisfy the demands of 
SAF 5 on a deeper level, because these were originally programs advanced by NICT and, before that, 
NASDA, that were planned back in the 1990s. NASDA had always intended to develop an advanced 
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DRTS satellite and NICT and NASDA (or rather the STA and the MPT/CRL) had long assumed that they 
would be getting budgets for a successor to the OICETS/Kirari optical interorbital high-data-rate 
communications satellite. But, as we have seen, these programs were shelved during the budget cuts of 
the late 1990s. So in a deeper historical context, the Basic Law has, in creating a national security space 
market, also established justification for reestablishing programs that were suppressed by the MOF nearly 
twenty years ago.7 Perhaps in this respect, Basic Plan 2016 shows plus ça change, plus c'est la même 
chose (the more things change, the more they stay the same).  
In the case of the MOD’s advanced X-band constellation, the picture is a little more nuanced. On the 
positive side of the balance sheet for the achievements of Basic Plan 2016, the X-band constellation is a 
significant win, if only because it has extricated the MOD, with a $50 billion annual defense budget, from 
the situation of relying for its space communications on transponders rented from a commercial company. 
On the other hand, the program was enabled somewhat on the cheap through a pay-by-installment 
scheme. Ironically, however this result comes as the U.S. is increasingly interested in disaggregating 
military missions onto commercial systems to save money and open up missions to new potentially 
cheaper contractors, weaning the DOD off its dependence of a tiny oligopoly military conglomerates! By 
that yardstick, Japan’s inherently disaggregated framework – probably more through accident than design, 
looks, if anything, quite elegant.  
But as outlined above, a closer look at the current situation with the implementation of the Basic Law 
shows that what has been achieved has come at a major price in terms of the vision of Kawamura and 
LDP politicians invested in asserting more direct control over space policy. As noted, MEXT and JAXA 
have, in the end, substantially both gotten their cake and eaten it. And METI’s ambitious space plans so 
ambitiously laid out in 2007 in SOD are as dust. There is no ASNARO-based global EO observation 
system. The EW sensor is to fly on a JAXA developed satellite. The data relay and optical satellites are 
both JAXA satellites. And, not least, JAXA succeeded prior to Basic Plan 2016 in securing the H-III 
rocket, which like its predecessors H-I and H-II, is supposed to be a revolutionary and highly engineered 
main launch vehicle, or Japan’s space truck, to enter service at a much lower cost than its predecessors. It 
is not difficult to comment on this in terms of something like “we’ve heard this story before.”  
Furthermore, it is instructive to see what has happened to the MDA and global observation programs. 
Outside of the ONSP, as alluded to at the end of Chapter 9, responsibility for coordination of MDA has 
involved harnessing an alphabet soup of non-space subgoverment actors, each with their own 
path-dependent priorities and ways of doing business, many of whom have had only tangential 
relationships with space policy. These include, for example, the Japan Meteorological Agency, the 
Fisheries Agency, the National Institute of Oceanographic Research and Development, the Agency for 
Natural Resources and Energy and the Petroleum Natural Gas and Metals and Mineral Resources 
Organization, and not least the Japan Coast Guard.  
Facing this tremendous domestic coordination task, the NSS mandated a comprehensive 
strengthening of ocean monitoring capabilities including the utilization of space while paying attention to 
the construction of international arrangements. This can be interpreted as mainly meaning how to 
configure cooperation with the U.S. Three years after the basic understanding that Japan’s contribution to 
MDA would first rest on using JAXA’s ALOS-2, the MDA program has continued to take a minimalist 
approach with the MIC, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries and MLIT all receiving small 
                                                
7 For the Advanced DRTS program, see Pekkanen and Kallender-Umezu (2010), pp. 155. 
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budgets for MDA related data and communications systems for using JAXA satellites. If a major test of 
Basic Plan 2016 is measuring how it coped with the idea of funding a new global EO constellation as one 
of the key platforms to raise the space activities budget to the ¥500 billion range annually, Basic Plan 
2016 falls conspicuously short.  
By way of final conclusions, this dissertation does however produce some more nuanced insights 
overall. Japanese postwar history has demonstrated that efforts by politicians to exert change over the 
civil service usually often only last as long as the politician is able to continue to exert strategic action 
through periods of contention – or, more prosaically, stay in office.  
In the case of space policy transition, we can see this clearly in the case of the ONSP when Maehara 
tried to set up his guerilla unit and quickly get the job done of enacting Basic Plan 1 in 2009 in time for 
the upcoming August budget request. Of course this failed in the short term, but behind this, SAF 3, in the 
case of space policy, was able to exert, on-and-off, what amounted to a decade-long campaign of 
innovative and strategic actions to maintain pressure on SAF 4, beginning with the innovative (or 
strategic action) of establishing the NSSPG, itself a direct response to the shock of the H-IIA #6 failure.  
In this sense, space policy and administrative change is interesting because it not only highlights the 
difficulty of political-led change over institutional inertia. It also, counterintuitively, shows something 
about what can be achieved under certain conditions. In terms of space policy and institutional transition, 
the chances of a non-civil-service originated and institutionally disruptive change succeeding depend on 
the ability of politicians to sustain effective innovative and strategic action to overcome bureaucratic 
defense-in-depth. The changes that did occur 2010-16 also showed, however, the potential of the 
extension of the Cabinet Office and political control into a new national policy in a field of new strategic 
importance – space policy. Space policy is now inextricably linked to military national security policy 
and the U.S.-Japan alliance and an administrative and institutional structure has been delivered, somewhat 
slowly and painfully, to run this.  
Next, as shown on several occasions, using the legal and administrative framework set up by the SPC, 
prime ministers and senior politicians became more directly engaged at several critical moments, 
beginning with the establishment of ONSP control of the QZSS system under Prime Minster Noda, and 
then with Prime Minster Abe in Basic Plan 2016. They did succeed in effecting change! So, in a way, the 
principal of more direct political control of a new and strategic policy area over the central ministries has 
been partially established. In a sense, this does represent a partial fulfillment of both the intention of 
Prime Minister Hashimoto, and the vision of Prime Minister Koizumi. 
This new principal of more assertive and effective political control is still contested in space policy. 
In terms of the SAF framework, the new General Space Activities SAF may not be fully settled. While 
the prime minister has a kind of “dual control” through the Cabinet Office over MEXT in terms of space 
policy, the primacy of the ONSP and the Cabinet Office is not yet fully established.  
However, the achievements of the guerilla unit set up by Maehara in setting up the ONSP also point 
to a new way of doing government business through the use of bringing in outside experts, academics, 
lawyers and the private sector to participate in commissions over the course of policymaking and 
implementing timeframes. In the case of delivering the Basic Law, it had become apparent that, with the 
loss of Kawamura at the helm of the SHSP, attempts to frame the implementation of the Basic Law in the 
terms of the challengers (the U.S., politicians, and business) would come within the framework of 
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reference, the logic of appropriateness, of the incumbents – governing incumbent civil servants and the 
institutions and priorities they serve.  
This dissertation starkly demonstrates that each attempt to change the deeply embedded institutional 
and administrative framework, any challenge to the power and budgeting distribution of Japanese 
ministries, was either absorbed, diverted, repurposed, resisted or parsed into an accommodation where 
policy might change, but the mechanics of administrative government remained relatively untouched. 
This is, in the end, the final story of why it took so long to partially effect change in space policy and 
implementation in Japan.  
 
Some Shortfalls 
Of one of the many shortfalls of this dissertation I can admit to is that I failed to analyze and 
contextualize one of the critical planks of the original NSSPG report, which was to use space 
development as a diplomatic tool, and which dedicated an entire chapter to the subject.3 Specifically, I  
may have been remiss in not tracking the increased involvement of MOFA. But, arguably, this is not a 
critical failing. Until recently, MOFA remained largely uninvolved in space diplomacy until the Basic 
Law; with one major caveat, as shown in Chapter 7, with its early interest in reconnaissance data and it its 
support for the IGS program.5  
On the other hand, over the last decade, MOFA has become involved in pursuing a wide-ranging 
agenda, including following Japan’s high-profile engagement in UNCOPUOS for space security and 
sustainability, mainly supporting the U.S. Then, since 2010, especially with the growing interest of the 
U.S. in deputizing the Japanese space program’s security enhancing potential in the service of the alliance, 
MOFA has played an increasingly important role facilitating the various dialogs. Most recently, MOFA 
has seen itself as the primary international implementation nexus for Abe gaikō and, for example, 
cooperation on MDA. 
But in these activities, MOFA has acted/ is acting as a facilitator of dialog, greasing the wheels, as it 
were, rather than a major SAF player blocking, or supporting strategic actions in domestic episodes of 
contention. If a major satellite program gets funded, or does not get funded, is of little material 
importance to MOFA’s budget. So I chose to deliberately skip over MOFA and its role in space 
diplomacy because in the crucible of SAF interactions, I chose to see MOFA as neutral.  
Another more serious shortfall of this dissertation has been to ignore the long process of drawing up 
the Space Activities Act, which establishes a framework for new private sector actors to obtain licenses 
and government backed insurance for the launching and operation of satellites so as to promote new 
entries, or, in reality, to try to open the door for more commercial opportunities. The drawing up of the 
Act and dealing with the complexities has without doubt been a major accomplishment of the Basic Law.6  
One more note on missing ministries. For the purposes of this SAF analysis, this dissertation has 
treated the MOF as a constant, incumbent domestic governance unit. This has been because the MOF has 
                                                
3 See “Part III Application of Space Development for Foreign Affairs,” Report by the National Space Strategy Planning 
Group “– Toward establishment (sic) of new space development and utilization system –“ Report by the National Space 
Strategy Planning Group, August 2005, pp. 18-26. 
5 As noted, the mid-1990s, the JDA had become a primary customer of a growing high-resolution commercial imagery 
market using foreign commercial satellites serviced by a growing domestic purchasing and resale sector, with not only the 
JDA but also MOFA and the Maritime Safety Agency as major customers. Subsequent to that MOFA staffers as advisors 
and analysists have played a substantive role in both the CIRO and CSIC.   
6 Setsuko Aoki, “New Law Aims to Expand Japan’s Space Business,” Nippon.com, 3 March 2017. 
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played a constant role in suppressing the space activities budget since the 1990s and its stance has been 
unchanging. It has been, in a sense, untouchable and its institutional behavior has been constantly 
negative. In fact, whenever it has had a chance, as was seen in 2009 with Basic Plan 1 and then with the 
METI wide area EO constellation, all the other players have come up short, and political pressure from 
the LDP has failed to move the MOF beyond the stance of preventing the overall raising of the general 
budget. 
 
A Final Note: The Possible Application of the SAF Framework to Cybersecurity 
In terms of further research, the utility of the SAF framework is proposed to be extended to another area; 
that of cybersecurity policy transition. This may be interesting because cybersecurity policy transition on 
certain levels and in certain ways shares some very similar features to space policy transition.  
First, it became apparent by the mid-2000s that the highly sectionalized, divided and uncoordinated 
information and data assurance policies drawn up under the bailiwicks of no fewer than ministries were 
becoming badly dated and inadequate.8 Second, almost in a direct parallel with space policy transition, 
U.S. concerns about Japanese cybersecurity rose through the mid-2000s. In the case of cybersecurity, 
concerns focused on the safety of transferring data about strategic military technologies, notably 
BMD-related, and increased intelligence sharing. This led to an April 2006 U.S.-Japan States 
Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Cooperation Regarding Information Assurance and 
Computer Network Defense.9 Third, as part of a growing awareness that Japan’s administrative and 
institutional structure for cybersecurity was inadequate, and perhaps very similar to space policy there 
was then a partial reform of administrative governance that sought to put more power into the Cabinet 
Office.  
In the framework of cybersecurity policy and administration, this initially took place in 2004 with the 
establishment of the a Cabinet Office IT Strategic Headquarters, and, in 2005, the Information Security 
Policy Council (ISPC), which were tasked with devising Japan’s basic strategy and a National 
Information Security Center (NISC) to act as its secretariat to develop strategy roadmaps, maintain a 
government-wide framework for coordinating cyber critical infrastructure protection, and to formulate 
Japan’s as then limited international engagement on cybersecurity issues. 
The parallels continue. As in space policy, cybersecurity also had its own Taepodong-like shocks. 
The first was the discovery in 2009 that Japan was not at all as cyber secure as it thought it was. But the 
                                                
8 For an overview of Japanese cybersecurity policy transition using a neorealist framework, please see Paul Kallender and 
Christopher M. Hughes, “Japan’s Emergence as a 'Cyber Power': From Securitization to Militarization of Cyberspace,” 
Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 40, Issues 1-2, 2017, pp. 118-145.  
 Japan’s foundational IT policies were initiated by the 2000 Information Technology Basic Law and the 
establishment in February 2000 of an Information Security Section in Prime Minister’s Cabinet Office. The first ‘e-Japan 
Strategy’ of 2001 focused on harnessing the revolutionary potential of the digital economy, rather than security 
considerations. The IT Basic Law Article 22 mandates the assurance of security and reliability of advanced information 
and telecommunications networks and the protection of personal information. In the ‘e-Japan Strategy’ of January 2001, 
security is only mentioned twice; once in connection with promoting a shift to the use of IPv64 addressing in a discussion 
of targets, and the other, in passing, notes that security is important as the government should work to eliminate the use of 
paper.  
9 This had been provoked by Japan’s revealed vulnerabilities in 2006–07 over the handling of data relating to the Aegis 
naval air-defense system. In an embarrassing incident in 2006–2007, it was discovered that details of the U.S. Aegis 
system had been copied by a 34-year old lieutenant commander onto a CD and passed to other MSDF officers, who had 
themselves made copies, causing the U.S. to temporarily halt the shipment of parts Aegis radar upgrades on the Japanese 
destroyer Kongō just as Japan was pressing the United States to allow it to procure the F-22 fighter and stealth 
technologies. See Kallender and Hughes (2017), pp. 16-17.  
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major shock came in 2011 when it was revealed that MHI had been penetrated as part of a highly 
sophisticated Advanced Persistent Threat attack, probably by APT-1 (a paramilitary PLAN cyberattack 
battalion) or similar body, and that very possibly it had been successful. 
As with the Taepodong flyover, the “shock” of the MHI revelations was profound. Following that the 
Japanese public was schooled in a whole new vocabulary of cybersecurity-related jargon such as 
Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs), worms, backdoors, hackers, and so on. Meanwhile, as Japanese 
waters were increasing encroached on by Chinese PLAN ships and paramilitary fishing fleets, the 
Japanese government, leading research institutions, think-tanks, and top-tier Japanese companies involved 
in a broad range strategic areas (not only in military-related technologies, but also in the IT, advanced 
materials and biotechnology sectors, to name a few) were revealed has being inundated in tsunamis of 
APTs. Following this, there was more urgency attached to re-reinforce the Cabinet Office to exert more 
control over the line ministries and draw together an all-Japan strategy, with mixed results. 
After many attempts to do this, almost directly paralleling the battles between different players 
(including the DJP attempting to impose its vision) in November 2014 the Policy to Enhance Japan’s 
Cyber Security was published and the Cyber Security Strategy Headquarters (CSSH), responsible for 
creating Japan’s new ‘whole of government’ Cyber Security Strategy of September 2015 was established 
in the Cabinet Office, backed by a Cyber Security Basic Act that is supposed to give the CSSH more 
comprehensive powers to assert a national strategy for cybersecurity and try to prevent continued 
stovepiping by making one of its prime missions under the law’s first provision ‘3. General Policy’ the 
assurance of cybersecurity at national administrative organs.  
The CSSH should now have authority to formulate common security standards for all central 
ministries and to evaluate their performance, especially in the light of any breaches or inadequacies 
exposed. It also has the authority to monitor expense budgeting plans for cybersecurity in ministries and 
IAIs, placing it above competitor agencies such as METI and the MIC.10 
As the above conventional narrative shows, the similarities between space policy and administrative 
arrangements and their counterparts in cybersecurity are startling. But the endpoint looks very similar; 
more Cabinet Office oversight and some more direct political control, but leaving much of the extant 
framework in place. In this light, follow-up research I would like to do would involve examining 
cybersecurity policy and administrative change using the SAF framework to delineate how and why, and 
how much (or how little) today’s cybersecurity policy and administration has changed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
10 All these points are covered in detail in Kallender and Hughes (2017).  
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